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The aim of this thesis is to explain and analyse Britain's 
policy with regard to oil and the control of oil sources in the 
Middle East during the period 1919 to 1932. 
A great many books, articles, and some theses have been 
written on Middle Eastern oil, dealing with various aspects of 
the subject, but none has specifically aimed to explain in 
detail British oil policy between 1919 and 1932. The nearest 
approach to it is probably to be found in B. Shwadran's "The 
Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers" (New York, 1955), which 
was written, however, from an American point of view, and without 
access to British Government archives. It is hoped, therefore, 
that this present work may help to fill this gap and, also, that 
it may help to dispel the many inaccurate (and often wildly 
fanciful) notions about Britain's Middle Eastern oil policy which 
have long been current. 
The term "Middle East" in this context includes Persia, 
Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Transjord.an, the Arabian 
Peninsula, and F.gypt·,: but most attention has been given to Iraq, 
since it was on Iraq that the main international oil controversies 
of the period centred. The Persian oil situation has been discussed 
in some detail, but no attempt at an exhaustive account has been 
made, since there is already a great deal of well-informed 
literature written on the subject. 
It has been found necessary to restrict the scope of the 
ii. 
thesis to the main theme of British oil policy, avoiding any 
detailed treatment of the wider issues with which British oil 
policy was interwoven. Thus the purely diplomatic aspects of 
the many issues with which the oil questions were involved are 
not covered in any detail. In particular, no systematic attempt 
has been made to place Britain's oil policy in the context of 
its foreign policy as a wh0le, either in the Middle East or 
elsewhere, nor has any attempt been made to examine in full the 
oil policies (or general strategies in the Middle East) of countries 
other than Britain. 
There are several reasons for these limitations of scope. 
Firstly, the practical reason that, for reasons of space, no 
single thesis could deal adequately with all the diplomatic 
and other issues which were connected with British oil policy 
during the period under consideration. Secondly, adequate 
treatment of these peripheral issues would necessitate a full 
programme of research into the archives of the several different 
countries concerned, in particular those of the French Government 
and of the United States Government. Apart from the fact that such 
a programme of work would hardly be practicable in the time 
available, there is the added consideration that, in particular, 
French Government archives for the period a.re still closed. Of 
relevance to this aspect of the matter, too, is the fact that 
published works which might be expected to yield mu.ch information 
on, for example, French Middle Eastern oil policy, simply do not 
contain sufficient relevant information to fill satisfactorily 
iii. 
the gap left by the non-availability of French Government archives 
(see Bibliography). 
A third reason for restricting the scope of the thesis is 
the need for lucidity. In order to keep what is itself a 
highly complicated theme reasonably clear, much pruning of 
materials not absolutely central to the main theme has had to be 
done, sometimes with the result that issues of great importance 
in themselves, but having only an indirect link with the central 
theme, have been given only scant treatment. 
Initially it was hoped that limitation of coverage to the 
central theme of Britain's ~Iiddle Eastern oil policy would enable 
an adequate treatment of the whole inter-war pEriod to be under-
taken. However, this proved to be too large an undertaking, and 
a terminal date prior to 1939 had therefore to be chosen. 
The year 1932 was selected as the most suitable terminal date 
for several reasons. Iraq had concluded negotiations only the year 
before for the revision of the Iraq Petroleum Company's concession, 
and in 1932 it granted a new concession to the B.O.D. Company. 1• 
This marked the end of the main Anglo-American dispute on the "Open 
Door" in Iraq, and Anglo-American oil rivalry henceforth was to 
be directed to other areas of the Middle Fast. 
In Persia the year 1932 saw the long-smouldering dispute 
between the Persian Government and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company 
1. British Oil Development Company, but its registered name was 
B.O.D. Limited 
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brought to a head, the result being the conclusion of an agreement 
satisfactory both to the two principal disputants and to the 
British Government. From the conclusion of that agreement a new 
phase in the history of Persian Oil began, although, it is true, 
the amicable relations thus established did not prove to be 
permanent. 
On May 31st 1932 oil was struck in quantity on Ba.hrein 
island. This event encouraged the oil companies to consider 
seriously the possibility that the whole of the Arabian east coast 
might contain significant deposits of marketable oil. In the 
resultant struggle for concessions the Americans came off best, 
and their entry into the Middle F.ast oil situation, hitherto 
restricted by their need to compromise in one form or another with 
British interests, began in earnest. 
Material for this work has been drawn from diverse sources, 
but by far the most important of these are Foreign Office papers 
in the Public Record Office, which are a mine of information. 
In addition to the Foreign Office papers, other British Government 
archives have also been of use, especially Cabinet, Admiralty, 
Treasury, and Petroleum Department documents. 
British Government archives, however, tell only one side 
of the story in any detail, usually giving only an incomplete 
view of other aspects. For this reason it had been hoped to gain 
access to the archives of the oil companies concerned, but this 
has not proved possible. Thus the views attributed to the oil 
companies have more often to be drawn from inference than from 
~ . l I 
t 
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direct evidence. Another gap in the evidence for this study 
has been created by the destruction of the personal records of 
one of the key figures of the period, Sir John Cadman. 
Certain classes of published American documents have been 
found useful in this study, and it has been possible to obtain 
copies of State Department files on microfilm (see Bibliography), 
so that the views of the American Government on the various issues 
are reasonably clear. However, as mentioned earlier, while the 
views of the French Government can be determined well enough for 
practical purposes from correspondence with the British Foreign 
Office, the process by which French oil policy was arrived at 
remains somewhat obscure, owing to the fact that French Government 
archives are still closed. However, the restrictive scope of 
this thesis renders such a limitation comparatively unimportant. 
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A NOTE ON TERMS, ABBREVIATIONS EI'C. 
The term "kerosine" has been used throughout this study for 
the product which in Britain is often termed "paraffin" or 
"paraffin oil". This is to avoid possible confusion, since the 
term "paraffin" is sometimes used (in some countries) to denote 
"paraffin wax". 
The terms "gasoline" and "petrol" are both used in this 
study for what is essentially the same thing. The term "motor 
spirit" is also used. In discussing, for example, American 
refining trends, it seems appropriate to use the term "gasoline", 
but hardly so when referring to, for example, the War Office's 
plans for petrol reserves. 
ROYAL DUTCH-SHELL 
The Royal Dutch-Shell Company, formed in 1907 by the merger 
of the Shell Transport and Trading Company (a British Company) 
and the Royal Dutch Company (which thereby owned 6~~ of the 
shares of the combination), was usually referred to, in both oil 
industry and political circles, simply as "Shell". This shortened 
form was also often used to refer to a Royal Dutch-Shell subsidiary, 
such as, for example, the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company. In this 
study no pedantic attempt to depart from this usage has been made, 
although, of course, the more specific name has been used in all 
cases where the more precise naming of the company seemed called for. 
STANDARD OIL 
In 1911 the Standard Oil Trust of John D. Rockefeller was 
officially broken up into several independent concerns, although 
it was some years before the policies of all the constituent 
companies became fully independent of each other. In the 1920's 
British officials usually referred to the main company, Standard 
Oil of New Jersey, simply as "Standard Oil" - but, they also used 
the same term to indicate the whole range of companies which had 
formerly belonged to the pre-1911 Trust (since, as they saw it, 
these companies worked in concert). In this study, despite this 
confusion, an attempt has been made wherever possible to name the 
exact company referred to. 
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Oil became of importance to Britain 1.·ri th the adoption of oil 
fuel as the sole fuel for the "G.~ueen Elizabeth" battleships, just 
before the li'irst ':iorld Har. Nevertheless, oil's importance was 
not fully realized by the British GoveIT.ment until the events of 
that war had demonstrated just how dependent on oil products the 
modern nation had become. 
By 1919 the Iloyal Havy was primarily oil-fuelled. The Army 
was moving, albeit slowly, towards mechanization, and the Royal 
Air :Force was in being. All Britain's armed forces thus needed 
oil products to keep them in action. 
Oil was also infiltrating and becoming part of the whole British 
economy. If Britain was to maintain her status as an industrial 
and military power and was to be able to protect her far-flung 
Empire in the new mechanical age, she had to have oil products. 
The British Empire seemed almost devoid of oil resources, 
and Britain therefore had to depend on imports from foreign territory 
for the bulk of her supplies. This situation, however, was held 
to be politically and strategically disadvantageous. In consequence, 
the British Government turned to consideration of how best to 
reduce this dependence, and attention then became focussed on one 
area where Britain exerted a degree of influence and where oil 
had not only been discovered, but where even greater quantities were 
suspected of being discoverable ~ the Middle East. 
In 1914, following the decision on the "Queen Elizabeth" 
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battleships, the British Government had taken a controlling interest 
in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, which company had an exclusive 
concession for oil production in almost the whole of Persia. 
Retention of that controlling interest was to be an extremely 
important facet of the British Government's oil policy throughout 
the inter-war years. In 1914, also, the British Government secured 
the entry of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company into the Turkish 
Petroleum Company, which then secured a promise of an oil concession 
in Mesopotamia from the Turkish Grand Vizier. 
The collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 then changed the 
whole Middle Eastern situation, and Britain ended the war determined 
to control the whole of Mesopotamia, Sykes-Picot Agreement with 
}1rance notwithstanding. This determination, however, was by no 
means solely due to Mesopotamia's supposedly rich oil deposits, 
for broader strategic and political considerations alone were 
sufficient motivation for Britain's policy. Control of Mesopotamia 
did, nevertheless, offer the advantage of giving to Britain the 
main voice in the disposition of whatever oil did actually exist 
there. 
The British Government's post-war Mesopotamian oil policy was 
very vague and confused, pulled first one way, then another, as a 
result of the conflict between the desire to secure for British 
interests the lion's share of any o$1 concession granted and the 
need to conciliate the other Powers who desired that their nationals 
be allowed to participate and share the spoils of war. Faced with 
the possibility of a Franco-American alliance at the Peace Conference, 
xi. 
the British Government was constrained to offer a quarter share 
in the Mesopotamian oil concession to 11rance. Later, faced with 
determined American opposition to British policy with regard to 
mandates, the British Government was forced to put pressure on the 
oil interests already concerned in the Turkish Petroleum Company 
to make room for American interests in the share-out of Mesopotamian 
oil. 
Despite certain waverings in 1920, one main pillar of British 
post-war oil policy was support of the Turkish Petroleum Company, 
first against the American attack, and then vis-a-vis Iraq over 
the matter of the actual granting of an oil concession. Faced 
with the task of supporting a company whose international 
composition and proclivity for internal disputes at times made 
support extremely delicate and difficult, the British Government 
nevertheless succeeded in steering concession negotiations to a 
conclusion which, though not entirely satisfactory, nevertheless 
did not entail too much of a sacrifice of the interests of any of 
the parties concerned. Moreover, the British Government also 
ensured that the concession thus granted was of value in that the 
Mosul vilayet was secured to Iraq, despite Turkish clamour. With 
reffard to Mosul, however, it should be noted that other considera-
tions than oil were of prime importance. 
By July 1928, when the American interests formally entered 
into the Turkish Petroleum Company, the British Government could 
congratulate itself on having succeeded fairly well with its oil 
policy in Iraq, but it then had to cope with further problems which, 




proposed pipeline from the Iraq oilfields to go to Haifa, but 
were unwilling to help to finance a railway project which would 
have ensured such an alignment. Instead, they sought to ensure 
a Haifa ali_;11ffient for the pipeline by other means, including the 
exertion of influence on the Iraq Petroleum Company. The French, 
who \·ranted the pipeline to debouch at a Prench-controlled port, 
not Haifa, took grave objection to what they considered to be the 
British Government's dubious methods, and the resultant Anglo-French 
controversy threatened to embitter the whole pattern of Anglo-:French 
relations. 
In the end the solution to the problem was found in compromise. 
By h:1XCh 1931 the Iraq Petroleum Company had gained control of all 
the areas of Iraq then thought likely to be oil bearing, and although 
the British Government had not particularly aimed for this, 
nevertheless it represented a triumph for that Government's policy. 
Neanwhile, in Persia, the British Government had been concerned 
with the security of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's oilfields, 
which were of g-reat importance in the navy's supply schemes, 
especially those concerned with the possibility of a war with Japan. 
The fall of the Sheikh of Mohammerah in 1924 was a blow to Britain, 
but one, however, which did not really matter as long as relations 
between the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and the Persian Government 
remained amicable. It was only in the crisis of 1932-33 that the 
' British realized just how defenceless the oilfields really were -
and it was only then that the British really took note of the changes 
wrought in Persia by the coming to power of Reza Shah. 
xiii. 
Anglo-American relations in the Fuddle East had been fairly 
amicable after British interests had shown some willingness to 
cooperate with the Americans in 1922-23. 'rhey threatened to 
become somewhat strained, however, in the late 1920's and early 
1930's when British exclusionist policies in Tiahrein and Kuwait 
came under attack from the United States Government. Once again, 
as with Iraq, the British had to compromise rather than risk damage 
to their relations with the United States. 
Compromise was the main feature of Britain's l·tiddle Eastern 
oil policy up to 1932. After that date, however, when foreign 
attempts at entry into the Pliddle Eastern oil situation shifted 
from Iraq and Persia to the Arabian Peninsula, even compromise was 
denied to the British. It was then that the American entry into 
the Niddle Eastern oil situation began in earnest. 
Until 1932, nevertheless, Britain's Middle Eastern oil policy 
as a whole can be regarded as having been fairly successful. 
British interests controlled the oil wells of Persia, had the 
largest share of Iraqi oil, and wielded some influence in other 
likely oil-bearing areas of the M.iddle East. But, against thj:s, 
long bf:fore 1932 Britain had apparently forgotten the lessons of 
the First World War. Instead of ensuring that the British navy 
never again became in danger of running short of oil (as it had been 
in 1917), successive Governments continued to neglect the Royal Navy's 
oil reserves. By this folly the British Government was in danger 
of rendering worthless its whole Middle Ea.stern oil policy. 
1. 
INTRODUCTION 
I. Oil in the Twentieth Century. 
During the Twentieth Century oil has become a vitally important 
source of energy for all industrially developed countries. Its 
different products are now used extensively as both fuel and lubri-
cants for power units in industry, agriculture, transport by air, 
sea, road and rail, and as fuel for central heating, driers, and similar 
installations. In addition there are many other varied applications 
as solvents, in varnishes, and as a basic raw material for the 
manufacture of a whole range of chemicals, synthetic rubbers, plastics 
etc. 
Oil's advance in importance and increase of consumption has been 
largely due to the inherent advantages conferred by the use of its 
products. Even apart from new applications for which its main rival, 
coal, was totally unsuitable, such as the aeroplane, oil products 
have gained from their rivals by reason of their ease of handling, 
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cleanliness, greater thermal efficiency, and general versatility. 
However, it should be noted that, in any case, the increasing 
industrialization and mechanization throughout the world has itself 
led to a greater demand for sources of power of all kinds. Nevertheless, 
oil's growing importance has been emphasised by the fact that it did 
not merely share in this industrial expansion, but it also succeeded 
1. For example, oil fuel has a calorific value of 19,000 British 
Thermal Units against values for anthracite and bituminous coal 
of 15,000 B.T.u. and 14,000 B.T.U. 
(A.C. Hardy, Modern Marine Engineering, (3 Vols: London, 1948) 
Vol. I, p.11). 
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in securing an increasingly larger proportionate share in it and 
itself helped to accelerate the whole process. 
Before the First World War the main sources of power in 
most countries were coal, the horse and other draught animals, 
and the physical labours of man himself. During and after the war, 
oil began to take its place alongside these three and, moreover, 
it began to make inroads into their traditional provinces. While 
oil rivalled coal as a source of power in industry and sea 
transport, and challenged both it and the horse by means of the 
ubiquitous internal combustion engined vehicle, ·at the same time 
it gTeatly accelerated the trend towards mechanized farming, 
thereby reducing dependence on both animal and manual labour. 
The industrial world's increasing demand for oil has not been 
without attendant complications, the most serious of which springs 
from the fact that major oilfields are very unevenly distributed 
geographically. Apart from Russia and the United States, all the 
important industrial nations1·are dependent on imports for the bulk 
of their oil supplies, while on the other hand many areas in which 
industrial development is small, or even non-existent, have an 
abundance of oil for which they have little or no immediate use. 
This has led to the growth of wealth in countries which have 
little but oil to offer the world, which in turn has been attended 
by internal economic and political repercussions. Of even 
1. No account is ta.ken of the position of Communist China in this 
statement (see: Petroleum Information Bureau, Oil - The Far 
~(London, 1967) pp. 5-6.) 
more significance, however, this uneven distribution of oil sources 
has meant that, from being recognized as a vitally important industrial 
and strategic raw material, oil has become an international commodity 
about which nations have been ready to dispute with each other, and, 
perhaps, even to fight. 
In 1900 less than one per cent of Britain's energy demand was 
met by consumption of oil products. By the mid-nineteen sixties, 
despite the overall increase in demand, and the advent of nuclear 
power, oil's share had increased to over a third of the total energy 
supply. Moreover, such statistics alone do not fully indicate oil's 
importance, since the different sources of energy, for example coal, 
hydro-electricity, nuclear power etc., cannot readily be adapted to 
fulfil the role played by oil and its products. While certain 
industrial users and, for example, shipowners could conceivably 
use other sources of energy than oil, there is no prospect at 
present of motor vehicles or aircraft being able to function entirely 
without it, notwithstanding certain developments in the electrical 
field and in nuclear power. In addition, oil is indispensable as a 
source of chemicals, lubricants etc. 
It is only since the Second World War that the consumption of 
oil products in the United Kingdom has really rocketed,although 
there had been a steady increase until then. 1. The earlier 
1. United Kingdom oil products consumption (inland):-
1900: 1 million tons • .™: 2 million tons. m: 2~ million tons. 
112.§.: 9 million tons. 1-242.: l~ million tons. 1.2€2.: 67~ million tons. 
(A.L.King, "Statistics Relating to the Petroleum Industry, with 
Special Reference to the United Kingdom," Journal of the Ro 
Statistical Society, Series A (General) Vol.115 1952 Part IV, 
pp.551-552. 
Petroleum Information Bureau, Oil - The United Kingdom (London, 
1968)' p. 7. 
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period is important, nevertheless, because, apart from its own 
intrinsic merits as a subject of study, to some extent it set 
the pattern for future developments. The various uses to 
which oil products are put today all have their historical 
roots in the pre-Second World War period, and the main inter-
national companies supplying British markets today have their 
origins in this period. It is true that there have been many 
great changes in all aspects of the oil world since the Second 
World War - new oil sources discovered, greatly altered 
concession terms, large tankers developed, the growth of 
United Kingdom refining capacity, the United Kingdom's greater 
proportionate demand for gas, fuel and diesel oils, the 
development of the Petrochemicals industry, various advances 
in technology, and, of course, latterly the development of 
North Sea oil - but a true understanding of the post-1945 
picture demands some knowledge of earlier developments. 
II. The Importance of Oil to Britain 
How important was oil to Britain, and why was it important, 
in the period before the Second World Wa:r? Without answers 
to these questions it is difficult to understand the part 
which oil played in British political and strategic thinking. 
In the first decade of the Twentieth Century, oil cannot 
be regarded as having been particularly important in the British 
Government's eyes, and certainly it did not rank as a specially 
vital and necessary material whose sources must undoubtedly be 
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secured. It became important for Britain, however, with its 
adoption as the sole fuel for the British navy's newest and 
most powerful battleships, the "Queen Elizabeth" class - an 
innovation that was eventually to have a considerable influence 
on British thinking on oil matters. 
From at least 1900 one nation - Germany - had given ample 
reasons for British statesmen to worry about foreign policy 
and the dangers of remaining isolated.1 • Whereas, of course, 
Britain had never previously lacked opponents to worry about -
in the 1890's, for instance, France and Russia had seemed 
likely enemies - the difference was that Germany seemed to 
offer a more formidable challenge on the sea. As the German 
navy of Tirpitz began to grow into something approaching a 
challenge to British naval suppremacy, British apprehension and 
fear began to grow also. 2 • 
Britain feared that the German navy would advance in power 
1. For example, the sending of the Kruger telegram in 1896, the 
occupation of Kiao-Chau in 1897, anti - British attitudes 
during the Boer War. In the Middle East the Kaiser's 
Damascus speech in 1898 seemed to hold a latent threat, while 
German schemes relating to the Baghdad Railway aroused 
Britain's suspicions. 
2. Admiral Alfred Von Tirpitz (1849 - 1930) was the chief 
builder of the German High Seas Fleet; he aimed to create a 
force almost equal in size to the British Grax:d Fleet. 
The German Navy Laws of 1898, and after·, laid the 
foundations for the German naval challenge. There was at 
first, however, little fear in Britain of any such challenge. 
Fear did grow slowly, though, and this growth was accelerated 
by Anglo-German friction over South Africa, and by such 
events as German refuelling of Russian ships during the Russo-
Japanese War of 1904-5. 
See J. Steinberg, Yesterday's Deterrent (London 1965) 
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and technical accomplislunent faster than would her own navy, 
and this fear was reflected in certain strategical readjustments 
of the Fleet,
1
• and in the creation of new naval bases such as 
.Rosyth and Scapa Flow, in order to counter the apparent threat 
from Germany. The fear was also reflected in a drive to 
improve the efficiency of the navy itself, one result of which 
was that, eventually, the value of oil fuel as a material 
capable of giving decided advantages to any navy using it (when 
compared with navies using coal) was sufficiently recognized to 
secure its adoption. 
The fact that an oil-fuelled vessel could be designed with 
a superior speed and greater radius of action than could a 
similar vessel fuelled by coal was an important consideration 
where the question of combatting the German (coal-fuelled) 
2. 
fleet was concerned. In addition, considerable financial 
1. From 1904 British naval strength began to be concentrated 
in home waters. 
2. The German navy began to use oil as an auxiliaxy fuel with 
coal in 1910, but were not prepared to go further than this, 
for reasons connected with price and supply. 
Report on the German Navy, August 6th 1910, by the British 
Naval Attache, in Gooch and Temperley, British Documents on 
the origins of the War, Vol. VI, p. 509. 
Tirpitz is reported to have said in the Reichstag that while 
oil fuel had great advantages, "its high price and dependence 
on overseas supplies was greatly against its adoption". 
~oal versus oil fuel", The Economist, March 21st 1914, 
Vol. 78, p.699). See also Tirpitz, My Memoirs (2 vols. 
London, 1919) Vol. II, pp.568-569. 
1. 
savings were expected from reduction of stokehold personnel etc. 
2. 
Spurred on by Admiral Fisher, in 1912 Churchill, who had 
been appointed First Lord of the Admiralty after the Agadir 
3. 
Crisis, pushed through the creation of the "Fast Division" 
of "Queen Elizabeth" battleships - ships dependent for their 
motive power solely on oil. The navy's first really significant 
step towards eventual total dependence on oil was thus tai:en -
although not without experiencing some opposition both from 
1. A full list of the advantages expected to derive from the 
use of oil fuel was drawn up by a Royal Commission on Fuel 
and Engines, appointed in 1912 to enquire into oil fuel 
supplies and their application in naval vessels. 
Great Britain, Public Record Office, Admiralty, Report of 
the Ro7a1 Connnission on Fuel and En«ines, Vol, I Part II. 
ADN116 1208. 
Note The advantages outlined apply to burning oil fuel under 
the boilers to raise steam. Internal combustion (diesel) 
engines were also considered, but there were many technical 
difficulties about their application in large ships. 
2. Admiral Sir John Fisher (1841-1920) was First Sea Lord 
1904-10, and October 1914 to May 1915. In 1912 he was 
appointed Chairman of the Royal Commission on Fuel and 
Engines. Called the "Oil Maniac" from at least as far back 
as 1886, he was the navy's staunchest advocate of the use 
of oil fuel, and kept the idea alive despite numerous 
setbacks. In 1906 he secured the use of oil fuel in 
destroyers, and continued to advocate its extensive use in 
larger vessels. 
3. In 1911, when the visit of the German warship "Panther" 
to Agadir, and the consequent international crisis, 
revealed the lack of coordination between Admiralty and 
War Office Staff. Churchill was-appointed to remedy 
the situation. 
8. 
outside and from within Government circles. 1 • 
Meanwhile, the aeroplane, dependent, of course, on petrol 
for fuel, had come into being and was demonstrating its 
potential as a military weapon, albeit to a largely sceptical 
d . 2. au ience. The Arrrry was, rather tardily, beginning to 
recognize the possibilities of mechanized transport.3• In 
addition, oil was beginning slowly to take its place in the 
British economy, as demand for gasoline, fuel oil and lubricating 
1. The coal interests, and MP's fromboal mining districts, 
were naturally vociferous in oppdsition. Lloyd George, 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, led the opposition to the 
question of expenditure, since the move over to oil was 
only part of Admiralty plans to increase the power and 
armament (and hence expense) of the British navy. 
See for example Parliamentary Debates (Hof C) 5th Ser., 
Vol. 35 (1912) cols. 1590, 1819; Vol. 55 (1913) cols. 1468-
1593; Vol. 63 (1914) cols. 1131-1248, 1642; Vol. 64 (1914) 
passim. See also "Coal versus oil fuel", The Economist, 
March 21st, 1914, Vol. 78, pp. 698-700. 
On oppo'sition within the Cabinet see, for example, 
Cabinet Circular b David Llo d Geor e December 
CAB 37 117 97. 
Prime ~iinister As uith's letter to the Ki 
1-fil CAB 41 35 1. 
2. Aircraft were first used in warfare in the Italo-Turkish 
war of 1911. Its potential as an effective military weapon 
was not really realized in Britain until after 1914 -
indeed, it was not fully realized until long after the 
First World War had endedl 
3. The Secretary of State for War told a meeting of the 
Conunittee of Imperial Defence in 1913 "that the Army was 
deeply interested in the supply of petrol, now that mechan-
ical transport had been adopted for military transport" 
Minutes of the Committee of erial Defence Jan th 
1fil CAB 38 23 2. 
12lst Meeting.) 
oils steadily increased. 1 • 
Nevertheless, the more modern attitude to oil did not 
become general until the First World War demonstrated the 
absolute dependence on oil products of modern nations at war. 
Then oil products were needed to make munitions, to keep 
supply lorries functioning (and later, tanks), to keep the new aeroplane 
1. United Kingdom Petroleum Imports 1860 - 1913. 
~ TOTAL (TONS) KEROSENE GASOLINE FUEL & GAS LUBRICATING 
OIL Jfil 
1860 2 ? ? ? ? 
1880 400,000 90% plus ? ? ? 
1900 1,000,000 84% 16% 
1910 1,400,000 44% 14% 25% 17% 
1913 2,000,000 31% 20% 32% 14~f 
(Files of the Petroleum Information Bureau London) 
NOTE: These figures must be seen in perspective, however. 
In 1913, against 2 million tons of oil product imports, 
Britain produced 287 million tons of coal. Even allowing 
for considerable coal exports, this was still an over-
whelming preponderance in favour of coal as a source of 
power in Britain. (London and Cambridge Economic Service 
Key Statistics of the British Economy (London 1964), p.9.) 
10. 
in the air and, with the advant of the oil-fuelled warship, oil was 
needed to keep the Royal Navy in action to protect Britain's life 
line across the seas. 
This lesson of 1914-18 was not immediately forgotten when peace 
came. The Navy was by then primarily oil-fuelled, and would need 
to ensure its supplies should war ever break out again. The Army 
was moving, slowly it is true, towards mechanization, and, while 
Britain neglected her home air defences, aircraft were found to be 
useful in such places as Arabia and Iraq. All Britain's armed forces 
would, therefore, need oil products to keep them in action. 
There were also other considerations. Industry and merchant 
spipping were finding advantages in using oil fuel in preference to 
coal. The diesel engine was finding many applications both on land 
and on the sea. The private motor car was gaining in popularity, 
while at the same time motor tractors ~re beginning to replace the 
horse on the farm. Civil aviation was born. The Coal Strike of 
1926 demonstrated to many that there was an alternative to coal, in 
gas, diesel and fuel oils, although it is true that there was a 
general reversion to coal after the Strike. 
Oil was thus inf'iltrating and becoming part of the whole 
British economy. A Government which ignored this fact did so at 
its peril, for even if, as yet, Coal was still very much King, Oil 
was nevertheless a Prince who could neither be banished nor ignored. 
Britain bad to have oil products if she was to maintain her 
status as an industrial and military power and was to be able to 
protect her far-flung &:npire in the new mechanical age. It would 
have been very useful if she could have found oil ill Britain itself, 
11. 
or at least in her Empire. But it was not to be. The exigencies 
of the First World War led to Government interest in prospecting for 
indigenous oil in Britain, but by 1922, when interest began to wane, 
only one well, at Hardstoft, with a production of one tom per day, 
was the result. Although interest revived in the 1930's, by 1939 
1. 
Britain's indigenous production was still of no account. Scottish 
shale oil production, laborious and uneconomic as it was, provided 
no real alternative supply, reaching an all-time peak of over a 
quarter of a million tons in 1913, after which it slowly fell to half 
2. 
that amount in 1938. The extraction of oil from coal received some 
attention from the British Government, particularly in the late 
1920's and 1930's, but despite some technical success it did not 
prove itself capable of being developed as a viable economic proposi-
3. 
tion, not even as a reasonable stand-by for wartime emergencies. 
4. 
Alcohol was of very limited use as a substitute for petrol. 
As for the Empire, it, too, seemed almost devoid of petroleum 
5. 
resources. Burma had produced some oil since the 1880's, but none 
1. Institute of Petroleum, The Petroleum Industry in the United 
Kingdom (London, 1966) pp.7-11. 
2. Ibid. p.14. 
3. Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Papers (House of CoDDDOns)l937-
1938 {Cmd 5665) xii, 439. "Report of the Committee of Imperial 
Defence Subcommittee on Oil from Coal", pp.15-44, 61. 
(German developments were pushed ahead largely because Hitler sav 
no real alternative, and the economics of the processes were 
regarded as being of minor importance). 
4. A.E. Dunstan (ed.) The Science of Petroleum (6 Vols: London, 
1938-53) Vol.IV, pp.2409-2413. 
5. In the inter-war years oil was thought to be much rarer of occurrence 
than has been subsequently found to be the case. 
12. 
for export outside of British India. Trinidad was a useful minor 
source, but even by 1939 it was not supplying more than one twelfth 
of United Kingdom imports. In areas of British influence, Sarawak 
was a small producer from 1913, and there were minor amounts in 
Egypt. By 1934 Bahrein was beginning oil production, and in that 
year, too, the long-awaited Iraq oil reached the Mediterranean by 
pipeline, while oil was later found in Kuwait (1938). For most of 
the period before the Second World War, however, the only notable 
oil producing area where Britain had influence was Persia, where oil 
had been struck in 1908. Persia provided 20-25% of Britain's refined 
1. 
oils, ~d much of its crude, during the 1920's and 1930's. 
It follows from the above that Britain was dependent on imports 
from foreign territory for the bulk of her oil supplies. Until 
after the First World War the United States predominated, at first 
being almost the only supplier, then dropping to a 60% share in 1900, 
Russia supplying most of the remainder in that year. During the 
First World War the United States supplied 75-80% of British imports, 
but in 1920 this fell to 60%, Mexico contributing most of the remainder. 
The 1929's saw the decline of imports from the United States to 33% 
in 1930, while Persia (23% in 1930), Venezuela (16%), and a slowly 
recovering Russia (11%) shared the rema]nder, pushing a decl:fning 
Mexican output into fifth place. By 1936 the United States' share 
had dropped to 10%, although it recovered to 18% in 1938, at the 
1. Dunstan, Science of Petroleum, Vol. 1, pp.22-23. 




• In the latter yea:r Venezuela (main 
supplier since 1932) supplied 38%, and Persia 2CYjo. 2 • In 
1938, if one counts Persia and Iraq as countries where 
British influence was of some importance (though exercised 
in different ways) Britain received no more than 32% of 
her oil imports from areas over which she had some measure 
of control. 
Britain's dependence on foreign oil may to some extent 
have become a little less worrying by 1938 in that actual and 
potential sources of oil were now more.numerous than they 
had been in the earlier yea:rs of the century,3• but, on the 
other hand, Britain needed much more oil in 1938 than she 
had done in earlier years. In 1900 one million tons of oil 
products ( 845'S kerosene, 16% lubricating oils) had sufficed, 
and in 1921 two and a half million tons (29;~ motor and aviatior ..
spirit, 25~& gas, diesel and fuel oils, 185~ kerosene, 12;Jf. 
lubricating oils) was sufficient. In 1938, however, United 
Kingdom consumption stood at 8,990,000 tons, of which 55% 
was motor and aviation spirit, 18)S gas, diesel and fuel oil, 
s:< kerosene and 6~ lubricating oils. 4. & 5. 
1. 1938 was the yea:r in which Mexico declared the nationalisation 
of its oil industry. 
2. Files of the Petroleum Information Bnreau, London. 
3. Ignoring for the present the ominous signs in Europe which 
tended to focus attention on the oil question. 
4. Excluding bunkers. King, op. cit. pp.551-552. 
5. Crude oil is a complex mixture of hydrocarbons. The chief 
products required for the market are separated out primarily 
by distilling operations, advantage being taken of the 
different ranges of boiling points. 
Gasoline, petrol or motor spirit: Very light, volatile 
constituents. Aviation spirit generally consists of the more 
volatile fractions of gasoline. 
Kerosine: Light and volatile, but less so than gasoline. 
Used for heating and lighting. 
Gas, diesel and fuel oils: Heavier and less volatile than kerosine. 
(This footnote continued on following page) 
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This growth of oil consumption and the changing proportions 
of the major products reflect several trends of the period, particu-
larly the increasing use of motor vehicles, a trend seen not only 
in increased consumption of motor spirit (from less than one million 
tons in 1921 to nearly 5 million tons in 1938), but in increased 
motor vehicle manufacture in the United Kingdom (73,000 vehicles 
1. 
in 1922, 445,000 in 1938). There was also a greatly increased 
demand for gas, diesel and fuel oils (1921 - 726,000 tons, 1938 -
1,608,000 tons). Demand increased for all products (except kerosine) 
during the whole period, and although, as the figures show, kerosine 
soon lost its early predominance and major importance as electricity 
and gas became more readily available for lighting and heating, 
nevertheless actual consumption of kerosine increased slowly after 
2. 
1921, although never (before 1940) attaining its 1900 level. 
Footnote 5 continued from preceding page -
The products vary considerably, from very light fractions 
differing only slightly from kerosine to very heavy fractions 
or residues. 
Gas oil has a variety of applications, ranging from the 
production of gas of high calorific value to use as a burning fuel. 
Also used as a constituent in special products ~. insecticides). 
The properties of diesel oils vary widely, dependent on the type 
of engine for which they are intended. 
Fuel oils similarly have a wide range of properties, chief 
applications being as fuel for furnaces designed either to produce 
power or electricity, or heat alone ~· for brickmaking). 
Lubricating oils: Manufactured from the higher boiling point 
constituents of crude oil. Many are specialised products. 
other roducts: Bitumen, wax, etc. 
Asiatic Petroleum Company Limited, A Petroleum Handbook (London,1933)). 
For more precise definitions see: Institute of Petroleum, 
A Glossary of Petroleum Terms (London, 1951). 
1. The production figure for 1937 was 508,000. London and Cambridge 
Economic Service, Key Statistics of the British Economy, 1900-1962 
(London, 1964) p.9. 
2. United Kingdom brosine consumption in 1900 was 870,000 tons. 
In 1921 it was 536,000 tons, and in 1938 it was 721,000 tons. 
(King, op. cit. pp.554·552). 
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Most of Britain's oil supplies during this period were 
imported as already refined products, although in the 1920's 
and 1930's about 2 million tons of crude oil were imported 
annually and refined in the United Kingdom, some of the 
refined products being then re-exported. This is in marked 
contrast to the post-Second World War policy of importing the 
bulk of the supplies as crude oil and only a comparatively 
small proportion as refined products. 1 • 
III Britain's Middle Eastern Oil Policy 1900 - 1914· 
In the years immediately preceding the First World War, 
the security of Britain's oil supplies became an issue of 
some importance. Although as yet naval oil consumption was 
small, 2 • the supply of this vital commodity had to be secure 
and, moreover, it had to be secure at the right price. What 
was needed, ideally, was a good source of oil in territory 
over which Britain could exercise some measure of control. 
Moreover, it was highly desirable that the comniercial control 
of such a source should be independent of the two major 
1. In 1965 approximately 77% of United Kingdom offil imports 
was in the form of crude oil. In 1965 total oil product 
re-exports exceeded in quantity the whole of United Kingdom 
consumption for 1938. 
(Petroleum Information Bureau, Oil - The United Kingdom, 
pp. 5-7). 
2. Naval oil consumption in 1913 was approximately 200,000 
tons, though this was expected to double by 1916. Several 
million tons of oil would have been required had the whole 
navy been oil - fired. 
Admiralty Memo: Oil Supply for HM. Navy, June 16th 1913,p.3. 
CAB 37/115/39. 
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international oil companies, so as to obviate any monopol-
istic price-fixing
1
• to the financial detriment of the 
Admiralty. 
Although oil sources at this time were not as widespread 
as they were to become later, discoveries had been made in 
areas of interest to the Admiralty, such as in Trinidad, in 
Egypt and in Persia. The evidence of there being only small 
reserves in Trinidad and Egypt detracted from the value of 
these sources, but the Persian discovery proved important 
enough greatly to interest the Admiralty. 2• 
Persia was already an important area of the world to 
Britain, for reasons mainly connected with the fact that Persia 
1. The Admiralty was especially concerned to guard against 
what it considered to be the monopolistic price-raising 
practices of the two major international oil companies, 
Standard Oil and Shell. Hence it was encouraged to 
invest in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (see below) in 
order to prevent it being drawn into "an ever-widening 
price ring". Pa.:rliament Debates (Hof C) 5th Ser., 
Vol. 63 (1914) Col. 1140. 
!Q.'!1!: Prices per ton (f.o.b.). of fuel oil quoted to the 
Admiralty were as follows:-
1910: 23/2d. 1912: 29/lOd. 1913: 39/2d 1914: offers 
at 50/-. Freight charges also increased similarly. 
2. See Appendix II. 
For some of the evidence relating to various sources 
taken by the Royal Commission on Fuel and Engines, see: 
Report of the Royal Commission on Fuel and Engines, · 
Vol. I., Summary Evidence, pp.5-28. 
ADM 116/1208. 
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formed,(along with Afghanistan and the Western part of China) 
a buffer between British India and the expansionist Russian 
Empire and also between British India and the German-
oriented Turkish Empire. Britain sought to exert her influence 
in Persia to counter any foreign, particularly Russian, 
attempts to gain influence there. 
It is therefore not surprising that the British Government 
gave diplomatic assistance to an Australian, William Knox 
D'Arcy, 1 • in his efforts to gain an oil concession in Persia~-
These efforts achieved success in 1901 when, having circum-
vented possible Russian opposition, D'Arcy was granted an 
exclusive oil concession by the Persian Government, 2•covering 
all Persia except the five Russian - dominated northern 
provinces.3· 
1. For a brief summary of D'A:rcy's early career, and an 
account of how he came to be interested in Persian oil, 
see B. Shwadran, The :Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers 
(New York, 1955), p.15. 
2. For an account of how the British Minister in Tehran used 
his good offices in D'Arcy's favour, see A. Hardinge, A 
Diplomatist in the F.ast (London, 1928) pp.278-280. -
These events, although too early to warrant detailed treat-
ment in this thesis, do give rise to speculation on the 
difficult problem of how far the British Government 
encouraged the oil interests to adopt a forward policy in 
areas of particular interest to that Government - and how 
far the process worked in reverse, with the oil interests 
urging the Government on. (Comment on this general theme 
will be made later in this thesis). 
3. Russia's preponderant influence in Northern Persia was 
eventually given formal recognition in the 1907 Anglo-Russian 
Agreement in Persia. The conaession granted was for a period 
of sixty years. It gave exclusive oil exploitation and pipe-
line construction rights. The Persian Government was to 
receive 16% of the Company's net profits. For the full text 
see J.C.Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle Fast 
(2 vols: Princeton, New Jersey, 1956) Vol.I, pp.249-251. 
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The Company subsequently fonned by D'Arcy eventually, 
after some vicissitudes,
1
• struck oil (1908), and in 1909 was 
incorporated into a new company, the A.Delo-Persian Oil 
Company, an entirely British concern with roughly half of the 
capital provided by Lord Strathcona (the former Canadian 
railway magnate and former High Commissioner for Canada) 
and half by the Burmah Oil Company. 2 • 
By 1912, after constructing a refinery at Abad.an, fed by 
pipeline from the oilfield over 130 miles away, the Anglo-
Persian Oil Company was in financial difficulties, and needed 
£2,000,000 for development. Sir Charles Greenway, the 
Company's chairman,3· appealed to the Admiralty for financial 
l• For example, in 1905 D'Arcy's company was in serious 
financial difficulties and was apparently saved from being 
taken over by French interests only by the intervention 
of the British Admiralty, which induced Lord Strathcona 
and the Burmah Oil Company to finance D'Arcy's project. 
Parliamentary Debates (Hof C) 5th Ser., Vol. 63 (1914) 
cols. 1190-1191. 
Also R.B. Lockhart Ace of Spies (London, 1967) pp.33-44 
(a rather romantic account whose authenticity is debateable). 
2. Initial capital was £2,000-,000. Lord Strathcona held 50;~ 
of the shares, the Burmah Oil Company 48%, and 2-% was held 
by Persian interests. Lord Strathcona was Chairman, and 
1) 'Arey was one of the directors. 
Parliamentary Papers (H of C) 1914 (Cmd 7419) Liv, 505. 
"Explanatory Memorandum on the Acquisition of the Anglo-
Persian Oil Company". 
Parliamentary Debates (H of C) 5th Ser, Vol. 63 (1914) 
col. 723. 
3. Sir Charles Greenway. 1857-1934· 
One of the principal founders of the A.P.o.c. 
Greenway had been active in the commercial and industrial 
life of India from 1885 to 1908. In addition to his pos-
itions with the A.P.o.c. and its associated groups, 
Greenway also held substantial interests in the firm of 
Shaw, Wallace and Co., India and Ceylon. 
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assistance, but at first made little headway. Then, after 
t t d t . t' l. t pro rac e nego ia ions, even ually an agreement was made 
between the British Government and the Company, the necessary 
Parliamentary approval of the financial aspects of the matter 
being obtained just prior to the outbreak of wa.r. 2 • 
The Government-Company Agreement of Hay 20th 1914 provided 
for British Government subscription to Company capital of 
£2,200,000, giving the Government a small majority of share 
votes. It was laid down that two ex-officio directors were 
to be appointed to the Company by the Treasury (one of these 
was to represent the Admiralty directly) with the power of 
veto, and the Government received the right to appoint more 
directors (proportionate to its share in the Company) if it 
should become necessary in the future. However, the Government 
agreed not to exercise its veto in purely financial and 
commercial matters, but to restrict it to matters affecting 
foreign or military policy, any change of status of the Company, 
1. For a full account of the negotiations see Marian Jack 
(now Kent), "The Purchase of the British Government's 
shares in the British Petroleum Company 1912-1914" Past and 
Present, Vol. 39 (April 1968) pp.139 - 168. 
2. For various criticisms made of the proposed measures in 
Parliament see especially:-
Parliamentary Debates (H of C) 5th Ser., Vol. 63 (1914) 
cols. 1144, 1154 - 59, 1165, 1179-88, 1218, 1212, 1230-38, 
1247, Vol. 64 (1914) cols. 1034-35, 1044-52. 
20. 
new fields of exploitation, or fulfillment of Admiralty 
1. 
contracts. 
An Admiralty supply contract was drawn up at the same time 
as the Agreement, but was kept secret. Under its terms the 
Admiralty obtained fuel oil from the Company at a price of 30/-
per ton (f .o,b.), with provision for a reduction down to 20/~, 
the reduction to be in proportion to the profits of the Company 
after a certain rate of dividend had been made. This compared 
favourably with then current market prices of from 40/- to 
I t 2. 75 - per on. 
The acquisition of shares in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company 
by the British Government was an unprecedented step, which 
naturally aroused opposition from various quarters. How much 
it was brought about by the Company persuading the Government 
to take the necessary step, and how much it was the result of 
Admiralty pressure within Government circles, are questions 
of some difficulty.3• What is undeniable is that the Government 
1. In addition, the continuing British character of the Anglo-
Persian Oil Company was guaranteed by specific provisions 
in the Agreement. For text see: Parliamentary Papers (H of C) 
1914 (Cmd 7419) Liv, 505 "Agreement with the Anglo-Persian 
Company Ltd". 
The limitations on the exercise of the Government veto were 
made explicit in a letter of Nay 20th 1914 from the Treasury 
to the Board of the A.P.O.C. See:- Parliamentary Debates 
(Hof C) 5th ser., Vol. 226 (1929) cols. 2263-2264. 
2. lo-Persian Oil Com , 
~11th 1914 p.2. CAB 37 119 61. At the time a delivery 
of six million tons over twenty years was envisaged. 
3. There is no doubt that the Anglo-Persian Oil Company did its 
best to persuade the British Government, by stressing not only 
the financial benefits likely to be gained by investment in the 
Company but also the political, strategic and other advantages 
of having a strong British company in control of the Persian 
oilfields. Much was made of attempts by the Royal Dutch-Shell 
Company to gain control of the Anglo-Persian, and of the rumours 
then current of German interest in the Shell group. 
The Admiralty was at first reluctant to commit itwelf on 
the question of the acquisit;on of shar~s in the A.P~O.C0 ~ mid-1913,however, Churchill \First Lord) had apparenuly ec me 
{co1rro. p · 21) 
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made a sound business investment, deriving considerable 
financial benefit from the acquisition. 1 • 
The move also had other than financial implications, 
however, for, as will be seen later, involvement in the Anglo-
Persian Oil Company made inevitable some direct Government 
involvement in oil politica, both in the Vuddle East and 
elsewhere. 
Mesopotamia (later known as Iraq) was one area concerning 
which the British Government took a direct part in oil politics 
before 1919. Motivated both by the desire to support its 
newly acquired protEfge, the .Anglo-Persian Oil Company, as also 
by more general principles of foreign policy, 2• the British 
Government used its influence to ensure that the Anglo-Persian 
1. Churchill estimated the total return on Government invest-
ment by 1923 to have been approximately £40,POO,OOO. (w.s. 
Churchill, The World Crisis (6 vols., London, 1923-29) 
Vol. I, p.71). By 1937; returns on investment and dividends 
alone (not counting savings on the fuel oil contract) 
amounted to nearly £16,ooo,ooo. Parliament Debates 
(Hof C) 5th Ser., Vol. 330(1937) Col.1337 • 
2. The British Government encouraged British commercial 
enterprise in the Ottoman Empire both for the general purpose 
of increasing British economic wealth and for the purpose 
of indirectly increasing political influence in an area of 
great strategic interest to the Empire. 
Footnote continued from previous page: 
convinced of the wisdom of Government investment in the 
Company, and from then on the Admiralty "assume(d) the role 
of Company advocate". On this see: J·ack op. cit., pp.139-
146. Also, Ro al Commission on Fuel and ~ Vol. I, 
Summary Evidence, p.18. ADM 11 1208. 
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Oil Company gained a share of whatever oil might be found in 
Mesopotamia, steering the several parties concerned to an 
Agreement in March 1914. 1 • 
The Foreign Office Agreement, as this AgTeement was termed, 
provided for the participation of the Deutsche Bank, Anglo-
Saxon Petroleum Company, 2• and Anglo-Persian Oil Company 
interests in the Turkish Petroleum Company, a company formed in 
1912 to exploit Hesopotamian oil resources.3· The Anclo-Persian 
Oil Company was to hold 47~ of the shares, the Deutsche Bank 
1. For an exhaustive account of the negotiations see Marian 
Kent, "British Interest in .·. · · ..· ·Middle Fast Oil Concessions 
1900-1925", Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of 
London, 1968. 
(Dr. Marian Kent and Mrs. Marian Jack (referred to earlier) 
are the same person). 
2. The Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company was a subsidiary of the 
Royal Dutch-Shell Company. 
3. In 1911 an English Banker, Sir Ernest Cassel, formed a 
company called "African and Eastern Concessions Ltd", 
which became the Turkish Petroleum Company in 1912. At 
that time (1912) the shares were distributed between 
the National Bank of Turkey (35%) Gulbenkian (15%) Anglo-
Sa.xon Petroleum Company ( 257~) and the Deutsche Bank 
(25~~). 
23. 
25%, the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company 22~, and C.S. Gulbenkiafi· 
the remaining 5%. An important provision in the Agreement 
bound the participants not to seek concessions within the 
Ottoman Empire except through the Turkish Petroleum Company 
itselr. 2 • 
Upon conclusion of this Agreement the Turkish Petroleum 
Company, with German and British diplomatic assistance, then 
sought an oil concession from the Turkish Government covering 
the vilayets of Mosul and Baghdad.3. On June 28th 1914 the 
Turkish Grand Vizier was induced to give a formal, written 
promise of a concession for the two vilayets. The outbreak 
of war prevented any further progress in the matter, however.4· 
1. Calouste Sarkis Gulbenkian (1869-1955) was an Armenian, 
educated in Britain, who in 1888 entered his father's oil 
business at Baku. Later he took an interest in Mesopotamian 
oil possibilities, and it was generally acknowledged in 
the 1920's that Gulbenkian was the principal founder and 
prime mover in the initial formation of the Turkish 
Petroleum Company. It is a curious fact, however, (if a 
usually reliable private source is to be believed) that 
Gulbenkian never set foot in Mesopotamia. 
Far a readable (but not especially reliable) biography 
of Gulbenkian, see R. Hewins. Hr. Five Per Cent (London 
1957) p.67. 
2. Text of the Agreement of Narch 19th 1914 is in:-
G.P. Gooch and H.W.V. Temperley, British Documents on the 
Origins of the Wax, 1898-1g14 (11 Vols: London, 1926-38) 
Vol. X, Part II, pp.345-34 • 
3. See Kent op. cit., p.200 et seq. 
Shwad.ran, op. cit., p.196. 
4. Text: Hurewitz, op.cit. Vol.I, p.286. 
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Nevertheless, the Grand Vizier's promissory letter was to 
be of great significance later, as will be seen. Not only 
was it to fi{~e prominently in the controversy over Mesopotamian 
oil in the early 1920's, but also it was to be a major considera-
tion leading to the grant of an oil concession to the Turkish 
Petroleum Company (in 1925) by the Iraqi Government. 
rv. Towards Peace 1914 - 1918 
Oil's part in the war which broke out in 1914 was 
tremendous. Tanks, lorries, and aeroplanes all depended on 
petrol for their motive power, while at sea the British navy 
became more and more dependent on oil fuel. 
In the last six months of 1918 the oil product requirements 
of Great Britain, France, Italy, and the American Expeditionary 
Force totalled over four and a half million tons, requiring 
the employment of a large number of tankers for transportation.1 • 
Special supply arrangements had to-be made, 2 • for by now oil had 
1. Memo by M. Benard: The American Naval Estimates 
Euro ean Su 1 of Petroleum Products Feb,....,, .. ,~,. 
F0371 4330 189896 189896. 
See a so Appendix I, below. 
2. In 1916 a Committee for Regulation of Petroleum Supplies was 
set up, and in 1917 the British Government took full control 
of the regulation of petroleum imports. In 1917 an agreement 
was drawn up between the major oil companies and the British 
Government whereby tanker tonnage and distributing facilities 
were pooled. Early on in 1918 an Inter-Allied Petroleum 
Council was established for the joint handling of petroleum 
problems. 
See: Great Britain, Ministry of Munitions, History of the 
Vlinistry of Munitions (8 Vols: London, 1919-22) Vol. VII, 
Part III p.143. 
Also: Files of the Petroleum Executive, under the reference 
B.T. CTA.281. 
(NOTE: At the time when these files were consulted they were 
located in the Ministry of Power. They are now located in the 
Department of Trade and Industry, presumably under a POWER 
33/-- reference). 
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become "as necessary as blood"l. to the successful prosecution 
of the war. At the same time, as the European parties in the 
Alliance came to realize how dependent they were on United States 
supplies of oil (over 80~·~ of total oil supplies caine from the 
USA), their determination to remedy this situation after the war 
increased, producing repercussions of some moment both before 
and after the final victory over Germany had been won. 
In Britain, a body known as the Petroleum Imperial Policy 
Committee was appointed in May 1918 to try to find a solution 
to the problem of how the British Empire could obtain a secure 
and permanent supply of oil in the years which would succeed the 
ending of the war. The Committee concerned itself with such 
questions as Imperial cooperation on oil matters, the exclusion 
of foreign capital from potential oil concessions in the Empire, 
and, more specifically, with projects for gaining control for 
British interests of one major international oil company, the 
Royal Dutch-Shel1. 2• 
1. Petrol was stated to be "as necessary as blood in the battles 
of tomorrow". (Clemenceau to President Wilson, December 15th 
1917. Quoted in E.H. Davenport and S.R. Cooke, The Oil 
Trusts and Anglo-American Relations (London, 1923), p.32. 
2. Great Britain, Public Record Office, Foreign Office, 




:By the Armistice, however, little of concrete value had 
been achieved by the Cormnittee. 1 • On the other hand, events in 
the Middle East, which left the British in occupation of large 
pa.rts of the Turkish Empire, had brought new factors into play. 
The British were now in a strong position in areas where oil 
was confidently expected to be abundant; in particular, they 
had physical control of Mesopotamia. 2• In the bargaining to 
come at the Peace Conferences and elsewhere, this was going to 
be of crucial importance. 
1. Until November 1918 proposals for gaining control of the Royal 
Dutch-Shell Company were linked with proposals involving the 
sale of the British Government's shares in the Anglo-
Persian Oil Company. The project in this form was abandoned 
because it seemed impossible to secure sufficiently firm 
control of Shell except at an unacceptable price, involving 
also the Government's loss of firm control of the APOC. 
2. Despite what some writers have said on this matter, the 
prospect of gaining control of Nesopotamian oil did not have 
a decisive influence on British war policy in the Middle East. 
See Kent, op. cit., p.263. 
The British were not especially keen to advance on Mosul even 
when it seemed that the Russians were likely to advance into 
that area. 
See: Committee of Imperial Defence, The Campaign in Mesopotamia 
Vol. III, p.253. 
Also, it should be noted that the Sykes-Picot AgTeement of 
1916 awarded Nosul to France - although it is true that the 
British later did everything possible to overturn this 




FROM OIL SHORTAGE TO DEPRESSION 1919-1933. 
I. The World Oil Situation 1919-1927. 
The history of the oil industry in the period 1919 to 1933 
falls naturally into two main sections. Firstly, the period from 
1919 to 1927, when the balance of supply and demand for oil 
products fluctuated considerably but did not for long give predom-
inance t·o either. Secondly, the period from 1927 to 193 3, when 
supply greatly outstripped demand and then, because of the 
economic depression, continued to do so for several years. 
During the period 1919 to 1927 the world's production of 
crude oil grew from 77 million to 174 million metric tons. 1 • The 
United States was responsible for approximately two thirds of 
this production, but, on the other hand, she also consumed approx-
irnately the same amount of oil as she herself produced. Thus, 
while the United States exported considerable quantities (mainly 
as refined products) she also had to import simi1ar quantities 
(mainly of crude oil) in order to satisfy her own internal demand. 
During the years 1920-1922 American demand generally outstripped 
her own supply and upset the balance of exports over 
imports. 2• This, it should be noted, was one of the 
reasons for American nervousness of British oil policy during 
1. See Appendix II. 
In 1926 the world's oil production was disttibuted among the 
major companies as follows: Standard Oil Group 26%; Royal 
Dutch-Shell 10}~; Anglo-Persian Oil Company 4%; Ten other 
large independent firms 16%; Soviet Russia 5t%; Others 39%. 
("Soviet Oil Exports", The Economist, March 24th 1928, Vol.106, 
p. 581.) 




these years, which nervousness only really faded away when the 
overproduction of 1923 restored the balance. 1 • 
American exports satisfied approximately 30 - 35~~ of the 
external world's demand between 1919 and 1927. 2• Thus, although 
extremely important, the United States' supplies were by no means 
adequate in themselves to meet the rising world demand. 
In 1919 the principal producers after the United States were 
Nexico, Russia, the Dutch East Indies, and Persia. However, Mexican 
production, after reaching a peak in 1921, rapidly declined, largely 
owing to the ingress of salt water in the wells. Russian production, 
hit by the chaos of Revolution, Civil War and Intervention, dropped 
to its lowest Twentieth Century figure of 3,832,000 metric tons in 
1920, after which it gradually recovered, overtaking its 1916 production 
Footnote 2 from Erecedi!!8: E~e 
American im orts com ared with e (figs. in millions 
of barrels 
EXPORTS IMPORTS 
Crude Refined TOTAL Crude Refined TOTAL 
1913 5.4 46.8 52.2 17 .8 0.4 18.2 
1919 6.3 57.5 63.8 52.8 1.4 54.2 
1920 9.3 70.3 79.6 106.2 2.6 108.8 
1921 9.6 62.0 71.6 125.4 3.4 128.8 
1922 10.8 63.5 74.3 127.3 8.7 136.o 
1923 17.5 84.4 101.9 82.0 17.6 99.6 
1924 18.2 98.9 117.1 77.8 16.8 94.6 
1925 13.3 100.5 113.8 61.8 16.4 78.2 
1926 15.4 116.5 131.9 60.4 20.9 81.3 
1927 15.8 125.8 141.6 58.4 13.3 71.7 
Total Exports represented about 155~ of total United States crude 
oil production. Source:- L.M. Fanning, American Oil Operations 
Abroad (New York and London, 1947), p.226. 
See Chapter 3, Section III, below. 
Fanning, OE• cit., p.225. 
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figure by 1927. Production in the Dutch East Indies increased 
only slowly during this period. 
prewar importance by 1924. 1 • 
Rumanian production regained its 
Persian production increased fourfold between 1919 and 1927, 
rising from 1,337,000 to 5,310,000 metric tons by the latter date. 2 • 
This represented almost the entire output of the Middle Eastern 
area in this period, since Egyptian production reached only 
184,000 metric tons in 1927, while Bahreini, Iraqi and Arabian oil 
development still lay in the future. 
The most outstanding development during this period was in 
Venezuela. Until 1924 production there was comparatively 
insignificant, but by 1927 it had reached s,769,000 metric tons -
a figure which it was almost to double in the following year, 
thereby overtaking both Russia and Mexico, to become second only 
to the United States.3· This rapid development, in which the 
Royal Dutch-Shell Company played the major part, along with certain 
1. See Appendix II. 
The Allies sabotaged the Rumanian oil wells in 1916, in 
order to prevent Germany from using them. 
2. See Appendix II. 
3. See Appendix II. 
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American companies, helped to bring about a worldwide glut of oil 
in 1927.1• 
Consumption of all oil products increased during this period, 
though with a marked swing towards the consumption of gasoline, 
and fuel oil, at the expense of kerosine. (See table'tBlow. 2•) 
This continued a trend noticeable before 1914, a trend fostered by 
greater industrialization, and the development of mechanical 
1. Overproduction in the American fields was, however, the main 
cause of over-supply in 1927 (see below). 
2. 
For a short account of Venezuelan development see H. O'Connor, 
World Crisis in Oil (London, 1962) pp.128-136. 
United States Refine~ OUtEut 1212-1221• 
Amount of Gas and 
Year Crude refined Gasoline/Naphtha Kerosine Fuel Oil Lub.Oil 
~ Prod.n. ~-~~-~-· 
1919 51.5 25.2 13.0 15.4 7.9 50.2 25.8 
1923 77.0 30.0 23.1 9.6 7.4 49.5 38.2 
1927 111.0 36.0 39.9 6.8 7.5 47.4 52.6 
Production figures in millions of metric tons, calculated 
roughly from figures in Dustan, Science of Petroleum, 
Vol. III, p. 2126 (from which source the percentage 






transport on land, sea, and in the air - changes which the war had tended to 
accelerate. 
The increased demand for gasoline was mainly due to its use in 
the rapidly increasing number of private ca.rs, motor 'buses, and 
lorries. Whereas in 1914 there had been a world total of 2 million 
cars, in 1919 there were nearly 9 million, and this latter figure 
was almost trebled by 1927.1 • In addition, the higher grades of 
gasoline were in great demand as fuel for the aircraft of the 
post-war airlines, developments in this direction being stimulated 
by dramatic Atlantic crossings, air races, and, to a lesser extent, 
by military needs. 2• 
Kerosine found application as a source of heat and light, 
although the spread of electricity was a factor inhibiting any 
increased consumption for these purposes. It was also used as 
fuel for driving agricultural machinery, although the development of 
mechanized farming in Europe was by no means rapid during this period.3. 
1. Based on figures in:- C. Tugendhat, Oil, the Biggest Business 
(London 1968) p.39. Dunstan, Science of Petroleum, Vol. III, 
p.2124; and E.L. Bass, "Automobile engine design in relation to 
the world's fuel supplies", Journal of the Institution of 
Petroleum Technologists, Vol. II (1925), p.490. 
2. C.H.Gibbs-Smith, The Aero lane: an Historical Surve of its Ori ins 
and Development. London, 1960 chapter 13. 
R. Miller and D.Sawers, The Technical Development of Modern 
Aviation (London, 1968) pp.12-14. 
The introduction, in 1922, of lead tetraetbyl as an anti-detonation 
agent was important for both aircraft and motor fuels. 
' 3. See H. Hunter, "Horses versus Tractors", in Bailliere's Encyclo-
edia of Scientific iculture (edited by H. Hunter) (2 vols: 
London, 1931 pp.573-575. 
On kerosine's varied applications in the 1920's see A.E.Dunstan 
(ed.) The Petroleum Industr:y, (London, 1922) pp.260,265. 
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Diesel oil engines were used on land to drive stationary 
machinery and to generate electricity; as yet, however, they were 
not used to any great extent in moving vehicles, although experiments 
to this end were progressing satisfactorily.1 • At sea the number of 
motor ships
2
• grew from less than 300 in 1914 to three times that 
number by 1920. Ten years later the figure was well over 3,000, 
a great many of which were oil tankers. Diesel-electric ships were 
also making their appearance in the mid-1920's.3· 
The consumption of oil fuel burned under the boilers instead of 
coal increased appreciably during the period. Just after the war the 
ratio of merchant vessels burning oil to those burning coal was 
substantially the same as in 1914, approximately 16 million gross 
tons (oil) to 45 million gross tons (coal). By 1927 this had changed 
to 23 million gross tons (oil) to 41 million gross tons (coal). It 
must be noted, however, that while oil definitely proved its utility 
for passenger liners, where comparative cleanliness and ease of 
handling were of great importance, ordinary freight shipowners tended 
to be governed by the price factor, and in times of high oil prices 
they would even carry out the necessary modifications to enable their 
ships to ~evert to coa1. 4 • 
1. Diesel lorries were first used in Britain in 1928. (Institution of 
Petroleum Technologists, Petroleum: Twenty-five Years' Retrospect, 
(London, 1935) p.6. 
2. Motorships - ships burning oil products as fuel for internal 
combustion engines (diesel engines).(i.e.without the use of boilers). 
3. Hardy, op.cit., Vol. I, pp. 12-14. 
L.Jones Shi buildi in Britain ma· between the Two World Wars. 
(Cardiff, 1957 , pp.42-43. 
4. Hardy, op.cit., Vol. I, p.12. "Oil - III - The Trend in Demand,"~ 
Economist, May 26th 1923, Vol. 96, p.1183. 
"Notes of the Week: The Consumption of Fuel Oil:,~" The Economist, 
October 6th, 1923, Vol.97, p.515. 
}-Uel oil was also used extensively in factory boilers, and in 
Britain some experiments in its use on railways were carried out just 
1. 
after the war, and during the 1926 Coal 8trike. Here price and 
availability of the rival commodities, coal and oil, were important 
factors determining the use of each. 
Apart from the above oil products, others were also of importance. 
How vital were good lubricants to the smooth operation of all the 
varied machinery in use in the 1920's need not be stressed, and such 
oil products as bitumen, waxes, and various solvents became in ever 
greater demand as the world's industrial and technological development 
2. 
proceeded. In addition, schemes for utilizing oil products in more 
novel ways were being considered, as a passage written in 1921 shows: 
It appears to be by no means unlikely that synthetic rubber, 
dyes, resins, alcohols and the like may be manufactured from 
this source at no distant date. 3. 
The history of world oil prices during the period 1919-27 
is almost entirely the history of United States oil prices. If 
the United States suffered from a shorpage of oil, prices all over 
the world rose; if it had a glut of oil, prices all over the world 
4. 
fell. This was inevitable as long as the United States remained the 
1. Dunstan, The ~etroleum Industry, p. 301. 
G .• M.,. B~t:t..~i.lway-~traction in relation to the Oil Ind\18tr:y". Journal 
of the Institution of Petroleum Technologists,~o~..!.!9 ~1933J p.·r25. 
2. Dunstan, The Petroleum Industry, pp. 254, 290-292, etc. 
3. Ibid., p. 197. 
4. This statement should not be taken as applying to Soviet Russia, 
of course. 
34. 
principal producer and consumer of oil products, and the so-called 
"Gulf-plus" system of pricing - under which the charge to refiners 
for supplies of crude oil, no matter from where obtained, was the 
same as if the supplies had come from the Gulf of Mexico1• - was 
a logical acceptance of the predominance of the United States in the 
oil world. 
From 1915 to 1920 American Crude oil prices rose steadily, 
as did the prices of most other (non-oil) commodities. During 
the peak period (mid-1920) crude oil prices were some 200% above 
their 1913 value, and they remained high, though dropping slightly, 
into 1921. Significantly this was the hottest period of the 
Anglo-American "Oil War". 2• Production resulting from the 
discovery of new fields then helped bring about a sharp drop in 
crude oil prices later in 1921 (though all commodity prices fell at 
this time). By 1923 crude oil prices were a mere 50% above the 1913 
norm, and as such were comparable with other (non-oil) commodity 
prices, which had fallen steadily from 1920 to 1923.3· 
1. On this see H.J. Frank, Crude Oil Prices in the Middle Fast. 
(New York, 1966) pp.8-13. 
2. See Chapter 3, Section III. 
3. These details are all obtained from an article by Sir R. Waley-
Cohen, "Economics of the Petroleum Industry," in Institution 
of Petroleum Technologists, Petroleum: Twenty-five Years' 
Retrospect, pp.23-32. 
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From 1924 to 1926 the general trend was a rise in crude oil 
prices, with production increasing less rapidly than in the 
immediate post-war years, while demand continued steadily to increas~: 
Then came the glut of 1927, caused partly (as noted earlier) by the 
great increase of Venezuelan production, but, more directly, by 
overproduction in the United States. 2• Crude oil prices plummeted 
to approximately 60% of the 1926 figure,3· where they remained until 
1929. It may here be noted, for reference in a later chapter 
of this study, that it was precisely at this point in time (1927) 
that oil was struck at Baba Gurgur, in Ir~q. 
In the transportation of oil products across the seas of the 
world there were no really radical changes during the period 1919 
to 1927. The world tanker fleet grew by leaps and bounds,4· but 
1. lE.!£., pp.24, 26. 
2. :A.Q.vanoe.s -:in Pl!oduction techniques were partly responsible for the 
U.S. increase. The re-entry of Russia into the world's oil 
markets was also a factor in creating world over-supply. 
3. 1926 prices were approximately 100% above those of 1913. By 
1927 they were approximately 20% above the 1913 norm. 
(Waley-Cohen, "Economics of the Petroleum Industry," in Inst-
itution of Petroleum Technologists, Petroleum, Twenty-five 
Years Retrospect, p.24). 
4. Figures for world tanker tonnage were approximately as follows:-
1.fil.: l~ million gross tons. 1920: 3 million. ~: 5 million. 
122..Q.: 7~ million gross tons. 
The war had begun the destruction of Britain's dominance of 
world tanker tonnage. From 1914 to 1920 Britain's share dropped 
from 57% to 45% (that of the U.S.A. jumped from 13% to 48% in 
same period). By the mid-1920's the British Empire's share was 
only 377~. 
(Hardy, op.cit., Vol. I., p.14. 
Memo for the De t. of Overseas Trade enclosed in Geddes 
Wash· on to Curzon Jul 2 th 1 20 F0371 4585 898 5494. 
Oil Fuel Board Memo Neutral To e Available for British 
oses. 1 2 CAB 50 3. 
\.. .. \ 
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the actual size of tankers did not increase above pre-war carrying 
capacity. Some technical improvements were made, but the most 
radical experiment of the period - the American attempts to build 
concrete tankers - was abandoned as unsuccessfui. 1 • 
After the First World War the great increase in demand for oil 
products, particularly for gasoline, coupled with fears of an oil 
shortage, led to an increased development of oil technology in all 
aspects of the industry. More scientific methods of finding oil, 
and, when found, of extracting it and converting it into the 
desired products, were urgently needed, and it was in fulfillment 
of these needs that attention was turned to the development of 
geophysical methods of exploration, drilling methods, production 
techniques, and, especially:,. the "cracking" (or thermal breakdown 
of oil) pr<hcess. 
Just before the First World War the old "wildcat" methods 
of finding oil were slowly beginning to give way to more scientific 
methods based on geological principles. By the early 1920's, crude 
geophysical exploration methods were extensively used, particularly 
in the United States. However, by the end of the period under 
review, these more advanced methods had still not reached a position 
where the "wildcatter's" wholly intuitive methods of oil finding 
1. L. Dunn, The World's Tankers (London, 1956) pp.64-70. 
(Far the origins of the tanker, and an account of its development 
before 1914, see pp. 1-59.). 
·"' 
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could be entirely dispensed with.1 • 
The main defects of the early rotary system of drilling 
(inability to penetrate hard rocks, difficulty in drilling a 
straight hole, etc.) were not fully overcome in the 1920's, but 
they were at least sufficiently diminished by 1925 for progress 
to be made towards deeper drilling than was practicable with the 
. t 2. percussion sys em. By 1927 the deepest well was still only just 
over 8,000 feet in depth, but already the deeper drilling so far 
carried out was "unlocking hidden reserves" of oil.3. During 
1. Geophysical methods of prospecting all rely on the fact that oil 
occurs in certain definite structures which can be detected by 
determining the location of large scale heterogenities in the 
earth's crust by plotting the physical properties of the rock 
in the region under examination. Seismic, gravity, magnetic 
and electrical methods were all in use in this period. 
"Wildcat" methods: The totally unscientific methods of searching 
for oil deposits - usually consisting of the making of a rough 
reconnaissance of the terrain, and then drilling at a spot 
selected by "hunch". 
2. "The modern rotary is ••• revolutionizing drilling practice, and 
except in hard compact sandstones and limestones it is replacing 
all percussions." (A. Beeby Thompson, Oilfield mloration and 
Development (2 vols: London, 1925) Vol. II, p.617 • 
Dunstan, Science of Petroleum, Vol. I, pp.273-275. 
Institution of Petroleum Technologists, Petroleum: Twenty-five 
Years' Retrospect, pp.65-67. 
3. "Notes of the Week: Federal Oil Conservation Board Report", 
The :Economist, September 18th 1926, Vol. 103, p.~60. 
It should, however, be noted that the percussion systems still 
had an important function where hard rock was encountered; but 
the speed of the rotary system was an important factor which 




this period the technique of drilling under water was being developed, 
too, following the striking of a gusher less than two miles from 
the shores of Lake Maracaibo, in Venezuela, in December 1922.1 • 
Little organized research on the scientific production of oil 
had been carried out during the war yea.rs, but soon afterwards 
the advantage obtainable by the scientific unit control of an 
oilfield became generally acknowledged2•. - though not with any 
marked practical outcome in most of competitive America. Tech-
niques such as the "air lift" production method were developed, 
however, contributing substantially to the increased production 
of the middle 1920 1s.3· 
The cracking process has contributed more towards the 
conservation of crude oil than any development in the 
history of the petroleum industry, for to have produced 
1. C.N. Crosthwaite, Introductory Paper at the Symposium on 
Submarine Exploration for Oil, Journal of the Institute of 
Petroleum, Vol. 45 (1959) p.263. 
2. Dunstan, Science of Petroleum, Vol. I, pp. 534-535· 
Scientific Unit Control implied the control of output and the 
maintenance of gas pressures in the whole oil-bearing structure 
compromising a given oilfield. 
3. See on this Dunstan, Science of Petroleum, Vol. I, pp.577-
578, and "Oversea Correspondence: United States", The 
Economist, March 26th 1927, Vol. 104, p.640. 
"Air lift" - air or gas is injected, through an annular 
spacing between the eductor tube (up which the oil flows) and 
the casing, into the oil and gas mixture at the foot of the 
well. The extra pressure thus created aids and stimulates the 
upward flow of oil. 
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all motor fuel requirements from straight run gasoline 
would have necessitated the raising of enormous quantities 
of crude oil, with the subsequent production of fractions 
far in excess of requirements 
These words were written in 19401 • when the cracking process 
had developed considerably beyond the stage it had reached in 1927. 
Nevertheless, they apply to the earlier period also, and point 
to the main motives for the development of the process during 
the 1920's. The need to produce better gasoline suitable for use 
in engines with the higher compression ratios then being intro-
duced also stimulated cracking developments in this period. 
Cracking capacity grew, and the percentage of gasoline derived 
by this method increased - from only 10% in 1918 to 31% in 1926. 2 • 
The flexibility which the cracking process gave to the refiner, 
in allowing him to adjust output of gasoline or heavy oils to 
changes in demand, was an important factor in maintaining price 
stability. At the same time, the quality of the gasoline prod-
uced improved.3. 
1. A.W. Nash, "The Development of Petroleum Refining", Journal 
of the Institute of Petroleum, Vol. 26 (1940), p.44. 
"Cracking" 
Under certain controlled conditions of temperature and pressure, 
the heavier hydrocarbons in crude oil can be split or "cracked" 
to produce lighter hydrocarbon compounds (together with a 
certain residue of even heavier hydrocarbons). Thus, for 
instance, fuel oil can be split into gasoline (or kerosine) 
and residue, the gasoline (or kerosine) thus produced being 
more valuable than the original fuel oil. 
2. A table showing the increase in engine compression ratios from 
1924 is given in: 
G.F.gloff and L.Badona, "The cracking art in 1~32" Journal of 
the Institution of Petroleum Technologists, Vol. 19 (1933),p.505. 
The motives for the development of new cracking processes 
included the need to circumvent existing patents, the need to 
make the process continuous (as the Dubbs process), reduction 
of costs etc. A table showing the importance of each process in 
actual production is in: Enos, op.cit., p.226. 
3. Estimated octane ratings for petrol sold in Europe rose between 
1922 and 1928 from 51 to 58 (No. 1 grade) and from 43 to 55 
(No.3 grade). (Dunstan; Science of Petroleum, Vol.IV, p.2407) 
'4ID. 
Oil technology was thus advancing from its almost entirely 
empirical stage of the pre-war years to a state where scientific 
method was not only recognized as desirable but was, indeed, held to 
be essential to economic efficiency. The grim period of economic 
depression which was to follow in the early 1930's was to give added 
point to these considerations • 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
II. The Depression (1927-33) 
The oversupply of 1927 was the beginning of a phase of economic 
difficulty in the oil industry which lasted well into the 1930's. 
From 1926 to 1927 United States oil production had leaped from 
106,474,000 metric tons to 123,486,000 metric tons, turning a national 
supply deficiency of over 2 million tons to a surplus of over 9~ 
million tons and causing stocks to rise from 74 million tons to 84 
1. 
million tons. In 1928, however, the situation improved, following 
2. 
restrictive meas~es in various states, and production remained 
at approximately the 1927. level, causing some further addition to 
stocks, but not maintaining its threat of a further great increase. 
3. 
Then in mid-1929 the "restriction front" collapsed, and production 
once more forged ahead, reaching a total of 138,104,000 metric tons, 
resulting in the addition of a further ten million tons to American 
4. 
oil stocks. · 
1. Calculated from figures in "Commercial History and Review of 1929", 
The Economist, February 15th 1930, Vol. 110, p.45. 
2. Restriction of production was successfully enforced in the important 
oil-producing states of CkJ.2.homa, West Texas, and California. 
("The Stock Exchange: The Failure of Oil Restriction," 
The Economist, July 6th 1929, Vol. 109, p. 24). 
3. Due in the main to the individualism and unwillingness of certain 
groups to cooperate (The Economist, Vol. 109, p. 24). 
4. Stocks in terms of months' supply, however, were falling very 
slightly between 1927/(The Economist, Vol. 110, p. 45). 
and 1929 
·41. 
Durine this period world oil production, at a figure of 152,804,000 
metric tons in 1926, grew from 174,055,000 metric tons in 1927 to 
205,135,000 metric tons in 1929, the main factors in this rise being 
1. 
the United States' and Venezuelan production increases. The Middle 
East still remained a minor source of oil (under 6 million tons 
were produced from Persia and Egypt in 1929) accounting for about 
2. 
10/o of the amount moving in international trade in 1930. 
Overproduction was not new in the oil industry, and the 
over-supply situation in 1927-29 was not so much worse than it had 
3. 
been in 1923 that any great alarm need have been felt. Provided that 
demand kept on rising as it had been doing since the war, increased 
production from new discoveri~s - even such as that of the East 
4. 
Texas field in 1930 - and from technological advances, could be 
expected to find a market eventually. Old fields would decline, new 
outlets for oil products would be found, and thus demand would 
eventually approximate to supply. In the event, however, this state 
of affairs was not to come to pass for several years. 
1. Production figures from Dunstan, Science of Petroleum, Vol. I, 
pp. 22-23. 
2. Frank, op. cit., p. 13. 
3. In 1922 and 1923 excess of supply over demand had amounted to 
approximately 14 million tons each yea:r (The Economist, Vol. 110, p.45). 
4. The famous "Dad" Joiner's discovery, which was an important 
factor in the sudden drop in oil prices in 1930. See Tugendhat, 
op. cit., p. 93. 
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The general economic depression which began in 1929 prevented 
the oil industry from making a quick recovery from its difficulties, 
1. 
and, moreover, it intensified those difficulties. Whereas the 
overproduction of 1923 had been followed by a period of steadily 
rising demand,the 1927-29 overproduction was followed by a period of 
comparatively static, then falling, demand. Inevitably this meant 
a severe fall in prices and a cutting back of production. 
Taking 1926 prices as 100, prices in 1927-29 had been fairly 
steady at an average of 63, 86, and 96 for crude oil, gasoline, and 
"non-_pH." commodities. By 193 3, however, the corresponding figures 
. 2. 
had fallen to 25, 59, and 65. American oil production fell from 
its 1929 peak of 138 million metric tons to 107,645,000 metric tons 
in 1932 (after which it again rose). Production trends in other 
countries did not follow exactly the same pattern, but the effects 
3. 
of the depression can nevertheless be discerned. 
With the heavy fall in prices came the inevitable fall in 
profits, with some large American oil companies even recording losses 
4. 
in the depression years. It may be noted here, for reference later, 
that the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's net profit fell from £5.2 millions 
5. 
in 1929 to £2.3 millions in 1931, the consequent sudden reduction in 
1. (It is beyond the scope of this study to consider the interesting 
question of whetner or not the overproduction of oil (together 
with overproduction of aocrricultural products etc.) helped to 
bring on the general economic depression.) 
2. Waley-Cohen, "Economics of the Petroleum Industry," in Institution 
of Petroleum Technologists, Petroleum: Twenty-five Years' Retro-
spect, p. 24.(see Appendix III). 
3. See Appendix II. 
4. Some figures showing the effects of the depression on the profits of 
American (and other)companies may be found in O'Connor, op.cit., 
pp. 19-20. 
5. Figures from Shwadran, op. cit., P• 161. 
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the Persian Goverrunent's income from the Company precipitating a 
serious crisis in Government-Company relations (see Chapter 1?). 
During the period 1927 to 1933 the general trend in the 
refineries towards the production of gasoline at the expense of 
other products continued, notwithstanding the slowing effect of the 
1. 
depression on motor-car production. After 1929 the trend towards 
producing an increasingly smaller proportion of fuel oil from-the 
crude, noticeable since 1921, began to accelerate, possibly influenced 
by the especially severe effects of the depression on shipping 
(which was one of the principal users of fuel oil) and by the growth 
of the "cracking" process. In general the depression tended to 
enhance and strengthen trends already occurring; once the worst 
of the depression was over, the process of change from one product 
2. 
to another seems to have been less rapid. 
1. Figures for motor car registration in the United States were 
26,524,000 in 1930, only 24,751,000 in 1934. 
Dunstan, The Science of Petroleum, Vol. III, p. 2124. 
2. PrinciJ2al Petroleum Products from Crude Oil (Percentages) 
Gasoline and Gas and 
YEAR - Naphtha Kerosine Fuel Oil Lubricants 
1923 30.0 9.6 49.5 4.5 
1927 36.0 6.8 47.4 3.8 
1928 37 .4 6.6 46.7 3.8 
1929 39.4 5.8 45.4 3.5 
1930 42.0 5.3 40.2 3.7 
1931 44.3 4.7 37.7 3.0 
1932 44.7 5.3 35.9 2.7 
1933 47.3 4.4 36.7 2.9 
1934 47.4 6.o 37.5 2.8 
1935 48.2 5.7 35.3 2.8 
Source: 1.E.!£.; III, p. 2126. 
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The depression yea:rs severely hit oil tanker owners, with 
many ships lying idle, and freight rates at rock bottom.1 • 
These conditions certainly did not encourage innovation. However, 
one pa:rticular development by the Japanese during this period 
should be noted - the building of a very fast tanker in 1931. 2• 
The effect of the depression on oil technology was to emphasise 
the already strong trend towards the use of more scientific 
1. In August 1932 there were as many as 398 tankers (3,803,089 
tons dwt.) laid up. Institution of Petroleum Technologists. 
Petroleum: Twent1-Five Years' Retrospect, p.130. 
For graph of tanker freights 1922-1938, see Frankel, 
op. cit., p.159. 
2. The Japanese fast tankers had a cruising speed of 17! 
lmots, whereas the average tanker then had a speed 
of only 12 lmots. The Japanese hoped to use the 
fast tankers for conveying raw silk, or special fish 
and vegetable oils, on what would otherwise have been 
empty eastward journeys across the Pacific. 
(Apparently the use of the slower tankers for raw 
silk etc. was not practicable, for reasons connected 
with the nature of the market for such products). 
The Japanese navy soon became interested in this 
development - causing American and British navy men 
to take careful note. 
Dunn, op. cit., pp.76-77. 
Seventh Annual Report of the Oil Boa.rd, October 26th 
1932, p.14. 
CAB 50/4. O.B. 83. 
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techniques in the search for more efficient ways of developing 
existing resources. Thus, instead of emphasis being placed on 
the search for new fields, attention was concentrated instead on 
the more economical development of fields already in production. 
In practice, however, this did not bring about any great change 
in the area most in need of such development, the United States. 
In that country the general acceptance in theory of the 
principles of scientific unit control of a:n oilfield was not 
followed by any noticeable implementation of those principles, 
despite the incentive which depression conditions gave to such 
development. 1 • As always the American "free-for-all" system 
prevailed, to the detriment of the industry in general. 
Lack of incentive to find new fields notwithstanding, 
some development in geophysical methods of finding likely 
oil-bearing structures continued in the depression years. 2• At 
the same time, improvements to the rotary drill (in particular 
the development of harder drilling bits) were made. The use of 
steel of higher tensile strength enabled pipeline thicknesses 
to be reduced, while still allowing pumping pressures to 
be increased. Techniques were also developed whereby the 
production of longer sections of pipeline became 
1. For example, with unit control there would be more control over 
the production from a particular area, and to some extent pro-
duction could be adjusted to market conditions. Unit control 
was in itself a more economical process, since waste, loss of 
pressure etc. could be avoided. 
2. Seismic surveying methods made some progress in this period. 
possible, resulting in the reduction of time, labour, and mater:'..a.1 
1. 
expenditure on jointing in the field. 
While the "cracking" process continued to develop during the 
period 1927-1933, stimulated by the continuing demand for gasoline 
of ever higher octane ratings, at the same time a newer process, 
hydrogenation, was nioyirig. __ ; from the laboratory stage to that of 
large-scale experimentation. In 1930 pilot plants were operating 
in both the United States and Britain, and much experimental work 
was in progress in Germany. However, while many of the purely technical 
problems had been overcome, most of the economic ones remained, 
thereby preventing any full scale exploitation of the process during 
2. 
this period. 
1. Institution of Petroleum Technologists Petroleum: Twenty-Five 
Years' Retrospect, pp. 62-67, 115-119. 
Dunstan, Science of Petroleum, Vol. I, pp.272-275 and page XI. 
2. Hydrogenation - a process whereby (in this case) the ratio of 
hydrogen to carbon in either coal or petroleum could be increased 
- had been the subject of discussion and experiment since the 
early 1920's. The aim of the process was, in the case of the 
hydrogenation of coal, to produce oil products as substitutes-. 
for those derived from natural oil. In the hydrogenation of 
natural oil itself, however, the aim was to improve the yield 
of particular products (especially of high grade gasoline) as 
compared with the yield from either straight distillation or from 
"cracking" processes. 
Institution of Petroleum Technologists. Petroleum, Twenty-Five 
Years' Retrospect, p. 107. 
K. Gordon "Development of hydrogenation and Fischer-Tropsche 
processes in Germany," Journal of the Institute of Petroleum 
Vol. 33 (1947) PP• 469-470. 
Parliamentary Papers (H of C) 1937-38 (Cmd 5665) xii, 439, "Report 
of the Committee of Imperial Defence Sub Committee on Oil from 
Coal", pp. 26-35. 
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III The Achnacarry Agreement 
The period of economic difficulty from 1927 to 1933 naturally 
had its effect on the attitude of the oil companies to each 
other. However, while on the one hand the difficulties of the 
situation tended to make each company more than ever ready to 
fight its rivals for a share in whatever markets were still open 
and unsaturated, on the other hand those same difficulties also 
led the companies to seek to cooperate with each other in order 
thereby to lessen those difficulties. 
In 1928 the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, which since the war 
had continued to expand its activities outside its main base, 
Persia, entered into an agreement to pool its distributing 
facilities in its Eastern markets with those of the Asiatic 
Petroleum Company, a Royal Dutch-Shell Company subsidiary. This 
was followed, in the succeeding four years, by the amalgamation 
of the distributing facilities of the two companies in Britain 
and elsewhere. During 1928, also, the Burmah Oil Company, which 
held a large shareholding in the Ahglo-Persian Oil Company, bought 
one million ordinary shares in the Shell Transport and Trading 
Company. There was thus a certain degree of interlocking 
between the three main British companies.1 • 
1. Tugendhat, op.cit., p.107. 
Also various Foreign Office papers in F0371/12835/file 1270. 
Also: Great Britain, Public Record Office, Treasury, Summary of 
Conclusions of Conference of Ministers Feb 16th l 28. 
T. 1 1 284. file s.33045 2. 
"The Stock Exchange: Cooperation in the Oil Industry", .!e.! 
Economist, December 21st 1929, Vol.109, p.1196. 
48. 
Competition between the Americans and British (including 
British-Dutch) companies had not generally been very fierce during 
the period when supply was busily chasing demand. The change in 
the situation in 1927, however, and the realization of what damage 
an all-out trade war could wreak on the oil industry as a whole -
as eXQlllplified in the bitter Shell-Standard Oil (New York) struggle 
over Russian oil in 1927-281 • - led the major international oil 
companies anxiously to review their policies. As a result, on 
September 17th 1928 the three principal figures in the inter-
national oil world - w.c. Teagle2• of Standard Oil (New Jersey), 
Deterding3• (Royal Dutch-Shell group) and Sir John Cadman4.(Anglo-
1. The Royal Dutch-Shell Company wanted Standard Oil (New York) 
to cease buying Russian oil. This would help Shell's campaign 
against Russian expropriation of oil properties. On Standard Oil's 
refusal to cooperate, Shell attempted to price them out of the 
Indian market. In a very short time the "war" had spread to 
hU.rope and the U.S.A. Tugendhat , op. cit • , p. 98. 
United States, Senate, Small Business Select Committee on the 
International Petroleum Cartel, Staff Report to Federal Trade 
Commission (Committee Report,82nd CongTess,2nd Session)(1952), 
pp.197-198. 
2. w.c. Teagle was President of the Standard Oil Company (New 
Jersey). In the early 1920's he played a large part in the 
negotiations leading to the American entry into the Turkish 
Petroleum Company (see below, Chapter 3, Sections III and IV). 
3. Sir Henri W.A. Deterding (1866-1939) 
Started in Indonesian Branch of Nederlandsche Handel 
Maatschappij "showing that grasp of essential figures and data 
which throughout his life allowed him to take quick, well-
balanced decisions in complicated situations". Joined Royal 
Dutch Petroleum Co. in 1896, and in 1900 became managing director. 
In 1907, on the merging of the Royal Dutch and Shell 
Companies, he became its first managing director (till 1936). 
He was knighted in 1920, following on the great services of his 
Company to the Allies during the War. 
Deterding was probably the most shrewd and able international 
oilman of his time, and his personal ability was no small factor 
in the growth in wealth and importance of the Royal Dutfill-Shell 
Company. He was, however, rather sensitive and his temper was 
(please see following page) 
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Persian Oil Company) - concluded an agreement at Achnacarry, in 
Scotland, which set the pattern for all the later attempts during 
the 1930's to establish overall control of the world's markets. 1 • 
The Agreement, entitled the "Pool Association", but more 
commonly referred to as the "Achnacarry Agreement", set out certain 
principles, aimed at stabilizing the world oil situation, in so 
far as companies' proportionate shares of the marltet outside the 
United States were concerned, as it existed in 1928, thereby 
eliminating competition between the signatories. Pooling of the 
signatories' distribution facilities, reciprocal exchanges of 
(footnote 3 continued from preceding page) 
quickly roused particularly, it would appear, in dealings with 
Government officials. 
See: Encyclopedia Britannica (Chicago, 1969) Vol. 7, p.311 
Henri Deterding and s. Naylor. International Oilman, 
(London, 1934). 
(footnote 4 from preceding page) 
4. Sir John Cadman (later Lord) (1877-1941) 
Inspector of Mines in 1902. Government Mining Engineer in 
Trinidad in 1904, where he first became interested in oil. 
Professor of Mining and Petroleum Technology at Birmingham 
University 1908-1920. Adviser on Petroleum (and other matters) 
to the Colonial Office and Board of Trade. A member of the 
Royal Commission which reported on the Persian oilfields in 
1913-14. 
During the First World Wa:r Cadman served on the Petroleum 
Executive, and was later a member of the Petroleum Imperial 
Policy Committee. He continued as a Government official until 
late in 1921, when he joined the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. In 
1927 Cadman became Chairman of that Company, and then also 
Chairman of the Turkish (later Iraq) Petroleum Company. (see 
below, passim, for further comments). 
Biography of Cadman: J. Rowland and Lord Cadman, Ambassador 
for Oil (London, 1960). 
1. Select Committee on International Petroleum Cartel, p.199. 
Tugendhat, op.cit., p.100. 
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supplies, allocation of quotas for each market, and the establish-
ment of a detailed pricing system (the "Gulf-plus" system 
formalised, in effect) were envisaged. It was hoped thus to 
eliminate competition and to reduce costs, and, thereby, to 
maintain both consumption (by making prices attractive) and profit 
levels. l. 
The Achnacarry Agreement was not meant to set up a "closed 
shop", however, since it was in the signatories' interests to 
ensure the application of its principles to all the leading 
companies in the extra-United States market. 2• The formation, 
within a few months of the signature of the Achnacarry Agreement, 
of two American export trade associations, having a common link 
in the Standard Oil Company (New Jersey), which, as has been seen, 
was a signatory of the Achnacarry AgTeement, meant that the 
principles envisaged at Achnacarry would have the widest possible 
application.3· 
The Agreement had excluded the United States from its sphere 
of action because of the American anti-trust laws with which it 
1. Select Committee on International Petroleum Cartel,pp.200,205. 
2. Tugendhat, op.cit., p.102. 
3. The u.s. export assiciations allocated quotas to individual 
member companies, on a similar principle to that of the 
Achnacarry Agreement. Select Committee on International 
Petroleum Cartel pp.201-202, 218-228. 
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might otherwise come into conflict. Inside the United States a 
move towards cooperation and reduction of competition was going 
forward,neverthelese, but, due to legal and other difficulties, the 
measures adopted there were never very effective.1 • 
The oil companies' schemes for a worldwide cartel 
soon ran into trouble, and the Achnacarry Agreement 
itself proved to be "more of a statement of things hoped 
for than a practicable guide 112 • for achieving the companies' 
objectives. While some success was achieved in fixing 
1. ~- pp.210-213. 
"The Stock Exchange: The Failure of Oil Restriction", 
The Economist, July 6th 1929, Vol. 109, 
p.24. 
2. Select Committee on International Petroleum Cartel, 
p.210. 
1. 
prices in the British market, in the world as a whole the fact that, 
extensive though it was, the cartel as operated did not in fact 'incltide 
all sources of likely competition in all markets, led in the end to 
the disruption of the scheme. Further attempts, on similar lines, 
to achieve a viable cartellization scheme all succumbed to the stronger 
inter-play of economic forces. Only when·the worst of the depression 
had passed did such schemes stand any real chance of success, although 
2. 
even then such cooperation as was achieved was less real than apparent. 
The oil companies' grandiose schemes, had they been more successful, 
would inevitably have come into conflict with the policies of national 
governments, which were becoming increasingly involved in oil 
affairs. The French Goverhment was especially concerned to regulate 
the activities of the oil companies in its territory, and it had a 
definite policy to foster the development of the refining industry in 
France. The Italian Government also was taking a keen interest in 
oil, having established the state-controlled Azienda Generale Italiani 
Petroli in 1926 as a means of developing Italian oil·resources at 
home and engaging in the exploitation of oil sources abroad. The 
Japanese, sp-µrred on by naval needs, were unlikely to allow the oil 
companies a free hand in developing schemes of their own without 
1. Tugendhat, op. cit., p. 105. 
"The Price of Petrol", The Economist, March 9th 1929. Vol. 108, 
p. 489. 
"The Stock Exchange: Cooperation in the Oil Industry", 
The Economist, December 21st 1929, Vol. 109, P• 1197. 
"Commercial History and Review of 1929", The Economist, February 15th 
1930, Vol. 110, p.45. 
2. Tugendhat, op. cit., pp.105-7· 
Select Committee on International Petroleum Cartel, pp.229-241 
(et. seq.). 
reference to their vital interests, while the rise of the Nazi Party 
to power in Germany -in 1933 certainly precluded any government 
1. 
disinterest in supplies of oil to Germany. In Britain the dislike 
of state interference with private interests might have allowed the 
oil companies free rein for a time, but only for as long as the oil 
companies did not threaten either to jeopardise what the British 
Government considered to be its vital interests or so to arouse public 
2. 
opinion as to necessitate government action.. The action of the 
British Government in taking over a majority shareholding in the 
Anglo-Persian Oil Company in 1914, and its subsequent refusal to 
. 3. 
relinquish that shareholding, sufficiently indicate that Government's 
interest in oil matters and, moreover, show that, in the last resort, 
the British Government would have been capable of ensuring that no 
all-embracing cartel could have been set up without its (at least tacit) 
consent. Thus, while to some extent the oil companies might have 
been able to hold governments to ransom over oil supplies, they were 
by no means capable of entirely controlling the situation, and they 
1. Tugendhat, op. cit., pp. 109-110. 
2. The British Government was stirred to action by public clamour 
against rising petrol prices in 1929. The principal oil companies 
were then asked for statements showing the reason for these price 
rises. On this see: 
"Commercial History and Review of 1929," The Economist, February 15th 
1930, Vol. 110, PP• 45-46 
Parliamentary Papers (H of C) 1928~29 (Cmd 3296) xvi, 685. 
"Prices of Petroleum Products: Statement by the Oil Companies 
concerned". 
Parliamen~ Debates, (H of C) 5th Ser, Vol. 226 (1928-29) 
cols. :12 -7, i6oo, 1846-8, 2261-2. 
3. See below, Chapter 4. 
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needed the cooperation of the national governments equally as much 
as those governments needed the cooperation of the oil companies -
at least, as long as the nations were at peace. 
r:v The British Aspect: 1919-33 
How did Britain fa.re in the period 1919 to 1933? She had 
emerged as a victor from the First World War, but she had then 
to face the new problems which peace brought, in a world which 
bore little resemblance to that in which she had once seemed pre-
eminent. Immediately after the war there was a boom period of 
industrial activity, caused by demand for products in short supply 
during the war, and by demand for such things as shipping to 
replace war losses. 1 • Then, from mid-1920, came depression and 
a greatly reduced demand for British goods, due in the main to 
the industrial growth of other nations. Although there was some 
recovery of British industrial growth from 1924 (until 1929) the 
rate of growth of British industry was far less than in Germany, 
France, or the United States. The last-named, which had profited 
greatly from the re-orientation of pre-war trading patterns, and 
which had emerged from the war as·-·a great creditor nation, soon displaced 
Britain from the position of the world's chief exporter of 
1. 
manufactured goods. 
A serious decline in the export of Britain's one major raw 
material, coal, also occurred, largely because of the increasing 
utilization of foreign coal and the use of alternative sources of 
2. 
power such as hydro-electricity and oil. This decline further weakened 
Britain's position in world trade. 
The decline in Britain's economic importance in the world 
naturally had political implications. The loss of economic prosperity 
led to reluctance to finance overseas commitments and to calls for 
reductions in general military and naval expenditure. The general 
public mood following the war was, in any case, inclined to lean 
3. 
heavily towards pacifism and general non-involvement. Hence Britain 
sought once again to let Europe look after itself, while she busied 
herself with her own affairs. 
In 1913 Britain's consumption of oil products was approximately 
1. Dunning and Thomas, op. cit., p. 19. 
W.H.B. Court, A Concise Economic History of Britain (London, 1965) 
pp. 224, 339-341. 
D. Thomson, Europe since Napoleon (Harmondsworth, 1966) pp.600-
601. 
?. Dunning and Thomas, op. cit., pp. 20-21. 
The effects of the Reparations clauses, whereby, for example, 
Italy received coal from Germany as Reparations, which coal she 
had formerly used to import from Britain, can be seen as tending 
further to dislocate pre-war trading patterns to the disaivantage 
of Britain. 
3. The tendency to pursue a vigorous foreign policy was partially 
responsible for Lloyd George's fall in 1922. 
(~.N·~ Med:U,C~!·t. O'o'n:t,eumo.Taiif. Etf6ha.nd (London, 1967), pp.171-173). 
2 million tons. By 1921 this had increased to 2~ million tons, from 
which it grew to 3l million tons in 1923, and to 5 millions in 1927. 
Consumption in 1926 had even reached over 5,300,000 tons, due to the 
Coal Strike of that yea:r, but it then fell to 4,994,000 tons in 1927. 
United Kingdom imports of refined products in 1919 consisted of 41% 
fuel and gas oils (1913 figure: 32;~) 28% motor and other spirit 
(1913 figure: 20%) 21% kerosine (1913 figure: 31%) and 9% lubricating 
oils (1913 figure: 14fo). The swing towa:rds motor and other spirit 
continued in the 1920's, reaching 33% in 1923 and 46% in 1927, while 
kerosine drifted down to only 12% in 1927. Fuel and gas oils reached 
a peak of around 47% in 1920, then slowly declined to 36% in 1927. 
1. 
Lubricating oils fluctuated between 8% and 10% during the period. 
Although most of Britain's imports were still in the form of 
refined products (as before the war) significant developments in the 
United Kingdom refining industry took place during the early 1920's. 
In 1919 there had been only two refineries in Britain, one at 
Pumpherston, erected in 1884, and the Shell Haven plant, erected in 
1916. Then in 1921 the Agwi Petroleum Company erected a plant at 
Fawley (later taken over by the Anglo-American Oil Company) and the 
Anglo-Persian Oil Company in the same year erected the first 
1. Figures based on data in the Files of the Petroleum Information 
Bureau, and on data in King, op. cit., pp. 551-552. 
Bitumen consumption rose from under 2% in 1921 (44,000 tons) to 
nearly 5% in 1927 (282,000 tohs). 
The annual value of Britain's oil imports in the later 1920's 
was almost £40 million.· This was only a very small proportion . 
of total annual imports (all commodities) which were over £1,000 
million in value. 
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large-scale refinery in Britain for processing imported oil, at 
Llandarcy. The latter company followed this up in 1924 by the erection 
of another plant at Grangemouth, and at Stanlow Shell erected a small 
1. 
bitumen plant. Imports of crude oil into the United Kingdom grew 
from an insignificant amount just after the war to nearly half a 
million metric tons in 1921, and to well over two million metric tons 
by 1927. In the latter year approximately one third of all British 
2. 
petroleum imports were in the form of crude oil. 
The depression after 1929 definitely slowed down the rate of 
growth of Britain's volume of oil imports. From 1927 to 1929 the 
import of refined products into Britain (excluding bunkers) grew 
from 4,994,000 to 5,868,000 tons, an average increase of 437,000 tons 
per year (or almost 17% over the two years.). From 1929 to 1932, 
however, the growth was from 5,868,000 tons to 6,671,000 tons, an 
average increase of only 268,000 tons per yea:x (or only 14% over i 
3. 
years). Imports of crude oil had already begun to fall before 
the depression (1927 figure 2,700,000 t0ns; 1929 figure 2,600,000 tons) 
1. Petroleum Information Bureau, Oil - The United Kingdom Refining 
Industry (London, 1968) pp. 1 - 4. 
2. Institute of Petroleum, The Petroleum Industry in the United 
Kingdom, p. 55. . 
Some of the crude oil imported was no doubt re-exported as refined 
products, but the quantities involved cannot have been great.(In 
1938 re-exports totalled just over half a million tons). 
3. Figures from King, op. cit.,pp. 551-552. 
The annual value of oil imports (including crude) dropped from 
£46 million to £29 million between 1930 and 1931, although the 
volume imported remained almost the same in these years. 
(Files of the Petroleum Information Bureau). 
~sa. 
following Government imposition of a tax on imported light hydrocarbon 
1. 
oils. The depression merely accentuated this fall, helping thereby 
to halt the progress made in refinery construction during the early 
2. 
1920's. 
Of the refined products, gasoline continued to increase its 
lead over the others, although the depression years made little impact 
on the rate of this increase. The only really significant changes 
which occurred were a pronounced drop in the consumption of lubricating 
oils, probably attributable to the slump in industrial activity,and 
the first appearance in quantity of diesel fuel for use in diesel-
engined road vehicles, following the introduction of this type of 
3. 
vehicle in 1928. 
1. A tax of 4d per gallon was imposed. This did not apply to oil 
products from shale or from coal. One reason for this tax was the 
desire to help the Scottish shale oil industry, and to encourage 
oil from coal projects. From the strategic point of view it seems 
curious that measures should be taken at this time which would hit 
the refining industry in Britain, even if the measure was designed 
to foster the development of indigenous sources. 
Institute of Petroleum, Petroleum Industry in the United Kingdom, 
p.52. 
Parliamentary Papers. (H of C) 1937-38 (Cmd 5665) xii, 439. 
"Report of the Committee of Imperial Defence Subcommittee on Oil 
from Coal" p. 57. 
2. The refineries constructed in Britain from 1928 to 1932 were designed 
mainly for bitumen production.(Petroleum Information Bureau, Oil -
The United Kingdom Refining Industry, (Lonaon;: .1968) pp.4-5). 
By 1931 crude oil imports had fallen to 1,400,000 tons. Thereafter 
they rose slowly to 2,000,000 tons in 1935. (Petroleum Information 
Bureau, Petroleum Industry in the United Kingdom, p. 55). . 
3. United Kingdom Inland Consumption 1927-1932 (Thousands of tons) 
Year Motor and Kero sine Derv. Gas 1 Diesel, ~- Others Total 
Other ~irit ~ Fuel Oils. Oils 
1927 2,304 744 0 1,125 430 391 4,994 
1929 2,971 722 0.1 1,243 471 461 5,868 
1932 3,586 722 10.0 1,441 412 500 6,671 
Source: King, op. cit., pp. 551-552. 
., Ct!) 
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During the period 1919 to 1933 there were significant changes in 
the sources from which Britain obtained her oil products. What little 
crude oil Britain imported in the years 1919 and 1920 came mainly 
from the United States, Mexico, and Trinidad, but from 1921 onwards 
the bulk of the crude oil (80 - 90 per cent) came from Persia. For 
refined products the pattern was similar, although Persian refined 
oils did not loom so large in the picture as they did for crude oil. 
In 1919 65% of Britain's refined products came from the United States, 
18%-from Mexico, and various minor amounts came from at least six 
other sources, including Persia (3%). By 1923, however, the United 
States' share had fallen to 377~, with Persia (267~) overtaking Mexico 
(245s) for second place. The next four years saw little change in 
the American and Persian percentages, but Mexico fell away to well 
under 10%, while Venezuela took over third place with amounts rising 
to 16%. The later years also saw the re-emergence of Russia and 
Rumania as suppliers of oil to Britain, although even by 1927 these 
1. 
sources together did not supply as much as 10% of Britain's oil. 
The period frOfn 1927 to the beginning of recovery after the 
depression in Britain (1932-33) saw the end of the United States' 
long rule as chief supplier of Britain's refined oil products. By 
1932 the United States supplied only 21% of Britain's imports of 
refined products (as against 39% in 1928), and only 14% in 1933. 
Venezuela, which had supplied 16%, in 1928 now took first place, 
1. Files of the Petroleum Information Bureau. 
::.60. 
supplying 31% of Britain's refined products in 1933. The p~oportion 
obtained from Persia during this period varied between 20% and 24%. 
Persia still held first place as supplier of crude oil to British 
refineries, however, although by 1933 she supplied only 57% (compared 
1. 
with 82% in 1928) of all British crude oil imports. 
The trend away from American predominance in Britain's supplies 
is accounted for by economic changes rather than by any fixed British 
policy to reduce dependence on the United States, although, as pointed 
out in the previous chapter, reduction of this dependence was certainly 
considered. desirable in Government circles. The growth of the Anglo-
Persian Oil Company, and the expansion of the Royal Dutch-Shell's 
production and marketing facilities, together possibly with the 
effects of the reduction in the availability of American oil for 
export in the early 1920's, were primarily r~sponsible for this 
development. 
Although Britain's strategic supply situation was improved 
somewhat by the development of Persian oil (and by the promise of 
Iraqi oil - see Chapters 10 and 11), conveniently placed on the route 
to the East, and by the amounts available in Trinidad, Britain was 
still dependent· on foreign sources for the bulk of her supplies. The 
British Empire was still by no means a prol~fic source of oil, nor 
2. 
was Britain herself and the great hopes of the Bergius and other 
' 3. 
methods of deriving oil from coal were far from realization. 
1. ~· 
Footnotes 2 and 3, please see following page. 
·:[,-, 
--ClJL• 
Thus, even though it was still very true that the age of Britain's 
predominant indigenous raw material, coal, was far from over - while 
Britain consumed 7 million tons of oil in 1933, she also produced 
1. 
thirty times that amount of coal - this was of little comfort, for, 
should war come, Britain's armed forces would need oil, not coal, 
with which to defend the Empire. 
Footnote 2 from preceding page 
In 1933 the British Empire produced:-
Trinidad 
India (Burma) 










(Dunstan~ Science of Petroleum, Vol. I, pp. 22-23). 
Scottish shale oil production was about 120,000 tons. 
United Kingdom indigenous natural oil production was negligible. 
To the above total could be added 7 million tons in Persia, 
and oil was soon to flow from Iraq. Against this, however, must 
be set the fact that India, Canada, and Egypt had nothing to spare 
for export (and, indeed, needed oil imports) while distance robbed 
the Sarawak and Brunei fields of much of their direct importance 
to Britain. In reality, only the Persian and Trinidad supply 
sources were as yet of much value in affording oil to the Empire, 
and, of prime importance, to the British navy. 
Footnote 3 from preceding page 
Tecl)nically the Bergius method of high pressure, high temperature 
distillation of oil from coal was making progress during these 
years, but its progress towards becoming a realistic economic 
proposition for obtaining oil was still very doubtful. 
"Dr. Bergius would not commit himself on the question of cosis," -
("Notes of the Week: Petrol from Coal," The Economist, January 1st 
1927, Vol. 104, p.16). 
See Dunstan, Science of Petroleum,.Vol. III. p.2149. 
For an account of British experiments in these years see:-
Parliamenta.ry Papers (H ... o~; .. P) 1937-38 (Cmd. 5665) xii, 439 
"Report of Committee o:( Defence Subcommittee on Oil from Coal", 
pp. 15-35. 
1. British coal production in 1933 was 207 million tons. (London and 
Cambridge Economic Service, Key Statistics of the British Economy 
1900-1962, p. 9.) 
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CHAPTER. 2 
BRITAIN'S STRATEGIC OIL POLICY 1919-1932 
I Admiralty Oil Reserves Policy 
During the period 1919 to 1932 the British Government's 
strategic thinking was governed by certain main assumptions. 
Firstly, there was the general assumption, adopted in i919, 1 • 
that there would be no major war in which Britain would be involved 
for ten years; in 1928 this assumption was put on the basis of 
advancing day by day, so that for any one day it could be assumed 
that for ten years hence there would be no major wa.r. 2• Secondly, 
it was considered inconceivable that there would ever be a war 
1. CB.biriet :Jttnutes~ "Augi# 15th 1919. CAB 23/15. 616A. 
Strictly speaking, this assumption applied only to the 
Estimates of 1919, but it was generally carried forward 
to apply to succeeding Estimates (even before 1928). It 
was supplemented by more specific assumptions, !Hi· in 
1925, that there would be no war with Japan for ten years. 
(Cabinet Minutes, May 6th 1925, CAB 23/50. 24 (25) 3.) 
2. Minutes of the Committee 
CAB 2 5 236th Meeting 
Jul 
between Britain and the United States, 1 • and a similar view was 
held of the possibility of there being a war between Britain and 
Fr 2. ance. Germany had not yet arisen from its defeat of 1918 
to challenge Europe, and Italy was not apprehended as a probable 
enemy. Only Russia and Japan seemed even remotely to represent 
any threat to British interests, and for most of the period the 
former country's potential menace seemed to lie more in its 
subversive activities in Europe and elsewhere than in its potential 
as a military power. 3• Thirdly, although for various reasons 
Japan could thus be made to appear as the greatest single menace 
to Britain's Imperial interests, war even with that power was 
1. Anglo-American relations in the period immediately after 
the First World War (1919 - 21) were not always cordial, 
friction occurring over, inter alia, naval matters (on which 
see s.w. Roskill, Naval Policy between the Wars, Vol. I 
(London 1968)), and over the control of oil sources (see 
Chapter 3 below). The two nations were never really in danger 
of going to war,how~v-e.y-. 
See the review of the "Origin and Present Position of the 
Decision to make no defensive Preparations against America as 
a possible enemy", in Note by Secretary to Committee of Imperial 
Defence "Three uestions of Im erial Defence Related to lo-
American relations", November 27th 1928. CAB 24 199. CP.3 8, 
pp.2-6. 
2. See for example Prime Minister Baldwin's statement in Minutes 
of Chiefs of Staff Sub Committee of the Committee of Im erial 
Defence, December 19th 1927 CAB 53 2. c.o.s. 63rd Meeting, 
page 2. 
War with France, however, was perhaps not quite so "inconceiv-
able" as was war with the United States, in view of the 
perennial Anglo-French disputes over Middle Ea.stern questions. 
3. In 1929, however, this view was qualified somewhat with regard 
to Russia's possible menace to the maintenance of Afghanistan 
as an independent buffer state between Russia and India. 
(see below). 
considered to be unlikely. 1 • 
The above assumptions were laid down by the politicians of 
the day, and were not always considered to be sound by military 
and naval thinkers who, indeed, held some of them to be dangerous 
in the extreme - especially after the Anglo-Japanese alliance had 
been abandoned, and when naval tonnage ratios had been set, at 
the Washington Conference, at values which precluded any return 
by Britain to global supremacy at sea. 2• The assumptions were 
used, however, as the basis on which the annual estimates were framed, 
and as working hypotheses on which planning could proceed. 
During the First World War the British navy had become almost 
entirely oil-fired, and it was thus natural that after the war the 
Admiralty should be very much concerned with the security of its oil 
sources. Of particular interest were Persia and Mesopotamia, where 
it was felt that ultimately oil production would be very great. 
The Admiralty was anxious to ensure that Britain should exercise the 
dominant control in those areas, but even those areas, when fully 
developed,would not in themselves guarantee the navy's oil supplies. 
This was so because "supplies(from those areas would)have to come 
by a long and difficult sea route and even if a pipeline (were) con-
structed to a Syrian port it(would) always be vulnerable and transport 
through the Mediterranean (might) be hazardous". The British 
1. See for example remarks made in 1925 by responsible British 
Ministers (Cabinet Minutes, May 6th 1925. CAB 23/50. 24(25)3). 
The British were jerked out of complacency in 1931 by 
Japan's Manchurian adventure, however (see below). 
2. For a particularly powerful attack on the view that Japan 
represented no threat to British interests see Memo by First 
Lord of the Admiralty, "Political outlook in the Far East", 
¥1.a.rch 5th 1925. CAB 24/172. CP 139. 
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navy would therefore, in certain circumstances 
' still be depen~ent 
to a vex~ large extent on the United States for its supplies. The 
only way to minimize this· dependence, the Admiralty reasoned, would 
be to maintain large reserves. In putting this point to the Cabinet 
in January 1919, the Admiralty recommended that these reserves be 
fixed at a minimum of twelve months' war consumption, which was 
estimated to be 4,500,000 tons. This expenditure would be large, 
the Admiralty admitted, but it would be spread over a considerable 
period, and in any case was, in practical terms, 
relatively negligible when it is remembered that the mobility 
of the British Navy is dependent upon it and that all other 
measures for the defence of the Empire may be rendered nugatory 
if oil fuel is not available and is known not to be available 
at moments of diplomatic pressure. 1. 
2. 
On January 17th 1919 the Admiralty proposals were approved. In 
the immediate aftermath of a war which had "abundantly demonstrated 
that the policy 03.storing large stocks of oil in this country (was9 a 
vital necessity", there was little or no opposition to these 
proposals. This situation, however, was soon to change, and, following 
4. 
the aAoption of the "Ten Years' Assumption" on August 15th 1919, the 
1. Admiralt Memo: Oil Fuel Reserve for the Na in Home Waters, 
January 3rd 1919. C.AJ3 24 72 2. GT.6594. 
See also:-
Admiralt Polic in Relation to the Peace 
ADM 11 18 1. 
The American Naval Estimates 
FO 371 4330 18989 189896. 
2. War Cabinet Minutes, January 17th 1919. CAB 23/9. 517(3). 
3. Note by W.R. Long, January 8th 1919. CAB 24/73. GT.6634. 
4 The assumption that there would be no major war for ten years. 
• Cabinet Minutes, August 15th 1919. CAB 23/15. 616A. 
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first of many reductions in the Admiralty's plans to secure a naval 
1. 
oil reserve was proposed in November of that yea:r. 
Undismayed as yet by these signs of the times, however (possibly 
because of them?) the Admiralty proceeded to elaborate its overall 
oil schemes, and in February 1920 asked the Cabinet to approve the 
laying down of an oil reserve, additional to that for the navy, of 
1,500,000 tons (over a period of ten years) for the supply of British 
2. 
merchant shipping. Instead of being granted approval for this 
expenditure, however, the Admiralty was asked "in view of the present 
high prices" to defer for a yea:r the further building up of the naval 
reserve, which was also at that time scheduled for completion in ten 
3. 
years. Later the Admiralty was asked to make further reductions in 
4. 
its estimated expenditure on naval oil fuel. 
1. Finance Committee Minutes, November 24th 1919. CAB 27/71. 16(3) 
2. Admiralt and Petroleum Executive Memo: Oil Fuel Reserve for British 
Oil-Burning Merchant Ships, February 5th 1920. CAB 24 98. CP. 01. 
There were no specific plans for oil reserves for Britain's general 
internal use (nor for the Army or R.A.F.) at this time. The 
Admiralty reasoned that if the navy and the mercantile marine had 
enough oil for their own use, they could guarantee supplies for 
these other requirements. (Note: The Admiralty was not keen to 
accelerate the change from coal to oil for merchant vessels. See 
Department 6f Trade and Industry, C. Walker to Petroleum Imperial 
Policy Committee, November 14th 1918. POWER 33/44). 
3. At this point reserves stood at 1,400,000 tons, and it was planned 
to build this up to 4,500,000 tons by January 1929, by annual 
increments. In the year 1919-20 there had been no addition to 
reserves, mainly because of lack of storage capacity. 
Finance Committee Minutes, February 17th 1920. CAB 27/71. 20(2). 
Admiralty Board Minutes, February 18th 1920. ADM 167/60. (1154). 
4. Finance Conmdttee Minutes, January 4th 1921. CAB 27/71. 31(3). 
Admiralty Board Minutes, January 20th 1921. ADM 167/63. (1305). 
Linked with the general question of oil reserves was the 
question of Singapore. The war plans of the British navy ·were 
directed primarily towards dealing with the potential danger from 
the strongest naval power other than the United States - Japan. 1 • 
For this reason the Admiralty had pressed for the construction 
of a first-class naval base at Singapore to which the main Fleet 
could be sent in the event of an emergency in the Far East. A 
large reserve of oil fuel was to be located there to ensure that 
the Fleet would be fully operational without having to place 
undue reliance on more distant supply sources. As is well 
known, the Singapore project came under fire from economisers in 
and out of Parliament, and for a period in 1924 the project was 
even suspended by the Labour Government. Labour's decision was 
much disapproved of by the Admiralty, of course, which foresaw the 
navy being thus made unduly dependent on Persian supplies for its 
operations in the Far East. 2• 
1. Summar 
ADM 167 
Even after the resumption of the 
2. See particularly the remarks made by Lord Beatty to 
the Committee of Imperial Defence in Minutes of the Committee 
of Im erial Defence Ma th 1 2 • 
CAB 2 4. 184th Meeting 
See also B.B. Schofield, British Sea Power (London, 
1967), p.111. 
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project under the Conservatives, the slow rate of accumulation of 
oil reserves at Singapore continued to trouble naval minds. 
Another problem associated with the naval oil reserves problem 
was that concerning control of possible oil sources within the 
Empire. There had never been any consistent Imperial policy 
regarding the granting of oil leases, and when an investigation 
was carried out in 1920 it was found that regulations varied 
widely. For example, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, and 
some parts of the West Indies had no restrictions on development 
(for oil) of Crown lands by foreign interests, while, for instance, 
India, Trinidad, and British Guiana imposed severe restrictions 
on such development, allowing entry only to British capital; 
Canada, Nigeria and Somaliland operated rules midway between 
these two extremes. Some attempt was made by the Petroleum 
Department, in the early 1920's, to establish a consistent leasing 
h . d 1. policy throughout the Empire, but nothing concrete was ac ieve • 
It was not until later events in Ba.hrein, Kuwait, and British 
Guiana forced the British Government to review Imperial Oil-
leasing policies, in the early 1930's, that any further attempt 
1. On this see Foreign Office Papers under the following 
references:-
FO 371/4329/180802/195242, 199468. 
Fo 371/7014/757/w4017, w0377, wi2305. 
FO 371/0300/6200/7090. 
FO 371/8494/79/3524, 4079, 4695, 
FO 371/9403/147/Y/5239· 
at change was made (see chapter 13). Meantime, such development 
as there was in British territory failed to have any appreciable 
effect on Admiralty oil reserve plans. Britain still had to rely 
almost entirely on foreign sources for her vital oil supplies. 
To return to the naval oil reserves policy proper. In 
February 1924 the Committee of Imperial Defence reaffirmed the 
War Cabinet decision of 1919 to lay down a total reserve of oil 
fuel for the navy equivalent to one year's consumption, though 
this reserve was only to be completed by 1937. The disposition 
of the reserves as they were accumulated was to be left entirely 
at the discretion of the Admiralty, however, thus leaving it free 
to concentrate on building up reserves on the Eastern route, 
which reserves it hoped to complete by 1931.1 • Throughout the 
subsequent period the Admiralty nevertheless had to fight a running 
battle to maintain the rate of accumulation of its oil reserves, 
while the Treasury led an attack aimed at reducing not only the 
rate of accumulation, but also the final total of the reserves -
even, at times, coming very near to questioning the idea of there 
being a reserve at a11. 2• From 1926 to 1929 provision for the 
1. Minutes of the Committee of Im erial Defence Feb 11th 
1924. CAB 2 4. 18lst Meeting page 5 • 
2. See especially Memo by Chancellor of the Excheguer, "Oil Fuel 
Reserve for the Fleet", June 22nd 1922 and Memo by First Lord 
of the Admiralt "Oil Fuel Reserves for the Fleet" June 2 h 
~ CAB 27 273. N.P. 25 27 and N.P. 25 31. 
It was estimated that the provision of oil reserves between 
1920 and 1925 (an accumulation of 1,880,000 tons of oil fuel) 
had cost £6,846,ooo. (CAB 27/273. N.P. (25) 27). 
10. 
addition of only 100,000 tons each year was made, which was less 
than one third of the amount required to maintain the rate of 
accumulation sufficiently high to complete the reserves by 1937. 
The depression years then led to the cutting out of even these 
modest additions, while the Admiralty unavailingly stressed the 
probable dangerous effects of such a departure from policies 
already laid down:. By April 1932 total reserves stood at 
4,270,000 tons, representing an increase of only 1,440,000 tons 
since February 1924. The total figure aimed at was now 7,582,600 
tons. Already the Admiralty had been forced to consider 
delaying completion of total reserves until 1939 instead of 1937, 
with a similar delay (1933-34 instead of 1931) for completion of 
reserves on the route to the .East. 2• 
1. It is a debateable point whether the depression years, when 
prices were at rock bottom, were not the very years when the 
~dmiralty should have built up their reserves. 
2. Minutes of the Committee of Im erial Defence Feb 11th 
1926. CAB 2 4. 209th Meeting. 2 • 
Cabinet ~linutes, February 22nd 1928. CAB 23/57. llf28)2. 
Cabinet ¥1.inutes, December 19th 1928. CAB 23/99. 58(28)2. 
Admiralty Board Yil.nutes, January 9th 1930 ADM 167/81. ¥~ute 2676. 
Admiralt Board Minutes Feb rd 1 1 and December 10th 1 1. 
ADM 1 7 83. ¥1.inutes 2804 and 2890. 
Memo b Chancellor of Exche uer ••• June 22nd 1 2 • CAB 27/273 
N .P. 25 27. 
Committee of Im erial Defence Oil Fuel Board Minutes Jan 
27th 1926 CAB 50 1. 2nd Meeting 6 • 
Seventh Annual Report of the Oil Board, October 26th 1932, 
page 11. 
CAB 50/4. O.B. 83. 
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The period 1919 to 1932 thus saw a change in the British 
Government's general attitude to the Admiralty's oil reserves 
policy, from one of complete acceptance of the necessity of having 
reserves to one (more normal, perhaps, in peace-time) of seep-
ticism and great reluctance to sanction the financial outlay 
required for those reserves. War seemed a remote contingency 
only to be given consideration when the more pressing economic 
and other problems which peace had brought would allow such 
consideration. Every item of expenditure which could be cut 
down had to be cut down - and this, to the Admiralty's disgust, 
included the navy's vital oil reserves. 1 • The development of 
Middle &stern oil sources, actual in Persia (and Egypt) and 
potential, as in Iraq, could not really affect the issues involved. 
Oil from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was obtainable at what was 
generally a bargain price, but even this seemed too much to pay 
in the current atmosphere of financial stringency. 
II The Oil Board and Strategic Planning 
On July 28th 1924 the Committee of Imperial Defence gave 
consideration to an Admiralty demand that the Admiralty should 
1. Possibly the lack of really outstanding First Lords of the 
Admiralty (of the calibre of Churchill) helps to explain why 
Admiralty demands were so consistently disregarded. 
12. 
assume control of the supply of all oil products in time of war. 
The general consensus of opinion at the meeting, however, was 
that, as the other Services also needed supplies of different 
kinds, it would be best if those Services retained their independence 
in this matter. The Admiralty then accepted this view, except 
in so far as the allocation of tanker tonnage for bulk petrol 
was concerned. Meantime, the Committee of Imperial Defence 
referred the whole question to the Principal Supply Officers' 
Committee. 1 • 
On March 18th 1925 the Committee of Imperial Defence approved 
a recommendation made to them by the Principal Supply Officers' 
Committee that a Standing Sub-Committee, to be known as the "Oil 
Fuel Board", should be set up with representatives from all 
interested Departments in attendance. It was suggested that the 
Board's terms of reference should include the collection of 
information on departmental estimates of oil product needs and 
tanker tonnage requirements in time of war, and that, on the 
outbreak of war, the Board should be constituted as an executive 
committee to deal with the control of oil supplies. 2• 
On December 31st 1926 the First Annual Report of the Oil Fuel 
Board was issued. This was concerned with the evaluation of the 
1. Minutes of the Committee of Im erial Defence 
CAB 2 4. 187th Meeting 1 • 
2. Minutes of the Committee of Im erial Defence March 18th 1 2 • 
CAB 2 4. 197th Meeting 1 • 
') 
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essential elements in the problem of the supply and transportation 
of the oil requirements of the Fighting Services, the Mercantile 
Marine, and the civilian population of the British Empire in two 
eventualities - a war in the Far East in 1937, 1 • and a war in 
that same area in the immediate future. Although much of the 
detailed appreciation was highly conjectural (as the Report itself 
admitted), the Oil Fuel Board had worked on the main assumption 
that the Far Eastern War would be without European complications, 
that it would be necessary for the Main Fleet to proceed to and 
operate from Singapore, and that an Expeditionary Force of 20 
Divisions, with the air support necessary, would be sent to the 
area. The requirements of oil products needed for the 
prosecution of the war for the first year of hostilities were 
calculated on this basis. 2 • 
It must here be pointed out, however, that it would be unwise 
to read too much political significance into the fact that plans 
were apparently being made for fighting a war in the Far Fast, 
which could only imply a war with Japan. As has been indicated 
earlier, Admiralty personnel were by no means as convinced of 
Japan's pacific intentions as were most of the politicians, but, 
1. The year 1937 was chosen because the navy's oil/fuel reserves 
were due to be completed in that year. 
2. First Annual Re ort of the Oil Fuel Board December 
CAB 50 3 O.B. 20. 
The estimate of 20 divisions for the Expeditionary Force was 
really not much more than a guess. It was criticised as being 
far too high by se7eral Ministers. Minutes of the Committee of 
Imperial Defence, February 15th 1927 CAB 2 4 220th Meeting 4).) 
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this fact notwithstanding, the choice of the assumption of a :E,ar 
Eastern war by the Oil Fuel Board was governed as much by 
hypothetical planning considerations as by any considerations of 
the probability of there ever being such a war, as the Oil Fuel 
Board's Report indicates: 
Such a war (i.e. in the Far East) would, in our opinion 
probably make the greatest demand on available tanker 
tonnage, though not necessarily on consumption of 
petroleum; and, if such a demand on tanker tonnage could 
be met, the requirements for other wars could, in all 
probability, also be met. 1. 
Thus, a "Far East War" was chosen as much for the strain such a 
war would impose on the maintenance of supplies as for any 
consideration of its likely occurrence. 
The Oil Fuel Board's Report gave detailed estimates of the 
Empire's oil requirements in the two eventualities envisaged, 
and thereby revealed the total inadequacy of British-controlled 
supplies to meet Imperial needs (even with Persian and Egyptian 
supplies included as "British controlled"). 2 • The Board's 
1. First Annual Re ort of the Oil Fuel Board December 
CAB 50 3. O.B. 20, page 6. 
2. The British Empire's estimated requirements for a war in 1937 








7,740,000 (India 1 million, 
Canada 3t million) 
Admiralty 7,500,000 (mainly fuel oil) 
Air Ministry 180,000 (over 50;f aviation spirit) 
War Office 227,000 (mainly motor spirit) 
GRAND TOTAL 20,551,000 tons 
Armed Forces requirements for the "immediate future" war were 
the same as for 1937, though there was an additional ~million 
tons needed to complete naval reserves. 
Civil requirements were put at 3,336,000 tons (U.K.) and 
5,161 000 tons (Empire). . . 
Aga.in~t this,the British Empire produced about 3 nu.Ilion tons 
(1925 figure). Persian and F.gyptian supplies brought the total up to 
7 million tons - less than half the Empire's requirements. Tanker 
transport would also have been a problem in the "j.Jpinediate future" 
war,though much improvement was expected by 1937.~.pp.7-~, 
12-11.and ADDendix 6). 
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conclusions likewise underlined what had long been obvious to 
British naval and military planners. Firstly, the Report 
emphasised that. 
the maintenance of supplies from the Persian Oil-fields 
throughout a war is an essential feature of the scheme 
of distribution. The safety and the control of these 
oil-fields is, therefore, a matter of vital importance. 1. 
The Admiralty representatives on the Oil Fuel Board, well aware 
that Persia was the nearest source of supply to Singapore (since 
the Dutch East Indies supply could not be relied on in the event 
of a war with Japan) doubtless pressed that this conclusion should 
be given prominence, if only to keep the Government's eyes open 
to the need for defence of those oilfields. 2• The second conclusion 
of the Report emphasised the importance of the United States in 
Britain's oil plans; the American attitude would be "a factor of 
primary importance" in the event of a war in the Far F,ast, declared 
the Oil Fuel Board. On the future oil supply situation the Oil 
1. Ibid., p.13. 
2. See Chapter 5 below. 
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Fuel Board cautiously expressed the opinion that "there (was) no 
need to anticipate that world supplies (would) be inadequate" 
to meet demands in the period covered by the Report. 1 • 
The Third Annual Report of the Oil Board2• was issued on 
April 26th 1929, and was concerned largely with two main issues. 
In the first place the Oi_l Board had been asked to examine the 
effect of the construction of a pipeline from the Iraq oilfields 
(where oil had been struck in 1927) to the Mediterranean seaboard. 
The Oil Board's detailed comments on this will be reserved for a 
later chapter in this study, 3• but it may be noted here that the 
pipeline was expected to add two million tons of oil to the Empire's 
supplies, and to facilitate the refuelling of the Fleet on its way 
to Singapore. Secondly, the Oil Board had been asked, with the 
purpose of bringing out just what Britain's dependence on the 
United States involved, to prepare a detailed statement of how 
Imperial requirements could be met in the event of a war in the Far 
East assuming firstly that the United States was a friendly neutral 
and, alternatively that the United States was an "unfriendly" neutra1: 
In the Oil Board's study the great degree of dependence 
of the British Empire on three particular sources - the United 
States, Venezuela, and Persia - was amply demonstrated. 
1. First Annual Re ort of the Oil Fuel Board December 
CAB 50 3. O.B. 20. pp.7,14. 
2. (The Second Annual Report (in 1928) was merely a revised version 
of the First Report). The name "Oil Fuel Board" was changed to "Oil 
Board" in February 1927. Minutes of the Committee of erial 
Defence, February 15th 1927 CAB 2 4 220th Meeting 4 • 
3. See Chapter 11 below. 
4. Terms of Reference of the Oil Board Sub-Committee. 
Third Annual Re ort of the Oil Board A ril 26th 1 2 
CAB 24 203. C .P. 142 29 , Annexure "A"• 
As the Report stressed, 
the dependence on the U.S.A. and Venezuela for oil and 
refined products in time of war gives cause for great 
uneasiness, If U.S.A. is "unfriendly" and withholds 
supplies, the a_ependence on Venezuela becomes alarming. 1. 
No less important was the Persian supply, The Sub-Committee 
relied, in its estimates, on obtaining at least 7 million tons of oil 
from this source (of which 4~~ million tons would be refined at Abadan, 
the rest at Suez, Rangoon, and Laver~on, Australia). This was enough 
to supply all the petrol and kerosine needed by both Fighting and 
Civilian Services East of Suez, as well as fuel oil equal to half 
2. 
the Fighting Services' needs. 
All these considerations, of course, gave added point to the 
Admiralty's constant cry that adequate reserves of fuel oil were 
essential if the Empire was to be defended adequately. Supply 
arrangements were going to be difficult for the first few months of 
the war whether or not Britain had access to all possible sources, 
and large reserves were needed to help the Empire to come through 
this initial difficult period. The Oil Board did not fail to stress 
this point, and, in fact, it recommended that all the Fighting Services, 
and the Munitions industry, should accumulate reserves of lubricating 
oil sufficient for one year of hostilities. It also, echoing the 
Admiralty's cry, put forward the point that 
1. Third Annual Re ort of the Oil Board A ril 26th 1 2 • 
CAB 24 203. C.P. 142 29 p.18. 
2. ~., pp. 16, 26-27. 
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unless one year's supply (of fuel oil) for the Fleet is 
in reserve at the outbreak of hostilities, the requirements 
of the :F'leet • • • cannot be assured. 1. 
As always, however, Treasury representatives were loath to 
accept any recommendations which entailed additional expenditure, 2 • 
and although the Oil Board's Report was approved by the Committee 
of Imperial Defence in May 1929, it was obvious from the remarks 
made at the time that it was to remain a piece of purely 
hypothetical planning and was not to serve as a basis for action. 3• 
However, despite the relative unimportance of the Oil Board's 
Annual Reports in the context of actual Government policy, the fact 
that such reports were being made does at least illustrate that 
changes were taking place in British thinking on oil questions in 
the 1920's. Immediately after the First World War oil's vital 
1. Ibid., p.19. 
(The Oil Board also recommended that refinery erection and 
development should be encouraged in Britain and in territory 
under the British flag. This contrasted, in fact, with actual 
Government policy, which tended at this time to discourage 
refining in Britain - see Chapter l (above).) 
2. See for example the remarks of the Permanent Secretary 
in the Treasury (Sir Warren Fisher) in Minutes of the 
CoIIllllittee of Imperial Defence, May 2nd 1929. 
CAB 2/5. 242nd Meeting (2) page 4. 
3. ~., p.5. 
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importance to Britain's armed forces had stood out to all concerned, 
politicians and military strategists alike. During the early 
1920's, however, while the main concept of the War's lessons had 
not been forgotten, pressing financial needs, economic and other 
problems of peace, the apparent remoteness of any likely war, 
and a partial return to pre-war modes of thought, had led most 
of the people who ought to have been concerned with the planning 
of how to ensure oil product supplies in the event of war almost 
entirely to ignore the problem • Only the Admiralty, whose 
vast requirements of oil fuel far exceeded the total of all 
products required by the Army and Air Force combined, had given 
any great thought to the oil supply problem before 1924. It 
was perhaps only under the stimulus of Admiralty demands for 
control of all oil products for all Services that any great 
attention was then given by the Wa:r Office and the Air Ministry 
to these matters. 
In November 1924 the Air Ministry ca:rried out its first 
really detailed appraisal of possible requirements of aviation 
petrol in the event of war. Its reserves then were obviously 
inadequate, and they were to remain so, despite more formal 
arrangements being made regarding the storage of reserves, right 
into the 1930's.l. Similarly, the War Office only embarked on 
1. See various papers, minutes etc., in the following Air Ministry 
files:- Air 2/1454, Air 2/1455, Air 9/43. 
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a detailed examination of the Army's petrol supply situation in 
the event of war in 1924. Later, however, the advance of 
mechanization - slow though it was to men who argued "that the 
day of the horse was over, and that the future lay with the 
tracked vehicle" l._ necessitated further more detailed examina-
tion of supply problems. Even then, though, much was left 
undetermined, largely because of the number of alternative 
t . •t .bl t . 2• opera ions 1 was possi e o env2sage. 
However this might be, during the period after 1924 British 
thinking on strategic oil questions was slowly turning towards 
consideration of details, even if such consideration could not 
always be translated into active policy. At the same time it 
was recognized that the cooperation of the Empire as a whole, 
including the Dominions, would be necessary if any detailed 
appreciation of Imperial war needs was to be of value and was 
not to be too highly conjectural. Consequently, during 1928 and 
1929 the idea of there being common consultation with Dominions 
representatives (and representatives of the Government of India) 
on str~tegic oil problems developed and, to a limited extent, was 
1. A reference to J.C. Fuller, an advocate of mechanization 
in the 1920's. 
c. Barnett, Britain and her Army, 1509-1970 (London, 1970)., 
p. 413. 
2. See various papers, minutes etc., in the following War Office 
files:- W.O. 32/3204, w.o. 32/3205, \tLO. 32/3206. 
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t . t t• l. pu in o prac ice. With the example of the almost total non-
cooperation of the Dominions on the Singapore project before it, 2• 
however, the Oil Board could hardly have expected that cooperation 
on oil questions would have led to the adoption of any measures 
which might have entailed additional Dominions expenditure, even 
had it been possible to secure the Home Government's sanction for 
such financial outlay. 
In 1928 there was a revolt in Afghanistan against the policies 
of the King of that country, King Amanullah. This revolt, and 
the ensuing civil war, 3• prompted a suggestion at a meeting of 
the Committee of Imperial Defence (in 1929) that the Oil Board 
should make an appraisal of the oil situation which would obtain 
in the event of Britain becoming involved in a war with Russia in 
Afghanistan. This suggestion was immediately welcomed by Sir 
Austen Chamberlain (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs), who 
declared that 
by far the most dangerous point in the world was Russia, 
where, with its internal state as it was, it was impossible 
to tell what might happen in the future ••• (4). 
1. Note b the Secretaries to the Oil Board Jan 
and attached a ers • CAB 50 3. O.B. 29. 
Oil Boa.rd Minutes, July 24th 1929. CAB 50/1. 9th Meeting. 
See also Minutes of the Committee of Im erial Defence Ma 2nd 
~· CAB 2 5. 242nd Meeting 2 page 7. conclusion 9. 
2. New Zealand was the only Dominion to contribute to the construction 
of the Singapore base. (Roskill, op.cit., Vol. I, p.465.) 
3. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Survey 1930 (London 
1931), pp.182-186. 
4. Minutes of the Committee of Im erial Defence Ma 2nd 1 2 
CAB 2 5. 242nd Meeting, pp.4-5 the suggestion referred to 
was made by Sir HUgb. Trenchard, Air Ministry) 
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One should not read too much significance into the suggestion 
that planning should proceed on the basis of a war with Russia 
in Afghanistan, nevertheless. Such a war was not deemed to be 
impending, nor was it felt to be more than a possibility which 
might some day have to be reckoned with. It was felt at this 
juncture, however, to be more likely than was a war with Japan. 1 • 
A war with Russia in Afghanistan would obviously have affected, 
directly or indirectly, Britain's position with regard to her 
¥liddle Eastern oil sources, and this point was duly noted by the 
Oil Board when it set out its plans for providing for the Empire's 
oil needs in the event of such conflict. 2 • Firstly, however, the 
Report dealt with the transportation difficulties envisaged, which 
were far less than those expected in the event of a war with 
Japa.n.3· Then it considered the situation which could obtain should 
Russia be cut out of the world's oil trade by blockade. 
If Russia were cut out of the world's oil trade, not only would 
Britain have to find another source of supply for the three quarters 
of a million tons of oil products which she normally imported 
from that source, but also she would have to cope with the fact 
that the world's oil trade as a whole would be disturbed, since 
Russia then normally exported nearly 3 million tons of oil 
1. The part of Chamberlain's remarks quoted above was immediately 
preceded by the following sentence:-
"In his (Chamberlain's) view ••• war with Japan was so unlikely 
in present circumstances that this country need not in practice 
take any immediate measures of defence against such a contin-
gency". (Ibid., p.5.) 
·2. Sixth Annual Re ort of the Oil Board 1 
(Annexure "A" pp.30-32. CAB 50 4. O.B. 71. 
3. It was calculated that a total of 19i million tons of oil prod-
ucts would be needed by the Empire in the event of a war with 
Russia in Afghanistan. Far fewer tankers for transportation would 
be needed, however, than for a war with Japan·- partly because 
a war in Afghanistan would not be a naval war, and because 
reliance could also be placed on Dutch Ea.st Indies supplies 
(unlike the situation in the event of a conflict with the 
Japanese). (ibid.) 
products to the rest of the world. In addition, in a war with Russia 
it could not be guaranteed that the British Empire would be able to 
draw on Humanian supplies. More serious than these two considera-
tions, however, was the fact that, in such a war, reliance could not 
be placed on supplies from Persia, from which source the British 
1. 
Empire was then normally importing over 3 million tons of oil products. 
Against these considerations, however, were the facts that, 
unlike the situation in which Japan was envisaged as the enemy, war 
against Russia would not entail the maximum expenditure of naval 
oil fuel, and moreover, in such a war, reliance could be placed on 
supplies from the Dutch East Indies and Sarawak. The Oil Board 
estimated that all military and naval requirements for operations 
2. 
East of Suez could be met from these two sources. 
In summarising its conclusions on the oil situation in the event 
of a war against Russia in Afghanistan, the Oil Board referred to 
the unreliability, in such circumstances, of supplies from Rumania 
or Persia. It then continued: 
The situation, however, should be considerably improved in 
1936 if the Iraq Oilfields have then attained a commercial 
production and the Mediterranean pipe-line has been completed 
as at present contemplated. 3. 
1. Ibid., pp. 28 - 29. 
Britain's oil imports from Rumania in 1929 were between one 
quarter and one half a million tons. (Estimates based on figures 
from the Files of the Petroleum Information Bureau). 
2. Sixth Annual Re ort of the 
Annexure "A" p. 30 CAB 50 4. 
3. Sixth Annual Re ort of the Oil Board 
Conclusions p. 13 CAB 50 4. O.B. 





In asserting this, it would appear that the Oil Board did not 
give sufficient weight to the fact that the Iraq oilfields were 
in fact nearer to Russian territory than were the oilfields of 
South Persia. However, the fact that the relationships between 
Britain and Iraq and between Britain and Persia were rather 
different, and would remain different even after the Iraq Mandate 
ended in 1932, possibly influenced the Oil Board's thinking on 
this issue. Persia might be less reliable under Russian politi-
cal pressure than Iraq would be, since the latter country would 
have definite treaty obligations to fulfil in the event of a 
Russo-British war. 1 • 
As noted earlier in this chapter, British strategic thinking, 
both on oil and on other more general questions, was governed 
throughout the 1920's by the "Ten Years' Assumption". 
Throughout this period the Service chiefs had intensely disliked 
this assumption, since the Treasury was able constantly to invoke 
it as an argument against any increased expenditure on the armed 
forces. In the opinion of the Service chiefs this could and did 
result in British forces, naval and military, remaining in a state 
of unreadiness and being totally inadequate to meet any emergency 
which might arise. 
1. See the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Preferential Alliance, June 
30th 1930. Text:- J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomac~ in the Near and 
Middle F.ast Vol. II (Princeton, N .J., 1956 •ff- 118- \ ~ / 
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The Japanese occupation of Ji'Janchuria in September 1931, and 
the ensuing difficult situation between Japan and the League of 
Nations, however, led the Service chiefs not only anxiously to 
examine Britain's preparedness to meet any sudden aggression by 
Japan, but also to launch a determined attack on the Ten Years' 
Assumption. This (the Ten Years' Assumption), they declared, 
had produced a whole series of dangerous results, which included 
the extremely hazardous situation in the Far East, "a terrible 
deficiency in essential requirements for all three Defence 
Services", the decay of the British armament industry, and 
a state of ineffectiveness unequalled in the defensive 
arrangements of any foreign military Power (and) a 
complete bar to the execution of any policy in Imperial 
Defence, however urgent. 1. 
Eventually, in March 1932, the Cabinet was induced to accept 
the Chiefs of Staff's recommendations that the Ten Years' 
Assumption should be cancelled, and that priority should be 
given to building up the hitherto neglected defensive arrangements 
in the Far East. 2• However, this did not mean that the British 
Government was immediately going to set about remedying all the 
deficiencies of its forces, as an extract from the Cabinet minutes 
1. Commi t~e .of i - ''erial Defence Annual Review for 1 2 b the Chiefs 
of Staff Sub-Committee, February 23rd 1932, pp.4,10.CAB 24 229.CP104. 
2. (The Review had contained the following striking remark:-
"Recent events in the Far East are ominous. We cannot ignore 
the Writing on the Wall"). 
Cabinet Minutes, March 23rd 1932. CAB 23/70. 19(32)2. 
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shows:-. 
The Cabinet recognized ••• that this (cancellation of the 
Ten Years' Assumption) must· not be taken to justify an 
expenditure by the Defence Services without regard to 
the very serious financial and economic situation that 
still obtains. 1. 
If the Services wanted anything, it was apparent that they would 
still have to fight very hard for it - and this applied to, 
inter alia, the provision of adequate oil product reserves. 
It has been seen in this chapter that British thinking on 
strategic oil questions was largely dominated by the conflict 
between, on the one hand, the Admiralty's strategic needs, and, 
on the other, the need for careful control of financial outlay. 
While the Admiralty persistently demanded that its oil reserves 
be completed at something approaching the rate initially 
envisaged, and reinforced its arguments by ensuring that its 
views were given full weight in the Oil Board's strategic studies, 
nevertheless it had little chance, in the prevailing economic 
situation of the 1920's and early 1930's of achieving its aims. 
As long as the international situation remained apparently 
quiescent there was little prospect of any change in the attitude 
of successive Cabinets towards Admiralty demands, countered as 
they always were by Treasury pleas of economy. In a different 
sphere, the need to maintain amicable relations with other Powers -
including especially the United States - were also important 
1. ~· 
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considerations in British oil policy. British sources could not 
supply the Empire with sufficient oil, hence in time of war much 
reliance would have to be placed on supplies from friendly 
neutrals. 
Linked to some extent with all these aspects was the question 
of Middle East oil. While Persian oil seemed to be so favourably 
placed strategically as greatly to influence the Admiralty's 
contingency planning, the hoped-for Iraqi oil had a similar 
strategic value - both sources were situated in close proximity 
to likely theatres of action. Also, it will be recalled, the 
Admiralty's financial burden was to some extent lessened by its 
1 t h 1 C 
1. pre-war supp y con ract with t e Anglo-Persian Oi ompany. 
All these aspects were important in themselves, and were 
closely inter-linked. They should be borne in mind when, in the 
succeeding chapters, British oil policy in the Middle East is 
explained in detail. 
1. See Introduction (above). 
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CHAPTER 3 
jYJ.ESOPCYI·.P...i":IA lill-1?_ BRITAIN 1 S SEARCH FOR AH OIL POLICY 1919 - 1923 
I Middle East territorial rearrangements 1919-22 
With the successful termination of the war, arrangements 
for the government of the territories of the former Ottoman Empire 
had to be made. Even apart from any question of oil, settlement 
of these territories was complicated by several factors. Victory 
over the Turks had been achieved largely by British arms, a fact 
which enhanced the claims of British statesmen to have a strong 
voice in any settlement of what they considered to be an area 
of great strategic importance. Britain wanted control of Basra, 
at the head of the Persian Gulf, and, partly to protect this 
area, Baghdad and Mosul, areas which were useful strategically, 
and, furthermore, had vast potential for such things as grain 
and cotton (and oil). In addition, control of Palestine and 
Jordan would be useful as affording safe communication from 
Mesopotamia (Iraq) 1 • to the Mediterranean. It would also give 
access to Egypt and the Suez Canal, and help to protect them 
from a:ny likely enemies to the north. The maintenance of British 
1. The names "Mesopotamia" and "Iraq" were both used in British 
Government circles in the years immediately following the 
Armistice, but "Iraq" was the term most often used after 
1921. 
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control and influence in these areas would be expensive, but this 
would be preferable to allowing France or Italy to have control. 
In any case, it was felt, large expense would not be a permanent 
feature, since in time full native Arab administrations, loyally 
allied to Britain, would be able to take over the burdens of 
t 
1. governmen • 
By the Sykes - Picot Agreement, concluded by British and 
French representatives in May 1916, Britain was to gain control 
of parts of Palestine, and was to have the predominant influence 
over an area reserved for the establishment of Arab states. 
France was to gain control over parts of Syria, and was to have 
the predominant influence over the remaining Arab reserved area. 
Included in this French "Sphere of influence" was the villayet 
of Mosul which, as has been pointed out, was coveted by the 
British as the war came to an end. 2• 
Immediately after the war, taking full advantage of France's 
desire for security in Europe, and of her exhausted condition 
1. The British Government as a whole does not seem to have had 
any very clear idea as to exactly how long the mandate system 
would need to be in operation before Iraq could stand on its 
own without British tutelage. 
On the question of general British aims see: 
J. Nevakivi, Britain, France and the Arab l'iiddle Fast 
(London, 1969) Chapter 5 (pp. 89-103). 
2. The text of the Sykes-Picot Agreement may be found in 
Hurewitz, op. cit., Vol. II, pp.18-22. 
Possibly in 1916 the British allowed ~'ranee to lay claim 
to Nosul in order that French territory might form a buffer 
between Russia and areas of British influence. After 1917, of 
course, this safeguard might have seemed less necessary. 
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after the war, and mindful of the strength of Britain's position 
in the disputed area, the British managed to secure the abandonment 
of the Sykes-Picot AgTeement. In 1920 the provisional boundaries 
of control between the two rivals were agreed, Britain retainine· 
control of Mosul within the boundaries of Mesopotamia, which was 
to be a British mandate, while the boundary between Palestine, 
which was to be British mandated territory, and Syria, which was 
to be a French mandate, was also tentatively settled. Included 
in the whole arrangement was an agr~ement relating to Anglo-
French oil exploitation in Nesopotamia and elsewhere.l. 
Neantime, however, a peace treaty with Turkey had to be 
concluded, and as the defeated nation Turkey would have little 
say as to its terms. The treaty eventually signed by Turkish 
representatives at S~vres in August 1920 was a dictated peace, 
providing not only for the detachment from Turkey of a consider-
able portion of the former Ottoman Empire, but also for the 
establishment of spheres of influence for the Allies in Turkey 
itself. 2• 
1. Parliamentary Papers (H of C) 1921 (Cmd 1195) xlii, 669. 
"Franco-British Convention of December 23rd 1920 on 
certain points connected with the ~iandates for Syria and 
the Lebanon, Palestine and Mesopotamia". 
(For the Oil Agreement, see below). 
2. For the text of the Treaty of Sevres, see Parliamentary 
Papers (H of C) 1920 (Cmd 964) Li, 609. "Treaty of Peace 
with Turkey, signed at Sevres, August 10th 1920". 
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The rise of Kernal Pasha and the Nationalists, and their 
creation of a new, virile Turkey, rendered much of the Treaty of 
Sevres inoperable, however. Greek and Italian hopes of great 
gains at Turkey's expense were dashed, while the Turks also 
strongly pressed their claim for the retention of Mosul, thereby 
encountering strong British opposition. The Turks also 
clashed with the French in Cilicia, but eventually secured some 
measure of agreement and cooperation with them. This Franco-
Turkish cooperation in turn led to strain in Anglo-French rela-
tions, since while on the one hand the British sought to keep 
Turkey impotent on the international scene, on the other hand 
France sought to uphold and strengthen Turkey, and to use her 
as a means of extending French influence in the Middle East. 1 • 
The rise of the Turkish Nationalists led to war between 
Greece, who had established herself in Smyrna, and Turkey. 
However, in October 1922, the Greeks having b~en defeated, an 
Armistice was concluded at Mudania. The way was thus clear for 
the Allies to conclude a fresh treaty with Turkey, and for this 
purpose a Conference met at Lausanne in November 1922. 2 • 
1. Shwadran, op. cit., pp. 217-219. 
2. H.W.V. Temperley, A History of the Peace Conference of 
Paris (6 vols: London, 1920-24) Vol. VI, p.104. 
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By this time, the League of Nations h.ad formally approved 
the mandates decided on by Britain and France in 1920. In 
order to placate Iraqi opinion, however, British-Iraqi relations 
were re6--ulated not by a specific mandatory instrument, but by 
a treaty concluded in 1922 between King Feisal and the British 
Government. This treaty was to come into force on ratification 
by the Iraqi Constituent Assembly. 1 • 
Britain thus gained all she sought by way of territorial 
control in the Middle East - more, indeed, than was perhaps 
strictly necessary or wise, in view of the expense involved. 2 • 
As for the potential oil-bearing territories of the area, they 
were now, assuming Mosul remained in Iraq, secure, and Britain 
was in a strong position regarding the decision as to who should 
exploit them. 
1. Text of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of October 10th 1922 in: 
Hurewitz, op. cit., Vol. II, pp.111-114. 
2. Sir Henry Wilson wrote on December 13th 1920: "I never saw 
the Cabinet in a worse plight. They had decided to remain 
in Nesopota.mia and Persia ••• Now they find that the House 
of Commons and the public will not stand the sinful waste 
of life and money; and so now they must come out ••• " (It 
was too late then, however). 
(Sir C.E. Callwell, Field Marshall Sir He Wilson His Life 
and Diaries Vol. II London, 1927 p,273. 
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II British Oil Policy in Confusion 
British policy in relation to Middle Eastern oil cannot 
be fully explained without first pointing out that if Britain 
had a policy with regard to oil at all, it was, to say the 
least, a very vague and confused one. British statemen knew 
that oil was a vitally important commodity, and they knew that 
large quantities were expected to be found in Mesopotamia. Thus 
it was realized that British interests must somehow control the 
exploitation of oil in this area - but as to how this was to be 
effected or what concrete plans should be made to secure these 
aims, all was undefined and obscure. Even wha'l, in 1919, an 
agreed policy appeared to have been form~lated by the Petroleum 
Imperial Policy Committee, this agreed policy was later suddenly 
abandoned and the whole question left undecided. This confusion 
was partly due to changing circumstances, and the interplay of 
various outside factors - such as pressures on Anglo-French and 
Anglo-American relations - but other reasons lay in divergences 
of opinion within the British Government itself, and, perhaps, 
at times in a certain inertia and lack of coherent thought on 
the subject, especially in Cabinet circles. 
The issues involved in the oil questions, even when 
territorial questions had been settled, were generally complex. 
Their resolution required expert knowledge and a sound grasp 
of the intricate details of both the current situation and of 
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the previous history of the questions. :F'or this reason, 
what may be termed the "policy" (for want of a better word) 
of the :British Government on oil questions was largely 
determined by the permanent staffs of the Foreign Office, 
the Colonial Office, the Petroleum Department, the India 
Office (and others), after full consultation with each other, 
generally on a day-to-day basis, rather than by the 
political heads of those Departments. With the exception 
of the Mosul question (which was not primarily an oil 
question), the Amalgamation question (1918 - 24), and the 
Pipeline question (1928 - 31), it was rare for questions 
involving oil to come before the Cabinet for decision, and 
the "policy" of His :Majesty's Government was determined 
more by the considered opinions of such men as E. Weakley, 
L. Oliphant, J. Clarke, and J.E. Shuckburgh than by the 
"big guns" such as Lord Curzon, Austen Chamberlain, Amery, 
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Churchill or Stanley Baldwin. l. This was no doubt the case also for 
many other questions of similar complexity, but it is well to note 
the way in which British oil "policy" was actually determined in view 
of the fact that some writers, both at the time and since, have 
tended to see in British actions concerning oil some sort of grand 
design, or sinister motivation. 2• No doubt behind all the day-to-day 
decisions of the Government Departments was some overall motivating 
idea, but it was not any precise deeply laid and intricately formulated 
scheme which was followed, but rather the general principle behind 
every government's actions - the protection of what it considered to 
be the nation's interest. 
The above considerations should be borne in mind when examining 
British oil policy in the Middle East, With regard to this present 
study, it should be noted that, as very detailed accounts have been 
given of both general Anglo-French relations 3.and of negotiations 
1. On the Mosul, Amalgamation, and Pipeline questions, see Chapters 
4, 6, 8, 10 and 11 (below). 
E. Weakley had been a Commercial Attache in Constantinople until 
the outbreak of war in 1914. He was thereafter employed in the 
Foreign Office until December 1923 (in what capacity it is not 
stated in the Foreign Office List, but he was probably of similar 
status to Oliphant). 
L. Oliphant was Assistant Clerk in the Foreign Office; then 
Acting Counsellor; Counsellor Sept. 24th 1923; Under Sec. State 
April 1929. 
J. Clarke was employed on the staff of the Petroleum Dept. until 
1924. 
J.E. Shuckburgli was Acting Asst. Under Sec. Colonial Office 1921; 
Asst. Under Sec. 1924; deputy Under Sec. 1931. 
Lord Curzon Act.Sec. State Foreign Affairs Jan. 1919; Sec. State 
F.A. Oct. 1919 to 1924. 
Austen Chamberlain Sec. State For. Affairs Nov. 1924-1929. 
L. Amery Sec. State for Colonial Af~airs 19~4-25, 1925-29. 
w.s. Churchill Sec. State for Coloill.al Affairs Feb.1921 to Oct.1922. 
s. Baldwin President Board of Trade April 1921-0ct.1922; Prime 
Minister May 1923 to Jan. 1924, Nov. 1924 to June 1929. 
(N.B. Only relevant posts given). 
2. For example Davenport and Cooke, op. cit., and M.Brooks, Oil and Foreign 
Policy (London, 1949). 
3. Nevakivi, op.cit. 
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specifically regarding oil up to the Conference of San B.emo of 
April 1920,
1
• this chapter will not cover events up to that 
date in more detail than is strictly necessary for a full 
u.nde1·standing of events afterwards. 
As has been noted earlier, the Turkish Petroleum Company 
had secured, in 1914, the promise of an oil concession for the 
vilayets of Mosul and Baghdad. The composition of the Turkish 
Petroleum Company had also been the subject of various negotia-
tions, and the Foreign Office Agreement of March 1914 had 
apportioned 50% of the shares to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, 
25?~ to the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company, and 25% to the Deutsche 
Bank (together with a proviso reearding Gulbenk!han's 5% share). 
War had prevented any completion of the concession negotiations 
with the Turks, and, moreover, the shares in the Turkish 
Petroleum Company, as determined by the Foreign Offices AgTee-
ment, had never actually been taken up. In 1915, in fact, the 
Foreign Off ice had informed the Anglo-Persian Oil Company that 
it considered the Foreign Office Agreement to be no longer valid. 2 • 
With the collapse of Turkey in 1918, and British advances 
into Palestine and Mesopotamia, the British Government gained 
a definite ascendancy in those areas. It thus felt justified 
1. Kent, op. cit. 
2. Ninute by Morgan, October 2nd 1926. FO 371/11456/27/5404. 
98. 
in deciding who would or who would not participate in the 
development of any oilfields found there. On November 14th 
1918 Cadman (at this time a member of the I)etroleum Executive) 
sugeested to the Petroleum Imperial Policy Committee that it 
might be advisable for the Government to secure the Deutsche 
Bank's shares (then held by the Public Trustee) and use them as 
a bait to interest the Royal Dutch-Shell group in proposals 
linking Mesopotamian oil shares with British control of that 
1. h group. T e Foreign Office, however, was worried in case, by 
thereby seeming to recognize the validity of the Turkish 
Petroleum Company and the Foreign Office Agreement of 1914, it 
should encourage other claims regarding pre-war arrangements 
and compromise any stand it might wish to make against such 
1 
. 2. c aims. 
Discussions on the wisdom or otherwise of maintaining the 
validity of the Turkish Petroleum Company's concession took place 
in November and December 1918, during which the idea was mooted 
of treating the whole question de novo and getting a fresh 
concession from the new Arab State to be set up. Finally, 
however, it was decided that the best course would be to uphold 
the validity of the Turkish Petroleum Company (though not 
1. Re ort and 
Committee, p. 
2. ~· loc. cit. (Chairman's remarks). 
Polic 
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necessarily the 1914 Agreement) and hand the Deutsche Bank's 
shares to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, leaving the remaining 
507~ in the hands of the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company. 1• At the 
end of December, therefore, the Deutsche Bank's shares were 
secured by a government nominee. 2 • 
Upholding the validity of the Turkish Petroleum Company's 
pre-war claim was one of the most important features of British 
oil policy in the ~liddle East during the period 1918 to 1925. 
The British Government was to go to great lengths, incurring the 
dangerous hostility of the United States, to defend this claim. 
Yet, even in this important feature of its policy the British 
Government was by no means consistent (as will be seen later), 
a fact which illustrates the lack of any really carefully 
formulated basic policy, other than the general principle of 
securing British interests, in relation to oil questions. 
The claim which the British Government so assiduously 
supported was not by any means water-tight, and there can be no 
doubt whatsoever that, had it suited its interest at the time, 
that Government would have had no scruples of a legal nature in 
1. Originally the Deutsche Bank and the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum 
Company had each held 25% of the shares, with the National 
Bank of Turkey holding 50;1~ (including Gulbenkian' s snares) • 
·va1en the National Bank withdrew in 1914, the Deutsche Bank 
and the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company each secured 50~~' 
pendir15 the implementation of the Foreign Office Agreement 
of Narch 1914. 
2. Re ort and Proceedi s 
Corrnnittee, pp. 84, 87. 
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abandoning and even challenging the Turkish Petroleum Company's 
claim. By no stretch of imagination could the Grand Vizier's 
letter of June 28th 1914 be deemed an actual grant of a con-
cession, and by the outbreak of the war negotiations towards 
this end had not progressed very far, so that at best the claim 
a.mounted only to the promise of a concession, giving possibly 
a moral right (for what that might be worth) but certainly not 
a legal right to a concession. While no doubt the British 
Government's contention that that promise had the binding force 
of a diplomatic understanding between sovereign powers1 • did 
perhaps convince British Government officials of the correctness 
of their own attitude, nevertheless this argument must still 
h d t b . d b t b h t h. t . 12 • ave appeare o un iase o servers o e somew a sop is ica • 
1. Since th~ promise was given to the British and German 
diplomatic representatives by a representative of the Turkish 
Government (See Introduction, above). 
2. Not all the.British officials concerned seemed entirely 
convinced of the British case. See for example a minute by 
Lindsay (in the American Dept. of the F.O.) in July 1923, in 
which he refers to the Turkish Petroleum Company's "rather 
dubious concession" - against which Eyre A. Crowe wrote, 
"But surely~ do not consider it dubious?" 
Ninute b R.C. Lindsa 
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11he reasons for the decision at this stage to support the 
claim of the Turkish Petroleum Company were fourfold. In the 
first place the Deutsche Bank had had certain oil rights under a 
Convention of 1903 relating to the construction of the Baghdad 
I) ·1 1. \.al. way. If the Turkish Petroleum Company's claims were 
abandoned by the British Government, therefore, whoever acquired 
the pre-war Baghdad Railway rights might be able also to lay 
claim to the oil rights -- and as the French had claims in this 
direction, the question might become awkward. 2• Secondly, unless 
some arrangement concerning the Turkish Petroleum Company itself 
were made, the Royal Dutch-Shell would be able to put forward 
a claim that that group now owned all the shares in that 
Company.3· While such a claim might not in itself be of great 
1. Article 22 of the 1903 Baghdad Railway Convention stated that: 
"The concessionaires may work any mines which they shall 
discover within a zone of 20 kilom. each side of the middle 
of the line •••• " The text of the Convention is in Hurewitz, 
op. cit., Vol. I, pp.252-263. 
2. (Memo by L. Nallet on Mesopotamian Oil (n.d.) printed in 
Re ort and Proceedi ~s of the Petroleum Im erial Polic 
Committee pp. 86-87. FO 368 2255 87990 141764. 
3. Ibid.' p.87. 
The Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company, already 5°'~ shareholders, 
could put forward some claim to possess the Deutsche Bank's 
shares under Article 36A of the Turkish Petroleum Company's 
Articles of Association, which stipulated that, should any 
one group retire from the Company, its shares must first 
be offered to the remaining groups. 
102. 
moment, since without diplomatic support the Royal Dutch-Shell 
could hardly have got far in its claim, the dispute with Shell 
which would result would probably vitiate British Government 
schemes at that time being put forward, to gain control of that 
group (see below). 
Thirdly, the problem of French claims mentioned above 
was not confined to any rights attached to the Baghdad Railway 
concession. France, too, had read the lessons of the war, 
and fully appreciated the importance of oil in the post-war 
world. Consequently the French Government was 
engaged in developing an oil policy of its own, 1 • and 
1. France had only minor amounts of indigenous oil (47,000 
metric tons in 1919), and uncertain prospects elsewhere in 
her Empire - although there were believed to be large 
quantities in Algeria. She was to seek to ensure her 
safety by encouraging oil prospecting in France, regulation 
of her internal oil trade, and the use of alcohol and 
other substitutes. External measures included partici-
pation in the development of Mesopotamian oil, and attempts 
at cooperation with British interests in Rumania and 
elsewhere. 
For the general French attitude to oil after the war see:-
E.L. Woodward and R. Butler (editors) Documents on British 
Forei Polio 1 1 - 1 (hereinafter abbreviated to 
D.B.F.P. 1st Series, Vol. IV, pp. 1111 - 1113. 
Report by Ma,ior R.L. Sherbrooke, "FrQnce and. the Petrol 
Question" December 8th 1922. Fo.371/9405/151/151. 
H. Berenger, Le Petrole et la France (Paris 1920). 
R.F. Kuisel, Ernest Nercier, French Technocrat (Berkeley and 
Los Angeles, 1967). 
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in its schemes the oilfields of Mesopotamia had a part to play. 
This was known, or at least suspected, in British Government circles.1 • 
If the British Government had some definite policy with regard to 
the Turkish Petroleum Company, it would facilitate arrangements with 
the }'rench. This was especially necessary since the British them-
selves intended to seek concessions from the French, both in the 
matter of securing the abandonment of the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 
1916, and concerning wayleaves across French-controlled territory for 
oil pipelines (from both Mesopotamia and Persia), and for railways. 2• 
By supporting the Turkish Petroleum Company's claims, and by itself 
acquiring the Deutsche Bank shares, it would be possible for the 
British Government to bargain with the French, using the ability to 
allocate the former German shares in the Turkish Petroleum Company 
as a means of obtaining the desired quid pro quo. 3. 
1. See particularly Cad.man's remarks on November 14th 1918 and 
December 13th 1918: Re ort and Proceedi s of the Petroleum 
Imperial Policy Committee, pp. 8, 84. FO 3 8 2255 87990 141764. 
2. The Chairman of the Petroleum Imperial Policy Committee, Lord 
Harcourt, seems at this stage to have had difficulty in appreciating 
the hard realities of the situation - and no doubt he was not 
the only British official at this time who was having difficulty 
in reconciling what was desirable and what was practicable. While 
on the one hand Harcourt had urged the Foreign Office to "secure 
some alteration in (Britain's) favour of the Sykes Agreement ••• 
(and to get) permission for a pipeline of (Britain's) own to go 
across the French sphere ••• ", on the other hand he had "pressed 
the Foreign Office not to let the French into Mesopotamia, and 
urged that we wanted to keep as much oil as we could in the world 
for ourselves." (Ibid., pp.82, 83). 
3. See the remarks of Cad.man to the Petroleum Imperial Policy 
Committee, December 13th 1918. (Ibid., P• 84). 
Rumanian oil also played a part in British deliberations (see 
~., p. 88). 
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A fourth reason for supporting the r.rurkish Company's claims 
was the fear that American oil interests (which were now showing 
siens of activity in the Niddle East) would "make PTeat 
<..) 
1 difficulties, and ••• set up large claims in Nesopotamia". • 
The Company's exclusive concession for the Iviosul and Baghdad 
vilayets, if upheld, would effectively block any such atteopts. 
The fact that this would arouse the hostility of the United 
States Government which, urged on by the American oil interests, 
would vociferously clamour against British monopoly and demand 
the :iopen Door", was realized in British Government circles -
though perhaps the full extent of the later "Oil War" was not 
foreseen - but it served at this stage rather to make more 
urgent the intended cooperation with France (so as to obviate a 
Franco-American 'oil entente') than to deter the British from 
2. their plans to uphold the Turkish Petroleum Company. 
Thus, then, the need to prevent outsiders from acquiring 
claims to Mesopotamia's oil through the disputed Baghdad Railway 
rights, to keep at bay possible Shell claims, to bargain with the 
French over the Sykes-Picot Agreement, and to counter possible 
.American pretensions, served as powerful motives in December 1918 
1. Captain Samuel (Shell Transport and Trading Company) in 
conversation with Lord Harcourt. 
(Ibid., p.82.) 
2. See Lord Harcourt's remarks on January 20th 1919 (Ibid.,p.88). 
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for the B:ci ti sh to uphold the validity of the Turkish Petroleum 
Company's pre-war claims to Nesopotamian oil rights. Meanwhile, 
other important aspects of British oil policy were also being 
dealt with. 
During 1918 negotiations had been proceeding between 
the Petroleum Imperial Policy Committee and the Royal Dutch-
Shell group, on the basis of the latter getting an increased 
share in Nesopotamian oil in return for the latter becoming 
British - controlled. These negotiations eventually terminated 
in the conclusion of a Provisional .Agreement on January 31st 
1919 which, after undergoing some modification, was finally 
approved by the War Cabinet on YJ.ay 8th 1919.1 • 
1. For the negotiations see ibid. pp. 11-16, 96-102. 
One of the factors influencing the Government's actions was 
lmowledge of French negotiations with the Royal Dutch-
Shell. (ibid., pp. 68, 88). 
For the Cabinet decision see: War Cabinet ¥linutes, May 8th 
1919. 
CAB 23/10/Neeting No. 564/Ninute (1). 
Under this Agreement the shares in the Turkish Petroleum Company 
were to be distributed as follows:- Anglo-Persian Oil Company 34%, 
Anglo-S&XOllrPetroleum Company 34%, His Majesty's Government 2%. 
There was thus provision for 30% to go to other interests (see below). 
The Anglo-Persian, Anglo-Saxon, and the Government votes were to be 
put into a Voting Trust, the majority vote of which was to determine 
the way the whole 70% block should vote. Thus, in theory, if the 
Anglo-Persian and the Government votes combined, they would have a 
majority of the Voting Trust, which would then cast its whole 70% 
vote in the way in which the Anglo-Persian Company and the Government 




In return for its increased participation, the Royal Dutch-Shell 
Group agreed to various safeguards whereby the Shell Transport and 
Trading Company (one of the major Shell companies) would remain 
3. 
permanently British, with 75% of its directorate British-born subjects. 
1. In view of the British Government's holding in the Anglo-Persian 
Oil Company, the Government's control of Mesopotamian oil 
development would, of course, have been almost complete in matters 
where control was desired. However, Shell was to have the 
management of the Company for the first seven years. 
2. Shell originally had held 25% of the shares (22f'fo ubder the Foreign 
Office .Agreement of March 1914) instead of the 34% now planned. 
3. No change of directorate was to take place without the consent 
of the Governor of the Ba.nlt of England. There were safeguards 
also against any transfer of the Company's assets to foreigners. 
107. 
The Shell Transport and Trading Company would then assume control 
of all the companies then controlled by the Anglo-Saxon Petrol-
eurn Company, and special arrangements were to be made to ensure 
their British character.
1
• By this means all the Royal Dutch-
Ghell subsidiaries operating outside Dutch territory, or Rumania, 2 • 
would come under British contro1.3· 
This Agreement was meant to lay the foundation of Britain's 
post-war oil policy, and, it was hoped, it would even make the 
British Empire independent of the United States within ten 
years. Yet, as Dr. Kent remarks in her thesis,4· the Agreement 
was still only in general terms, and many details would have had 
to be filled in before it could come to fruition. 
While the negotiations with the Shell group were going 
1. Certain Dutch-controlled companies were to be re-
constituted under British control. All the companies 
concerned were always to have a majority of British 
directors, and a "British nominee" with special voting 
powers was to b@ appointed. 
2. Certain special provisions were to be made regarding Shell's 
"Astra Romana" company in Rumania. 
3. Petroleum Executive Memorandum for the War Cabinet, "~ 
Ac uisition of British Control over the Ro al Dutch-Shell 
Grou;p. 11 February 22nd 1919. CAB 24 76. GT. 6961. 
4. Kent, op. cit., p. 306. 
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forward, the arrangements with the French necessary to the 
success of the British scheme were also under consideration. 
Following tentative discussions between hr. Long and M. Berenger,l. 
and between Cadman and Berenger, in November and December 1918, 
concerned with British and French oil interests (actual or 
prospective) in Persia, Algeria and Nesopotamia, 2 • the first 
concrete step towards an Anglo-French Oil Agreement was taken 
in a formal note from the French Ambassador to the British 
Foreign Office, dated January 6th 1919. 
The French note, after a brief mention of the "grave 
inconvenience of the }1rench position as regards petroleum", 
expressed a desire for an Anglo-}1rench Agreement on a common 
oil policy,. which would involve, inter alia, the help and 
encouragement of French groups to take shares in oil companies 
operating in various different countries. "Conversations 
have already taken place on this subject with the Royal Dutch 
1. W.H. Long was head of the British Petroleum Executive at 
the time. 
N. Berenger was Commissioner-General of Petroleum Products 
in France. 
2. Note of a meeti in Paris December 1 th 1 18. 
FO 368 2095 3251 3593. 
For an account (which, however, must be treated with caution) 
of Gulbenkian's influence on French thinking at this time 
see N.S. Gulbenkian Pantaraxia (London, 1965) pp.87-88. 
Company", continued the note - somewhat ominously for British plans. 
The note finally asked specifically for the allocation to France of 
1. 
the Deutsche Bank's shares in the Turkish Petroleum Company. 
At the time, as has been mentioned earlier, there was great 
2. 
concern in British official circles to discard the "iniquitous" 
Sykes-Picot agreement, the Admiralty in particular, with an eye on 
3. 
pipeline possibilities, urging its abandonment. A verbal agreement 
of December 1918 between Clemenceau and Lloyd George, whereby the 
Sykes-Picot agreement would be modified and, inter alia, Mosul would 
be administered by Britain, had been kept a close secret at the time, 
4. 
ijven from the Foreign Office. Doubtless with the idea of using the 
inception of oil negotiations as a lever to induce the French to make 
territorial concessions, therefore, the Foreign Office advocated that 
the Government should refuse entirely to discuss the oil questions 
until the territorial questions had been solved - a procedure which, 
though hardly possible in view of the French attitude, certainly would 
1. French Minister in London to Secretj3! of State for Foreign Affairs, 
January 6th 1919. FO 360/2095/3251 3251. 
2. Minute by Lord Curzon, January 29th 1919. FO 368/2095/3251/12790. 
4. 5th 1919 and 
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have had the virtue of simplifying matters a little. The Foreign 
Office view did not prevail, however, and an inter-Departmental 
Conference held on January 15th decided that the French should 
immediately be informed that the British Government was willing to 
come to an understanding on the oil question, although it was conceded 
that any detailed scheme would have to be left until after the Peace 
1. 
Conference. 
The reasons for this decision are clear: 
The French Government are understood to be negotiating not 
only with His Majesty's Government but with the u.s.Government, 
and the Standard Oil were stated to be actively attempting to 
secure increased holdings outside America •••• 
The Conference considered that His Majesty's Government 
should at once signify its willingness to cooperate before 
France secured American assistance and before this country 
was forced by decisions at the Peace Conference to adopt in 
self-defence and practically under compulsion the policy to 
which it was now invited... 2. 
3. 
Despite Foreign Office opposition, therefore, the Petroleum 
Executive proceeded to negotiate with French representatives, and, 
notwithstanding the fact that, supposedly, no details were to be 
discussed, the outcome was the signature on April 8th 1919 of the 
Long-Berenger Petroleum Agreement. 
The Agreement declared Anglo-French policy to be based on the 
principles of "cordial cooperation and reciprocity", relating to 
Rumania, Asia Minor, and British and French Colonies; an extension to 
1. 
3. See· Memo on the Histo of the Lo -Bere r eement {being an 
enciosure to Document 84 in D.B.F.P., lat series, Vol. IV, 
pp.1093-1094. Unsigned, Undated Memo, FO 368/2095/3251/23803. 
Minute by Curzon, March 19t!• 1919, FO 368/2095/3251/41123. 
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other areas, such as Galicia and Russia, was also envisaged. 
With regard to Mesopotamia, "in the event of His Majesty's 
Government receiving the mandate ••• ", the British Government 
undertook to uphold the Turkish Petroleum Company's rights with 
the Mesopotamian Government. The shares in that Company were 
to be distributed as follows:- British interest 70-~, French 
interest 20%, Native Government interest 10%. There was also 
a :provision for Native private interests to participate u:p to 
11'\.'Jl 1. ViO• The Company was to be "under permanent British control". 
In return the French Government agreed to facilitate the passage 
of two :pipelines (one from Mesopotamia, one from Persia) through 
French mandated territory, should such passage be desired. 2• 
It also seemed to be understood that Mosul would be included in 
Mesopotamia. 
This AgTeement thus fitted in with the British Government's 
Agreement with Shell, and seemed to mark another important step 
in British oil :policy. 3. Bu~ then the whole arrangement 
1. This 101~ to come from :participating groups in :proportion 
to their holding. 
2. The text of the Long-Berenger .Agreement of April 8th 1919 
may be found in D.B.F.P., 1st Series," Vol. IV, :p:p.1089-1092. 
3. The Foreign Office, however, opposed the Agreement for some .. 
time being worried about, inter::alia, the lack of any :provision 
for .American :participation in the Mesopotamian arrangement. 
See D.B.F.P., lat Series, Vol. IV, p.1094. 
Minute by Kidston, March 1919 and Memo prepared by Kidston 
A ril 2 rd 1 1 • 
FO 3 8 2095 3251/41123 and 56571. 
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ha . 1 was s ttered by a "first class dog fight" • between Clemenceau 
and Lloyd George at Paris on May 21st and 22nd over the settlement 
of the Syrian frontier, Clemenceau attacking what he considered 
to be British efforts to take more territory than they were 
entitled to "in order that the British might construct a railway". 2 • 
The oil negotiations were dragged into the discussion, and as a 
result Lloyd George later wrote to Clemenceau cancelling the 
Agreement of April 8th on the grounds that the negotiations were 
a departure from the verbal agreement of the previous December 
by which Clemenceau had agreed to the modification of the Sykes-
Picot Agreement. 3. 
There followed a period of much confusion in the Foreign 
Office and the other Government departments, with considerable 
doubt existing as to whether or not the Anglo-French Agreement 
was still in being. This was not finally resolved until, 
following an official Anglo-French exchange of letters, the 
Cabinet met on August 20th and confirmed the annullment of the 
Long-Berenger Agreement. 4. 
1. Callwell, op. cit., Vol. II, p.194. 
2. Notes of a Meet· in Paris Ma 21st and 22nd 1 1 
CAB 29 38 1, CF 20A pp. 581-584 , CF 22B p. 11 • 
4. Curzon to French Ambassador in London, July 22nd 1919 and 
French Charge d'Affaires in London to Curzon, Augu.st 12th 
12!2,, in D.B.F.P., 1st Series, Vol.IV, pp.1101, 1110. 
Extracts from Minutes of War Cabinet Meeti A t 2oth 1 1 • 
FO 371 4233 file 109301 109356. 
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However this might be, in British Government circles the 
fear of a possible Franco-American entente on oil (and other 
matters) persisted, strengthening an already growing feeling that 
the Anglo-French Agreement of April 8th ought to be revived. In 
December 1919, the British made tentative approaches to the 
1. 
French and succeeded in reviving the oil talks, resulting 
on December 21st in the conclusion of a new agTeement - signed 
by Sir Hamar Greenwood and Henri Berenger - which was basically 
the same as that of April 8th. The French were now to have 25% 
participation in the Turkish Petroleum Company, but this increase 
over the earlier agreement was purely nominal, since the French 
would have to provide half of the first 10% of native interest 
shares should such interests desire to participate. Also,in 
addition to the provision of pipeline facilities, the new 
t 2. agreement gave similar facilities for railway construe ion. 
Whatever the vicissitudes in Anglo-French relations may 
have been, one facet of British oil policy seemed at this point 
1. Note of a conversation between the Prime Minister and 
M. Loucher, December 3rd 1919. CAB 21/158. 
Cabinet ~linutes, December 10th 1919. CAB 23/18. C 12(19)18. 
2. Memorandum of Agreement between Sir Hamar Greenwood and 
Senator Henri Berenger, D.B.F.P., 1st Series, Vol. IV, pp.1114-
1117. 
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to be clear - that the British Government would uphold the claims 
of the Turkish Petroleum Company to work the oilfields of 
Mesopotamia. Yet, such was the confused state of British 
oil policy at this period that, within a month of the signature 
of the Greenwood - Berenger Agreement, yet another remarkable 
change in that policy was made. 
On January 23rd 1920 a Conference of rtinisters considered 
a suggestion that 
the oil resources of Mesopotamia were so 
extensive that sufficient revenue should be 
forthcoming from them to pay for the whole 
administration of the country, and for that 
reason private exploitation should be 
prevented •••• 
After some discussion the Conference 
were of opinion that as a matter of principle the 
profits arising from the exploitation of the 
oilfields of Mesopotamia should accrue for the 
benefit of the State rather than for the benefit 
of Joint Stock Companies ••• 
and it was decided that the War Office should proceed with 
a survey of the Mesopotamian oilfields, and that all 
prospecting was to be done on behalf of the State. 1• 
1. Minutes of a Meeting of a Conference of Ministers, 
January 23rd 1920. FO 371/4231/102161/174193. (Alternative 
reference: CAB 23/20. 8/20) Appendix II (17). 
This meant a complete change of policy by His Majesty's 
Government. Hitherto the keystone of the Government's policy had 
been support of the Turkish Petroleum Company's claims, and on that 
basis both the Agreement with the Royal Dutch-Shell group and the 
understanding with the French had been framed. Now, it seemed, the 
Turkish Petroleum Company's claims were to be abandoned, and the 
agreements which had been built around those claims were to be 
"knocked on the head". Moreover, according to the Under-Secretary 
1. 
of State in the Foreign Office, Hardinge, "that (was) the intention". 
True, with regard to the Anglo-French Agreement the minutes of the 
Ministerial Meeting reveal that "there was no objection to the proposed 
assignment of a percentage share of the interest in the oilfields of 
2. 
Mesopotamia to the French Government", but the percentage actually 
allotted to the French in the agreements of April 8th and December 
21st 1919 had been determined on the basis of participation in the 
Turkish Petroleum Company, to whose shares the Anglo-Persian and Shell 
eom.panies had certain claims. If private companies were to be 
excluded, then the whole basis on which the French accepted a minority 
sha1'e would be altered, and hence the already existing agreement of 
1920. 
December 21st 1919 could no longer be considered as in force. This 
1. 
point was emphasised later by the French. 
The decision of the Meeting (if, indeed, it can strictly be termed 
a "decision") is a puzzling one in some respects, although the idea 
of working the offilfields under state control was not an entirely new 
one at this time, for it had been tentatively suggested by Arnold 
2. 
Wilson in April 1919. According to notes written by Sir G. Barstow 
(of the Treasury), the Prime Minister, Lloyd George, was principally 
responsible, having been 
much influenced by a statement made to him by Sir John Cowans 
(now of the Shell Company) that 'a million a week' might be 
made from Oil in Mesopotamia. 
In Barstow's opinion, however, such figur~s were "probably sheer fairy 
tales", and, he wrote: 
We should pay dearly for this oil if we have to keep garrisons 
costing £10,000,000 a yea:r in order to secure it. But the 
prospect of Oil in Mosul is evidently having a great influence 
on our Mesopotamian policy. 3. 
The decision certainly reflected the British Government's growing 
concern with the financing of its many commitments abroad: financial 
solvency was going to be, it appea:red, an aim which cut across other 
matters of high policy and strategic thinking - as the naval oil 
1. Memo b 
1920. 
Minister in char of Petroleum De 
Enclosure CP. 1118 • 
3. Great Britain, Public Record Office, Treasury, Memo by G. Barstow 
n.d. but evidentl written A ril 21st 1 20) and Note by G.Barstow, 
A ril 21st ? 1 20. T. 172 1387. 
reserves controversy waa also to prove - and the grand plan of securing 
independence from foreign oil companies in ten years (by the Shell 
Agreement) was now to be sacrificed to the financial needs of the 
Mesopotamian administration and the military forces needed for its 
protection. 
The later San Remo Oil Agreement, however, reveals most clearly 
one peculiar characteristic of British oil policy in these years -
its indecisiveness. Despite the apparent decision on state working 
just referred to, this Agreement still envisaged the possibility of 
private interests working Mesopotamian oil, and provision was made 
in the Agreement for satisfying French interests in both eventualities 
1. 
- State or private working. 
The Agreement which the British and French Governments concluded 
at San Remo on April 24th 1920 was essentially the same a.a the earlier 
Greenwood-Berenger Agreement. It helped to clarify the French position 
in view of the change in British oil policy since December 1919. 
The Agreement envisaged Anglo-French cooperation in Rumania, Asia 
Minor, "territories of the old Russian Empire", Galicia, and in 
:French and British Colonies. It included the same ~lausei ooncerning 
pipeline and railway facilities as had the previous agreement and, 
apart from the omission of any specific mention of Pearson's Algerian 
2. 
concession (included in the earlier agreement) the only noteworthy 
1. Article 7 of the San Remo Oil Agreement. (see below). 
2. In both the .Agreements of April 8th 1919 and December 21st 1919 the 
French Government had promised to grant Messrs.Pearsons and Sons 
a concession in Algeria as soon as that company had complied with 
the laws applicable. 
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changes were that, as noted, provision was made for satisfying French 
interests should Mesopotamian oil be developed by either private or 
state enterprise, and that a new clause regarding Persian oil was 
included. If Mesopotamian oil was to be worked by private interests, 
the arrangement of December 21st 1919 was to stand. If by state 
enterprise, the French were to secure 25% of the crude oil produced, 
at current market rates. The clause concerning Persian oil provided 
that France was to get, on terms to be agreed, 25% of a:n:y Persian 
oil piped through French territory; this additional clause was 
conceded by the British Government in return for the French 
dropping their claim to 50% of Mesopotamian oil. 1. 
So far, then, British oil policy had woven its rather 
hesitant way from the decision of December 1918 to uphold the 
validity of the Turkish Petroleum Company's pre-war claims, 
through several agreements in which both Shell and French 
participation in those clai$s was envisaged, to a situation in 
January 1920 where the whole policy of the previous year was 
called into question and a new plan for State working of 
Mesopotamian oil was mooted. Then, partially clarifying matters, 
had followed the San Remo Agreement. 
Here, however, there was at last something permanent in 
1. Memorandum of Agreement at San Remo, April 24th 1920, between 
M. Philippe Berthelot, Directeur des Affaires Politiques et 
Commerciales au Ministre des Affaires Etra.ngeres, and Professor 
Sir John Cadman KCMG, Director in Charge of His Majesty's 
Petroleum Department. United States, Department of State, 
Forei Relations of the United States (hereinafter abbrev-
iated to F.R.u.s. 1920, II, pp. 55- 58. 
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Britain's oil policy, for the San Remo Oil Agreement was to 
endure, despite various outside pressures against it, and despite 
further Anglo-FTench squabbles over oil and other matters. 1 • 
Nevertheless, if the basis of agreement with the French was 
settled, even that settlement could not be worked out in 
detail as lone as there was doubt concerning two things -
the arrangement for the working of the Mesopotamian oilfields 
(by private or by state enterprise?), and the final settlement 
of the mandate for Iraq. 
III P-£essure from America 
The San Remo Conference had decided that Britain should 
have the mandate for Mesopotamia (which would include Mosul), 2 • 
but the actual form of the mandate had not yet peen decided, and 
1. See below (passim). 
2. See Nevakivi, op. cit., pp.245-246. 
On riarch 23rd 1920 the British Cabinet had approved the basis 
of a statement on the subject of the Mesopotamian Mandate, 
the first two points of which declared that if Great Britain 
were offered the Mandate she would accept, but that, "The 
mandated territory must include Mosul, since there is no 
suitable physical boundary for Mesopotamia in the plains 
between Mosul and the Persian Gulf; since the inhabitants 
object to the partition of their country, and since the 
oil-bearing regions of Mosul are essential to the revenues 
on which the future development of the whole country will 
depend." 
·(Cabinet Minutes, March 23rd 1920, CAB 23/20. 16(20)3.) 
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final approval would have to be given by the League of Nations. 
However, the discussions with regard to mandates were not simply 
the concern of Britain, }"'ranee and the other member~ of the League. 
The United States, though not a League member, also claimed a 
voice in these discussions, and, with regard to Mesopotamia, 
that nation was particularly suspicious of British policy there, 
especially concerning oil. 
At this time (mid-1920) the so-called Anglo-.American "Oil 
War" was at its height. Demand for oil products had increased 
rapidly and was tending to outstrip production increases, and 
there was thus a great fear in America of an oil shortage. 
Intensifying this fear was American apprehension of the power 
of the Royal-Dutch-Shell combine, with its strong British 
element, and general suspicion of British intentions regarding 
oil in many parts of the world. 1 • On the British side, fears 
1. The sources for an account of +.he Anglo-American "Oil War" 
are legion. Apart from the newspapers and periodicals of the 
time on both sides of' the Atlantic (probably the most 
important source, since the "War 11 was largely a product of 
newspaper campaigns - no doubt sponsored by the oil interestst), 
the following are worth noting:-
British Foreign Office files (numerous) 
United States, Senate, Small Business, Select Committee on 
the International FetroleUJu Cartel Staff Re ort to the 
Fecieral Trade Connnission Committee Report, 82nd Congress, 
2nd Session) (1952). 
F.R.u.s. (various volumes). 
United States National Archives and Records Service: 
File 890 g.6363 ~Rights of the Turkish Petroleum Company in 
Nesopotamia) is available on microfilm M 722/24. Also available 
is file soo.6363, dealing with international oil questions in 
general. 
There are also numerous secondary works dealing with the subject 
(See Bibliography in Shwadran, op.cit.). 
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01' the intentions and suspected intrigues of the supposedly 
omnipotent Standard Oil "Combine", 1. combined with a certain 
anxiety amongst British naval men concerning the apparent plans 
of the U.S. Navy Board to make the American Navy greatly superior 
to the British,
2
• increased the tension between the two countries. 
The tension over oil was never quite as serious between 
the two Governments as it appeared to be from the accounts given 
by newspapers of the time, however. The Anglo-American "Oil 
War" was, to a great extent, a creation of newspapers on both 
sides of the Atlantic. Nevertheless, the tension between the 
British and United States Government that did exist did find 
expression in various ways, one of them being· a diplomatic duel 
over economic rights in mandated territories, with special 
reference to Nesopotamia. 
On Nay 12th 1920 the American Ambassador in London 
delivered an important note to Lord Curzon. The no~e affirmed 
the rights of the United States Government to participate both in 
discussions on mandates and in the consideration of pre-war 
1. See in particular:- Memo by Weakley on the Standard Oil 
Com an 's Activities December 1 21. 
FO 371 371 6345 13886. 
2. Nemo on Naval Construction b the First Lord of the Admiral t 
W.R. Lon Jul 2 rd 1 20. CAB 24 109. CP.1677. 
Allan Westcott ed. American Sea Power since 1775 (Chicago, 
n.d.) pp.335-337. 
s.w. Roskill, Naval Policy between the Wars, Vol. I (London, 
1968) pp.24, 71-73, 104, 212-214, 
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concessions, and stressed that the principle of equality for all 
nations concerning economic rights (the "Open Door") should apply 
in mandated territory, and that any monopoly operating on behalf 
of the Nandatory Government would be definitely inconsistent with 
such principles.
1
• Later, after publication of the San Remo Oil 
Agreement,
2
• a further American note (of July 28th) alleged that 
that Agreement infringed both the Handate and "Open Door" 
principles in general. These statements, together with specific 
allegations of British exclusionist policy in Mesopotamia, 3• 
1. Davis to Curzon, May 12th 1920, in Parliamentary Papers, 
(H of C) 1921 (Cmd. 1226) xliii, 481 "Correspondence between 
His Majesty's Government and the United States Ambassador 
respecting Economic Rights in :Mandated Territory". 
2. The Foreign Office had been particularly anxious to 
publish the San Remo Oil Agreement, in case American 
oil companies got hold of the text and published itJ 
along with hostile comments, before the British view 
could be fairly explained to the American public. See 
Jvlinute b Weakle Jul 2 th 1 20 FO 371/5085/20/8622. 
Curson to Geddes Washi on Jul 2 rd 1 20 in D.B.F.P. 
1st Series, Vol. XIII, pp. 314-315. 
3. See especially the third and fourth paragraphs of the Note 
of May 12th 1920. 
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obviously constituted a direct attack on British plans to secure 
full control of hesopotamian oil. 
Curzon replied to the American allegations on AUa~st 
9th, stating that the San Hemo Agreement "aimed at no monopoly", 
but was merely a bargain between Britain and :B1rance whereby 
the latter renounced her interests in Nosul as well as giving 
certain pipeline facilities in return for a share of 
Mesopotamian oil. As for the American claim to a voice 
in the discussion of mandates, Curzon stated that only League 
}lembers had such rights, although at the same time he e:q>ressed 
agreement with the general principles which had been put 
forward by the Americans in their note of V.iay 12th, and he 
affirmed that all pre-war concessions would get fair and 
1. equal treatment. 
1. Davis to Curzon, July 28th 1920 and Curzon to Davis, 
A st th 1 20 in Parliamentary Papers (H of C) 1921 
Cmd. 1226 xliii, 481, "Correspondence between H.M.G. 
and the U.S. Ambassador respecting Economic Rights in 
:Mandated Territory". 
The American Government was unconvinced however, and, with 
justice, declared itself (in a note dated November 20th 1920) unable 
to reconcile three aspects of the matter which Curzon had stated to 
1. 
be part of British policy - maintenance of the San Remo agreement, 
the idea of securing Mesopotamian oil for the Arab State, and the 
declaration that all pre-war concessions would get fair and equal 
treatment. More specifically, the United States openly challenged 
the claim of the Turkish Petroleum Company to any rights .to develop 
2. 
Mesopotamian oil, and strongly attacked the provision in the San 
Remo Agreement which declared that any private company developing 
3. 
Mesopotamian oil should be "under permanent British control". 
In thus attacking British policy, the Americans had pinpointed 
4. 
one of its basic weaknesses at the time - its confused state. The 
Foreign Office in particular had found the confusion existing as to 
whether Mesopotamian oil was to be developed by State enterpris~, in 
1. In his Note of August 9th 1920. 
2. The American note referred to a public statement made by the 
British Minister in charge of Petroleum Affairs that the San Remo 
Agreement was based on the principle that the concessions granted 
by the former Turkish Government must.be honoured (see The Times, 
July 27th 1920, p. 16, col. d). !'Pe American note stated that the 
American Government's information indicated that the Turkish 
Petroleum Company "possessed in Mesopotamia no rights to petroleum 
concessions or to the exploitation of oil." 
3. Bain)fri~ Colby to Curzon, November 20th 1920 in F.R.u.s. 1920, 
II, pp. 9-673. 
4. It could perhaps be contended, however, that the confused sta~e o~ 
British policy at this time was a factor strengthening it vis-a-vis 
other governments - it left the British various options and 
loopholes. 
accordance with the Conference decision or January 23rd 1920, or by 
private interests, a great handicap in trying to frame its replies 
to the United States' notes. Did the decision still stand or not? 
It had not been revoked, but the San Remo Agreement implied that it 
might be. The growing friction with the United States over mandates 
clearly demanded that some clarification of Britain's oil policy be 
made - for unless it was known clearly what that policy was, it was 
obviously going to be very difficult to defend it. 
The decision on state working had been under attack from many 
Departments in the British Government from the vei:y start. The 
Admiralty in particular regretted the abandonment of the Shell Agree-
1. 
ment, while the Petroleum Department of the Board of Trade not only 
agreed with the Admiralty as to the advisability of implementing the 
Shell Agreement, but also attacked the principle of state enterprise 
on the grounds that it meant inefficiency, lack of initiative and, 
moreover, would entail the provision of large sums of government 
2. 
money for <Bvelopnient. Even the hitherto strongest advocate or st~te 
working, A.T. Wilson, changed his attitude, now urging that the 
1. Admiralty Memo for the Cabinet 
b First Lord or the Admiralt 
2. Memoranda by Kellaway, April 22nd, June 21st, November 15th 1920 
and Memo b President of the Board of Trade A ril 16th 1 20 
FO 371 508 20 • 
Anglo-Persian Oil Company was the best agency for the development of 
1. 
Mesopotamian oil. On December 9th 1920 Lord Curzon joined the chorus 
of official protest in a memo for the Cabinet, asking for re-interpret-
ation or re-consideration of the decision "particularly in view of 
2. 
the attitude of the U.S.A.". 
By the end of 1920 the American diplomatic onslaught was beginning 
to have its effect on the British Government's thinking on oil policy. 
His Majesty's Government still had to answer the latest American note 
(of November 20th) and, while it could not afford openly to transgress 
against any of the principles which the Americans apparently held so 
dear, it had also somehow to save itself from the calamity of having 
to throw Mesopotamia open to all and sundry for development. The 
only way to achieve these aims seemed to be by again boldly championing 
the Turkish Petroleum Company's pre-war rights to the oil concession 
for Mosul and Baghdad; this, of course, would mean the abandonment 
of the principle of state working. In addition, some concession to 
American interests would have to be made if Anglo-American relations 
were not to be further embittered. 
The decision of the Conf erenoe of Ministers on State working still 
stood, formally, when on February 28th 1921 Curzon made his reply to 
the American note of the previous November. Nevertheless, the deli veey 
of that reply made it practically impossible to implement that decision 
1. Civil Commissioner at B dad to India Office Jul 
FO 371 5085 20 8077. 
It may perhaps be significant that A.T.Wilson later joined the 
Anglo-Persian Oil Company staff. 
2. Memo for the Cabinet b Lord Curzon December 
FO 371 508 20 15389. 
KOTE: The Oil Companies obviously had an interest in overturning the 
deOTsion, but no evidence of their views having influenced the 
attitude of Government officials has been found. 
without categorically disowning what was a formal diplomatic communica-
tion from His Majesty's Government to the Government of the United 
States, for Curzon's reply firmly asserted that the Turkish Petroleum 
Company's claim to the oil concession in Mosul and Baghdad, based on 
1. 
the Grand Vizier's letter, was definitely valid. 
The British note was by no means ra ·na.st.ily oo.niH ... dered · ~. · 
document, nor had it been conceived and executed only after 
consultation within the Foreign Office. On the contrary, the note was 
a much drafted, altered, and re-drafted document in the composition 
of which all Departments had been consulted and which, furthermore., 
had been sent only after the Prime Minister's express approval had 
2. 
been given. However, since no formal recognition of this fait accompli 
(if it may be so termed) was given at the time by the Cabinet, the 
confusion as to the exact position persisted. Nevertheless, from that 
time onwards, with one exception, discussions on the question of 
Mesopotamian oil took as a basis the idea that development would be 
done by the Turkish Petroleum Company, and not by state agency. The 
one notable exception, a plan mooted early in 1921 by Sir Percy Cox 
(High Commissioner in Bajhdad) whereby the Anglo-Persian Oil Company 
1. Curzon to Davis Feb 28th 1 21 (see paragraph 8 of this 
communication in Parliamentary Papers (H of C) 1921 (Cmd 1226) 
xliii 481. "Correspondence between H.M.G. and the U.S.Ambassador 
' it " respecting Economic Rights in Mandated Terr ory • 
2. See various notes, minutes and drafts in FO 371/6363/576/2611. 
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alone should act as state agency for the development of Nesopotamian 
oil, was abandoned, partly at least because of fear of th~ likely 
American attitude to such a plan.l. 
Purther .PJnerican notes of Aw~ust 24th and November 17th 1921 
showed that the American attitude was unlikely to soften. 2 • The 
British Government believed that the United States was fully capable 
of keeping up its present attitude to the handates until the oil 
question had been settled to its liking, and that even if it did 
not do that, it might try to influence the Arab Goverru.'lent against 
fin.ally L:rranting the concession to the Tm. .. kish Petroleum Company. 
There seemed only one way out of the dilemma -- to off er the 
Americans a share in the Turkish Petroleum Company and to set on 
foot neeotiations with the Standard Oil Company towards that end. 3• 
There were, too, other things to be considered. A Company 
known as the Central Mining and Investment Corporation.\aLondon-
based Company) had taken up certain claims of the heirs of the former 
Sultan Abdul Hamid II to properties in Mesopotamia and other terri-
tories of the former Ottoman Empire. 4· These claims were of such a 
prodigious extent that the High Commissioner had declared that, if 
granted, they would leave Mesopotamia "a beggared State11 • 5· The 
1. 
2. G. Harve 
17th 1921. 
3. :Memo by Weakley, December 13th 1921. 
4. ~~:.:::.:::~==~-=:=.....;:.:.;.;~..;..;;;;.;~~---~~~~~~~~=-------
5. Hi h Commissioner for Ira to 
Colonies, November 4th 1921. 
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Central Nining and Investment Corporation, in approaches to 
the Foreign Office, had hinted that it might try for American 
support. While the Foreign Office felt there was little of 
substance in the claims of the heirs, it recognized that in 
the hands of the Americans they could have at least a great 
f . 1 1. deal o nuisance va ue. 
1. hinutes of Inter-Departmental Neeting, June 18th 1921. 
FO 371/6361/382/7110. 
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Then, too, there was the problem of Italy. Following the 
publication of the San Remo Oil Agreement in mid-1920, the Italians 
had made several diplomatic approaches to Britain and France on the 
subject of oil. At first they had echoed the American charges against 
the allegedly monopolistic character of the Anglo-French agreement, 
declaring it to be a grave menace to Italy's fuel supplies, and 
1. 
contrary to the principles of the League Covenant. Later, this 
clamour against the iniquitous San Remo Agreement had turned into a 
plea to share in its benefits, these pleas being supplemented by 
vague threats of combination with American interests if Italy did not 
2. 
get what she wanted. While the Foreign Office was by no means alarmed 
by the "spectre of an Italy-United States combination in the oil 
3. 
question", the Italian demands were nevertheless an added international 
complication. 
Although on the surface it would appear to have been in France's 
interest to support British plans for the maintenance of the rights 
of the Turkish Petroleum Company, Anglo-French relations were at times 
by no means so cordial as to allow the British Government any 
1. Memorandum communicated by the Italian Ambassador, August 20th 
1920, in D.B.F.P. let Series, Vol. XIII, p. 342. 
2. Note from the Italian Ambassador to F.arl Curzon, October 23rd 1920, 
in D.B.F.P. lat Series, Vol. XIII, pp. 363-365. 
Italian Ambassador to Curzon, March 16th 1921. FO 371/6360/382/3650. 
Petroleum De artment to Forei Office A t rd 1 21. 





complacency on the subject. li'or one thing the 1;ersistent 
reports of the great influence of the Standard Oil Company 
t F f ff . 1. amongs 1 re11ch o ficials were disquieting to the Foreign 0 ice. 
Accordingly, towards the end of 1921 a definite plan beean 
to emerge whereby some compromise would be sought between the 
1:!.
1urkish Petroleum Company and the American interests which 
would also, it was hoped, provide for satisfying the demands 
of the Italians and, if their claims were upheld legally, for 
compensating the Sultan's numerous heirs. This plan was put 
forward first in a memo of December 13th 1921 by Yir. Weakley, 
and seven days later the Foreign Office wrote to the Colonial 
ff f . t . th. t . 2 • O ice or i s views on is sugges ion. 
1. See in particular Minute by Tyrrell, November 24th 1921 
FO 371/6367/382/13144. 
2. Eemo by Weakley, December 13th 1921. 
Forei Office to Colonial Office December 20th 1 21. 
FO 371 6364 576 12708. 
What of the companies already participating in the Turkish 
1. 
Petroleum Company? Although the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was preparing 
to cooperate fully with the Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) in 
2. 
Northern Persia, it had always been very reluctant to forego any of 
its prospective privileges in Mesopotamia which compromise with the 
3. 
Standard Oil would entail. The Royal Dutch-Shell was even determined 
to fight it out with the Americans rather than compromise in 
Mesopotamia - at least, that seemed to be Deterding's attitude, and 
4. 
for.all practical purposes he~ the Royal Dutch-Shell. 
There was also, of course, another aspect altogether to be 
considered. If the Americans, and perhaps the Italians, were to be 
included in the Turkish Petroleum Company as well as the French, then 
there was no prospect either of the British Government using the 
promise of a large share in that Company as a bait to gain control 
of the Royal Dutch-Shell, as earlier schemes had envisaged, or of there 
being any "permanent British control", as specified in the San Remo 
1. 
2. See Chapter 5 (below). 
4. In urging (to the Foreign Office) that British interests cooperate 
•ather than fight the Americans, Gulbenkian had particularly asked 
that his views be kept confidential, because, he said, he and 
Deterding differed on the question. 
(Minute by Tyrrell, November 24th 1921. FO 371/6367/382/13144.) 
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Oil Agreement. British plans to gain control of the Royal Dutch-Shell 
Company were, however, now being developed along different lines, 
1. 
and Mesopotamian oil was no longer the crux of the whole matter. 
As for the idea of "permanent British control", this was already 
impossible of realization in the form originally envisaged. 
At the beginning of 1922 the Conference· of Ministers' decision of 
January 23rd 1920 still stood, unrevoked, as a statement of British oil 
policy, although probably no-one now seriously believed that it would 
be implemented. By July, however, the pressure of events had forced 
its final, formal repudiation. 
In January 1922 the Colonial Office (which since October 1921 
had taken over responsibility for Mesopotamian affairs) approved 
Weakley's suggestion that American and Italian interests should 
2. 
participate in the Turkish Petroleum Company. Further progress was 
made also at an informal conference at the Colonial Office on January 
16th at which Anglo-Persian Company representatives (and possibly also 
3. 
Shell representatives) agreed verbally to the principle of American 
participation in the Turkish Petroleum Company. (The question of 
4. 
Italian participation was shelved for the time being). Already, however, 
1. See Chapter 4. (below). 
3. It is not certain from the documents whether Shell representatives 
actually were present, but nothing in them contradicts this view, 
and it is very probable that they were. 
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Cadman (now a member of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company)l. had 
intimated to Standard Oil (New Jersey) representatives that his 
Company was willing to discuss cooperation with them in the 
Turkish Petroleum Company. 2• Here, it seemed, the fact that 
the Anglo-Persian and Standard Oil Companies were already 
cooperating in Northern Persia was an important factor in getting 
the two groups together on the Mesopotamian question. 
The British Government, whose interest in the affair of 
the Turkish Petroleum Company had gradually become a question 
as much of political concern3· as of concern for oil per se, 
having steered things to this stage, was now anxious that any 
negotiations between the groups should take place on the 
commercial level only and that, as far as possible, the 
respective governments should not interfere. This, it was felt, 
would lessen the danger of further political complications. 
By mid-June 1922 inform.al inter - Company negotiations on 
American participation in the Turkish Petroleum Company had 
begun to bear fruit. Bedford, of the Standard Oil Company, had 
1. Cadman had joined the Company in 1921. 
2. to Forei Off ice 
3. Churchill (Secretary of State for the Colonies) urged Anglo-
American cooperation in Mesopotamia and Northern Persia over 
oil concessions as a means of relaxing the tension over 
¥.iandates and the Kemalist situation, and of conciliating the 
United States in the Middle Fast. Churchill to Curzon, 
Pebruary 1st 1922. FO 371/7782/132 1195 • 
contacted the American companies and determined which were 
interested in participation in the 'l'urkish Petroleum Company 
(there were seven such companies in all). He was doubtful, 
however, about the adequacy of the 20,::; share which had earlier 
been tentatively suggested by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company as 
the basis of' American participation. 1 · 
The State Department also, it appeared, had consented to 
the Americans entering into formal negotiations with the Turkish 
Petroleum Company, on condition, though, that the "Open Door" 
policy be maintained and that the State Department approve any 
agreement arrived at. This did not imply any fundamental change 
in the State Department's attitude, however, since that body 
made it amply clear that it still regarded the Turkish 
Petroleum Company's claim as invalid, though it seemed probable 
that it would accept the fait accompli if the Mesopotamian 
Government eventually ratified the concession. 2 • 
There remained yet the attitude of the French to clarify. 
On July 11th 1922 the Foreign Office wrote to Hardinge, British 
Ambassador in Paris, requesting that he ask the French Government 
to appoint its nominees to take up the 25% Turkish Petroleum 
1. New York to Greenwa A.P.o.c., 
2. Ibid. 
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Company shares so that the Company might be fully constituted and 
a 1
1
rench representative be present at the negotiations with the 
Am 
. 1. ericans. The lilrench, however, were in no hurry to do this, 
and, indeed, as will be seen later, they had certain reservations 
about the proposed rearrangement of the Turkish Petroleum Company. 
Nevertheless, at this stage it seemed possible for more 
formal negotiations for American entry into the Turkish 
Petroleum Company to go forward. Moreover, from the British 
point of view, certain elements of confusion in its oil policy 
had apparently been eliminated for, in the Foreign Office's 
communication to Hardinge just referred to, the following passage 
occurred: 
Exploitation of the Mesopotamian oilfields by 
private enterprise has been considered the best 
means for developing the oil resources of the 
country. 2. 
Here then, at last, was the final rejection of the idea 
of state working for Mesopotamian oil. There does not appear 
to have been any discussion in the Cabinet of the matter, and the 
whole question of the formal reversal of the January 1920 
decision seems to have been decided by informal (and apparently 
unxecorded) discussions within the Departments.3· 
1. e Paris Jul 
2. Ibid. 
3. An inter-departmental meeting to discuss the matter of the 
French taking up their shares in the T.P.C. had been held on 
July 5th 1922. The question of the reversal of the Cabinet 
decision of January 1920 must have been mentioned at the time, 
and also presumably came up in whatever informal discussions 
took place afterwards - but there is apparently no extant record 
of any concrete decision having been taken on this point. 
Minute by Weakley, July ¥th 1922. FO 371/7784/132/6691. 
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The British Government now had a more definite policy for 
oil. The first tenet of that policy - sµpport of the Anglo-
liersian Oil Company in Persia (and elsewhere) had of couree never 
been in doubt. Now, after over three years, the search for a 
policy for Hesopotamian oil had ended - inevitably in the 
prevailing circumstances - in a final decision to give the Turkish 
Petroleum Company the full support of His hajesty's Government. 
The British Government thus had a second potentially 
powerful oil company under its wing, but, unlike the Anglo-
Persian Oil Company, the Turkish Petroleum Company was no longer 
to be a wholly British concern. Britain had deemed it expedient 
to allow the French a share in it, but she had initially resisted 
American pressure. This pressure (thinly disguised as insis-
tence on the "Open Door") had, however, gradually made an 
impression, helping to force British oil policy out of its 
initial rather confused and indecisive state into a more 
definite form. Thus the British were obliged to surrender 
,,,.,. / 
to American concerns a substantial interest in their protege, 
the Turkish Petroleum Company, as the price of political 
peace. 
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"IV The 1rurkish Petroleum Company Reorganized 
The first of the meetings between Standard Oil 
(N.J.) and Turkish Petroleum Company representatives specifi-
cally called to negotiate the American entry into the 
latter company took place in mid-July 1922. 1 • An outline 
agreement on a formula to satisfy the United States Government's 
insistence on the "Open Door" was soon arrived at (selection of 
certain blocks, the rest being auctioned) 2• and certain other points 
2. The Turkish Petroleum Company was to select, not later than 
two years after the confirmation of the concession, not more 
than 12 blocks, each not exceeding 16 square miles. The rest of 
the concession area was to be sub-leased by auction, at which 
the Turkish Petroleum Company was not to bid. 
1'3-~. 
1. 
were settled quickly, but on the major question of the amount of share 
participation to be allotted to the American Group no agreement was 
reached. 
At the July meetings Teagle (of the Standard Oil (N.J.) Company) 
had asked for 25% for the American Group, but it soon had become 
2. 
apparent that he was prepared to accept 20% instead. The distribution 
would then have been: Anglo-Persian Oil Company 4~, Anglo-Saxon 
3. 
Petroleum Company 20%, French Group 20%, American Group 20%. Deterding, 
however, was prepared only to agree to offer the American Group a 
"half-interest", or approximately 12%, which figure the Americans 
4. 
had no intention of accepting. Moreover, Deterding was inclined to 
adopt a "take it or leave it" attitude, ignoring Colonial Office pleas 
for compromise and warnings to him that American consent to the 
5. 
Mandate was needed before it could be operative, and, furthermore, 
1. Mainly concerning general principles, and including agreement to go 
ahead and fix the royalties payable to Ira~ as soon as possible. 
3. This distribution was, of course, subject to some modification in 
view of Gulbenkian's claim to a 5% share, and in view of possible 
Iraqi participation. 
Forei 
5. Since the United States was not a League Member, American consent 
was not formally necessary - but her continued opposition would 
obviously have made the position difficult for Britain. 
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that unless aJ6Teement was reached soon the Iraq Government might 
decide to put the concession up to the highest bidder. 1 • 
Deterding maintained his uncompromising stand for some time, 
but on September 9th he suggested, as an alternative, that the 
.Americans be civen 25/'C out of the Ang-lo-Persian Company's share, 
in return for which that company should have a royalty. 
Considerable (liscussion then ensued between Shell and Ahglo-
lJersian representatives, with the British Government also involving 
itself by exerting· pressure on Deterding to alter his attitude. 
Eventually, however, in December, the Anglo-Persian Company 
accepted Deterding's proposal of September 9th. 2 • 
The ·arrangement thus proposed divided the Turkish Petroleum 
Company shares equally among the French group, the American group, 
and the Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Persian Companies, though with 
provision for Gulbenkian to retain 4~s of the shares. Each group 
would therefore have a 24% participation. To compensate the 
Anglo-Persian Company, whose share thus fell from 47~~ to 24%, 
lo-Saxon Com 
to Petroleum De t., 
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that company was to get lOfo of the crude oil, free of charge. l. 
American pressure, and Deterding's stubbornness, had now, it 
seems, finally demolished a:ny chance of there being a:ny practical 
"permanent British control". 
The proposed arrangement was cabled to the American Group, 
which was asked to accept it and, additionally, to secure a 
promise from the State Department that it would not henceforth 
question the validity of the Turkish Petroleum Company's 
concession. 
2
• On January 4th 1923, Teagle (President of the 
Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) informed the Turkish Petroleum 
Company that the provision for giving the Anglo-Persian Oil Company 
a 10% royalty was unacceptable to the American Group, although it 
was recognized that some compensation to the British Company for 
the reduction in its shares should be made. 3. At the same time 
the British were informed that the State Department refused to 
make any firm promise regarding its attitude to the validity of 
the Turkish Petroleum Company's claim. This seemed to indicate 




heirs, could still be troublesome -- though it was not expected 
that this would be a serious problem if final agreement on 
American participation could be reached. 
l?urther discuss ions continued. An agreement between the 
Turkish Petroleum Company and the American group was eventually 
reached in June, and, according to the 1furkish Petroleum Company, 
it was "a firm one". L This agreement must have;i.ncluded at least 
a provisional acceptance by the American Group of the proposal 
to give a 10% royalty to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, a proviso 
that was eventually (in 1928) included in the Groups' Red Line 
t 2. Agreemen • The basis of American participation was thus 
settled in principle, although this did not, as will be seen later, 
1. Petroleum De artment to Forei Office 
FO 371 8995 91 6157. 
Nichols (Managing Director, Turkish Petroleum Company) told 
Vernon (Colonial Office) that the agreement was "a firm one". 
(R.V. Vernon to Clarke, June 26th 1923. FO 371/8995/91/6913. 
2. It is not absolutely clear just how definite the Americans' 
acceptance of the 10;;; royalty provision was at this juncture. 
However, in October 1923 Teagle told the U.S. Secretary of 
State that, although there was as yet no definite signed 
contract regarding American participation in the T.P.C., 
"practically all of the important terms of such contract 
have been discussed and agreed to so far as the British 
parthers in the Turkish Petroleum Company Limited are 
concerned." (Teagle to Secretary of State,October 11th 1923, 
in U.S. National Archives and Records Service, I'licrofilm 
M 722/24 No. 0597-0598). 
NOTE: Shwadran (op. cit. p.233) maintains that there was still, 
in October 1923, dispute between the Americans and British on 
the io-;:; royalty provision. He appears to be under some 
misconception regarding the relevance of th~ evidence he quotes 
in support of this vie.w, however (See F .R. U.S. , 192 3, II, 
pp.247-257, which Shw~9-~an quotes). 
For the Hed Line Agreement see below, Chapter 9. 
frnlve all the problems involved, pa.rticularly those concerning 
G -. 1, ·.1r' 1. U.l ueril\.1an. 
'l1here still remained, however, the question of :B1rench consent • 
.i~arly in Harch the 111rench Govermnent revived a point which they 
had made some time before in correspondence with the Foreign 
Office. 'l1hey requested that the Iraqi participation in the 
Company provided for by Article 8 of the San Remo Agreement be 
'th t t. . ht 2 • w1 ou· vo ing rig s. The British, however, were not prepared 
to countenance the idea. Nevertheless, in order to compromise, 
they tentatively agreed to consent to any Iraqi shares being 
taken pro rata from all the groups, instead of, as laid down at 
Sqn Remo,· France providing half of' the first 10;·~ of such shares. 3 • 
1. Early in 1923 the Americans queried Gulbenkian's position 
in the Company, and the suggestion that Gulbenkian commute 
his share for a cash payment was being mooted as a solution 
to the problem. 
(Piesse to Nichols,__}anuar7 3rd 1223 and Nichols to Piesse, 
January 4th 1923. FO 371 8994/91/258. 
Minute by Weakley, March 14th 1922• FO 371/8995/91/2752.) 
2.(For the original request, see French Ambassador to the Earl 
of Balfour, July 3lst_l.9.22. FO 371/7794/132/7553). 
The French apparently feared that the Iraqi vote would always 
be cast in the British Group's favour - a doubtful supposition, 
it would seem. They were also motivated by the need to gain 
the approval of the French Parliament for what might appear to 
be French sacrifices to placate American interests. (See ~ 
b Clarke Ma 10th 1 2 and Minute by Weakley, May 14th 1923-_. 
FO 371 8995 91 4920 • 
3. Osborne to 
22nd 1923. FO 
and Clarke to Osborne June 
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On June 30th, following the conclusion of the companies' 
agreement on American participation, the French were urged to 
consent to its terms and formally to take up their shares by 
forming a commercial company to participate in the Turkish 
1 
Petroleum Company. • The French, however, were in no hurry to 
comply, though they did not, to the ~'Tench Office's relief, 
create further difficulties in this matter. It was thus not 
until the following January that the French Government authorised 
the 11Groupe national francais des Petroles" to take up the Turkish 
f 
Petroleum Company shares, and not until July 1924 that they were 
actually taken up. 2• 
By mid-1923 what was to be the Turkish Petroleum Company's 
final composition could be discerned, although many details of 
its operation were still undefined and were liable to a.rouse 
bitter controversy. The American group and the French group 
had each won its rizht to partnership on an equal footing with the 
2. Various reasons contributed to the long delay, including 
confusion as to which French company was to take the shares 
up, Turkish Petroleum Company requests to the French for certain 
assurances, and the question of whether or not the French ought 
to pay interest additional to the price of their shares. 
See various letters, notes and minutes under the following 
references:-
FO 371/9386/5522/8813; FO 371/8996/91/10969. 11294; 
FO 371/10082/13/1050; FO 371/10084/13/4304, 4855, 5199, 5422. 
In March 1924 the "Compagnie Francaise des Petroles" was 
formed to take over the interestssof the "Groupe national 
francais des Petroles", and it was this group that actually 
took sup the shares in July 1924 •. (FO 371/10084/13/ 4236 and 
6193.) 
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Anelo-PeTsian and Shell groups (though, of course, the Anglo-
Persian Oil Company had the advantage of an oil royalty), while 
the Gulbenkian interest was still represented in the Company. 
Also, although the Italiana, the Sultan's heirs (and also another 
group known as the Chester group) 1• each in their different ways 
still posed problems to both the Turkish Petroleum Company and 
to the British Government, their prospects of having some share 
in Mesopotamian oil development at this stage were not very bright. 
So far the Turkish Petroleum Company had survived as an 
entity only·because it had been in the British Government's 
interest that it should so survive. As has been pointed out, 
the claims of the Turkish Petroleum Company to an oil concession 
in :Mesopotamia were rather dubious, and were supported by the 
British Government more on the grounds of expediency than on any 
consideration of actual legality. At one point, the British had 
even considered abandoming these claims in favour of a scheme for 
State working. In the end, however, other considerations, 
particularly the need to compromise with the Americans, had forced 
a reappraisal of this policy, and the British ?overnment finally 
came to the conclusion that only by actively supporting the Turkish 
yetroleum Company could it ensure both that British interests in 
Eesopotamian oil were safeguarded and that relations with the 
1. 'fhe "Chester group" had various pre-war claims in the 
former Turkish Empire. See below, Chapter 6. 
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Americarrn over this oil remained capable of improvement. 
Hi thout this active ::;u:pport the 1.rurkisn J:etroleurn Company would 
hc;:,ve existed as a mere _qtphe.r:,, a nuisance but certainly not a 
major stumbling block to whatever schemes were mooted for the 
development of hesopotamian oil. 
In the immediate future, too, the Turkish Petroleum 
Company's dependence on British Government support was to be no 
less marked,for it had many problems still to face, the most 
important of which was the confirmation of its claim to a 
concession in the 1'1osul and Baghdad vilayets. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE ANGLO-PERSIAN OIL COMPANY AND THE COMPANIES' AMALGAMATION SCHEMES 
1919 - 1924 
In Persia the full development of the Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company's concession had been somewhat hampered by wartime conditions, 
although some progress had nevertheless been made during the war 
yea.rs. With the coming of peace, however, the Company could give more 
attention to the development of its resources. 1 • During the period 
1919-1924 production from the Company's oilfield at Maidan-i-Naftun 
(Masjid-i-Suleiman) grew steadily, climbing from just over one million 
metric tons in 1919 to 4,246,000 metric tons in 1924. Moreover, the 
oil was of good quality and, compared with that derived from American 
f . ld h t d 2• ie s, was c eap o pro uce. 
The Company was intent on expanding its interests outside Persia 
also during these yea.rs. While developing its refining capacity in 
Britain, and setting up a refinery in Australia, the Company also 
acquired interests in several countries outside the British Empire, 
with the aim of establishing distributing facilities there and, in 
some cases, of developing oil production. These countries included 
France·, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Albania, Egypt, Argentina and others. 
1. See S.H. Longrigg, Oil in the Middle East (London, 1961) p.36. 
2. ~., p. 48. 
Dunstan, Science of Petroleum, Vol. I, pp. 22-23. 
In addition, the Company developed its tanker fleet, and embarked on 
a programme designed to establish its own bunkering facilities in all 
1. 
the principal ports of the world. 
Relations between the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and the British 
Government were close during these years, largely because the interests 
of each were similar. It should be noted, however, that despite the 
fact that the British Government owned a majority of the Company's 
shares, this did not mean that that Government exercised an:y control 
over the general day-to-day policy of the Company. The 1914 Govern-
ment-Company Agreement gave the British Government the right to 
appoint two directors to the Company Boa.rd, but the liaison between 
the two Government Departments directly involved (the Treasury and 
the Admiralty) and the Government's appointed directors was of a 
somewhat casual and informal nature. Unless anything brought up at 
the Boa.rd Meetings was felt directly to concern the Government, its 
appointed directors did not make any formal report to it on the 
matter. Thus over a broad area of policy the Company remained 
2. 
unfettered by any Government interference, direct or indirect. 
1. Reports of the Annual General Meetings of the Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company, December 20th 1920 and December 21st 1921, in The Economist, 
December 25th 1920, Vol. 91, pp.1136-1140: December 24th 1921, 
Vol. 93, pp.1121-1123. 
2. See: Tree.eury, Memo by M. Trickett, January 28th 1928. 
T. 161/284.· file.33045/1. 
Nevertheless, on several very important matters the Company's 
policy was sometimes affected by the fact that the Government· was 
involved - generally to the annoyance of the Company as a whole. 
In 1920, for example, when the Company wished to allot shares to the 
Persian Government (in order to promote a settlement of outstanding 
1. 
questions) the Treasury refused to countenance the idea. This 
restriction on the Company's actions then led Greenway (Anglo-Persian 
Oil Company Chairman) to seek some modification of the Government-
2. 
Company relationship - but without any success. Again, in 1921, the 
Treasury refused to find capital for certain of the Company's proposed 
development plans. At this, one member of the Board wrote: 
I am tempted to wonder very much what real advantages we get 
from having the Government as shareholders in the A.P.o.c. against 
the serious disadvantages there undoubtedly are, especially in 
regard to finance.... ;. 
Dislike of the Government's involvement in the Company was not 
confined to one side, however, for at least one Treasury official 
felt that the Government's association with the Company was "both 
4. 
politically and financially ••• embarrassing." 
1. See next dhapter below. 
2. See especially: lo-Persian Oil Co to Treas 
1920 and Barstow to Greenway, August 12th 1920. T.l 1 
;. Extract from a letter from J.T. Cargill, quoted in Greenway to 
Inchcape, July 12th 1921. T. 161/140. file S.12245. 
4. Unsi ed undated memo 
Chancellor of the Exche uer 
T. 1 1 142. file s.12612 01. 
official to the 
One instance in which the British Government made its influence 
felt directly was over the appointment of Sir John Cadman (then the 
Company's Technical Adviser) to the Company Board.as Managing Director. 
First put forward in 1922 by Baldwin (President of the Board of Trade), 
the suggestion aroused strong opposition from the directors against 
Government interference in the affairs of the Company, although in 
1. 
the end the Government got its way. In 1925 the British Government 
also secured, despite some opposition on the Board, the appointment 
of Cadman to succeed Greenway as Chairman of the Company (on the 
2. 
latter's retirement). 
Relations between the Company and the Admiralty during these 
years were not always cordial, disputes occurring over, inter alia, 
the method of calculating the rebate due to the Admiralty under the 
3. 
fuel oil contract concluded in 1914. A conference held in February 
1921 failed to settle the various points at issue, and the matter 
dragged on until, in March 1928, full agreement was eventually reached 
on a plan to abandon the rebates scheme, the Company agreeing to supply 
the Admiralty its fuel oil at the fixed price of twenty-two shillings 
4. 
per ton (f .o.b.). 
1. Department of Trade and Industry, Baldwin to Greenway, September 7th 
1922, and Greenwa; to Baldwin Se tember 2 th 1 22 and November 8th 
1922 POWER 33 9 • 
2. Treasury, H.M. Treasury to Bradbury, August 11th 1925. 
Letter circulated to A.l:J.o.c. Board by Greenway, September 29th 
~· Bradb to Chancellor of the Exche uer October rd 1 2 • 
T. 160 25. file 8 • 
See 
3. :lntrod~e'ti.on) (above) • 
4. The Admiralty files relating to this question are:-
ADM 116/2318.B (this deals with the period 1917-1924) 
ADM 116/2318.C (period 1914-1928). 
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'rhue far it has been seen that friction occurred between 
the Government and the Company over diverse matters, including 
interference of the Government in the structure of the Company 
Board, the Government's restrictions on expansion progranunes 
and on proposals put forward by the Company for the settlement 
of points at issue with the Persian Government, as well as over 
rebates due to the Admiralty under its 1914 oil contract. This 
friction was never sufficiently strong, however, to lead to any 
firm demand by either side that the Government's shareholding 
in the Company be eliminated, though the question of the sale of 
the Government's shares did come up for discussion on several 
occasions, largely as a result of manoeuvres by the Royal 
Dutch-Shell interests. 
In January 1920 the agreement which the ?etroleum Imperial 
Policy Committee had negotiated with Deterding, whereby British 
interests gained control of most of the Royal Dutch-Shell organization, 
in return for that Company getting certain benefits in Mesopotamia, 
had been "knocked on the head", and it was never revived in that 
form. 1 • Instead, a new scheme, which in some ways was more far-reaching 
than the earlier one, was put forward by the oil companies and was 
given careful consideration by His Majesty's Government. 
1. See Chapter 3 (above). 
(Nevertheless, even after the dedision of January 1920 on 
state working, discussions on certain details of the scheme 
originally approved by the War Cabinet in Nay 1919 were 
evidently continuing in the Treasury. See Treasury file 
T. 172/1387.) 
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The scheme, prepared by ¥.tr. R.I. Watson, Managing 
Director of the Burmah Oil Company, under the date of 
July 29th 1921, was first considered by the Petroleum 
Department, and then, in October 1921, it came up for 
examination by all the British Government Departments. 
'l1he Oil Company Memorandum on the Proposed 
Combination of the Royal Dutch-Shell, Burmah, and 
Anglo-Persian Oil Companies stated that amongst the 
outstanding objects of the scheme ~ere the following: 
Firstly, financial and commercial control by a British shareholding 
majority over the oil production of the Royal Dutch-Shell group would 
be secured by the scheme. Secondly, the scheme would give greater 
security of the British Government's liquid fuel contracts with th..4 
Anglo-Persian Oil ·Company "which today is dependent on Crude Oil 
produced from the Persian Oil Fields alone but which under such a 
combine would have the Security of the Oil Fields all over the World 
which the Combine would: control". Thirdly, the scheme would result 
in the formation of a strong British unit, able to compete throughout 
the world with the Standard Oil Company.) Fourthly, as a result of 
the amalgamation, capital expenditure and running costs of the 
companies involved would be greatly reduced. Finally (since under 
the scheme the Government would probably sell its shares): 
The Government, while not only securing but actually 
strengthening the objects they had in view when they made 
their investment in the A.P.o.c. Ltd. would rid themselves 
from the diplomatic and other complications ••• which have 
arisen and will continue as a consequence of their direct 
financial interest in and, a fortiori, natural sympathy 
with a particular oil group viz:- the A.P.o.c. 1. 
The plan put forward was to combine the assets of the three 
companies involved and thereby to secure a small British majority of 
the combination. Thus the Burmah Oil Company's assets were calculated 
to represent l0.6SVfa of the total combined capital, the Anglo-Persian 
Oil Company 6.25%, and the Shell Transport and Trading Company 33.24%. 
This made a total British percentage of 50.17%, to the Dutch (Royal 
Dutch Company) 49.83%. Although the British majority was.small, 
British interests were to have full control of operations, excepting 
only those on Dutch territory, and, the Memorandum claimed, this 
scheme was different from previous plans in that there was now to be 
"an actual financial preponderating British share majority" instead 
1. 
of, as in former plans, a mere "paper control". 
The first reactions of the Government Departments to the scheme 
were generally to cast doubts on its merits, from various points of 
view, although only the Admiralty came out strongly against it, stating 
that, if the scheme were to be adopted, various safeguards would be 
2. 
required. Some discussion took place in October and November 1921, 
but it was not until January 1922 that any seri()us attempt to formulate 
a policy was made. 
In a memorandum dated January 6th 1922, Sir Philip Lloyd Graeme 
(Director of the Department of Overseas Trade) set out the whole 
companies' amalgamation question in its various aspects, pointing to 
the advantages to be gained by adoption of the proposed scheme. 
Firstly, amalgamation of the three companies would result in an 
efficient, British-controlled unit being set up, from whose efficiency 
the British consumer would eventually benefit. Secondly, if the 
1. ~· 
2. The Admiralty's views at this stage were the same as those given 
in some detail later (for which see below). Notes of a Meeting ••• 
October 26th 1921. FO 371/7027/11099/11691. 
Treasury sold its shares in the Anglo-Persian Oil.Company (as was 
then envisaged if the scheme were adopted) it would thus be freed 
from the necessity of making large outlays of capital towards the 
Anglo-Persian Oil Company's expansion schemes. Thirdly, both the 
Anglo-Persian and Burmah Oil Companies would secure a broader base 
for their operations than they then had. With regard to Admiralty 
objections to the scheme, these could be met by the conclusion of 
various agreements with the oil companies, Lloyd Graeme felt. There 
was a danger of angry reactions in the United States to the formation 
of the Combine, Lloyd Graeme admitted, but, he felt, these reactions 
would be shortlived, and would not cause axiy serious difficulties in 
1. 
Anglo-American relations. 
On February 24th 1922 it was decided to appoint a committee to 
2. 
examine the amalgamation question, and this then led various 
departments to elaborate their views. 
The Foreign Office felt that if the proposed Combine were formed, 
the Government definitely ought not to retain its shares in the 
Anglo-Persian Oil Company, because this would lead to diplomatic 
difficulties, especially with the United States, resulting in damage 
to the prospects of Anglo-American cooperation in Iraq and North 
Persia. It might also lead to British responsibility for defending 
1. Memo by P. Lloyd Graeme, January 6th 1922. FO 371/8288/873/873. 
interests which were principally Dutch. On the other hand, with 
regard to Persia, the Foreign Office was loath to part with control 
of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, which was felt to be "a big political 
1. 
asset in the country". 
The India Office, which had asked the Government of India for 
its views, was not in favour of amalgamation, although it would not, 
it stated, raise objections if it was considered to be in the national 
interest to sanction the project. The Government of India demanded, 
however, that in that event Indian interests should be adequately 
2. 
safeguarded. 
In a memo dated March 11th 1922 the Admiralty attacked the whole 
amalgamation scheme. The Admiralty objections were, firstly, that 
the proposed Combine would have a monopoly in the East; secondly, 
the inclusion of the Royal Dutch-Shell Group's interests in Mexico, 
California, Trinidad, Venezuela etc. would not greatly improve the 
Admiralty's supply situation (as the supporters of amalgamation had 
argued) since fuel oil to meet the Admiralty's specification was 
difficult to produce from these sources; thirdly, the Combine might 
be able to manipulate the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's profits to 
reduce the Admiralty's rebate on price which was laid down in the fuel 
oil contract; fourthly, the abandonment of the Government's shares 
would render this contract less secure; fi£thly, the Admiralty stated 
1. Minute by Weakley, March 9th 1922. FO 371/8288/873/2119. 
2. Particularly as concerned the Indian consumer, and the development 
of the Burma oilfields. (Enclosures in.Cabinet Office to Foreign 
Office, March 9th 1922. FO 371/8288/873/2151). 
that there was no evidence that the Anglo-Persian Oil Company Board 
1. 
really wanted the scheme. 
The first meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Oil Companies' 
Amalgamation took place on March 10th 1922, when various points 
2. 
mentioned above were made in the discussion. At the second meeting 
of the Committee, three days later, A.J. Balfour, who had just 
returned from the Washington Naval Conference, dwelt on the danger 
to Anglo-American relations if the project went through: 
If the British Government held shares in a great rival 
company the .Americans would undoubtedly regard it as an 
international affair at once. In the alternative case 
(i.e. the Government's shares sold, but the amalgamation 
project approved) judicious mis-representation would 
undoubtedly have the same effect... 3. 
The views of Sir Charles Greenway were sought at the third and 
fourth meetings. It then became clear that, notwithstanding a 
statement made by him that the amalgamation scheme was a good one 
commercially, Greenway was by no means in favour of its implementation. 
Instead of praising the scheme, he dwelt on the rosy prospects of 
the Anglo-Persian Oil Company as an independent concern, and he cast 
1. Statement of Admiralty views (March 11th 1922). FO 371/8288/si3/2177. 
"There is little doubt that the 'Shell' Company are at the back of 
the present scheme." Minute b Jenkins Director of Contracts, 
Admiralty, October 21st 1921. ADM 116 3452. Sheet 77 • 
2. Committee on Oil Co anies Amal tion: Minutes of First Meet· 
March 10th 1 22. FO 371 8288 873 2587. 
Baldwin President of the Board of Trade) was Chairman, and 
representatives of the Treasury, Admiralty, Board of Trade, 
Foreign Office, Colonial Office and India Office usually were 
present at the meetings. 
1sa. 
doubt on the reality of the "British control" which would be achieved 
1. 
if his company entered the proposed Combine. Whatever misgivings 
Greenway might have had about the British Government's involvement in 
his Company, it was obvious that he preferred to see this involvement 
continue rather than that the Company should be swallowed up in a 
2.. 
larger combine such as would result from the amalgamation scheme. 
The views of Watson (Burmah Oil Company) and Deterding were also 
sought by the Committee, as were the views of the Government Directors 
on the Anglo-Persian Company Board. While Watson and Deterding 
emphasised the benefits of the amalga.mo.tion scheme, the Government 
Directors did not favour its adoption, Lord Inchcape in particular 
declaring that "if a combination was formed the consumer was bound 
3. 
to go to the wall". 
The Committee's Report, dated June 12th 1922, reviewed most of 
the points noted above. Particular stress was placed on the doubts 
existing with regard to the possiqility of securing effective and 
permanent control of the proposed Combine. ·"In the last resort", 
stated the Report, "effective control over oil companies in time of 
war can only be obtained by control over production in the producing 
territory", and this applied everywhere. Also, while special voting 
rights could be given to British Government nominees to secure British 
2. At his meetings with the Committee, Greenway did not express any 
particular dislike of the Government holding a share in a.he A.P.o.c. 
3. of Fifth, Sixth, 
1 22. 
interests, nevertheless, "the real management of the amalgamation 
(would) inevitably pass to the man of outstanding ability and keenest 
1. 
brain, whatever his nationality". Although the Report did not say 
so, undoubtedly the Committee felt that to combine the Anglo-Persian 
and the Burmah Oil Companies with the Royal Dutch-Shell Group was, in 
effect, to hand over those two British companies to Deterding. 
The Committee's Report accepted the Admiralty's thesis that 
the amalgamation would weaken the satisfactory arrangement for fuel 
oil supplies with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Apart from Persia, 
the only areas the Combine would cont~ol which were suitable for 
producing fuel oil to the Admiralty's specification were Borneo and 
Sarawak; this was by no means sufficient to outweigh the increased 
possibility of artificial restriction of supply which would come 
about if the Combine were to be set up. In effect, approval of the 
amalgamation scheme would be a reversal of the policy of 1914, when 
the independence of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company had been deemed so 
vital an interest that the British Government had stepped in to 
2. 
prevent the Company's absorption by Shell. 
Consideration of the issues from the point of view of India was 
also given space in the Report, and it was particularly noted that, 
because of the great difference in the cost of production between 
Burma oil and that from Persia (Burma oil cost £2 per ton, Persian 
1. Committee on Oil Com anies' Amal tion: Final Re ort June 12th 
1922, pp. 4-5. CAB 24 137· CP.4050. 
2. ~., p. 6. 
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only five shillings), there would be a great danger, under the 
1. 
amalgamation scheme, of Burma oil development being severely restricted. 
Reference to the difficulties which would arise in Anglo-American 
relations if the amalgamation project were accepted (with or without 
Government participation) was made, the Report stating that Balfour's 
2. 
evidence on this point waa conclusive. 
Then, turning away from the question of the companies' amalgamation 
as such, the Report briefly referred to the particular issue of the 
Government's shareholding in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. The 
Committee saw no reason why His Majesty's Government should sell its 
shares just then; if the question arose later, "serious consideration 
should be given as to the safeguards required to assure the position 
3. 





The Report finally made two recommendations:-
(a) That His Majesty's Government shouldJ:efuse permission to 
the Anglo-Persian Oil Company to enter the proposed 
amalgamation. 
(b) That His Majesty's Government should retain the existing 
Government shareholding in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company 
for the present. 4. 
~., p. 7. 
~., p. 7. 
Ibid.' p. a. 
~., p. 8. 
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Notwithstanding the fact that so much serious discussion 
of the various issues had taken place, there can hardly have 
been much real doubt about this verdict from the outset. There 
had never been any enthusiastic advocates of the amalgamation 
scheme in Government circles, while on the other hand there had 
been at least one inveterate opponent of the scheme, the 
Admiralty, right from the start. As the discussions had 
continued, even the lukewarm supporters of the scheme, such as 
Sir Philip Lloyd Graeme, began to see that the advantages were 
definitely outweighed by the disadvantages, as far as Government 
interests were concerned. Among the oil companies, the Royal 
Dutch-Shell Group was enthusiastic - and indeed was probably 
the initiator of the scheme, notwithstanding the fact that the 
outline scheme was drawn up by Watson of the Burmah Oil Company. 
The Burmah Oil Company was warmly for amalgamation also, in order 
to broaden its base of operations, but, as has been seen, the 
Anglo-Persian Oil Company was by no means keen on the idea. 
The decisive issue in the question was that of naval supply, 
and it was on this issue, primarily, that the scheme foundered, 
although other considerations, such as the expected adverse 
effect on Anglo-American relations, also contributed to the 
scheme's rejection. 
The rejection of the amalgamation -scheme, in mid-1922, 
however, was not the end of the matter, and the Shell Group 
particularly had by no means ·abandoned hope of securing its 
162. 
t 1 . 1 t t• 1. even ua imp emen a ion. It was not until mid-October 1923, 
however, that the issue again came to life (almost certainly 
as a result of Shell influence) with the circulation to 
Government Departments of a letter on the subject by Neville 
Chamberlain, Chancellor of the Exchequer. 2 • 
Irrnnediate reaction in the Departments to Chamberlain's 
raising the issue again was almost entirely unfavourable,3· 
-------~··----
1. Minute by Weaklei, March 2nd 1923. FO 371/9405/151/2205. 
2. The scheme proposed by Chamberlain was similar to the 
1921-22 amalgamation scheme. Chamberlain was apparently 
concerned about allegations that the A.~.o.c. was 
inefficient and had lost a lot of capital, and that the 
Company would need a lot more financial support (much 
of it from the British Government) if it was to remain 
independent. 
Neville Chamberlain to Lord Curzon, October 17th 1923. 
FO 371/9029/119/10990. 
3. Both the Foreign Office and the Admiralty sharply 
attacked the new proposals, on grounds similar to 
their criticisms of the 1921-22 scheme. 
Minute b Weakle October 1 th 1 2 • 
FO 371 9029 119 10990. 
(Weakley noted that the A.F.O.C. was not a burden on the 
taxpayer). 
hemo by First Lord of the Admiralty: Admiralty 
views on the Proposed Sale of the Government 
Holding in the ~lo-Persian Oil Company, January 10th 
~· 
CAB 24/164. CP.20. 
but nevertheless the question was referred to the Cabinet in 
January 1924, when it was proposed to reconstitute the Committee 
of 1922 to re-examine the question of the companies amalgamation. 1 • 
On January 22nd, however, the Conservative Government then in 
office resigned, and the first Labour Government took office. 
Within a week the amalgamation proposals had been consid.ered 
and definitely rejected, primarily for the same reasons which 
had led to the rejection of the project in 1922. 2 • 
The subsequent fall of the Labour Government in the autumn 
of 1924 then led to much speculation in the press, the opinion 
being expressed that the return of the Conservatives to power 
meant that the sale of the Government's shares in the Anglo-
Persian Oil Company would quickly be proceeded with.3· However, 
any hopes that Shell might have had of getting hold of the 
Government's much coveted shares were soon dashed. After 
very little discussion between the Departments, the 
following official statement was issued to the press 




CAB. 23/47. 8(24)11. 
lo-Persian 
CP. 32. 
3. The "Daily Express" of lfovember 13th 1924, for example, 
insisted that Baldwin had been in favour of the scale of the 
Government's shares in the A.P.O.C. 
See various newspaper eoctracts in FO 371/10126/62/9s32,9s73,9s96. 
on November 19th 1924:-
His ¥J.ajesty's Government have informed the Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company Limited that they have no intention of disposing of 
the Government holding of shares in the Company. 1. 
The ommission of any such words as "at present." lent the statement 
an air of finality. 
The amalgamation project and the related issue of the sale of 
the British Government's shares in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was 
never again seriously considered during the period with which this 
study is concerned, although occasionally a question was asked in 
Parliament on the subject. The Royal Dutch-Shell Group's long struggle 
to remedy its· early mistake of ignoring Persia as a potential source 
of oil thus ended in defeat. In view of the tenacity with which 
successive British Governments have continued to hang on to their 
much coveted shares, it would seem that the unprecedented action of 
the Liberal Government in 1914, when the shares were originally 
acquired, can be considered to have been fully vindicated. 
1. Extract from the "Times" November 20th 1924. FO 371/10126/62/10074. 
On November 17th 1924 Sir Warren Fisher had written to Greenway: 
"The Prime Minister desires me to inform you that His Majesty's 
Government have no intention of departing from the policy of 
retaining these shares". 
{Fisher to Greenway, November 17th 1924. FO 371/10126/62/10074). 
It can safely be concluded that, had the Conservative Government 
remained in office early in 1924, instead of being ousted by 
Labour, the verdict would not have been different. 
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CHAPTER 5 
PERSIA, BRITISH POLICY, AND THE NORTH PERSIAN CONCESSION STRUGGLE 
1919-1924 
I. Defence arrangements for the South Persian Oilfields 1919-1924. 
After the First World War, the British Government, seeking 
to make Persia a strong, stable and, above all, a friendly state 
capable of acting as a buffer between India and newly acquired 
Mesopotamia on the one hand, and the chaotic and hostile 
entities taking shape f:rom the :ruins of the Ottoman and Tsarist 
Russian Empires on the other, concluded an Agreement with Persia 
in August 1919. This Agreement, by which the British Government 
sought to supplement its traditional influence in Persia, gave 
Britain the right to supply all advisers, milita.Jty and civilian, 
to the Persian Government. (at the latter Government's expense), 
as well as the right to supply all munitions and equipment for 
the Persian Army. In addition, provision was made for the 
encouragement of Anglo-Persian enterprises to develop and 
improve such things as Persian :railways, while Persia was to 
receive a substantial loan from Britain. 1• 
1. Parliamentary Papers (H of C) 1919 (Cmd 300) (iii, 983. 
"Agreement between His Majesty's Government and the Persian 
Government, signed at Tehran 9th August 1919." 
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The Agreement of August 1919 never became effective, 
since it remained unratified by the Persians, who ·disliked the 
loss of sovereignty which its terms implied. 1• Despite the 
various accusations made, 2• however, the Agreement bad nothing 
to do with oil specificallz, although obviously the great 
importance to the Admiralty of Persian oil was a factor in 
British calculations. 3. The Agreement aimed to give 
Britain a tight control over Persian actions, and thus 
aimed to secure British strategic control over the oil-
fields, but, it can easily be contended, Britain's fear 
of Russian influence, and the ever-present worries 
1. (Although in the Agreement Britain promised to 
respect the integrity and sovereignty of Persia). 
2. See for example an article in the "New York Evening 
Journal" of August 10th 1920. FO 395/350/127/No.P.987. 
3. There is no mention of oil in the text of the 
Agreement. Oil per se was only one of many factors 
influencing British thinking (See Memo by Curzon 
on the Persian Agreement, August 9th 1919 in 
D.B.F.P., lat Series, Vol. IV, pp.1119-1122). 
about Indian security, were in any case sufficient to ensure 
British concern for control of Persia. While in one way the 
collapse of Tsarist Russia might have temporarily weakened the 
Russian threat, on the other hand the consequent growth of 
Bolshevism enhanced this threat, making it seem, in some ways, 
more insidious and dangerous to the British position in Southern 
Asia.1 • 
It is true, however, that once British troops had been 
withdrawn from Persia after the War, and plans for the disbandment 
of the South Persia Rifles were being made, great concern was 
shown, particularly, as one would expect, by the Admiralty, 
over the defence of the oilfields both from tribal attacks and from 
possible Russian aggression. At this time the Admiralty was 
drawing 350,000 tons of naval oil yearly from Persia, and expected 
this quantity to increase greatly in the future. 2• The kaleido-
scopic nature of Persian politics, and the general instability 
of Persian movernments during this period, did not give the 
Admiralty any confidence to rely on Persian obligations (under the 
1. In November 1919, for example, a Conference of British Ministers 
concluded that Bolshevist activity in Persia and Central Asia 
was "one of the most troublesome problems which the :British 
Empire had to face". (CAB 23/18. CS (19) Appendix III l(e).) 
2. Memo by W.H. Long, December 24th 1920. F0 371/6399/2/288. 
1901 D'Arcy Concession) 1• to defend the oilfields against attack, 
however, particularly as they were sit~ted so far from the capital, 
Tehran. At the same time, the Indian Government objected to the 
keeping of British troops in Arabistan {as Colonel Wilson had 
suggested) preferring rather to entrust defence to the Sheikh 
of M:ohammerah and the Bakhtiari tribesmen. The Admiralty, 
therefore, by no means satisfied with this arrangement, appealed 
to the Cabinet to find an adequate means of defence for the 
oilfields should the disbandment of the South Persia Rifles be 
proceeded with. 2• 
Nevertheless, by 1922 defence plans were still in a 
state of flux. While various agreements between the Anglo-
Persian Oil Company and the Bakhtia.ri khans had been successfully 
concluded in 1921 (and others early in 1922), 3. these had not 
been welcomed by the Persian Government, which denounced 
them as a violation of the D'Arcy Concession. The effect 
of this denunciation, however, was to foster 
1. See Introduction, above. 
2. The South Persia Rifles, an organization which had helped to 
maintain the security of the A.P.o.c.•s property during the 
war, was in fact disbanded in 1921. 
Admiralt Memo for the Cabinet "South Persia Rifles" 
3. The .Agreements referred to here were not defence arrangements, 
but concerned the sale of land by the Bakhtiaris to the 
A.P.o.c. (FO 371/6450/10099/10099.) 
closer relations between the khans and the Sheikh of Mohammerah -
which closer relationship tended to increase their respective values 
as defenders of the oilfield and pipeline, a development welcomed 
1. 
by the British Government, although wa:ry of openly encouraging it. 
A proposal to supplement these arrangements by a local defence 
volunteer gToup formed by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, however, 
2. 
was dropped after Foreign Office and Oil Company objections. 
Yet, these local arrangements were all the time subject to 
disrupting influences, both because of the natural animosities between 
the several tribes and because of the schemes of Communist agitators 
3. 
who played on these animosities. Moreover, at their best, these 
arrangements were not sufficient to deal with any aggression other 
than from a local uprising or a marauding band. Partly because of 
this, and because of the undesirability of keeping British troops 
on Persian soil, in 1922 the Air Staff prepared a plan for the 
defence of the Persian oilfields from Iraq, with both air and land 
forces being involved. This plan, however, was conditional on the 
situation in Iraq pe~itting its execution, and, moreover, was 
4. 
conditional on replacements being sent from India. The Army Council 
1. Loraine Tehran to Forei 
FO 3 71 7 81 1 5188 ;;.Lo~ra:;,:::i;::n,:::.e ..l..:..:::=:.="--=;.:;...::;..;;.;:.~il::...;;.;;;.;;;;~;;.i..~~;..;....;;;..i:..;;;~ 
1922. FO 371/7808/6 82 O. 
The Sheikh of Mohammerah was being supplied with rifles by Britain 
2. Foreign Office to Loraine (Tehran) August 28th 1922. FO 371/7818/7/8407. 
Committee of Im erial Defence to Forei Office December 12th 1 22. 
FO 371 7819 1 14002. 
de s. Br India Jul 
4. Great Britain, Public Record Office, Air Ministry, Paper prepared 
b Air Staff for Committee of Im erial Defence 2 rd Meet· "South 
Persian Oilfields Defence Scheme", June 23rd 1931. Air 2 1437.Paper 69A. 
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obviously had doubts about the efficacy of such a plan, but neverthe-
less approved it, being careful to add that in giving this approval 
1. 
"they took into account the loyalty of the Sheikh of Mohammerah." 
As friction grew between the tribes and the Persian central 
government (now largely, but not as yet completely, controlled by 
2. 
Reza Khan, the War l'1inister), in consequence of the Persian 
Government's endeavours to extend its area of authority to the remote 
South Western part of Persia, it became apparent to the Anglo-Persian 
Oil Company that it ought to negotiate a new defensive agreement 
with the Persian Government rather than, as hitherto, rely on its 
3. 
usual method of local arrangements with the tribes. The British 
Government actively encouraged the Company in this idea and, moreover, 
1 • 1.E1-.2:.. 
2. Reza Khan was the principal figure in the Persian Army's coup 
d'etat of February 1921. He became Minister of War, and for 
some years concentrated on suppressing revolts and restoring law 
and order in the country. Meanwhile in Tehran the Medjlis was 
elected - "a heterogenous group that symbolized the futility of 
Iranian politics." In 1923 Reza Khan countered various plots 
against him, and became Prime Minister, determined to achieve 
full control of the machinery of government. In December 1925 
he became Shah Pahlevi, the Qajar Shah having earlier left the 
country, never to return. (Amin Banan.i, The Modernization of 
Iran, 1921-1941 (Stanford, Calif., 1961) pp. 31-43). 
3. The Company had at first resisted the idea (which had been 
put forward by Sir P. Loraine), but later was probably convinced 
of the wisdom of cooperating with the Persian Government by 
the views of its local representative, Dr. Young. 
(See various items in FO 371/9029/119/9553, 9644, and 9806). 
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urged on the Sheikh of Mohammerah the necessity of getting on good 
1. 
terms with the central government. 
Early in 1924, however, a clash between the Persian Government 
and the semi-autonomous tribes of South West Persia seemed imminent. 
The Air Ministry, worried at the signs of impending trouble, no 
longer felt that it would be able to cope with the situation with the 
forces then at its disposal, and suggested that permission to send 
British troops into the oilfields be sought from the Persian Govern-
2. 
ment - a suggestion which was immediately rejected by the Foreign 
3. 
Office. At this time neither the War Office, the Air Ministry, nor 
the Indian Government were willing to accept responsibility for the 
4. 
oilfield's defence, while the Admiralty, especially anxious for the 
security of Persia at this time in view of the Labour Government's 
5. 
decision not to proceed with the Singapore project, desperately 
pleaded that some arrangement be made with the Persian Government 
which would ensure that the navy's supplies would be adequately 
1. Office October 22nd 1 2 • 
in 
the previous two years. 
3. Foreign Office Minutes, February 29th 1924. FO 371/10124/27/1942. 
4. India Office to Forei Office March th 1 2 and Minute by 
G.P. Churchill, March 25th 1924. FO 371 10124/27/2094 and 2362. 
5. If there were no large oil reserve at Singapore, the -navy would 
have to rely on Persia almost entirely for its oil supplies for 
operations east of the Mediterranean •. (See Chapter 2~ abd~~). 
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safeguarded. By July 1924, a reluctant India had been prevailed 
upon to earmark two brigades to defend the Persian oilfields, in 
1. 
concert with forces from Iraq. 
The Anglo-Persian Oil Company was naturally alarmed at the 
situation, and urged the Foreign Office to intervene at Tehran to 
secure an easing of the tension between the Persian Government and 
2. 
the Sheikh of Mohammerah and the Bakhtiaris. On August 23rd 1924, 
therefore, Ovey (Counsellor of Embassy, acting as Charge d'Affaires 
at Tehran) was instructed by the Foreign Office to tell the Persian 
Prime Minister that "vital British into.rests in South West Persia 
may be imperilled by his recent administrative measures", and that 
any serious disturbances in Arabistan could not be regarded with 
3. 
equanimity by Britain. 
Things were already moving to a climax, however, While it was 
undoubtedly the British Government's policy at this time to 
hold themselves impartial, though inevitably leaning to the 
regular authority, that is, the Central Government, and to 
impress both sides with the necessity of maintaining peace 4. 
and, although prepared to send a ship to Basra, to refrain from 
5. 
involving British troops, this policy w~ by no means being adhered 
Tehran 
5. Ibid. 
The ship in question was for use a.gainst the Sheikh of 
Mohammerah if necessary. · 
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to by the British Consul at Ahwaz, Peel. Instead, Peel was actively 
encouraging the Sheikh of Mohammerah in his hostility to the Persian 
1. 
Government, and the Sheikh, obviously believing that he would have 
British Government support, was now "determined to overthrow Reza 
2. 
Khan or perish in the atte'mpt". Appeals from Ovey to the Consul at 
Ahwaz to reverse :his policy fell on deaf ears, and in the end Peel 
was only induced to desist from his tactics by a stern telegram from 
Ramsay MacDonald (British Prime Minister and Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs) in which MacDonald insisted that he comply with Ovey's 
3. 
instructions. 
On November 15th, after a personal interview with the Sheikh, 
Sir Percy Loraine (British Minister Plenipotentiary at Tehran) reported 
from Moha.mmerah that he.had persuaded the Sheikh to send to Reza 
Khan (now Prime Minister) a complete apology for his rebellious 
4. 
actions. It thus appeared that the matter would be settled amicably. 
5. 
The continued advance of Reza Khan's troops, however, alarmed the 
1. See Peel (Ahwaz) to Ovey (Tehran) September 29th 1924.FO 371/10135/263/8428. 
2. Ove Se tember 11th 1 2 .FO 371/10135/263/8602. 
October th 1 2 • 
4. Sir P. Loraine Mohammerah to Forei Office November 1 th 
~· FO 371 10137 263 9926. . 
(Loraine was the official British Minister in Tehran; Ovey was 
Charge d'Affaires in his absence). 
Minute by Mallet, November 17th 1924. F0 371/10137/263/9926. 
British Government, and, feeling that, by submitting, the Sheikh 
of Mohammerah had put himself in the right, the Foreign Office 
suggested to Sir Percy Loraine that the Persian Government should be 
1. 
informed of British obligations to the Sheikh, and that Reza Khan 
should be warned that 
if the Persian Government persist in attacking the Sheikh, 
His Majesty's Government must reserve to themselves the 
right to take such measures as they may think fit in 
pursuance of their assurances to the Sheikh. 2. 
By this time, however, the Sheikh's spirit was completely broken, 
and he was afraid to meet Reza Khan anywhere. Eventually he 
surrendered, and in April 1925 was removed to Tehran, while Persian 
Government forces took over his territory and brought it fully under 
3. 
central government control. 
With the fall of the Sheikh of Mohammerah neither the Anglo-
Persian Oil Company nor the British Government had any longer any 
choice in the matter of the defence of the Persian oilfields. The 
events of 1924 had amply demonstrated the inability of British arms 
to intervene to protect the oilfields when the threat came from inside 
1. Explicit assurances to protect the Sheikh of Mohammerah, as long 
as he in turn fulfilled his obligations to the Persian Central 
Government, were given by the British Government in 1910, and 
these were still considered to be applicable. 
(Precis of relations of the Sheikh of Mobammerah-with the lo-
Persian Oil Comp~ Memo enclosed in A.P.O.C. to F.O. 
August 18th 1924 FO 371/10134/263/7136. 




• (as opposed to a threat by an external force). Direct 
intervention by British troops or aircraft would inevitably have 
led to an outcry both in Persia and in other countries, especially 
Russia, which countries would have wasted little time in 
attributing all kinds of sinister motives to British actions. 
Henceforth Britain would have to rely on the action of the 
Persian Government itself to protect one of the British navy's 
main sources of oil; with the rise of Reza Khan, however, this 
was not so hopeless a situation as it undoubtedly· had appeared 
to be in earlier yea.rs - always provided, of course-; that the 
British Government and the Oil Company could keep on good terms 
with Persia's new and determined ruler, 
II. The Arinitage-Smith .Agreement. 
In 1919, relations between the Anglo-Persian Oil Company 
and the Persian Government were rather strained. While on the 
one hand the British Government aroused suspicion and hostility 
1. The British Government was particularly keen not to have 
to intervene mili ta.rily in Persia at this time because 
of the difficult Egyptian situation (the British Commander 
in Chief of the Egyptian Army, Sir Lee Stack, was murdered 
in Cairo on November 19th 1924). 
Forei Office to Loraine B dad November 26th 1 2 • 
FO 371 10137 263 1036 • See also FO 371 10137 2 3 10414).) 
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in Persia (and elsewhere) by the signature of the Anglo-Persian 
Agreement of August 9th 19J9 1 '-" friction between the Anglo-
Persian Oil Company and the Persian Government also arose over 
diverse matters - and as it was well known that the British 
Government held a controlling share in that Company, this friction 
served to enhance hostile feeling in Persia against both the 
Company and the British Government. 
Friction between the Persian Government and the Anglo-
Persian Oil Company had arisen during the war over the calculation 
of the Persian Government's share in the Company's profits. 
Under Article 10 of the 1901 D'Arcy Concession the Persian 
Government was to receive 16 per cent of the annual net profits. 
In the Persian view this applied to the profits from all 
companies belonging to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, whether 
operating in Persia or not. The Company, however, disputed 
this, stating that Persia was only entitled to profits arising 
177. 
from companies operating in Persia directly in accordance with the 
D'Arcy Concession terms. Another point at issue was the cutting 
of the Company's pipeline in 1915 by Turkish-inspired Bakhtiari 
tribesmen. The Company held that, in accordance with Article 14 
of the Concession, the Persian Government was bound to protect the 
Company's property; as it had not done so, the Company therefore 
claimed damages, and insisted on withholding royalties until this 
claim was settled. The Persian Government, however, disputed its 
liability in the circumstances, and asked for arbitration. 1 • 
In September 1919 the Anglo-Persian Oil Company agreed to pay 
the royalties so far withheld, on condition that the Persian 
Government ·examine, inter alia, the question of putting the royalties 
on the basis of a fixed sum of money per ton, instead of keeping to 
the disputed profits basis~ The Company offered to waive the claim 
relating to the cutting of the pipeline if a satisfactory agreement 
on royalties was reached. 2• Discussions dragged on, however, with 
various factors impeding a settlement, these factors including the 
unwillingness of the Persian Government to take any decision which might 
a.rouse opposition in the Medjlis, and, much to the Foreign Office's 
disgust, the refusal of the British Treasury to allow Persia to 
acquire non-voting shares in the Company as part of a general 
1. Shwadran, op. cit., pp.33-34. 
2. :.;;::.;;;.;;;._::;o~;:.;;-.;;.-.;;;;;;;;;;~--~~-=-~~--=:i=--~ 
settlement. 1• 
Eventually, after the appointment of Armitage-Smith2• as the 
representative of the Persian Government in the dispute, an agreement 
was reached in December 1920, which settled the immediate issues and 
established a working basis for the settlement of future disputes 
on the question of payments to Persia. 
The Armitage-Smith Agreement provided for the payment to the 
Persian Government of 16% of all profits arising from the production, 
refining, and marketing of Persian oil by the Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company or its subsidiaries, whether carried out on Persian 
territory or not. This sum, however, was not to include profits 
arising from tanker transport. What exactly was to be termed a 
"subsidiary company" was defined, and the various adjustments for 
dividends, income tax etc. were specifically laid down, thus filling 
some of the glaring gaps on this question left in the drafting of 
the original D'Arcy Concession. In a separate Agreement, the 
Company agreed to pay £1,000,000 to settle all outstanding questions 
between it and the Persian Government.3• 
The Agreement thus reached in 1920 was meant to enable any 
future disputes between the Persian Government and the Anglo-
1. Treas to Forei Office December 20th 1 1 • FO 371/3880/4303/164058. 
Treasury to A.P.o.c., July 5th 1920. FO 371 4913/243/1317. 
(The Treasury's reasons for refusing Persian participation appear 
to have been financial). 
2. A British Treasury Official. See Shwadran, op.cit., p.33, note 49. 
3. ~., pp.35-37. 
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Persian Oil Company to be settled quickly and to the satisfaction 
of both sides. However, the fact that the Persians still remained 
not entirely satisfied with the amount of revenue they received 
from the Company, and to some extent distrusted the Company's 
financial calculations, did not augur well for the future of the 
AgTeement. Nor did the fact that the Persians left the Agreement 
unratif ied strengthen the belief that the arrangement thus 
achieved would be anything more than temporary. (See chapter 12 
below). 
III. The revival of the Khoshtaria Concession. 
On March 9th 1916 the Persian Government gTanted to a Russian 
subject, A.M. Khoshta.ria, an exclusive concession (for a period 
of seventy years) for the exploitation of petroleum in the 
provinces of Ghilan, Mazanderan, and Asdrabad 1. - part of 
the northern area of Persia long subject to Russian 
influence. As the Medjlis was not sitting at the time 
(and did not meet until several yea-rs afterwards) 
1. Text: F.R.u.s., 1920, III, pp.351-352. 
The Persian Government was to receive 16% of the profits. 
(Minerals other than oil were involved in similar concessions 
to Khoshtaria at this time). 
the concession was never ratified. As far as is known, this was 
the only oil concession granted if.n the five northern provinces 
up to this time, with the exception or minor grants to Persian 
noblemen, notably one Mohammed Vali Khan Sepahsalar, with whom 
khoshtaria entered into an agreement some time in the period 
1916-1910.1• 
The position at the beginning or 1919 was that Khoshtaria 
had formed the "Rupento Syndicate" of Tiflis to take over his 
rights, and he had then disposed or some of his shares and rights 
to the Russian Naphtha Corporation, 2• and entered into negotiations 
for the disposal of the remainder with two British subjects, Messrs 
Leach and Firebrace. 3. The Russian Naphtha Corporation then 
approached the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in connection with the 
concession, the latter company at that time viewing this approach 
with favour, while Messrs Leach and Firebrace approached the 
British Government on the subject, asking for support and pointing 
out the "eiitremely great importance" of the concession "both from 
the political and economic point or view". 4. 
2. The Russian Naphtha Corporation: It is not clear whether or not 
this is the same company ref erred to as the "Russian General 
Oil Corporation (Soci·ete Generale Naphthifere Russe) Ltd." 
in W.R.Skinner, Oil and Petroleum Manual (London, 1919) pp.130-131. 
3. Petroleum Executive to Forei Office Jan: 1 th 1 1 • 
FO 371 3879 3921 8 75. 
Messrs. Leach and Firebrace were reportedly connected with a 
Paris firm (Dreyfus), which was thought to be connected with Shell. 
(FO 371/3879/3921/33586). 
4. Minute b Wea.kle Jan 18th 1 1 • FO 371/3879/3921/8675. 
Memo on Khoshtaria Concession encl. in Firebrace to F.O., 
Mardh 18th 1 1 FO 371 3879 3921 44872. 
Russian concession holders felt the need for British support 
particularly after the Persian decree abrogating Russian Concess-
ions (see next note). (Cox (Tehran) to Foreign Office, February 
27th 1919. FO 371/3s79/3921/335a6. 
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On April 11th 1919 an inter-Departmental meeting, at which 
H.E. Nichols of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was present, discussed 
the whole question of the North Persian concession, when it was 
decided that the British Government's policy should be (as so 
often in these matters!) one of "wait and see." In view of doubts 
as to the validity of the Khoshta.ria concession - for both the 
Russian and Persian Governments considered the concession to be 
no longer valid 
1
·- it was decided that the acquisitibn of any 
rights relating to it should .!!2!_ be recommended to British 
interests. 2• Later, it was further decided to support Persia 
should she decide definitely to cancel the concession on the ground 
that it had lapsed through non-fulfillment of certain terms. 
On December 13th 1919 Sir Percy Cox (Acting Minister at Tehran) 
informed the Persian Government of this decision, adding, however, 
that the British Government hoped, if it were decided to grant a 
new concession for the area, that "in the interests of Persia ••• 
an English Company (would) be preferred." 3. 
1. See the Notes on the denunciation of privileges obtained under 
the Tsarist regime by the S6viet and Persian Governments in 
June and July 1918. Text: Hurewitz, op.cit., Vol. II, pp.34-36. 
2. Notes of a Meeting, April 11th 1919. FO 371/3879/3921/62923. 
3. The Concession laid down that Khoshtaria must submit his scheme 
of operation to the Persian Government within a certain fixed 
period. According to Foreign Office information at the time, 
no such scheme of operation had been submitted. 
The text of Cox's letter is in Shwadran, op.cit., p.83, note 4. 
(See also F.O. to Cox Tehran November 2 th 1 1 • 
FO 371/3879 3921 150229 • 
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The Anglo-Persian Oil Company was already on the move in 
this question, however, and on February 24th 1920 it reported 
having reached a tentative agreement with Khoshtaria, and asked 
for British Government support. 1• While at first the British 
Government's view was that support could only be given if the 
concession applied for to the Persian Government was a new one, 
later, after examination by the Foreign Office's legal expert, it 
was concluded that the Khoshtaria concession had !!2i lapsed through 
non-fulfillment. 
2
• On April 9th 1920, therefore, Sir Percy Cox 
was instructed to support the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's claim 
to a valid concession based on t~ rights acquired from Khoshta.ria. 3• 
Thereupon the Anglo-Persian Oil Company formed a subsidiary, North 
Persia Oils, Limited, to work the concession. 4. 
2. Note b Mr. Sherman Assistant Le 1 Adviser to the Forei 
Office A ril 6th 1 20. FO 371 3879 3921 188324. 
The Anglo-Persian Oil Company had earlier produced evidence 
showing that the terms of the Concession ~ been complied 
with. 
4. Tbe Chairman of this company was Greenway; there were two 
other directors from the A.P.o.c., along with Mr. R.I.Watson 
(Burmah Oil Co.,), and Khoshtaria. The sixth director was a 
Mr. Djakelly (F.R.u.s., 1921, II, pp.641-2). 
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An Anglo-Persian diplomatic duel then ensued·~ in which the 
British contention that the Khoshtaria conce~sion ought to be 
ratified by Persia was stoutly resisted by the Persians.1 • 
Moreover, after the signature in February 1921 of a treaty between 
Persia and Soviet Russia which declared all concessions "obtained 
by force by the Tsarist Government and its subjects" to be null 
and void, the Persian case was somewhat strengthened. Even bad 
the Khoshtaria concession originally been valid (as the British 
contended), the treaty now rendered it invalid 2• - though in 
fact, since the treaty also contained a promise by Persia that she 
would not grant concessions thus surrendered by Russia to subjects 
of a third power, Persia preferred to maintain her contention 
that, as it had not been ratified by the Medjlis, the Khoshtaria 
concession had never been valid. She thus had her hands free 
to use the concession as bait with which to attract other parties, 
particularly American concerns, in the hope of securing loans and 
other financial benefits to herself. In a:ny case, whatever 
argument Britain put forward, Persia apparently had an adequate 
answer. 3• 
1. See various papers under the following references:-
FO 371/3879/3921/206179. 
FO 371/4919/910/1346, 1360, 5808, 12950. 
FO 371/6413/76/5354. 
2. Since Khoshtaria was a Russian subject. 
3. Text of the Treaty in Hurewitz, op.cit., Vol. II, pp.90-94. 
See the Persian Government's replies to British and Russian 
protests in November 1921. 
(FO 371/6417/76/13213 and F.R.u.s., 1921, II, p.649). 
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The British nevertheless kept up their duel with Persia, 
despite the fact that the Persians, to reinforce their already 
strong case, made various embarrassing references to Sir Percy 
Cox's letter of December 1919 which plainly stated that the 
British Government "prefer(red) to support the standpoint of the 
Persian Government in that the Khoshtaria concession is invalid". l. 
The whole matter had, however, t~n on a rather different 
complexion by now. In 1920 the Persian Minister in Washington 
had intimated to the U.S. State Department that approaches for 
concessions in North Persia by American oil companies would be 
welcome, and some interest had eventually been shown by the 
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey. 2• The Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company, becoming, in 1921, rather worried at the evident interest 
of the American company, then urged the Foreign Office to act to 
prevent the Persian Government from taking a:ny precipitate action 
in the matter. 3. However, the Foreign Office was by now turning 
1. Shwadran, op. cit., p.83, note 4. 
Forei Office to Greenwa A.P.o.c. Jan 
FO 371 7812 1 142. 
Sir P. Loraine (British Minister in Tehran) evidently had 
qualms about supporting the A.P.o.c.•s claims, but the Foreign 
Office felt that it "(could) not abandon the position (it) 
ha(d) taken up". Loraine Tehran to Crowe Dec. 2 rd 1 21 
and Forei Office to Loraine Tehran Dec. 2 h 1 21. 
FO 371 419 1 14291 • 
2. F.R.U.s., 1920, III, p.353. See also D.B.F.P. lat Series, 
Vol. XIII, p.597. 
(The Persians obviously wanted American interests to serve as 
a bulwark against both British and Russian influences in their 
country.) 
3. lo-Persian Oil Com to Forei Office June 2nd 1 21. 
FO 371 414 1 6361. 
The A.P.o.c. also hurriedly began prospecting operations in 
various areas at about this time A.P.o.c. to Strick Scott Ltd. 
(Mohammerah) August 16th 1921. FO 371 415 7 9450 • 
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its attention more and more towards the positive benefits, as a 
counter to Bolshevism, of Anglo-American cooperation in Persia, 
and, moreover, to the need for such cooperation in the whole sphere 
of Middle Eastern oil, particularly as concerned Mesopotamia, the 
Mandates question, and the question of the Turkish Petroleum 
Company. It was, therefore, keen to see the Anglo-Persian 
Company change its hitherto intransigent attitude to any form of 
compromise with the Americans. 1• 
At this time the Anglo-Persian and the Standard Oil Companies 
were not the only ones in the field, for (amongst other rivals) 
another American company, the Sinclair Oil Consolidated Corporation, 
was also showing an interest, the Persians having suggested that 
the Corporation send a representative to Tehran to begin concession 
t . t. 2. nego ia ions. This apparent threat no doubt influenced a 
decision made by Greenway some time later to begin negotiations 
with A.C. Bedford (of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey), 
1. Minute by R.C. Lindsay, June 6th 1921. FO 371/6414/76/6361. 
By mid-1921 Greenway was becoming rather less intransigent 
than previously on the subject of cooperation with American 
interests. Though prepared to cooperate in Northern Persia, 
however, he was still against such cooper~tion in Mesopotamia 
Petroleum De t. to Fore· Office June 21st 1 21. 
FO 371 414 7 7134 • 
2. Memo of talk with Persian Minister b G.P. Churchill A t 
20th 1921. FO 371 415 7 9538. 
At this time French, Belgian and independent British interests 
were also endeavouring to gain oil and other concessions in 
Northern Persia. Moreover, it is a very curious fact that at 
one time the German Charge' d 'Affaires in Tehran was keeping the 
situation well stirred up by acting as an intermediary for 
American interests in their rivalry with the A.P.o.c. See 
especially FO 371/6415/76/9756, 9965, 10027, 10366. 
FO 371/6416/76/12163. FO 371/6417/76/13677. 
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who was then in London, on the basis of a fifty-fifty p~.ner­
ship in the North Persian concession - a move which the Foreign 
Office welcomed. 1• 
Up to this stage, then, the matter of the IOloshtaria 
concession illustrates several things about British Middle Eastern 
Oil policy in the hectic period following the Armistice, in 
particular its confusion and liability to change with the 
political wind (see also chapter 3). The British Government had 
first decided to support the Persian contention that the Khosh-
taria concession of 1916 had lapsed, and had indicated this attitude 
to the Persian Government. Later, after receiving further 
information and advice, it had veered round to the view that the 
Khoshtaria concession had not lapsed, and only needed ratification -
by the Medjlis -- and had then gone on to argue the point with 
the Persians. This volte face was partly due to British 
Government sym];)athy with its prote'g-E(, the Abglo-Persian Oil 
Company, but also it was due to the receipt of more adequate data 
than that on which it had originally acted. However, the fact 
that, in the first place, British oil policy was originally based 
on inadequate data is itself significant, but what is even more 
indicative of the rather haphazard state of British oil policy 
1. (British protests regarding A.P.O.C. claims were still being 
made in Tehran, however). 
Anglo-Persian Oil Company to Foreign Office, November 9th 1921, 
and Fore Office to lo-Persian Oil Co November 11th 
1921. FO 371 417 7 1243 • 
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at this time is that the British Government went ahead and declared 
that policy to the Persian Government, thereby causing itself 
later embarrassment. All this was certainly a far cry from the 
views held by many contemporary, and later, critics that British 
oil policy was deliberately planned to the last detail, with 
M.achiaevelian cunning, to secure British control of whatever oil 
could be brought within the British grasp. 
Once the initial confusion was over, however, British oil 
policy began to take more definite shape. In the circumstances 
it was inevitable that it should veer towards cooperation, rather 
than competition, with American interests -- but what now 
complicated the whole question was that certain American interests 
were in competition with each other. 
IV. Anglo-American Stalemate in North Persia 
On November 22nd the Medjlis passed a bill approving the 
granting of a concession to the Standard Oil Company covering the 
provinces of Azerbadjan, Ghilan, Asdrabad, Mazanderan, and 
Khorassan, and laying down certain conditions for the grant. 
Article 5 of the gill was particularly significant in view of 
Anglo-American cooperative tendencies at this time:-
The Standard Oil Company shall have no right 
whatsoever to tra.nsf er this concession to any 
government or company or person. Also any 
participation of other capital must have the 
consent of the Persian National Assembly. 1. 
1. Text: F.R.u.s., 1921, II, p.649. 
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In view of the evident desire of the Persians to keep the Anglo-
Persian Oil Company out of Northern Persia, Standard Oil coopera-
tion with that Company in the area would obviously not be welcome 
at Tehran. 
The Foreign Office decided to protest at the Persian action, 
but officials were hopeful of the outcome of the Bedford-Greenway 
negotiations then under way.1 • The Russians also protested, 
arguing that the Khoshta.ria concession was Russian property and 
would remain so until the ratification of the Russo-Persian 
Treaty of February 1921 - a view which the Persians immediately 
. t d 2 • reJec e • 
Meanwhile the Persians were reported to be "at (their) 
wits end for money", particularly for money with which to pay the 
army, and wer~ seeking a loan from the British-controlled Imperial 
Bank of Persia. 3. The British Government, however, was strongly 
1. Curzon to Bri 
Off ice Minutes 
21 (and Foreign 
2. Brid eman Tehran to Curzon November 2 th 1 21 and November 
29th 1921. FO 371 6417 76 13034 and 13213. 
The Persians argued that the Russian argument was irrelevant 
since, they stated, the Khoshtaria concession had never been 
valid, because it had never been ratified by the Medjlis. 
3. Brid eman Tehran to Curzon November 2 th 1 21. 
FO 371 6417 7 13078. 
The Foreign Office had originally opposed any moves to lend 
money to Persia, as it was felt that by this means the Persian 
Government would be induced to push the 1919 Anglo-Persian 
Agreement through the Medjlis. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company 
and the Imperial Bank, however, had always argued that the 
opposite tactics would be successful. See:-
FO 371/4906/56/6915 and 8958. 
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averse to any loan being made to Persia unless, firstly, the Bank 
did it on its own responsibility, and secondly, unless Persia 
accepted in writing certain specific conditions. Included in 
those conditions was the proviso that "existing valid British 
concessions (should) receive full recognition". 1. The British 
Government thus endeavoured to take full advantage of Persia's 
financial weakness to secure, inter alia, the confirmation of the 
British-held Khoshtaria concession. 
The details of an agreement between the Standard Oil 
Company (N.J.) and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company on the basis of 
their proposed cooperation were worked out early in 1922. The 
Standard Oil Company was to have an option to withdraw after one 
yea:r, and the Persian Government was to be asked to grant a 
concession·to the partnership which included reference to the 
fact that the Khoshtaria concession was considered to be valid. 
The Foreign Office was delighted, and the State Department was 
also pleased at the outcome. 2 • 
With the Persian Medjlis, however, it was a very different 
1. Other conditions were that Persian intrigues in America should 
cease, that Persia would not offer the A.P.O.C.'s royalties as 
security to third parties, and that certain railway concessions 
already under discussion with British interes~ should not be 
offered elsewhere. Curzon to Bri eman Tehran December th 
1921 FO 371/6417/76 13187 •• 
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story. On February 26th Loraine reported that the Anglo-American 
concession proposals had been rejected, the main objections being 
to the preamble, which asserted the validity of the Khoshtaria 
concession, to the Standard Oil's withdrawal option, and, 
primarily, to British participation. Later, however, after the 
two companies had dropped the preamble from the draft concession, 
and arranged for reference to Anglo-Persian Oil Company 
participation in the project to be omitted (though that Company 
would in fact pay half of the operating company's expenses, and 
receive half of the oil produced), 1• it seemed that there was 
some prospect of getting the concession proposals through the 
M d ·1· 2. e J is. To facilitate this, the Foreign Office lifted its 
embargo on the Imperial Bank of Persia granting loans to the 
Persian Government. 3. 
Meanwhile, a hitherto rather disregarded threat to the 
Anglo-Persian/Standard Oil Company project had grown considerably 
in magnitude. After much reported plotting, bribery and intrigue 
among Persian deputies in the Medjlis, and allegedly supported 
by the Russian Legation, 4. the Sinclair Consolidated Oil 
1. Minute by Oliphant, June 27th 1922. FO 371/7817/7/6317. 
2. Fairley (Tehran) to A.P.o.c., April 27th 1922. FO 371/7816/7/4572. 
4. See various conununications under the following references:-
FO 371/7816/7/4572, 5825, 5978. FO 371/7817/7/6149, 7331. 
(There is no evidence at this time of a:ny A.P.o.c. or Standard 
Oil attempts at bribery). 
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Corporation succeeded, on June 11th 1922, in securing an 
amendment to the bill of November 22nd 1921 which had authorised 
the granting of a concession to the Standard Oil Company. The 
amended bill how authorised the Persian Government to grant a 
concession for the northern provinces to the Standard Oil Company 
"or to any American Company independent of outside connections", 
thus leaving the door open to Sinclair. 1 • 
The Sinclair Corporation had apparently offered a loan of 
ten million dollars to the Persian Government as part of the 
concession arrangements. It thus seemed incumbent on the Standard 
Oil and Anglo-Persian Companies to do the same, and this was 
arranged. 
2
• The Persians, however, were not yet finished with 
their advantageous game of promoting competition between the 
rivals, 3. for in mid-September the Persian Prime Minister 
submitted both sets of proposals (Sinclair's and Standard Oil's) 
to the Medjlis, which refused to choose between them, retorting 
1. Loraine Tehran to Forei Office June 12th 1 22. 
FO 371 7816 7 5978. 
Neither the Standard Oil nor the Anglo-Persian Oil Company had 
regarded Sinclair as much of a threat up to this point. 
(Minute by Oliphant, March 27th 1922. FO 371/7815/7/3278.) 
2. The Standard Oil Company bad initially made an offer of a five 
million dollar loan to Persia. The Foreign Office gave the 
A.P.O.C. permission to participate (secretly) in the 
increased offer, using the oil royalties as security. 
Forei Office to lo-Persian Oil Com A t 10th 1 22. 
FO 371 7817 7 796 see also 7752 • 
3. Loraine suspected that the "bidding" might also be going on at 
another level, in that po"ibly the Prime Minister was "'8.iting 
to see which Company would off er him personally the largest 
bribe. 
Loraine Tehran to Forei 
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that it was the Government's business to do so. On September 
25th Fairley (the Anglo-Persian Oil Company representative) 
reported to his Board that the Persian Government had then picked 
the best terms from the two Companies' offers, made up a composite 
draft concession from them, and had submitted it to the Medjlis 
for approval; the idea apparently was to grant a concession to 
whichever Company would accept this draft. 1 • 
After some opposition within the Medjlis had been 
overcome, 
2
• a Northern Oil Concessions Bill was passed on June 
13th 1923, giving the conditions governing the concession (for 
four of the five provinces) to be offered to the Standard Oil 
Company and to the Sinclair Corporation. Of significance to 
British interests was Article 14, which laid down that the 
concessionaire could in no circumstances transfer his rights to 
foreign nationals or foreign g>vernments. 3 • This was obviously 
designed to exclude the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. 
2th 
2. The Medjlis wanted to put any money received for the concession 
under the control of the Financial Adviser. Reza Khan, however, 
was anxious to get hold of the money - presumably so as to use 
it for army purposes Fairle Tehran to A.P.o.c. Se tember 2 th 
and September 28th 1922. FO 371 7818 1 9835 • 
3. Loraine (Tehran) to Foreign Office, June 30th 1922. F0371/9028/119/6450. 
F.R.U.S., 1923, II, pp.713-715. 
Loraine Tehran to Forei Office A (enclosing 
translation of "Law of Fundamental Terms". FO 371 9029/119/8875. 
(Various specific provisions regarding Persian participation, 
royalties and a ten million dollar loan to Persia were laid 
down in the Bill). . 
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While the Standard Oil Company refused to accept the prof erred 
concession, the Sinclair Corporation indicated its willingness to 
do so, and on December 20th 1923 its representative signed a 
preliminary agreement in Tehran. 1 • Urged on by the Anglo-Persian 
Oil Company, the Foreign Office, which by this time was beginning to 
have doubts about the wisdom of remaining involved in the complicated 
struggle, instructed Loraine to lodge a protest against the Persian 
action in giving away rights which, it was held, belonged to the 
Anglo-Persian Oil Company. 2·1ater, after Persian rejection of this 
protest, Ovey (Charge d'Affaires in Loraine's absence) was instructed 
to remain neutral, and to avoid discussing the question. 3. 
The reasons for this later Foreign Office instruction were 
two-fold. In the first place, a scandal over the naval oil reserves 
see F.R.u.s., 1923, II, 
2. Anglo-Persian Oil Compan.y to Foreign Office, January 1st 1924, 
and February 15th 1924. 
Forei Office to lo-Persian Oil Com Jan th 1 2 , 
and February 22nd 1924. FO 371 10125 44 44 and 1418. 
Reza Khan to Monson March 2 th 1 2 • FO 371/10125/44/3749. 
Loraine had asked for the protest to be def erred until after 
further discussion of the matter, and the F.O. had agreed to 
this. However, in Loraine's absence the protest was made by 
Monson). 
3. The Persian Government 
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at Teapot Dome, l. in which Sinclair was deeply involved, bad 
caused a great sensation in the United States, and Sinclair's 
financial position was badly shaken. His chances of raising 
the required loan to Persia were now held to be very slim. 2• 
The Foreign Office was by no means disposed to ease this 
situation for Sinclair by responding to tentative American 
approaches for a joint Anglo-American loan to Persia;3· on the 
1. In mid-1923 the U.S. Senate Investigating Connnittee began to 
investigate the circumstances of the lease of naval oil 
reserves at Teapot Dome and Elk Hills to the Sinclair Oil 
Company and the Doheny Pan American Company. As a result of 
these investigations several people, including former Secretary 
of the Interior, Fall, were found guilty of taking bribes in 
connection with these leases, and were sent to prison. (On 
this see M.N. McGeary, Gifford Pinchot (Princeton, New Jersey, 
1960), pp.331-333, and J.L. Bates, The Origins of Teapot Dome 
(Urbana, Illinois, 1964)). 
2. It was reported that Sinclair had even made approaches to 
British interests in an attempt to raise a loan in connection 
with the concession. 
(Memo by Oliphant, April 30th 1924. FO 371/10125/44/3818.) 
other hand it was not felt politic to worsen Anglo-American relations 
in Persia by either a direct rejection of these approaches or by 
overtly opposing Sinclair's concession, beyond the protest already 
made on the subject. In the second place, the Foreign Office had now 
come to the conclusion - and this idea must surely have been in the 
back of some officials' minds all along - that if the Anglo-Persian 
Oil Company was to secure the North Persian concession, conflict 
with Russia on the subject would be inevitable. It would therefore 
be better, if was felt, for an American Company to have the concessiohl; 
in any case, that Company would have to secure the Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company's permission if it desired to pipe the oil through Southern 
1. 
Persia. 
The murder in Persia of the American Vice Cons.ul, Major Imbrie, 
on July 18th 1924, then struck a fatal blow at any remaining chance 
2. 
Sinclair had of floating a loan on the American market. In 1925 
the Sinclair Corporation informed the Persian Government t~t it was 
unable to pursue the matter further, giving as the reason that the 
attitude of Soviet Russia prevented it from doing so. As is evident 
from the above, however, this was not the sole reason, although 
3. 
obviously it was an important one. 
1. (Because of the terms of the D'Arcy Concession of 1901). 
Minute by G.P. Churchill, May 16th 1924. FO 371/10126/44/4282. 
2. F.R.u.s., 1924, II, pp. 548-549. 
Shwadran, op. cit., p. 94. 
3. According to Nikpay, Sinclair had various arrangements with Soviet 
Russia, all of which were contingent on Sinclair being able to 
raise a large sum of money for the exploitation of certain Russian 
oil lands in cooperation with the Soviet Government. The Teapot Dome 
scandal prevented Sinclair from raising the money required, and 
therefore all the arrangements, including, presumably, an agreement 
to allow oil to be exported from the North Persian concession through 
Soviet territory, fell through. ~~ •. ;~,~~.Aspects 
of Foreign Oil Interests in Iran down to 1947". Unpublished Ph.D. 
thesis, University of London, 1956, page 409. 
The collapse of the Sinclair project led to some further approaches 
by Persia to the Standard Oil Company, which company, however, refused 
to take up the project again unless the Anglo-Persian Oil Company 
also was involved in it. Some talks on the subject took place between 
¥1illspaugh (the Financial Adviser in Persia) and Greenway in August 
1925, but nothing ca.me of them. There, until the mid-1930's, the 
1. 
matter ended .. 
In the question of the North Persian oil concession, one might 
well ask what the fuss was all about. True, with the oilfields of 
the Caucasus on one side, the rich 86uth Persian fields on the other, 
and with the proximity of the supposedly rich oil lands of Iraq, 
there was perhaps some justification for expecting that at least 
pa.rt of the area would be rich in petroleum, and theref9re valuable. 
Nevertheless, oil was not of much use unless it could be transported, 
economically, to the consumer. Oil from the northern provinces of 
Persia could only reach· the world's markets by three routes: over 
the mountains to a South Persian port; across Iraq from where in due 
course a pipeline was supposedly going to be laid to the Mediterranean; 
or to Baku, and from thence by the established routes al.ready taken 
by Russian oil. All of these routes had certain drawbacks from the 
economic point of view, which drawbacks might perhaps have proved 
1. British Consulate General New York to H.M.Ambassador on) 
February 2tth 1925, and Oli hant to Sir E. Howard Was · on 
December 1 th 1925. FO 371 10847 1539 1539 and 7723. 
On the Amira.nian Oil Company's activities in North Persia in the 
mid-1930's, see Shwadran, op. cit., pp.95-99· 
prohibitive, while, even if the political difficulties concerning 
the Iraqi route could probably have been overcome, those involv~d 
in securing a route across Soviet Russia were particularly forbidding. 
Moreover, whatever route was chosen, Russia was likely to make 
untanable the position of any operating company of whose presence 
in the area she did not approve. 
The Anglo-Persian Oil Company can hardly have been greatly 
desirous of developing this territory had it secured the concession; 
1. 
no doubt its prime aim was merely to prevent others from doing so. 
Once having taken up the Khoshtaria claim, however, the Company 
doubtless had another motive for its actions - to prevent Persia 
from rejecting this claim out of hand, in case it became a precedent 
for a later challenge to the D'Arcy concession. 
The British Government supported the Anglo-Persian Oil Company 
largely because it was in the habit of doing so; as has been shown, 
the Foreign Office was not itself especially keen on the idea of the 
Company getting the concession, an~ not even the Admiralty could have 
made out a really convincing argument for it from the strategic poihtt 
of view. In the British Government's view it was better to let 
another power, the United States, bear the brunt of whatever 
complications arose from the presence of a capitalist organization in 
1. Nikpay makes the point that if the Sinclair Concession had become 
a working proposition, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company would have 
been strongly pressed by the Persian Government to modify the 
less favourable terms (to Persia) of the D'Arcy Concession. 
(Nikpay, op. cit., p. 412). 
an area considered by the Soviet Union to be of strategic importance. 
The struggle over the North Persian Oil Concession may seem now 
to have been rather pointless, but it is nevertheless of some 
importance in the context of this present study. Firstly, it provides 
an example of the confused state of British Government policy on 
oil matters in the immediate post-war years. Secondly,it illustrates 
to some extent the general state of Anglo-American relations in the 
Middle East at this time: the two nations, although rivals, were not 
so diametrically opposed in interests that compromise could not easily 
be sought and found. Thirdly, the North Persian concession struggle 
had some bearing on the more important Anglo-American struggle over 
Mesopotamian oil. Once cooperation in one area was envisaged and 
accomplished, it became easier to accept the idea of cooperation in 
other areas. The meetings between Standard Oil (N.J.) and Anglo-
Persian Oil Company officials over the North Persian concession issue 
helped to pave the way for an understanding on the more delicate and 
difficult issue of American participation in the Turkish Petroleum 
Company. They thus also helped to bring to an end the bitter 
Anglo-American controversy over oil which had soured relations between 
the two nations since the Armistice. 
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CHAPTER 6 
PROBLEMS AT THE LAUSANNE CONFERENCE 
I. The first phase: Mosul 
The Lausanne Conference was called in November 1922 for the 
purpose of negotiating a peace settlement with Turkey, since the 
1920 Treaty of Sevres was a dead letter.1 • One of the questions 
it was hoped would be resolved at this conference was that of the 
Mosul vilayet, which area, although included in the British 
mandated territory of Iraq, was claimed as still Turkish 
territory by the Turkish Nationalist Government. 2 • 
Great interest was shown by all parties, whether directly 
involved or not, in the Mosul question, the importance of which 
seemed greatly enhanced by the possibility that the disputed area 
was tremendously rich in oil (although, as yet, no full scale 
prospecting had been done th~re). Newspapers reported interviews 
with Turkish officials in which Turkish preoccupation with the 
disposition of Mosul was prominent - as were occasional hints 
that American participation in the oilfields therein would be 
1. See Chapter 3, Section I. (above). 
2. The Iraq-Turkish frontier at this time corresponded with the 
positions held at the time of the cease-fire in October 1918. 
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welcome to Turkey. 1 • 
The British Foreign Office was naturally waxy, and wa.S 
particularly worried about the attitude of the Standard Oil 
Company (N.J.), then negotiating entry into the Turkish Petroleum 
Company, in case it should decide to abandon its negotiations and 
pursue some independent line with Turkey. 2• The Admiralty, too, 
interested itself in the Mosul question. On November 28th, 1922, 
the Foreign Office was informed that: 
My Lords consider it a matter of considerable 
importance that the future oil output of the 
Mosul and Baghdad area should remain under 
British control through the medium of the 
Turkish Petroleum Company, and that British 
influence in Iraq should therefore be in no 
way weakened •••• the preservation of British 
prestige in Iraq should have an important 
bearing up9n the security of the Persian 
oilfields, from which the Admiralty obtain 
about half the Navy's peace time requirements 
of oil fuel. 
For these reasons my Lords would view with 
concern the possibility that Mosul should be 
returned to Turkey, but They will be glad to 
learn that in a:ny event the claims of the 
Turkish Petroleum Company to develop the 
oilfield will be supported. 3. 
1. Mustafa Kemal told a special correspondent of the "Chicago 
Tribune" that there was "nothing against .American exploitation 
of oilfields in Turkey, as America has no political ambitions 
in our country" - having earlier stated that he regarded Mosul 
as Turkish territory. 
Forei Office, Extract from Manchester Guardian Se tember 2 th 
1922. FO 371 7784 132 1030 • 
2. At this time the negotiations were at a standstill owing to 
the Anglo-Persian and Anglo-Saxon Companies' disagreement on 
the terms of American participation. See Chapter 3 above. 
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The opening of the Lausanne Conference was naturally 
preceded by much study by British Government officials of the 
questions and issues involved. Of interest is a memo prepared 
for the Cabinet by the Colonial Office which examined the question 
"Why did Britain go to Iraq?". Some of the advantages of Britain 
retaining her position in Iraq were there stated to be: firstly, 
it would facilitate the maintenance of an Empire air route; 
secondly, it would give Britain some control over the oil 
resources of the country; thirdly, it would allow the grain and 
cotton potentialities of Iraq to be developed, with advantage 
to Britain; fourthly, the head of the Gulf would be kept out of 
enemy hands, and fifthly, it would make possible the maintenance 
of an Arab State, friendly to Britain, between Turkey and Persia. 1 • 
When these points are correlated with the current British view 
that 
Mosul cannot be given away without loss of 
Irak and collapse of Irak kingdom, nor collapse 
of Arabs without return of Turks and final 
defeat of British policy in the East, 2. 
then one can clearly see that, whatever waveringa occurred in the 
minds of some British statesmen,3· and however exaggerated this 
1. Office November 20th 1 22. 
3. "I found Bonar longing to clear out of Mosul, the Straits, and 
Constantinople, willing to give up anything and everything 
rather than have a row ••• " 
Letter from Lord Curzon to Lady Curzon, January 1st 1923, 
quoted in: µ>~ Bo~~d~ The Life of Lord Curzon Vol.III 
(London, 1928) p.332. tBonar Law was Prime Minister at the time). 
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latter view might have seemed to some people,1 • the possibility 
of Britain allowing the Turks to obtain the whole of Mosul without 
a tremendous struggle was extremely small. 2• In fact, the 
British Cabinet decided, four days before the Lausanne Conference, 
that Curzon (Britain's chief representative) was to be authorised 
to "refuse to discuss any proposal which the Turkish delegation 
might make for including Mosul within the Turkish frontiers". 3• 
One reason for this decision was stated to be that Mosul had already 
been given to Iraq, and, furthermore, that the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty 
of October 1922 laid down that there should be no cession of 
Iraqi territory. 4. 
1 •. Lord Curzon was, of course, noted for his rather exaggerated 
views on strategical matters affecting the British route to 
India and the Far East. 
2. Had they held a:ny great fear of the outcome, the British 
Government would no doubt somehow have avoided anything like 
arbitration such as they eventually entrusted to the League. 
3. Cabinet Minutes November 16th 1 22. 
CAB 23 32. 1 22 2. 
4. Ibid. 
Article VIII of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of October 10th 
1922 begins:-
"No territory in Iraq shall be ceded or leased or in any 
way placed under the control of any Foreign Power; •••• " 
Text: Hurewitz, op. cit., Vol.II, pp.111-114. 
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At the very beginning of the Lausanne Conference there 
seemed some possibility of an Anglo-Turkish deal being concluded 
by which Mosul would be retained by Iraq, with certain frontier 
modifications in Turkey's favour, in return for which Turkey would 
receive some share in Iraq oil. 1 • Hopes of such an easy solution 
quickly faded, though, when on December 6th the Turkish 
Delegation told Curzon that Turkey was prepared to meet Britain 
on all the other disputed points between the two countries, but 
only if she could have Mosul. 2• There would in any case have 
been difficulties about giving the Turks a direct share in the 
Turkish Petroleum Company, however, especially since, in addition 
to the Fren~h and American complications, 3. there remained still 
the question of Italian participation - an issue which Curzon 
endeavoured to keep "on the shelf" during the Conferenc_e by 
promising the Italians some share of Iraqi oil once the Mosul 
question was settled. 4. 
Off ice December 1st 1 22 
(see Curzon's 
2. Off ice December 6th 1 22 
3. See Chapter 3, above. 
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In an attempt to meet Turkish demands half-way, Curzon put 
forward for the Cabinet's consideration a plan whereby a compromise 
might be made with the Turks by offering them the wholly Kurdish 
part of the Mosul vilayet, as well as some participation in oil. 
The Iraqis apparently had acquiesced in this idea, as long as none 
of the Mosul plain were ceded. 1• The Cabinet, however, rejected 
Curzon's compromise suggestion, largely on the grounds that cession 
of the suggested territory would eventually lead to Turkish 
encroachment on the whole vilayet, and that any such cession 
would greatly increase the difficulty and expense of 
defending Iraq. 2• Among the opponents of Curzon's suggested 
compromise was, almost inevitably,the Admiralty,who pointed out that, 
although the strip of territory which Curzon had suggested should 
2. 
The area to be ceded to Turkey was to follow the line of the 
mountains, including Keui Sandjak, Rowanduz and Suleimanieh, 
but not Amadia, Mosul town, or Erbil Kirkpa. 
See Map at p. 203. 
Lausanne December 8th 1 22 
203. f 
---.Frontiers. ~Boundary of the former Ottoman vilayet of Mosul. 
--v- Rivers ........ The "Brussels Line" laid down by the League Council. 
------Northern frontier claimed for Iraq by Britain. 
-·-·-Southern limit of Turkish occupation under status quo, July 1923.i 
I 
0 Land over 1500 feet. 
THE MOSUL BORDER AREA (1924-25) 
Sources: Map prepared from information in:-
R.I.I.A., Survev, 1925, I (end map). 
Longrigg, Iraq, 1900 to 1950 (end map}. 
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be ceded, "did not actually include the land where oil was likely 
to be found ••• it was in close proximity to it". 1 • 
Meanwhile, a duel of memoranda on the Mosul question had 
developed between Curzon and Ismet Pasha. 2• On the one band 
Ismet endeavoured to prove, by historical, geographical, economic, 
ethnic, strategic and other arguments, that Mosul was indispensable 
to Turkey and gelonged to her of right, while on the other hand 
Cu.rzon endeavoured to prove the contrary, that Mosul should belong 
to Iraq. 3• Curzon also, in this exchange, emphasised the British 
2. Ismet Pasha. (Inonu) 1884-
In 1918 was Under Secretary in the Ministry of War, Constanti-
nople, until he left to join Mustafa Kemal's forces. In 1922-
23 Ismet was Minister of Foreign Affairs. (In later years he 
served as Prime Minister, and as President of the Turkish 
Republic). 
3. In Cu.rzon's memo of December 14th he stated that ll/12ths of 
the population of Mosul (including 7/12ths Kurds) had no 
affinity with the Turks and did not want union with Turkey; 
the economic relations of Mosul were with Baghdad, not Asia 
Minor; if the Turks had Mosul they would be able to menace the 
rest of Iraq; he dismissed the 'historical argument' as "not 
one to which importance can properly be attached." 
Curzon to Ismet Pasha· Memo on Mosul December 1 th 1 22. 
FO 371 79 6 13003 14103. 
In contrast, Ismet Pasha stated that 4/5ths of the population 
had affinity with Turkey and wanted union with that country; 
the economic ties of Mosul were stronger with the North than 
the South; Mosul was indispensable to Turkey, and would never 
menace Baghdad. He also elaborated on the historical argument, 
and advanced other arguments to do with the climate and terrain, 
and invoked the National Pact as an argument for Turkey getting 
Mosul. Ismet Pasha to Curzon, December 23rd 1922.F0371/7968/13003/14402. 
And the Kurdish view?- "I no like a:n.y Government, I no like British 
Government, Turkish Government, Russian Government,or Arab Govern-
ment. I farmer. I no like politics." (words of Kurdish deputy 
for Diarbekir). 
Minute by Forbes-Adam, January 30th 1923. FO 839/16/file 44/1305. 
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obligations in the matter, in that Britain had promised to free 
the Arabs from Turkish rule, had promised to give the Kurds 
autonomy in Iraq (at San Remo, when she accepted the Mandate), 
and had an obligation under the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty to see that no 
territory was ceded by Iraq. 1• There was, however, it should be 
noted, no specific mention of oil in any of these memoranda. 
While this was going on, the attitude in Iraq remained 
positive: no cession of Mosul. As to oil, it was felt that it 
was a strong asset to the country, and consequently should not 
be lightly disposed of by Britain. 2• 
Neither of the protagonists in the duel of memoranda 
succeeded in making any impression on the other; the question of 
Mosul was therefore no nearer solution as the Conference continued 
on into 1923. 
The British delegates at this time were becoming increasingly 
concerned at the activities of the American observers at the 
Conference, who were thought to be intriguing with the Turks -
though the evidence for these intrigues was not felt by the 
British to be sufficiently tangible to warrant formal complaint to 
1. 26th 1 22. 
2. Extract from a letter (unspecified as to source) iri.cluded in 
Note b First Lord of the Admiralt December 26th 1 22 
CAB 27 20 • Paper IRQ.15. 
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the American Government. 1• Another source of annoyance was the 
Turkish economic experts in London, who were attempting to arrange 
for a British syndicate to work oil in Mosul, and, in addition, 
were spreading propaganda that the only remaining point at issue 
preventing signature of a treaty was Mosul. In their efforts they 
had succeeded in interesting two British Members of Parliament, 
and had even made certain tentative agreements with them. 2 • 
Moreover, involved in all this was the notorious Rickets who, 
besides feeding the Turks with wild tales of dissensions in the 
British Government and of plans to by-pass Curzon at Lausanne, 
was reputedly in constant touch with Russian officials. 3. 
Curzon was, of course, greatly annoyed by reports which he 
received of these intrigues, and he urged that an official repud-
iation of the various mis-statements being put about be made. 4. 
1. Minute E. Forbes Adam Feb ? 
FO 371 8994 91 1434. 
See also G. Maitland &!wards to Colonial Office, February 12th 
,!2gl and Minute by Weakley, February 19th 1923. 
FO 371/8995/91/1945. 
to Forei 
2. See various letters, minutes, extracts etc. in FO 371/9059/1/589. 
3. Rickets was an adventurer who meddled in various political 
and commercial matters, and was well known to the Foreign 
Office. 
¥1.i.nute b Lausanne for Curzon 
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Turkish propaganda, however, was to some extent effective, as shown 
by a minute of January 9th 1923 written by Sir ~e A. Crowe at a 
time when the Lausanne negotiations were deadlocked on several 
matters. There was no question, wrote Crowe, of negotiations 
with the Turks in London, and everything must go through Curzon 
at Lausanne. Nevertheless, he wrote: 
I found it hard - practically impossible - to 
convince the P.M. that this whole affair was nothing 
but a clumsy Turkish manoeuvre to circumvent Lord 
Curzon at Lausanne, and deserved no consideration 
whatever, nor their statements any credence. The 
Prime Minister remains obsessed with the idea 
that Mosul is the sole obstacle to a settlement 
with Turkey, although I have shown him the 
Intercept& which in no way confirm the allegation 
- in fact refute it - that on all other questions 
the Turks are ready to give way. 1. 
The Mosul question came up before the Frontier Commission 
late in January 1923. No settlement was reached, and the dispute 
was referred to the Secretary General of the League of Nations. 
However, at the Turks' request, the League agreed to defer 
proceedings for one year while British and Turkish negotiators 
sought to reach an amicable agreement on the question. 2 • 
The Mosul dispute, therefore, was still unresolved at this 
1. Minute by E.A. Crowe, January 9th 1923. FO 371/9059/1/589. 
2. Curzon Lausanne to Forei 
FO 371 90 0 1 830. 
Parliamentary Papers The Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern 
Affairs 1922-23; Record of Proceedings, Cmd 1814 (1923) xxvi,l, 
pages 403-404. 
See also FO 371/9061/1/1050 and Shwadran, op.cit., p.227. 
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stage. Neither the British nor the Turks were willing to yield, 
but instead had doggedly put forward their opposing views, and 
were, it appeared, quite ready to continue doing so either in 
private negotiations or before the League. The Turks no doubt 
fought for Mosul for territorial, political and prestige reasons, 
while the British interest was primarily strategic and political, 
in that Mosul was considered strategically necessary. adequately 
to defend Iraq, and desirably politically in order to placate 
Iraqi opinion and thereby make easier the task of British 
guardianship. As for the oil potentialities of the area, these 
were secondary considerations on both sides. While the Turks 
might use promises of oil concessions in Mosul to attract, for 
example, American support for their cause, oil in itself was not 
the Turks' prime reason for wanting the territory. The British, 
too, though anxious to secure control of the supposedly rich 
(though still undiscovered) oil fields of Mosul, had other, even 
stronger reasons for resisting the Turks' demands. But, however 
this might be, neither side had entirely dispelled the notion 
current at home and abroad that their respective stands on Mosul 
were to a large extent determined by the area's reputed oil 
potentialities -- a notion given rather more credence, however, 
with regard to the British attitude than to the Turkish. 1 • 
1. There is undoubtedly sufficient evidence available to enable the 
British attitude to be determined with confidence, but the 
available evidence for the Turkish attitude is of a less concrete 
nature. The opinions on the Turkish attitude given above are 
therefore rather conjectural. 
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Here then we see a need to keep Britain's Middle Eastern 
oil policy as a whole in perspective. Oil was an important 
consideration in Britain's overall policy with regard to the Middle 
East, but it was by no means the only one, nor was it the most 
important. Other more traditional considerations of Imperial 
strategic policy carried far more weight. The Middle East lay 
astride the route to India -- and that itself was sufficient cause 
for the British to be concerned with its defence against any force 
likely to be hostile to the British Empire. 
II. The Concessions Protocol 
At the end of 1922 the Turkish Petroleum Company had written 
to the Petroleum Department with the request that His Majesty's. 
Government take steps to secure the express recognition of the 
Company's rights at the Lausanne Conference. 1 • At that time 
Curzon had agreed that it would be desirable to confirm the 
Company's rights in Mosul by a treaty provision, 2• and this aim 
thus came to form part of the British Government's desiderata at 
the Lausanne negotiations. 3. As the Conference had coiit.j.nued 
1. Turkish Petroleum Co 2 th, 
2. 
1922. FO 371 8994 91 92. 
See also Turkish Petroleum Comp~ to Petroleum DeEartment, 
November 8th 1922. FO 371/7784 132/12597. 
3. Amongst the points put forward as being most desirable to reach 
agreement on with the Allied Powers at the Lausanne Conference 
was included:-"Insistence upon recognition by Turkish Government 
of Allied pre-war concessions ••• "(The Turkish Petroleum Company's 
concession was later selected for specific mention). A~endix I to 
Cabinet Minutes, November 16th 1922. CAB 23/32. 67(22 1. 
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and the Mosul question was still unresolved, this aim did not 
lessen in importance, and, in fact, by April 1923 it bad assumed 
even greater importance following the grant of a concession to an 
American group, known as the Chester group, 1. by the Angora 
Goverrunent. 
The concession granted to the American Chester group, 
which had pressed pre-war claims based on an unratified railway 
concession over parts of the Ottoman Empire (including a line 
through Kirkuk and Mosul), 2•covered the construction of 1,200 
miles of railway in Asia Minor and the Mosul vilayet, and gave 
oil rights for twenty kilometres on each side of the line. As 
such, its signature on April 29th 1923 3. drew protests from both 
the British and the French Government, the latter on account of 
1. A consortium of diverse American (and Canadian) interests, 
of whom the principal figure was Admiral Colby M. Chester 
(see below for further details). 
2. The American Admiral Chester had secured the signature of 
the railway concession by the Turkish Grand Vizier, after 
which the concession had gone to Par~iament for ratification 
in 1911. For various reasons, however, the concession was 
never ratified. 
See Shwadran, op. cit., pp.197-198. 
le to Forei 
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the conflict between the Chester concession and certain French 
pre-war railway claims, the former on account of the fact that 
the concession covered territory held to belong to Iraq. 1 • 
The Foreign Office was particularly concerned in case the 
United States Government took up the project and used it to 
demonstrate that the Turkish Petroleum Company's pre-war claims 
in Mosul were by no means indisputable. The Foreign Office also 
suspected that one at least of Turkey's motives in granting the 
concession was the desire to enlist American support in the Mosul 
controversy. 
2
• However, as the major American companies showed 
great reluctance to back the Chester project, the State Department 
held aloof. The American press also, after first welcoming the 
scheme, later became more cautious and began to urge Anglo-
American cooperation in the Middle East (as in Nortl{eersia) rather 
than outright competition. 3. A public quarrel between the son 
of the principal founder of the Chester Group (Admiral Chester) 
and a Canadian colleague:·, Clayton Kennedy, 4. immediately after 
Clayton-Kennedy had the power of attorney for the Ottoman 
American Development Company, in which Admiral Chester had 40% 
of the shares. 
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the signature of the Agreement, brought to a head bitter dissensions 
within the Chester Group (that is, the ottoman-American Development 
Company 
1
•), which greatly lowered the prestige of the group, 
thus weakening its ability to secure financial backing, and hence 
detracting from its supposed threat to the Turkish Petroleum 
Company's claims. Eventually, through lack of financial support, 
the group was unable to fulfil its obligation to start operations 
in November 1923, and the concession was cancelled. 2• 
Although, as shown above, the thre~t to the Turkish Petroleum 
Company's claim from tpe Chester project turneq'out to be of no 
consequence, this was not entirely foreseeable in the circumstances. 
The latent threat of the project, therefore, was an added incentive 
to the British Government to ensure that a provision confirming 
the Turkish Petroleum Company's rights be inserted in the treaty 
to be concluded at Lausanne. 
As the Lausanne Conference neared its close in July 1923, 
Sir Horace Rumbold 3., who had replaced Curzon as chief British 
1. This Company had acquired all the rights of the former Chester-
backed concern, the Ottoman Exploration Company, in March 1922. 
Shwadran, op. cit., p.220. 
2. See Henderson Constantino le to Forei 
FO 371 9151 2104 5150. 
Commercial Secretary (Constantinople) to Department of Overseas 
Trade, December 19th 1923. 
See also F.R.u.s. 1923, II, p.1251. 
3. Sir Horace Rumbold. 1869-1941. 
For the first session of the Lausanne Conference Rumbold had 
been Second Plenipotentiary. When negotiations were resumed 
he became Chief Delegate. 
Rumbold had had a varied diplomatic career. From 1920 to 1924 
he was High Commissioner, then Ambassador, at Constantinople. 
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delegate for the second phase of the negotiations, had succeeded 
in securing some measure of agreement on the inclusion of a clause 
relating specifically to the Turkish Petroleum Company, which he 
described as containing a "simple affirmation of validity and 
maintenance of pre-war concession." 1. The Americans, however, 
protested against Rumbold's clause, as did Ismet Pasha, who put 
forward a modified version, which Rumbold considered unacceptable. 
Eventually, Rumbold had to yield, rather than risk a rupture at 
so late a stage in the negotiations, when so many other points 
in the treaty had been settled and only awaited signature. 2 • 
The position was not accepted immediately by Lord Curzon, 
who telegraphed to Rumbold on July 18th that he was:-
1. Rumbold Lausanne to Forei Office Jul 
FO 371 9086 1 7114. 
The text was:- "Les d.roits acquis par la compagnie petrol de 
Turquie, en vertu des arrangements intervenus en dix neuf cent 
quatorze, ainsi que."'.l~s~~obligations, de-coulent pour la di te 
societe anonyme de ces arrangements sont valables et maintenus." 
This may be found in FO 371/9087/1/W7251, being a copy of part 
of a paper in W7250 (E7250 is still closed until 1974). 
2. Rumbold Lausanne to Forei Office Jul 
FO 371 9087 1 7258. 
See also Secretary of State to the Special Mission at Lausanne, 
Jul 10th 1 2 in F.R.U.S., 1923, II, pp.1031-1034. 
Or U.S. National Archives, Microfilm Roll M722/24, No.0562-0570). 
For American approaches to Ismet, aimed at stiffening his 
attitude against the T.P.C. concession, see F.R.u.s., 1923, 
II, pp.1025-26, 1029-30. 
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most uneasy at learning that you jettisoned case of 
Turkish Petroleum Company whose claims I repeatedly 
emphasised in discussion when at Lausanne regarding 
Mosul ••••••••••• Unless you are convinced that my 
apprehensions are not fully justified you should 
insist on putting back the Turkish Petroleum Company 
into the Protocol. I object very strongly to 
additional validity given to Chester by our surrender. 1. 
It was too late, however, to fight any longer for what 
was, after all, a secondary question in the conclusion of the 
Peace Treaty, as Rumbold explained the following day. He 
believed, he said, that Ismet had instructions to break rather 
than to yield 2•, and if it had come to a break, then the Allies 
"and considerable section of world opinion, would have accused His 
Majesty's Government of destroying certainty of peace for sake 
of British oil interests" 3. This explanation was accepted by 
Curzon, who could hardly have done otherwise in the circumstances.4· 
1. Curzon to Rumbold Lausanne 
FO 371 9089 1 7723. 
2. Ismet Pasha was certainly tied down tightly by his Government, 
and he himself complained bitterly of this. 
Henderson Constantino le to Forei Off ice June 
FO 839 50 9 1028. 
See also ~ti.nute by Osborne, July 20th 1923. FO 371/9088/1/7527. 
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The Turks were delighted with their "unimaginable success"l. 
on this point, and doubtless felt that it increased their chances 
of securing American support over Mosul. The collapse of the 
Chester project, however, and the obvious preference of the 
Standard Oil Company for the Turkish Petroleum Company precluded 
a;ny really firm American support for the Turks on the Mosul 
t . 2. ques ion. 
The Turkish Petroleum Company was naturally displeased at 
the outcome of the Lausanne negotiations, but, despite protests 
to the Foreign Office, had to be content with Rumbold's public 
declaration to the Conference on July 17th: 
- a 
mon Gouvernement considere toute les obligations 
contract~es par le Gouvernement ottoman en 1914 
envers le T.P.C. comme conservant leur pleine force 
et valeur et coimne liant le Gouvernement turc sur 
toute terri to ire qui rest era turc ·,a la suite de paix. 
statement which Ismet Pasha by no means accepted. 4 • 
2. The Foreign Office, however, were highly suspicious of American 
intentions at the end of the Lausanne Conference. See 
Foreign Office ¥J.inutes, July 18th 1923. FO 371/9087/1/7399. 
3. Minute b Mor 
September 19th 1924 
Conference) 
4. Ismet Pasha replied (extract):-
"Je declare que les declarations de la dele'gation 
britannique n'engagent en rien l'avenir pour la Turquie". 
~· 
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It can thus be seen that the Lausanne Conference accomplished 
nothing concrete concerning the question of Mosul and the pre-war 
claims to its oil. At most it led to some public discussion 
and airing of the problem, although against this can be set the 
fact that it also led to much unpleasant intrigue, both at the 
Conference and elsewhere. 
Britain's policy with regard to oil was not affected by 
the Conference. She failed to gain the advantages she sought -
confirmation of Iraq's right to Mosul and confirmation of the 
Turkish Petroleum Company's right to Mosul's oil, but on the other 
hand she succeeded in holding on firmly to what advantages she 
already had. 
Yet the Conference, even in the sphere of oil, accomplished 
more than mere maintenance of the status quo, for it at least 
helped to produce comparative tranquility in the Middle East 
after over seven years of war. Without this tranquility the 
already difficult negotiations concerning American entry into 
the Turkish Petroleum Company would have been almost impossible, 
for the Americans would have been loath to talk in concrete terms 
while the future of the whole area was beset with uncertainty. 
As it was, doubts about the future of Mosul tended to ham.per the 
negotiations and to lead to various intrigues. Moreover, the 
settlement of Mosul by the League would itself not have been 
practicable before the Lausanne negotiations. The peace which 
the Lausanne Conference brought to the area was also important 
in enabling the Iraq-Turkish Petroleum Concession negotiations to 
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get under way, even though the area of the concession was still 
the subject of dispute -- and this in turn enabled some limited 
prospecting to begin in search of Iraq's as yet untapped oilfields. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE CONFIRMATION OF THE TURKISH PEil'ROLEUM COMP!NYTS.CO!jCJ?SION 1925 
As noted earlier, Britain had assumed the responsibilities 
of Mandatory for Iraq. Broadly speaking, these responsibilities 
entailed the protection of Iraq's political, strategic, economic 
and other ihrterests until such time as Iraq became fully capable 
of protecting them herself. At the same time, Britain was to do 
everything possible to help the Iraqis to develop politically 
so as to be capable of running their own affairs without the need 
of the Mandatory's assistance - at which point the Mandate would 
end. 
During the period following the signature of the Anglo-Iraqi 
Treaty of 1922, 1•the Iraqis made considerable progress, and, 
2. 
aided by British advice, soon set up a viable system of government. 
While an Iraqi executive, relying heavily at first on the services 
of British Advisers, ran the day-to-day business, a Constituent 
Assembly met to discuss the framing of the fundamental laws for 
the new state, which had been drawn up on principles laid down in 
the 1922 Treaty. By 1924 an "Organic Law", establishing the main 
1. See Chapter 3, above. 
2.(Viable, though the kaleidoscopic nature of Iraqi politics 
soon led to frequent Cabinet changes etc.) 
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framework of the constitution, bad been approved by the Assembly.1 • 
On its promulgation a full Parliamentary system of government 
would come into being. 
British policy had steadfastly encouraged these developments. 
Despite what some writers have alleged, British advice was not 
always exclusively geared to British interests to the detriment 
of Iraq's. Obviously, British Advisers would inevitably have 
their own country's interests in mind when framing their advice, 
but, it must be stressed, in cases where this advice ran counter 
to Iraqi interests, or where the Iraqis felt that it did, the 
Iraqis were usually capable of resistance. The Iraqi Ministers 
were certainly not, as is sometimes alleged, mere puppets in the 
hands of the British. 
All these points should be borne in mind when, in the 
following pages, the story of the Iraq-Turkish Petroleum Company 
negotiations is explained and analysed, particular attention being 
paid to consideration of how far Britain fulfilled her obligation 
to protect Iraq's interests in the oil question, and alternatively, 
how far Britain allowed her policies to be swayed by other 
considerations, including the wishes of the oil companies. 
1. The most useful books on this topic are 
P.W. Ireland, Iraq (London 1937) 
S.H. Longrigg, Iraq 1900 to 1950 (London 1953) 
Also useful is H.A. Foster, The Making of Modern Iraq (London, 
1936). 
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I. Negotiations 1923-24. 
The agreement in 1923 on American participation meant that 
the Turkish Petroleum Company could concentrate on consummating 
its pre-war claims and try to secure a definitive concession from 
the Iraq Government. 
1
• In September 1923, therefore, preliminary 
discussions between the Company and representatives of the Iraq 
Government began in London. 2• 
The London discussions (which took place at the Colonial 
Office) were centred round a draft agreement, dated May 15th 1923, 
prepared by the Turkish Petroleum Company, the main features of 
which were that the Company was to get the exclusive right to oil 
development for a period of 99 years in the vilayets of Mosul, 
Baghdad and Basra, in return for a royalty to Iraq of four shillings 
per ton. Immediately the Iraqi representatives attacked the 
provision relating to the period of the concession, suggesting a 
drastic reduction. They were also unwilling to include Basra in 
1. On November 8th 1923 the American State Department told the 
Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) that the Department was 
prepared to support the Turkish Petroleum Company's new 
concession in Iraq (subject to certain conditions). It took 
particular note of the fact that this concession was to be 
a new one, not the "alleged concession of 1914". 
se"Cret of State to the President of the Standard Oil 
Com of New Jerse w.c. Te le November 8th 1 2 
F.R.u.s., 1923, II, pp.257-259. 
2. Colonial Office and Petroleum Department representatives were 
also present. 
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the concession, and the Company, doubtless conscious of its weakness 
on this particular point, 1• showed some willingness to concede 
it. Other points at issue concerned royalties, when a suggested 
sliding scale in relation to profits was discussed, and drilling 
obligations 
2
: At the end of the preliJilinary discussions the Company 
was anxious to send a representative to Baghdad to continue, and 
if possible to conclude, the negotiations. The Colonial Office, 
however, made it quite clear that they must see any agreement arrived 
at before it was finally concluded. The British Government was 
determined to maintain its hold on the situation and thus be able 
to protect both its own and Iraq's interest in the matter. Further-
more, at this stage it was not the Government's policy to allow the 
final conclusion of the concession anyway until the Mosul issue was 
decided, although on this point there was some divergence of opinion 
befween the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office. 3. 
The main Company - Iraq negotiations commenced in Baghdad, and 
continued into 1924. Meanwhile, a new factor had entered into the 
situation. In December 1923 the High Commissioner for Iraq, Sir H. 
Dobbs, had reported that a Mr. Cheney, who represented the interests 
of the Phoenix Oil Company (a company registered in London,with maih 
interests in Rumanian oil4.)had approached the Iraq Government with 
terms for a concession for his Company which were very favourable 
l.Basra had not been included in the original promise of a 
concession by the Grand Vizier in 1914. 
2. Minutes of Meet· at the Colonial Office th 
and 10th 1923 FO 371 a996 91 9448. 
3.The Colonial Office wished to allow final signature of the con-
cession before the final settlement of the boundary question,but 
the Foreign Office,worried about possible repercussions in 
Turkey, rigidly opposed this idea. Colonial Office to Dobbs(Hip.h 
Commissioner in Ir November 12th 1 2 and Foreign Office Minutes, 
November 22nd and 23rd 1923 FO 371 8996/91/10969. 
4.The Phoenix Oil and Transport Compapy registered in June 1920,had 
various production and refining interests in Ru.mania. It seems to 
have been fairly sound company,but the Boa.rd of Trade did not rate 
it very highly. Various details are given in W.R.Skinner, 
The Oil and Petroleum Manual (London,1924) pp.168-171. 
to Iraq. "I fear that in view of the less favourable terms offered 
by the Turkish Petroleum Company this off er may prove dangerously 
1. 
seductive to the Iraq Government", warned Dobbs. 
The approaches to the Iraq Government of Mr. Cheney were 
supplemented by a violent anti-Turkish Petroleum Company press campaign 
a. 
in Iraq which sought to sway popular opinion against that Company. It 
was feared in London that, despite the fact that Dobbs was using all 
his influence with the Iraq Government to prevent it from entertaining 
3. 
Cheney's offers, the Iraq Government might nevertheless be tempted to 
sign an agreement with Cheney in order to ease its current pecuniary 
4. 
embarrassment. This would indeed complicate the issue after all the 
patient and difficult international bargaining which had gone into 
constructing the still delicate framework of the Turkish Petroleum 
Company. 
2. the Anglo-Saxon 
3. This applied as far as Mosul and Baghdad were concerned, but there 
was no particular objection to the Phoenix Oil .Company applying 
for Basra, which was not covered by the Turkish Petroleum Company's 
pre-war claim. 
(Memo by Secretariat of British High Conunissioner, !rag to Secretary 
of Council of Ministers 
4. It was also feared that Iraq might be tempted to sign a concession 
with the T.P.C. without reference to Lo_ndon. 
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This fear of an early Cheney "coup" dominated discussions on 
policy among the British Government Departments in the early 
months of 1924, and led to an eventual decision to allow final 
signature of a concession by Iraq, should negotiations reach such 
a stage, even before a final settlement of the Turco-Iraq frontier 
question was reached. It was laid down, however, that in such a 
case the concession area should be defined as "Iraq except the 
transferred territories and the Basrah vilayet", and that no 
prospecting was to be done in disputed territory. 1 • 
The Baghdad concession negotiations made very slow progress, 
and many suggested modifications of the original draft were under 
discussion. The Iraq Intelligence Report No 3 of February 7th 
1924 described the Iraq Committee (that is, the Committee appointed 
by the Iraq Government to consider the oil question) as being 
"profoundly ignorant •••••••• (and)exceedingly suspicious", 
afraid of responsibility and of public criticism, and as constantly 
seeking to gain apparently advantageous (if actually worthless)points 
2. 
to impress the public - which,of course,did not help to expedite matters. 
1. Memo b Osborne on the inter-De artmental Conference on Oil ri hts 
in Iraq, February 25th 1924. FO 371 10082 13 1721. 
Foreign Office to Colonial Office, June 2nd 1924. FO 371/10084/13/~273. 
The formula "Iraq except the transferred territories and the Basrah 
vilayet" was felt to be necessary to avoid accusations that the 
British were in any way anticipating the League's decision on 
Mosul. It was also meant to avoid Turkish accusations that a 
concession was being awarded in territory over which Turkey 
claimed sovereignty. 
Transferred territories: Under a Persian-Turkish frontier protocol 
of 1913 a small part of Persian territory was transferred to Turkey. 
Turkey promised to respect the rights of the A.P.o.c. there, since 
the territory had formed part of the 1901 D'Arcy Concession. This 
territory was now in Iraq, who in turn respected A.P.O.C.rights. 
(Map - p. 362 ) • . 
2. Extract from Ira Intelli nee Re ort No. of Feb th 1 2 • 
FO 371 10109 1826 1826. 
(The description given seems rather biased and unfair) 
The Iraq Committee referred to was appointed by the Iraqi 
Cabinet to consider the concession proposals. It generally con-
sisted of three Iraqi Ministers, and usually a British Adviser 
was present. (This information has been supplied by a private source). 
For accounts of the administration of Iraq at this time, with 
(continued on following page) 
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Negotiations eventually came to a halt in May 1924 with the 
departure from Baghdad of Keeling, the Turkish Petroleum Company's 
representative. The passing by the Iraq Constituent Assembly of 
the Organic Law, a measure which would deprive the Iraq Government 
of its executive power to bTant the concession without reference tp 
the Legislative Assembly (once the Law was approved by King Feisal);• 
then lent added urgency to the matter of getting the negotiations 
going again. The Colonial Office therefore telegraphed to Dobbs 
asking him to find. out if the Iraq Government was ready to resume 
discussions with the Company. 2• 
The draft concession at this stage showed that some measure 
of agreement over royalties had been reached before Keeling had 
left Iraq in May, and that the terms of the "Open Door" clause, 
insisted on by the Americans,3· had been modified somewhat, in an 
attempt to meet certain Iraqi objections. 4. After scrutiny (during 
August) by various British Government Departments, the draft was 
at length pronounced by the Colonial Office to be "eminently reasonable 
and fair".5. Further negotiations on its terms then began at Baghdad. 
(continued from preceding page) 
reference to British Advisers etc., see: 
P.W.Ireland, Iraq (London, 1937) pp.338-369. 
S.H.Longrigg, Iraq 1900 to 1950 (London, 1953) pp.162-171. 
1. The principles governing the Organic Law were laid down in 
Article III of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of October 1922. The Organic 
Law came before the Iraq Constituent Assembly in June 1924. 
(Ireland, o~.cit., p.381 • 
2.Colonial Of ice to Dobbs B 
3.see Chapter 3, above. 
4.The royalty was now fixed at 4 shillings per ton. The "Open Door" 
clause had originally given the Company the right to sublet areas 
to "any person,firm or corporation irrespective of nationality" 
(my emphasis), but the Iraqis had objected to t'..1is, and had secured 
the deletion of these words from the clause.(Draft Concession 
enclosed in:T.P.C.to Colonial Office, July 16th 1924. 
FO 37lfl0084fl3/6167. 
5.Colonial Office to Dobbs B hdad A 
FO 371 10085 13 7501. 
At this point the controversy between Gulbenkian and other Groups 
in the Turkish Petroleum Company over the Working Agreement blew up, 
resulting in some danger of .an American withdrawal from the Company 
- with all the dire political consequences likely to follow from such 
1. 
withdrawal. This, together with further difficulties occurring in 
the Iraq-Company negotiations, and the appearance of another rival to 
2. 
the Turkish Petroleum Company, a certain Major Holmes, made the 
outlook for the Company rather dim. The only bright spot on the 
horizon was the prospect of diminished opposition from the Phoenix 
Oil interests, following reports of the imminent downfall of Cheney. 
3. 
By October 10th the concession negotiations had reached an impasse, 
the Iraq Government and the Turkish Petroleum Company being at variance 
4. 
on several points and unable to make any progress. Dobbs was becoming 
1. Gulbenkian objected to the Working Agreement (by which 
participants received crude oil from the T.P.c., which was 
made a non-profit making concern) on the grounds that he wanted 
dividends, not oil, which he could not dispose of. The 
Americans, however, insisted on the Working Agreement in order 
to avoid double taxation. (See next chapter, gelow). 
2. Major Holmes applied for an oil concession, covering the 
whole of Iraq, on behalf of his company, the Eastern and 
General Syndicate. (F. Holmes to High Commissioner for 
Ira Ma 1 th 1 2 • 
FO 371 10084 13 6117~ 
3. Phoenix Oil Company directors were annoyed with Cheney for 
exceeding his instructions in applying for areas covered by 
T.P.C. claims. He had apparently been instructed to apply 
only for Basra. (Colonial Office to Dobbs B dad J 26th 
~· FO 371/10085 13 527. 
~· 
very concerned at the way things were going, and he laid the blame 
for the impasse at the Iraq Goverrunent's door: 
The Turkish Petroleum Company has now gone to the utmost 
limits but Iraq Government continue to make excuses. There 
are grounds for suspecting that enormous bonuses have been 
offered to Feisal and others by Major Holmes acting on behalf of 
other interests including Amer·ica. 1. 
Dobbs then suggested that, if the Iraqis definitely refused to grant 
the concession, he should be instructed to tell them that His Majesty's 
Government considered the draft terms "eminently fair and reasonable" 
and that His ¥iajesty's Government considered Iraq bound to give the 
Turkish Petroleum Company a concession by the terms of the Lausanne 
2. 
Treaty and by Article ~ of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty (under which Iraq 
3. 
accepted the terms of the San Remo AgTeement). Furthermore, suggested 
Dobbs, if Iraq did not agree, he should be authorised to tell Iraq 
that the British Government would go to arbitration under Article XVll 
1. Dobbs B hdad to Colonial Office, October 10th 1924. 
FO 371 10086 13/9184. 
2. Article 9 of the Concessions Protocol to the Treaty. This did 
not specifically refer to the Turkish Petroleum Company (as 
pointed out earlier) but it referred generally to contracts 
entered into before October 29th 1914. For the text see 
Parliamentary Papers (H of C) 1923 (Cmd 1929) xxv, 533. "Treaty of 
Peace with Turkey, and other instruments signed at Lausanne on 
July 24th 1923": Protocol relating to certain concessions granted 
in the Ottoman Empire (Article 9), page 209. 
3. 11'1be High Contracting Parties agree to conclude separate agreements 
to secure the execution of any treaties, agreements or understandings 
which His Britannic Majesty is under obligation to see carried out 
in respect of Iraq. His Majesty the King of Iraq undertakes to 
bring in any legislation necessary to ensure the execution of these 
agreements •••• " (ArticleX of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of October 1922. 
Text in Hurewitz, op. cit., pp. 112-113). 
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of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty1• or, alternatively,that Iraq should be 
told that His Majesty's Government: 
cannot consent to concession for oil in vilayets of 
Mosul and Baghdad being given to any other applicant 
than the Turkish Petroleum Company and therefore 
the exploitation of oil resources of these two vilayets 
will be prohibited for the duration of the Anglo-Iraq 
Treaty to the great financial loss of Iraq who cannot 
expect His Majesty's Government to give her a:ny 
financial assistance while she refuses to utilize her 
own resources. 2. 
This was strong language - but these suggestions were by 
no means welcome to either the Colonial Office or the Foreign 
Office, which rejected them, both on general grounds and because 
it was felt best not to intervene in the negotiations directly 
if such intervention could possibly be avoided. 
However, on November 13th 1924 the Colonial Office 
instructed Dobbs to remind the Iraq Government of the Turkish 
Petroleum Company's "undoubted right" to the concession if 
reasonable terms were offered. Various arguments were to be 
used with the Iraqis 3. (though none of such force as those earlier 
suggested by Dobbs), including the suggestion that: 
1. "Any difference that may arise between the High Contracting 
Parties as to the interpretation of the provisions of this 
Treaty shall be ref erred to the Permanent Court of International 
Justice provided for by Article 14 of the Covenant of the League 
of Nations ••• " (Article XiII of the Treaty). 
2. Dobbs B hdad to Colonial Office October 10th 1 2 • 
FO 371 10086 13 9184. 
3. Dobbs was instructed to remind the Iraqis that long delay would 
ensue if the Organic Law were promulgated before the Concession 
was signed, which would delay Iraq's obtaining oil royalties. 
He was also to remind them that the Turkish Petroleum Company 
was the strongest combination of resources ever arranged for oil 
development. 
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Final settlement of Oil concession will greatly simplify 
task of pressing claim of Iraq as regards northern 
frontier: also attempts which are being made by competing 
interests to arrive at an understanding with the Turks 
will be defeated. 1. 
As the Foreign Office noted, the rather specious Colonial Office 
argument about the frontier settlement not only was rather unsound 
logically but, as Osborne (Foreign Office) noted, it "smack(ed) 
ever so little of blackmail".a. 
Up to this point the British Government had tried hard to 
maintain its desired policy of non-intervention in the negotia-
tions between Iraq and the Company. It had kept a watchful eye 
on the two sides, hoping that the many points at issue would be 
resolved without any need for direct interference. However, 
negotiations had dragged on, first in London, then in Baghdad, 
while new threats, in the shape of the Cheney intervention and the 
Gulbenkian controversy, had arisen. By late 1924, although the 
Cheney threat had by now receded, the prospects of an early 
agTeement between Iraq and the Turkish Petroleum Company were not 
1. Colonial Office to Dobbs 
FO 371 10086 13 10164. 
The reference here is to Lord Inverforth's (and others') 
alleged intrigues, for which see nertt chapter. 
2. The argument was unsound logically since the concession was held 
to exclude the disputed areas anyway. 
Minute by Osborne, November 25th 1924. 
Forei Office to Colonial Office December 
FO 371 10086 13 101 4. 
(The Foreign Office had not been consulted before the Colonial 
Office telegram had been sent). 
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very bright. While the two sides were still at variance on a great 
many important points, the time was fast approaching when the 
promulgation of Iraq's Organic Law could no longer be delayed, and 
reference of any concession granted to the Iraq Legislative Assembly, 
with all the consequent opportunities for delay or even rejection, 
would then be unavoidable. It was obvious to the British 
Government that more direct efforts to speed negotiations would 
have to be made, even though such efforts would bring further 
problems in their train -- for example, if matters came to a cries, 
whose interests would have to be sacrificed, those of the Turkish 
Petroleum Company, or those of Iraq? 
II. British Government Intervention 1925. 
Late in 1924 the impression in British Government circles 
was that Iraq was following an awkward line of its own in its 
concession negotiations with the Company with the express purpose 
of obstruction. This was not exactly the case, however, as 
Dobbs soon found out, for the two main points of difference between 
the two sides were, for Iraq, valid and important. 1 • 
Firstly, Iraq objected to Article 32 of the Draft Concession, 
1. Though it must be admitted that at times Iraq did put forward 
excessive claims, such as, for example, a demand for reversion 
to her of property outside Iraq. See Minutes of Conference at 
Baghdad ••• regarding T.P.C. Concession: Fourth Meeting, 
December 1 th 1 2 and Fifth Meeti ~ December 1 th 1 2 • 
FO 371 10827 43 351. 
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which required that the operating company be registered in Britain. 
One can understand the Turkish Petroleum Company's point of view 
in insisting on this. It was also in line with British Government 
policy and was enshrined in the San Remo Oil Agreement. Neverthe-
less, one must also appreciate the Iraqis' point of view in that 
they feared that this provision might lead to the reintroduction 
of judicial capitulations and the growth of foreign influence on 
a great scale. On this point Dobbs asked if he could give Iraq 
1. some assurance. 
Secondly, Iraq, bound by the terms of Article X of the 
Anglo-Iraqi Treaty to accept the San Remo Agreement, consequently 
felt that it had a right to ayail itself of that .Agreement's 
benefits in that Article 8 thereof provided for 20% Iraqi 
participation. Furthermore, Iraq wanted to have all the privileges 
attached to such participation, such as being able to appoint a 
director, and to secure a good profit from the undertaking. 
The Turkish Petroleum Company, however, resisted Iraq's claim, 
(at ilea~t·::partly,:because they feared consequent Iraqi interference) 
arguing that the operation of the Working Agreement, insisted on 
by the American Group, 2• meant that, in itself, the Turkish 
November 
December 
2. To avoid double taxation. Here again the inclusion of 
American interests led to difficulties with Iraq (as with the 
"Open Door" clause). (Under the Working .Agreement the T,P.C. 
was to be made a non-profit making concern, the participants 
receiving crude oil in proportion t.o their shareholding. 
See next chapter). 
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Petroleum Company would be a non-profit making organization, 
each component group getting its share of oil at cost price, 
and therefore Iraq would not benefit greatly from participation 
anyway. To this the Iraqis replied that, even without the 
profits, they wanted share participation in order to be able to 
appoint a director. Dobbs asked the Colonial Office for a 
decision on this point, but opined that the Iraq Government's claim 
was indisputable. 1 • 
The Colonial Office reply urged the necessity of having 
the Turkish Petroleum Company registered in Britain so as to 
facilitate the subscription of the large amounts of capital 
required. 2 • As to capitulations, His Majesty's Government could 
not go beyond the assurances already given to Iraq, and in any 
case could not guarantee Iraq on this matter against other Powers, 
such as the United States. 3. On the question of Iraqi partici-
pation, the Colonial Office felt that it would be better for Iraq 
1. Off ice November 20th 1 2 • 
2. This argument was used at the time by.the T.P.C., but in 
fact the Company's shares were never put on the open market, 
incr~ased capital being drawn pro rata from the participants. 
3. On the capitulations issue see Article IX of the Anglo-Iraq 
Treaty of October 1922, (Text, Hurewitz, op.cit. II, p.112) 
and the subsidiary Judicial Agreement (Parliamentary Papers, 
(Hof C) Cmd 2120 (1924) xxvi, 453, pages 28-31). 
For references and summary of Anglo-Iraqi discussions since 
the Treaty see Minute by Morgan, December 18th 1924. 
FO 371/10086/13/11331. 
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to drop its claim, since this would entail getting a reduced 
royalty; it was better for Iraq to accept "certain gains instead 
of speculative hopes", it was urged. 1. 
In general at this stage in the negotiations the differ-
ences between the two sides occurred largely because the Iraqis 
were, rightly, afraid of abuses of the concession terms (which, 
prima facie, seemed reasonable enough) and therefore they sought 
either to find a fresh basis for particular terms or to tighten 
the language used to make for more certain interpretation. 
(Possibly lalowledge of the Persian concession disputes was a 
factor here 
2
•). Often Keeling could appreciate the Iraqis' 
point of view and would be willing to compromise, but sometimes 
he was unable to do so because of being tied down by his Company's 
rigid refusal to move. 3. 
By the end of January 1925 the draft concession showed that 
some progress had been made. The period of the concession had been 
fixed at 75 years, and agreement on the "Open Door" formula had 
been reached.4·Keeling had apparently offered Iraq the right to 
2. See Chapter 5 Part II(above)and Chapter 12 Part I (below). 
3. T.P.C.officials, of course, had always to keep in mind the 
fact that the Company as a whole was composed of diverse 
international interests (actual or, as in the case of the 
Americans, potential). This must at times have reduced flexi-
bility regarding certain points in the concession (e.g. the 
"Open Door" clause). 
4. Dobbs B hdad to Colonial Office Jan 
FO 371 10827 43 78. 
Under the terms of the draft concession the T.P.C. was to 
choose 24 plots from the total area of the concession (by a 
given date),and the rest was to be sub-let to other concerns. 
The Company draft envisaged the T.P.C. itself appointing the 
sub-lessors, but Iraq, suspicious of the Company's intentions, 
stuck out against this. The Company eventually conceded to 
Iraq the right to appoint the sub-lessors. 
appoint a director to the Board, as a counter to Iraq's demands 
for full participation, although this offer had not yet been taken 
1. 
up by Iraq. There were still, nevertheless, many points of difference 
to be settled. 
Meanwhile a serious situation was beginning to develop. While 
both the Turkish Petroleum Company and the British High Commissioner, 
Dobbs, pressed urgently for final signature, in Iraq the Iraq Government 
was under constant attack from the opposition, who were redoubling 
their efforts to prevent the concession going through before Parliament 
2. 
met. At the same time the fact that the negotiations were so long 
drawn-out was leading to impatience among the groups and this, together 
3. 
with the still continuing Gulbenkian controversy, was imposing a 
1. Draft Convention, January 1925. FO 371/10827/43/748. 
2. Dobbs Ba hdad to Colonial Offic~J February 17th 1925. 
FO 371 10827 43 1020. 
No attempt has been made here to determine the elements of opposition 
in Iraq to the Turkish Petroleum Company's concession - a task 
which would almost merit a thesis of its own. 
Iraqi politics at this time were kaleidoscopic. Parties of a 
sort did exist, with various declared objectives, but they showed 
little facility for organization. Support of or opposition to a 
particular measure or government was determined more by personal 
allegiance, religious or racial affinity, local or tribal 
considerations, and the tactics of the "ins versus outs" struggle 
than by considerations of doctrine or party programme. Sentiments 
such as nationalism and aversion to British tutelage were present, 
however, and were presented as part of the "ideology" of certain 
of the parties. 
On this see: S.H. Longrigg and F. Stoakes, ~ (London, 1958) 
pp. 87-88. Longrigg, Iraq, 1900-1950, pp. 148-152. Ireland, 
op. cit., pp. 394-396. 
3. See Chapter 131L (below). 
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severe strain on the fragile arrangements which held the Turkish 
1. 
Petroleum Company together. 
One of the points still at issue was Iraq's demand that royalties 
2. 
be paid on a gold basis, which demand the Company was resisting. 
After discussions with Company representatives in London, the Colonial 
Office persuaded the Company to accede to Iraq's wishes on this 
matter. In informing Dobbs of this, L. Amery (secretary of State 
for the Colonies) telegraphed: 
Company have stipulated that there shall be no further amendments 
of (the January draft concession) and after perusing it I concur 
in their view that they have met Iraq handsomely on all counts 
In .Amery's view the draft was now exceptionally favourable to Iraq 
and he urged Dobbs to "impress this upon the Government of Iraq and 
3. 
make every endeavour to obtain signature at a very early date". 
In Iraq, however, the clamour against the proposed grant of the 
concession before Parliament met continued. The ~linisters of Works, 
Justice, and Education were threatening to resign if the Prime Minister 
pushed the concession through. It was now certain, felt Dobbs, that 
1. Colonial Office to Dobbs B 
FO 371 10827 43 843. 
2. Iraq feared that if the British Government followed a deliberate 
inflationary policy in order to ease the unemployment problem 
(as advocated by some people at the time) then sterling would 
depreciate, hence if Iraq's royalties were not tied to a gold 
value they would fall considerably in value. 
(According to a private source, Dobbs himself suggested to the 
Iraqis that they demand that royalties be on a gold basis). 
the Prime Minister could not push the measure through and survive 
the pending elections, and he urged that the British Government take 
1. 
"inunediate and drastic action". 
The main point at issue was the question of Iraq participating 
in the Turkish Petroleum Company, in accordance with the terms of the 
2. 
San Remo Oil Agreement. The Iraqi Prime Minister had suggested to 
Dobbs that if a clause were added to the concession whereby this 
question was to be put to the Iraqi Parliament when it met, and 
participation then negotiated if Parliament so desired, then the 
concession could be signed immediately. Dobbs, however, had stated 
that it was useless to put such a suggestion forward to the Company, 
and he had used various arguments to sway the Prime Minister, 
including the threat that the British Government might withdraw all 
interest in Iraq, and that this might be followed by an immediate 
American demand for capitulations. He had especially emphasised the 
fact that the League of Nations Commission investigating the Mosul · 
3. 
frontier question was taking a particular interest in the negotiations. 
Paulis (the Belgian member of the Commission) had told the Iraqi 
Minister of Pinance "that the first of the two parties to the frontier 
dispute to grant (the) oil concession to the Turkish Petroleum Company 
would get (the) Hosul vilayet". Acootding to Dobbs, however, the 
recalcitrant Hinisters were by no means dismayed by his arguments, 
2. Yasin Pasha, one of Iraq's more efficient and determined leaders in 
this period. 
3. See Chapter 8, below. 
and they apparently felt that, despite all, "Great Britain (would) 
1. 
pull them out of the hole". 
Together with the rather amazing utterance of M. Paulis (if true), 
it appeared that the negotiations had now developed into a game of 
bluff and counter-bluff between the Company, supported by Dobbs, and 
the Iraqi Ministers. The Iraqi Ministers stood by their undoubted 
rights to participation (although they admitted Iraq's inability to 
find the necessary capital), and they evidently hoped all the time 
that the British Government would save the situation. On the other 
hand Dobbs, who had gone as far as he dare<! in his official capacity, 
now sought to induce his home government to join directly in the game. 
He urged the Colonial Off ice to send a strong message to the Iraqi 
Government in order to force it to put the concession through, and 
suggested, inter alia, that this message should include the threat 
to cancel the financial and defence talks then scheduled and to abandon 
the proposed financial commission to Iraq, along with a reference to 
2. 
Iraq's default on the Ottoman Debt installments. In this he was 
supported by King Feisal, who even offered to dismiss the Cabinet and 
appoint a new one to grant the concession - though this would have 
3. 
laid him open to much int~rnal opposition. 
ll - Dobbe B hdad to Colonial Off ice Fe b~, ... _..:P' 
FO 371 10827 43 1020. 
2. The Iraq Council of Ministers had refused to pay the 30 lacs 
installment of the Ottoman Debt on the grounds that it would mean 
suspension of salaries and would "bring the machinery of 
administration to a standstill". (Ibid.) 
The opposition pressure was mounting, and on February 18th the 
Prime ¥1inister was forced to announce publicly that the Organic Law 
would pe promulgated in two weeks and that elections would be rapidly 
proceeded with. Just how much of the opposition to the passing of 
the concession was actually due to a desire to secure Iraqi participa-
tioh, and how much of it was directed against the grant of the 
concession itself (with or without participation) is difficult to 
determine. In addition, it is equally difficult to determine how 
much the Iraqi Prime Minister himself was secretly in collusion with 
his more recalcitrant Minist~rs, and, indee~perhaps with some elements 
1. 
outside the Cabinet who were opposed to the concession. Morgan 
expressed his doubts on this score in a Foreign Office ¥dnute of 
February 19th when he wrote: 
The Iraq Ministers have shown a genius for delaying the grant 
of a concession to the Turkish Petroleum Company. One might 
almost suspect that they had been "influenced" by Turkish or 
rival oil interests. 2. 
Of importance at this stage was the personality of the High 
Commissioner, Dobbs. It might be argued that his firm attitude with 
the Iraqi Ministers was necessary if any progress at all was to be 
made on the concession problem - an argument that has much to be said 
for it. However, in the delicate situation of the time, Dobbs~ aptness 
1. to Colonial Office Feb_,,,., .......... 
FO 371 10827 43 1020. 
See also Dobbs B dad to Colonial Office Feb_..,~,~ 
FO 371/10827 43 1194. 
2. Minute by Morgan, February 19tp 1925. FO 371/10827/43/1020. 
to form and hold, and possibly seek to implement, his own strong 
ideas on how a situation ought to be handled, together with his 
tendency to resort too quickly to the "ultimatum" as a weapon, was 
liable to be a positive danger in the circumstances. "I wish that 
I knew more of Sir H. Dobbs", minuted Sir Austen Chamberlain, ''What 
1. 
little I see fills me with anxious doubts." 
The inconsistencies in the whole situation were noted by Osborne. 
He minuted: 
It is regrettable that while we continue to. proclaim our official 
disinterest in the oil of Mosul, one of the League Commissioners 
should inform the Minister of Finance that it is the crux of the 
question and that Sir H. Dobbs should threaten the Iraq Government 
with the withdrawal of all interest of His Majesty's Government 
in the country and with the hypothetical bogey of American 
capitulations if the concession is not granted. 2. 
1. Minute b Austen Chamberlain Feb,...,, .. ~~ 
FO 371 10827 43 1020. 
(This minute was signed simply "A.C.", but it seems fairly 
certain that it was written by A. Chamberlain, the Foreign 
Secretary). 
H.R.C. Dobbs (1871-1934) had been in service in India, Persia, 
and Afghanistan before the First World War. In 1915-16 he 
was Revenue Commissioner in Mesopotamia. He served as 
High Commissioner in Iraq 1923-29. P.W. Ireland refers to 
him as follows:-
"Versatile in talents, but essentially an administrator, he 
brought to the difficult period, 1923-29, when he served as 
High Commissioner to Iraq, a great capacity for realistic 
thinking, a highly developed sense of duty, and a deep 
loyalty to the Empire which 1 d'ominated all his relations with 
the Arabs." (Ireland, 1!:!.q, p. 85 note 2.). 
2. Although, added Osborne, the Arab Government had "displayed 
almost intolerable perversity and procrastination in the 
negotiations". (Minute by Osborne, Febr;uary 19th 1925. 
FO 371/10827/43/1020.) 
237. 
There was great reluctance in the British Government 
Departments to act on Dobbs' suggestion of sending a stern Note 
to Iraq. After sounding Turkish Petroleum Company officials 
further on the question, and finding them still adamant against 
Iraqi participation, the Colonial Office therefore brought the 
matter to the notice of the Cabinet, which discussed it on 
February 25th. l. 
The Cabinet rejected any idea of sending the "ultimatum" 
suggested by Dobbs, and they were reluctant to ask King Feisal 
to dismiss his Ministers, although this latter suggestion was 
held to have possibilities as a last resort. 2• It was decided 
again to approach the Turkish Petroleum Company and to endeavour 
to reach a compromise on the lines put forward earlier by the 
Iraqi Prime }linister, 3. while in the meantime a Cabinet Committee 
was to be appointed to study the whole question closely. 4 • 
1. Minute by Morgan, February 20th 1925. FO 371/10827/43/1020. 
2. By this time the Iraqi elections had been postponed, (partly 
because of difficulties in preparation of electoral rolls, 
partly because Iraqi authorities considered it best to wait 
until the Frontier Commission had finished their investigations 
in Iraq), and the Iraqi Prime Minister had managed to explain 
away his earlier statement regarding promulgation of the 
Organic Law Dobbs B dad to Colonial Office Feb 26th 
~· (Telega. 112 and 113 • FO 371 10827 43 1194. 
3. Colonial Office to Dobbs B hdad Feb 
FO 371 10827 43 1183. 
The compromise referred to is the Iraq Prime Minister's 
suggestion oVt.tlined above, page '2. 3~ • 
4. Cabinet Minutes, February 25th 1925. CAB 23/49. 10(25)27. 
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On February 27th the Company considered and rejected the 
Iraqi Prime Minister's suggested compromise, on the grounds that 
Iraqi participation would result in "the whole fabric of the 
Turkish Petroleum Company being torn to pieces". The Company 
then again urged the Colonial Office to continue pressure on 
Iraq to sign. 1 • The day afterwards, however, the Cabinet 
Connnittee concluded its deliberations and came to a firm 
decision. Instead of putting pressure on Iraq, the British 
Government was to put pressure on the Company to accept a 
compromise arrangement which would give Iraq a definite share 
allotment (under certain conditions 2·). 
On February 28th the President of the Board of Trade 
(Sir P. Cunliffe Lister3•) and the Secretary of State for the 
1. The main reason given for the Company's refusal was that 
in their view the Working Agreement, insisted on by the 
Americans, left no room for Iraqi participation. 
Turkish Petroleum Com an H.E. Nichols to Colonial Office 
L. Ame Feb 2 th 1 2 • FO 371 10827 43 1240. 
2. 
(For the conditions, see below). 
3. Sir Philip Cunliffe - Lister had earlier (before November 
1924) been known as Sir Philip Lloyd Graeme. 
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Colonies (L. Amery) had an interview with H.E. Nichols, the 
Vian.aging Director of the Turkish Petroleum Company, at which 
Nichols was informed that the British Government was definitely 
not prepared either to press for the dismissal of the Iraqi 
Cabinet or to present an ultimatum to that Government, and 
Amery then put forward two alternative proposals, one of which 
was the original compromise proposal of the Iraqi Prime 
Minister. The second proposal was that the Iraq Government 
be given free, fully paid-up shares in the Company amounting to 
20;'~ of the total issued capital, these shares to rank equal to 
Ordinary shares as regards dividend, but to ca:rry no voting rights. 
Dividends payable were to be deducted from Iraq's royalties. 1 • 
1. The proposed shares would not give Iraq the right to 
intervene in the general management of the Company, and 
could only be disposed of to members of the Company. 
Memorandum on "Irag: Turkish Petroleum Compan.v" by the 
Secret of State for the Colonies March 18th 1 2 
CAB 24 172. CP.171. 
See also Colonial Off ice Ame to Turkish Petroleum 
Com Nichols March 2nd 1 
FO 371 10827 43 129(). 
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Four days later the Turkish Petroleum Company reluctantly decided 
to accept the second proposal, provided that measures were taken to 
1. 
safeguard the Working Agreement. British Government pressure, at 
last applied to the right quarter - for after all, Iraq's right to 
2 
participate under the San Remo Oil Agreement was indisputable, and 
the British Government, as ¥.iandatory, was supposed to protect Iraq's 
3. 
interests - had secured what looked like being a breakthrough. Yet 
it was already too late, as will be seen. 
At this time the League Frontier Commission in Iraq was giving 
the British Government much to puzzle over by its enquiries of the 
Iraq Government as to whether that Government recognized the Turkish 
Petroleum Company's claim as valid, and "whether especially in view 
1. The Company proposed that a contract be drawn up whereby the 
Iraq Government would agree to accept the Working .AgTeement. 
(Turkish Petroleum Com an H.E. Nichols to Colonial Office 
(L. Ame March th 1 2 • FO 371 10827 43 1350 • 
2. Article 8 of the San Remo Oil .AgTeement of April 1920 read 
(extract):- " ••• should the private petroleum company be 
constituted ••• the native Government or other native interests 
shall be allowed, if they so desire, to participate up to a 
maximum of 20 per cent of the share capital of the said 
company". Text in:-
F.R.u.s., 1920, II, pp. 655-658. 
Morgan (F.o.) tentatively suggested that Article 8 could be 
suppressed, without Iraq's consent, but this step was not 
considered seriously'and was, of course, outside the realms of 
practical politics at this stage. (Minute by Morgan (February 
1925 (?).) FO 371/10827/43/1240.) . 
3. c~ven though the point was mainly one of prestige at this 
stage, and of no real financial benefit to Iraq (as it was then 
envisaged)). 
of Company combining international oil interests there is prospect 
1. 
of Concession being granted by Iraq Government in near future". In 
addition, Count Teleki (the Hungarian member of the Commission) had 
offered to use his good off ices to persuade the Iraq Government to 
2. 
sign the Concession. 
Dobbs felt that this "strange anxiety shown by the Frontier 
Commission to induce Iraq to sign" might be explained by the fact that 
the Commission possibly was considering proposals which would give the 
whole of Mosul to Turkey or, alternatively, would divide Mosul in 
3. 
two between Iraq and Turkey. Knowing that this would be opposed by 
the powerful oil interests, and would thus be unlikely to secure 
4. 
acceptance by the League, the Commission was trying to get both 
Iraq and Turkey to recognize the Turkish Petroleum Company's claim 
1. Dobbs Ba hdad to Colonial Office Feb.....,,~•-r 
FO 371 10827 43 1194. 
See al~o: Great Britain, Public Record Office, Colonial Office, 
Memo of a Conversation between H. Dobbs and Colonel Paulis, 
Jan-µary 23rd 1925. CO 730/72. No. 6291. 
2. Dobbs B hdad to Colonial Office March 2nd 1 2 • 
FO 371 10827 43 1312. 
British Government officials were not very keen on this idea, 
however. See various minutes in FO 371/10827/43/1312 and 1350. 
3. The Commission did actually consider partitioning the Mosul 
vilayet, but rejected the idea, according to their report, in 
the interests of the population. 
(Parliamentary Papers (H of C) 1924-5 (Cmd 2565) mi, 563. "Report 
by M. Unden on the question of the Turco-Iraq Frontier, December 
16th 1925", page 7.) 
4. Since the oil interests of Britain, France and Holland would 
influence their Governments against acceptance. 
The United States might also, from outside the League, raise her 
voice against partition. (Assuming that the oil companies had 
sufficient influence with their governments to make them act in 
this way). 
~-
(and if Iraq signed the concession, this would be one hurdle cleared) 
so that the powerful oil interests would not oppose the Commission's 
1. 
recommendation. 
It thus appeared, Morgan minuted on March 6th, that the League 
Commission was not convinced by the British Government's statements 
that its interest in retaining as much as possible of Iraq arose 
from other reasons than oil, and it apparently felt that Britain's 
main interest in Mosul was to secure the oil concession there for the 
Turkish Petroleum Company. If Iraq refused to meet the wishes of 
the oil interests, then perhaps the Commission would feel bound to 
award Mosul to Turkey, who had promised to meet their wishes - however 
2. 
worthless the Turks' promises were considered to be by Britain. 
When Dobbs later reported his views on the possibility of League 
Commission proposals being made to give the right bank of the Tigris 
to Iraq and the left to Turkey, with the suggestion that the Commission's 
motive in wishing to get Iraq to grant the Concession was thus to avoid 
1. (Since the concession would cover the vilayets of Mosul 
and Baghdad irrespective of frontiers, on this reasoning). 
Dobbs B hdad to Colonial Office March 2nd 1 2 • 
FO 371 10827 43 1312. 
Dobbs suggested the inclusion of a clause in the proposed 
Concession which would nullify the Concession grant if the 
whole of Mosul were not given to Iraq. In Dobbs 's opinion 
this would ensure French and American support for Britain 
in the frontier question. 
2. March 6th 1 2 • FO 371/10827/43/1312. 
ell F.O. to Shuckbur h Colonial Office 
March 9th 1925. FO 371 108-27 43 1350. 
(Morgan had occupied various minor posts in Turkey. He was 
employed in the F.O. from April 1923). 
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Iraqi opposition to pipelines from the Turkish part of the Concession 
going through Iraqi territory (and thus again to avoid opposition 
1. 
from the oil interests), Morgan minuted in disgust: 
The Commission seems to treat as unimportant the strategic 
question, the question of the Christian and other minorities, 
the rights of the Arabs and of the Kurds, and the fact that 
the vilayet is ours by right of conquest. 2. 
There was no doubt some foundation for British suspicions of the 
League Frontier Commission's activities, although the question was 
hardly likely to be as "black and white" as the Foreign Office seemed 
to think. Doubtless the Commission was concerned to look at all 
angles of the problem, and it was obviously useless to ignore hard 
facts and to propose some solution which it knew would be doomed. from 
the start. It would be, one hopes, unthinkable for the Commission 
to have ignored "the question of the Christian and other minorities, 
the rights of the Arabs and the Kurds", and obviously, too, the 
strategic question had to be given some consideration. Foreign Office 
officials, rightly suspicious, perhaps tended to exaggerate the degree 
to which oil interests dominated any situation even remotely connected 




2. Minute by Morgan, March 11th 1925. FO 371/10827/43/1430. 
3. See for example Davenport and Cooke, op. cit.; Brooks, op.cit.; 
and Ludwell Denny, We Fight for Oil (New York and London, 1928). 
Also, of course, the newspapers. 
The Turkish Petroleum Company representative in Iraq, Keeling, 
did not immediately put forward the approved proposal to give Iraq 
20% participation without voting rights, but held it back temporarily. 
Before he could make the offer, however, the Iraq Council passed a 
formal resolution authorising the signature of the concession, subject 
to the settlement of certain minor points still outstanding, but 
without insisting on Iraq's right to participation. This break in 
the impasse was reported by Dobbs on March 7th, and he informed the 
Colonial Office that this authorisation had been obtained"at the cost 
of the resignation of the Ministers of Education and of Justice, who 
might now mount a further campaign against the concession. Dobbs 
urged that the Company be pressed to give way on the outstanding minor 
points (nine in all), otherwise the opportunity of immediate signature 
l. 
might be lost and never recur. 
Eventually, after the Colonial Office had persuaded the Company 
not to stick out against Iraq on one final point (concerning an Iraq 
2. 
Government option to acquire a local refinery), on March 14th 1925 
3. 
the concession was signed. 
l. Dobbs (Baghdad) to Colonial Office, March 7th 1925. FO 371/10827/43/1421. 
It is not clear exactly what factors induced the Iraq Council 
to drop its insistence on participation. 
2. B hdad to Colonial Office }1arch 12th l 2 , and Shuckburgh 
March l th l 2 • 
3. The Organic Law came into operation on March 21st 1925, seven days 
after signature of the Concession. Submission of the Concession to 
the Iraq Parliament for approval was therefore not necessary. 
(The British desire to avoid reference to the Iraq Parliament, 
though easy to understand, is a curious comment on their much 
professed love of democracy!). 
1. 
The final text of the Concession gave the Turkish Petroleum 
Company the exclusive right (subject to the "Open Door" clause) to 
obtain and export oil in an area defined as "Iraq except the Transferred 
Territories and the region formerly the vilayet of Basrah", with 
provision for a supplementary Convention, to be concluded once the 
2. 
precise limits of Iraq had been determined. The period of the concession 
3. 
was fixed at 75 years. Article 5 required the Company to select, 
within 32 months, 24 rectangular plots of 8 square miles each, and 
laid down certain drilling obligations. The Company was to order a 
pipeline for export from these areas "as soon as it shall be 
commercially justifiable", or within four years of declaring the 
areas fully tested. Article 6, the "Open Door" clause, provided 
for the auction of the area left, after the Company had selected its 
plots, to the highest bidder. For this purpose the Company, which was 
to receive the proceeds of the auction, was to act as the agent of 
the Iraq Government, the latter having the right to refuse permission 
for any lease of plots to a bidder of which it did not approve. 
The Iraq Government's royalty was fixed at four shillings (gold) 
per ton for twenty years after export commenced, and thereafter 
1. The final text of the Concession may be found in' 
FO 371/10828/43/2760. 
Also in Hurewitz, op. cit., Vol. II, pp.132-142. 
2. Articles 1 and 3 of the Concession. 
3. Article 2. 
1. 
royalties were to be calculated on a sliding scale according to profits. 
Article 15 fixed the price of oil sold locally in Iraq, and allowed 
Iraq to acquire her own refinery, while Article 16 gave Iraq the 
right to inspect Company property, though this ... , .;' only applied to 
property inside Iraq. Article 20 laid down the conditions under which 
2. 
railways for Company use might be constructed. 
The Iraqis had accepted the provision that the operating Company 
3. 
be British, but had secured the right to appoint a director to the 
4. 
Board. Article 34 provided that, in any new issue of shares offered 
to the general public, Iraqis would be allowed to subscribe to a limit 
of 20% of such shares -. a clause which was, in the event, of little 
5. 
value, even if pleasing to Iraqi public opinion. Other clauses 
concerned taxes, import duties, the employment of Iraqis, termination 
of the Agreement, arbitration etc. 
1. Article 10. 
2. Outside the 24 plots (chosen under A:bticle 5) the Company was to 
construct only narrow gauge (not exceeding two feet six inches) 
railways, unless authorised to construct broader gauge lines by 
the I~aq Government. 
3. Article 32. 
4. Article 35. The Iraq Director was to "enjoy the same rights and 
privileges" etc. as the other Directors. 
5. New subscriptions of capital were always taken up by the participants, 
and thus shares were never offered to the general public. 
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By the standards of the time the Concession agreement was not 
grossly unfair to Iraq, and it was in some respects an advance on 
the other major concession in the Middle East at this time, the D'Arcy 
1. 
Concession. The gTeatest injustice to Iraq was, of course, the denial 
of a proper share in the profits of the enterprise which full 
participation might have secured. After all, Iraq had a right to 
this under the San Remo Oil Agreement, even apart from any other 
considerations. While one can appreciate the difficulties of the 
Turkish Petroleum Company as regards giving Iraq a full 200/o participa-
tion, in that that Company was already composed of too many different 
elements all having to "share one pie", one cannot escape the truth 
that the "pie", after all, belonged to Iraq. 
The question naturally arises as to whether Britain ought to have 
done more to secure Iraq's interests, especially since, in so doing, 
2. 
she was to some extent securing her own. The British Government, 
1. Both concessions covered a huge area, and were for a long period 
(the D'Arcy Concession was for sixty years). The Iraq concession 
of 1925 did not have the provision whereby the Government took 
16% of the profits, which in Persia led to endless trouble because 
of (primarily) loose drafting allowing abuse. Iraq had a royalty 
on output (on a gold basis) instead. Neither concession gave the 
host government much profit (compared with the company's profit, 
and with present day arrangements). The Iraq concession, however, 
was an advance on the D'Arcy Concession because it was drafted 
far more tightly, imposing definite obligations on the operating 
company. 
For various points of comparison see H. Cattan, The Evolution 
of Oil Concessions in the VJ.iddle East and North Africa, (New York,1967). 
2. In the financial sphere, revenue accruing to Iraq from oil development 
would help to pay for the administration of the country; profits 
accruing to the Turkish Petroleum Company participants went mainly 
into foreign (American, French, Dutch) pockets. 
judging naturally by the standards of 1924-25, held the draft concession 
put forward by the Company (after some modification) to be "eminently 
reasonable and fair." To castigate the British Government for this 
opinion now, from the standpoint of nearly half a century later, 
would perhaps be a little unfair, but one cannot escape the fact that 
it allowed its supposed protege Iraq to be robbed of what it undoubtedly 
had a right to - share participation in its fullest sense, without 
unfair deduction from royalties. 
On the other points, too, the British Government did not make 
any great effort to protect Iraq. True, it refused to support the 
Company's early claim to include Basra in the concession, and occasionally 
used its influence to persuade the Company to accept certain minor 
points desired by the Iraqis, but whatever important benefits the 
1. 
Iraqis did secure were secured mainly by their own efforts. Of course, 
British policy was avowedly one of the avoidance of direct intervention 
in the negotiations, a policy to some extent inevitable in view of 
the international complications involved, but· on the occasions when 
Britain departed from this policy in Iraq's interest it was, with one 
exception, only on comparatively minor issues. ihe one exception -
concerning Iraqi participation in the Company - hardly merits description 
as such, since the British Government's intervention with the Company 
on that issue was carried out only because there seemed no feasible 
1. (The assistance of the British Advisers to the Iraq Government 
was no doubt invaluable to the Iraqis on more technical points). 
alternative, and in any case was, as it happened, already too 
late to be of help to Iraq. The British Government's fears of 
repercussions from American interests and possible disruption 
of the Turkish Petroleum Company, along with fears of what might 
happen in the Mosul issue should Iraq refuse to grant the 
concessioh, perhaps made the British lean (even if unconsciously) 
a little towards favouring the Company's interests, but while 
these may be reasons, they cannot truly be called excuses for 
the British attitude. 
The influence of the High Commissioner, Dobbs, who in 
the early stages of the negotiations had little patience with 
Iraqi pretensions, was probably an important factor helping to 
determine the British Government's attitude, as possibly was 
the fact that the basis of the negotiations was, after all, a 
draft prepared by the Company. This latter fact often made it 
appear that it was the Iraqis who were forever creating diffi-
culties by objecting to the Company's draft terms, thus causing 
British officials to see the Iraqi ~linisters as being purely 
obstructive and "exceedingly suspicious". Had the Iraqis 
themselves been sufficiently lal.owledgeable to have put forward 
their own draft - or, perhaps, had they been able to take a 
leaf out of the Persians' book in the North Persian concession 
struggle 1 • - then the British Government would no doubt have 
1. When the Persians took drafts submitted by different oil 
companies, picked the best terms from each, and then drew 
up a new draft, asking oil companies concerned to accept it. 
See Chapter 5 (above). 
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found that the Turkish Petroleum Company, too, could be 
"exceedingly suspicious" and liable continually to raise fresh 
issues in the negotiations. 
On balance it can fairly be said that, while the British 
Government's policy helped to speed the negotiations a little, 
and probably prevented a complete breakdown in that neither the 
Company nor Iraq could guarantee that it would have British 
Government support for any unreasonable stand, nevertheless the 
British Government's attempt to be impartial and to stand aloof 
from the negotiations militated more against Iraq's interests 
than against those of the Company. 
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CHAPTER 8 
MOSUL AND THE GULBENKIAN CONTROVERSY 
I. Mosul and Gulbenkian 
The Lausanne Treaty of July 1923 had provided for maintenance 
of the status quo in the Iraq-Turkey frontier question while 
Britain and Turkey negotiated a final settlement. If such 
settlement were not reached within nine months from the signature 
of the Treaty, the matter was to be referred to the League 
Council. 1. 
The British Government did not especially want to let the 
matter go to League arbitration, and would have preferred to 
settle matters with the Turks directly, although for such direct 
settlement some substantial territorial concessions to the Turks 
would have had to be made, on a scale which the British Government 
was not prepared to countenance. 2• 
The already firm determination of the British Government 
to cede only minor areas of Iraq to the Turks needed no added 
strengthening from considerations of oil potentialities, 3.but had 
1. Parliamentary Papers (H of C) 1923 (Cmd 1929),xxv, 533,"Treaty 
of Peace with Turkey, and other instruments signed at Lausanne 
on July 24th 1923", Article 3 (2), page 15. 
2. The British Government preferred a direct settlement because 
the outcome of League arbitration was uncertain, and would 
entail much delay. For an illustration of the limits to which 
the British were prepared to compromise ("without restoring 
Mosul town to Turkey or compromising its strategic position".) 
See Secret of State for Colonial Affairs to the Hi h 
B hdad Se tember 20th l 2 • 
3. See Chapter 6, pp. 199-200 (above). 
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it done so it would have received that extra support from the 
information contained in a map which the Turkish Petroleum 
Company was at pains to supply to the Government indicating that 
most of the likely oilfields in Iraq were to be found in Mosul. l. 
The direct Anglo-Turkish frontier negotiations at 
Constantinople between May 19th and June 9th 1924 yielded no 
result except to make even plainer the "wide and irreconcilable 
divergence" between the two sides. 2• Consequently, on August 6th 
Britain asked that the League Council place the dispute on its 
agenda, following which request the Council, after hearing both 
points of view, decided to institute an enquiry, and appointed 
a three-man Commission for the purpose on September 30th 1924. 3. 
The Turks, however, still continued to express a desire 
for a direct settlement, and during October the Turkish Minister 
in London approached the British Prime Minister (Ramsay MacDonald) 
with suggestions for a settlement of the Mosul question to 
1. The map referred to is not now in the British Government 
files, but a Foreign Office minute, written after consulting 
the map, states: "As the Turks will probably claim the 
district embracing Mosul, Khanikin and Suleimanie they will, 
if they succeed, leave practically no oilfields in Iraq" 
(Minute by Morgan, August 20th 1923. FO 371/8995/91/8369.) 
2. Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on 
Turkish Pro osals for a direct settlement of the Turco-Irak 
Frontier Question, April 2nd 1925. FO 371 108 2 175 1727. 
3. Parliamentary Papers (H of C) 1924-5 (Cmd 2565) xxxi, 563. 
"Report by Mr. Unden on the Question of the Turco-Irak 
Frontier, December 16th 1925", pp.2-3. 
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Turkey's advantage, in return for Turkey giving various commercial 
privileges and advantages to Britain. 1 • Possibly the Turks 
(in common with many people in Britain) had expected the First 
Labour Government to follow a policy markedly different from that 
of the Conservatives, but in this they were disappointed. Nothing 
ca.me of the Turkish approach, and it is unlikely that even had 
MacDonald not fallen from power immediately afterwards any 
progress would have been made. 2• 
The League Commission was busy collecting information 
concerning the Mosul dispute. Besides examining relevant 
documents and discussing matters with the British and Turkish 
Governments, the Commission also visited the disputed territory 
and made various enquiries there, incidentally, as has been seen, 
revealing a more than passing interest in the oil question. On 
September 3rd 1925 the Commission made its Report to the League, 
recommending that, subject to certain conditions, the Mosul 
vilayet be retained as part of Iraq. Thereafter the Anglo-
Turkish dispute centred on the question of the legal nature of 
the Council's expected decision on the Report's recommendations, 
1. Constantino le 
2. MacDonald addressed a query to the Foreign Office as to how 
far the British Government was committed to supporting the 
T.P.C. In reply the Foreign Office stated H.M.G.'s 
commitment to be only "the inherent obligation to continue 
the support afforded to the Company in the past, in the 
absence of a:ny good cause for refusing it" - but at the same 
time the commitments to France and the United States were 
stressed as important (Minute by Osborne, November 4th 1924. 
FO 371/10080/7/9561). 
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Britain contending that the decision would be binding, Turkey 
contending that it would be merely a recormnendation. l. 
While all this was happening, and the Mosul dispute 
remained thus unsettled, controversy was raging between Gulbenkian 
on the one hand, and the groups within the Turkish Petroleum 
Company and the American Group seeking entry, on the other. 
This controversy, although at first sight of a purely commercial 
nature -- albeit complicated by personal animosities 2·--
eventually led to the involvement of the British, American, and 
the French Governments. 
The British Government first became aware of the controversy 
on September 23rd 1924, when Nichols (of the Turkish Petroleum 
Company) called at the Foreign Office with the request that His 
Majesty's Government "threaten (Gulbenkian) with their displeasure 
unless he became amenable to the representations of Nichols and 
Teagle". 3. According to Nichols, Gulbenkian had recently 
1. Parliamentary Papers (H of C) 1924-5 (Cmd 2565) xxxi, 563. 
"Report by Mr. Unden on the Question of the Turco-Irak 
Frontier, December 16th 1925". 
(The Commission of Enquiry rejected the idea of partitioning 
Mosul, and held that economic and geogTaphical considerations, 
together with the wishes of the majority of the people of the 
area, made the inclusion of Mosul in Iraq the most satis-
factory solution of the problem - provided that certain 
conditions were met (for which see later pages of this chapter)). 
2. Between Gulbenkian and Deterding over the latter's policy 
concerning a certain Venezuelan Oil Company. For details see 
N.S.Gulbenkian, Panta.raxia (London, 1965) pp.122-24, 133-38, 
and R. Hewins, Mr. Five Per Cent (London, 1957) pp.160-63. 
3. Memo by Morgan, September 23rd 1924. FO 371/10085/13/8473. 
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put forward "impossible demands" for his concurrence in the terms 
of the Working AgTeement and of the draft concession then being 
sought from Iraq. Gulbenkian disliked the Working Agreement 
because under it he received only a share of oil (which he 
1. 
himself had not the facilities to dispose of) instead of dividends, 
and he objected to the "Open Door" formula in the draft con-
cession because it meant that the Company itself only worked a 
small area of the concession instead of the whole area, which 
meant a consequent diminution of his profits. 2• However, 
Gulbenkian was prepared, Nichols said, to agree to the "Open 
Door" terms if the Company would grant him a royalty of one 
shilling per ton on all oil produced, an arrangement which the 
Company was not prepared to accept. 3. 
On later being asked for his side of the story, Gulbenkian 
had several valid points to make. Referring to the "Open·Door" 
leasing arrangement, Gulbenkian pointed out that there was 
nothing to prevent the Groups from getting all the territory 
1. The Turkish Petroleum Company was to be a non-profit making 
organisation, the participants receiving their share of oil 
from the Company. 
2. Under the "Open Door" formula the Company only worked 24 plots, 
the rest being thrown open to public auction. 
3. This would work out, it was calculated at that time, at 
£100,000 p.a. for Gulbenkian. 
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outside the Company's 24 plots, even though the Company itself 
was barred from bidding - thereby rendering chimerical any idea 
of there being a real "Open Door" to all comers. 1 • As for the 
Working Agreement, it was a "fraud" in which the profits were 
"artificially kept at a nominal figure, and the real profit 
escape(d) tax". On this latter point, however, Gulbenkian's 
grievance was, really, that he himself was unable to share in 
this "fraud". 2 • 
Both the British and the United States Governments were 
loath to intervene, particularly since Gulbenkian had a strong-
legal case on which to base his attitude, and preferred to let 
1. The Groups in the Company would have obvious advantages 
against outsiders, in that they would have access to the 
Company's information on the value of plots offered and, 
furthermore, since the proceeds of the auctions went to the 
Company, some at least of the money paid for any plot 
2. 
bought at the auction came back indirectly to the buyer. 
Gulbenkian's assessment of the Groups' motives (the American's 
in particular) was reasonably accurate, as can be seen from 
the remarks of G. Wellman (Standard Oil (New Jersey)) to 
A.W. Dulles (State Department) (F.R.u.s., 1924, II, p.225.) 
feared that he would have to sell his oil to 
at a very low price, since he himself could not 
and enclosures). 
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the two sides sort the matter out themselves. 1• The controversy 
dragged on, however. In October 1925 the American Groups 
presented Gulbenkian with a memorandum outlining certain terms, 2 • 
adding that 
it was the unanimous decision of the American 
group that the above terms set forth are final ••• (and) 
••• the American group realized that a failure to settle 
with Gulbenkian w(ould) mean the withdrawal of the 
American group from the proposed association with the 
Turkish Petroleum Company. 3. 
The Foreign Office, having been informed of the situation, 
was seriously concerned at the way things were going. While 
it was reluctant to believe that the Americans really did 
contemplate withdrawal from the Turkish Petroleum Company, 4 • 
1. Forei Office to E. Howard Washi :ton October 10th 1 2 • 
FO 371 10085 13 8475. 
The Turkish Petroleum Company offered Gulbenkian various 
alternatives at this time. See:- Messrs. Linklaters and 
Faines T.P.C. Solicitors to Messrs. Freshfields Leese and 
Munns Gulbenkian's Solicitors Se tember 2 th 1 2 • 
FO 371 10085 13 8475. 
2. The main terms outlined were that Gulbenkian would sell his 
T.P.C. shares to the Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Persian Oil 
Companies for £8,000, and receive a royalty of one shilling 
per ton on all the oil produced by the T.P.C. Gulbenkian 
was to be a director of the T.P.C., with access to the 
accounts. 
3. Memo submitted by Mr. Montagu Piesse, on behalf of the 
American Groups, to the other Groups as the result of his 
conference with the American Group in New York on 6th October 
~· 
FO 371/10828/43/6989. 
4. See various Foreign Office minutes in FO 371/10828/43/6762, 
6989, and 7000. 
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nevertheless the possibility could not be ignored in view of the 
delicate state of the Mosul question, still a waiting League 
decision, and in view of certain other items of information which 
came to hand, particularly those concerning the alleged machina-
tions of Lord Inverforth and others. 1 • In order, therefore, 
fully to understand the problem which the Gulbenkian controversy 
posed to the British Government, it will be necessary to look 
closely at the various negotiations and intrigues which were 
proceeding at this time, all of which were related to the Mosul 
question. 
II. Intrigues and Other Complications 
While the question of whether Mosul should go to Iraq 
or to Turkey r~mained undecided, various attempts to influence 
the decision were made by several parties. Some of these 
attempts were direct approaches by Turkish officials to the 
British Government, with mainly territorial and political 
considerations in mind, others were more subtle intrigues engaged 
in by persons whose main concern seemed to be to gain access to 
the supposed rich oilfields of the disputed area. 
1. See below, Section II. 
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In March 1925, for example, the Turks made an attempt to 
settle the Mosul question by putting various proposals for a 
settlement to the British Foreign Office. These proposals, which 
envisaged (inter alia) the cession to Turkey of two-thirds of 
the Mosul vilayet, in return for which the Mosul oil concession 
would be given to a group nominated by the British Government, 
were politely but firmly turned down by the British Government, 
h 1. owever. 
Italy seemed at this time to be a doubtful supporter of 
Britain over the Mosul question. Nothing had been heard from 
the Italians on the subject of Iraq oil since, at Lausanne, 
Curzon had promised the Marquis Garroni a share of oil once 
the Mosul question was settled. 2• When, on October 30th 1925, 
the Italian Volta Agency contradicted earlier Italian press 
statements that Britain had promised Italy.a share in Mosul oil, 
the Foreign Office saw in this evidence that the Italian Govern-
ment was uncertain about what the League's decision on Mosul 
would be and, in the Foreign Office view, the Italians were 
therefore "toadying to Turkey" in the hope of securing 
1. Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign. Affairs on 
Turkish Pro osals for a direct settlement of the Turco-Irak 
Frontier Question April 2nd· 1925. FO 371 108 2 175 1727. 
2. See Chapter 6 (above). 
benefits should Turkey regain Mosul. There was, however, a bright 
side to this - the Foreign Office now felt itself relieved from the 
burden of trying to fulfil Curzon's vague promise, although the matter 
1. 
had been, in any case, very much in abeyance. 
With regard to actual intrigues, secret M.I.5 reports in September 
1925 on the activities of a Mr. Bennet, acting for the former Sultan's 
heirs, suggested that Bennet was involved in intrigues with Turkish 
officials and had approached M. Briand, France's representative at 
the League of Nations, asking him to use his influence to prevent 
2. 
the Mosul dee~sion from going against Turkey. Bennet's efforts alone, 
however, can hardly have had much hope of success. 
Potentially more serious than either Bennet's attempts to seduce 
the ]'rench or Italy's doubtful wooing of Turkey were the activities 
3. 
of the Inverforth Group, which was reported to be endeavouring to 
intrigue not only with Turkey but with elements in the United States 
1. R. Graham Rome to Forei Office October and Forei 
Office Minutes FO 371 10828 43 6704. 
Uo doubt the Italians had long despaired of getting a share in 
Iraq oil, but it does not seem likely that their rapproachement 
with Turkey - if such it was - can have been very far reaching, 
in view of later Italo-Turkish tension (See below). 
2. M.I. Secret Re orts on Bennet Se tember th and September 10th 
12,g2. FO 371 10828 43 5489 and 5 52. 
3. Lord Inverforth (Andrew Weir): President of Andrew Weir Shipping and 
Trading Company Limited. He also had several other business interests. 
Surveyor General of Supply at the War Office, 1917-1919; Minister of 
Munitions January 1919 - :March 1921. 
Admiral Wester Wem.yss was also a prominent member of the group. He 
had been First Sea Lord 1917-1919. (Biography: The Life and Letters 
of Lord Wester Wemyss, by Lady Wester Wemyss (London, 1935)). 
Other (alleged) members of the group included Lord Beaverbrook (see 
below), Sir G. Armstrong (a naval officer), and a certain Mr. J.H. 
Thomas. (whether or not this was the J.H. Thomas who was Colonial 
Secretary in 1924 is not clear). 
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and in France, in addition to stirring up popular opinion in Britain. 
The aim of this group appeared to be to obtain the oil concession in 
Mosul and, as this was impossible if Mosul remained as part of Iraq, 
the group therefore sought to use its influence to secure the cession 
of :Mosul to Turkey. 
Firm evidence relating to any intrigue is, by the very nature of 
that intrigue, difficult to obtain. The evidence in the Foreign Office 
files, while not conclusive regarding the direct complicity of certain 
individuals alleged to have been involved, is nevertheless conclusive 
on the question of whether or not some group or syndicate was involved 
in approaches to the Turks and to the French on the subject of 
obtaining the oil concession should Mosul revert to Turkey. It is 
certain that such approaches were made. The evidence relating to 
alleged approaches to American interests, however, is not wholly 
conclusive. 
Possibly the least assailable item of evidence in this question 
is referred to in a letter from E. Phipps to L. Oliphant, dated 
November 6th 1925, in which Phipps mentions an occasion on which 
N. Berthelot had read to him a private letter which he had receivea 
from M. ~1leuriau, the French Ambassador in London. According to 
1. 
Fleuriau's letter, Lord Wester Wemyss had called on the French 
Ambassador to tell him of the formation of a Syndicate, headed by Lord 
1. See previous note. 
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Inverforth, for the working of an oil concession to be granted by 
Turkey in the event of Mosul reverting to that country. Wemyss 
informed :B1leuriau that 25~~~ of the shares would be allotted to France 
1. 
in accordance with the San Remo provisions. 
While this letter undoubtedly shows that a Syndicate, with which 
Lord Wester Wemyss and Lord Inverforth were associated, was formed 
to work Mosul oil should Mosul revert to Turkey, and that the 
Syndicate sought French support, it does not prove that the Syndicate 
either was negotiating with the Turks or was actively seeking to secure 
the cession of Mosul to Turkey by means of influence either in France 
or elsewhere. Nevertheless, one may wonder, is it possible to believe 
that such a Syndicate could be formed in order passively to await the 
League decision on Mosul, on which decision depended the very raison 
d'§tre of the Syndicate, without doing more than merely clearing the 
ground of obvious obstacles, such as by offering the French 25% to 
avoid their opposition? Could such a Syndicate refrain from making 
approaches to the Turks and, following those approaches, could such a 
Syndicate have totally ignored the inevitable Turkish rejoinder that 
even a tentative promise to consider the Syndicate's application after 
the League decision was contingent on the Syndicate's prior support 
1. Oli hant F.o. November 6th 1 2 • 
Phipps was British Minister Plenipotentiary 
and efforts to secure a decision favourable to Turkey? Although 
it certainly is true that Lord Inverforth, allegedly the head of 
the Syndicate, assured the British Foreign Secretary (in December 
19?;;) that 
neither directly nor indirectly, by himself or by 
others, had he entered into any negotiations or 
conversations in regard to a new concession for oil 
in Mosul with French, Americans or Turks, 1. 
nevertheless it seems difficult to believe that the answer to 
these questions can be other than in the negative. 2• 
Some of the more disturbing reports which came into the 
Foreign Office concerned the reported contacts between American 
interests and the Inverforth Group, viewed as being all the 
more dangerous by the Foreign Off ice in view of the current 
Gulbenkian controversy. Although evidence for these contacts 
is admittedly rather weak, in view of Wester Wemyss's approach 
to Fleu:tiau mentioned above it seems only reasonable to assume 
that the Syndicate Wemyss referred to would also "clear the 
ground" with the Americans, and perhaps would even try to 
inveigle the Americans into the plan to secure Mosul for Tur~ey. 
1. Record of Lord Inverforth's interview with Sir Austen 
Chamberlain, December 3rd 1925. FO 371/10829/43/7522. 
2. It must here be noted, however, that the present Lord 
Inverf orth states that his father did not have any interest 
in Mosul oil. (Private letter from Lor~nverforth to the 
writer, October 19th 1970). 
3. A letter from the Standard Oil Company (N.J.) to Mr. Dulles, 
of the State Department, seems to indicate that the Inverforth 
Group~ make approaches to Standard Oil Company (N.J.) 
representatives some time in 1925 (Standard Oil Compa.ny (N.J.) 
to Dulles State De t. December 8th 1 2 • U.S. National 
Archives, Microfilm }f722 25 No.0298, page 3.) 
Gulbenkian himself added to the Foreign Office's worries 
about the alleged intrigues of the Inverf orth group by reporting 
to them certain rumours about the Group's involvement with various 
persons in French political circles 1 • as well as with certain 
well known British personages. 2 • According to Gulbenkian, the 
group had plans for mounting a political campaign on both sides 
of the Channel, and had offered to the Turks the bargain: "We 
will give you Mosul and you give us the oilfields". 3. While 
it can be argued that Gulbenkian's motives in retailing such 
1. Including, it was alleged, M. Boncour, who was at that 
time France's representative at the League of Nations. 
2. Including, it was alleged, ·Lord Beaver brook - though 
3. 
it should be noted that Beaverbrook denied any connection 
with the Group. 
Mosul estion n.d.) 
rumours might have been suspect, 1 • Gulbenkian's statements do 
lend credence to the belief that ~ group was at work aiming 
to thwarx British policy and to secure the cession of Mosul to 
the Turks in return for benefits to themselves. Furthermore, 
later Turkish official sources confirm this belief, and seem to 
indicate that it was the private company which made the first 
approaches to the Turkish Government, not vice versa. 2 • 
The British Government's reaction to these various 
reports and rumours was, of course, highly unfavourable, 
and it is important to note that official opinion was by no means 
sceptical of the reports and the possible danger which their 
contents revealed. 3. 
1. (Since Gulbenkian no doubt wished to demonstrate to 
2. 
the British Government the urgency of the need to put 
pressure on the T.P.C. Groups to reach a settlement with 
him). 
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However,disturbing as the reports were in themselves, their importance 
in the context of Anglo-American oil relations was enhanced by their 
possible relevance to the American threat to withdraw from the Turkish 
Petroleum Company over the Gulbenkian controversy, notwithstanding 
British scepticism as to the reality of this American threat. "I 
understand that the real background to the American move is again 
Lord Inverforth, who wants to substitute himself for the Turkish 
Petroleum Company with the assistance of Angora", minuted Tyrrell on 
November 14th 1925, referring to reports of Inverforth's approaches to 
1. 
the Standard Oil Company. 
It has been necessary to go rather deeply into the alleged 
Inverforth intrigues to show their relationship not only to the Mosul 
question but also to the Gulbenkian controversy. As has been seen, 
these intrigues were liable to affect Anglo-American and Anglo-French 
(not to mention Anglo-Iraqi and Anglo-Turkish) relations to some degree. 
It must now further be shown that the Gulbenkian controversy itself, 
even irrespective of the Inverforth intxigues and irrespective of the 
threatened American withdrawal, cannot be viewed in isolation; it was 
interwoven (and as time went on tended to become more so) with the whole 
question of Anglo-French oil relations. 
Late in August 1925 the French Government began, simultaneously 
2. 
with a Belgian demarche, another attempt to enhance its claims to 
1. Minute by Tyrrell, November 14th 1925. FO 371/10828/43/7004. 
2. Rice F. -9.!_) · 
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Iraqi oil - an attempt which the Foreign Office regarded as a piece 
of attempted blackmail while the Mosul decision was still hanging 
f
. 1. ire. The French claimed the right, under the San Remo Agreement, 
to participate in any concession granted for the Basra vilayet (along 
with certain other claims) and supported this by various contentions. 
Even after the Foreign Office had refused to entertain these claims 
they continued to press the point, sending a further note in November. 2• 
In dealing with these French demands the Foreign Office at first 
viewed the matter as entirely isolated from the dispute between 
Gulbenkian and the Groups. It only became clea..r, six months after 
/ 
the first French demarche, that. there was possibly a link between the 
French demands for participation in Basra and the demands which 
Gulbenkian had earlier put forward for, inter alia, a share in the 
proceeds of the development of Basra should the Turkish Petroleum 
Company secure the concession for the vilayet. Foreign Office officials 
were aware of Gulbenkian's close relations with the French Government 
on Middle East questions,3'but, somewhat surprisingly in view of their 
1. Minute by Morga.n, September 25th 1925. FO 371/10828/43/5701. 
2. The }~ench claim was based on the fact that Article 7 of the San 
Remo Oil Agreement referred to "the Mesopotamian oilfields", 
which could be held to include Basra. 
Note left b M. Fleuriau at the Forei 
FO 371 10828 43 5224. 
French Ambassador to Forei Office November 21st 1 2 • 
FO 371 10829 43 7229. 
3. The French Government even suggested that Gulbenkian be appointed 
as Chairman of the Turkish Petroleum Company. 
(Minute by Tyrrell, June 29th 1925. FO 371/10828/43/3863.) 
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usually suspicious attitude towards all things French, they did 
not connect the two things (Gulbenkian's demands and the French 
diplomatic approach over Basra) until ¥iarch 1926. 1 • 
This close relationship between Gulbenkian and the .French 
Government was perhaps of some benefit to the British Government 
whilst the Mosul question remained undecided, as Gulbenkian used 
his influence to keep the French wedded to the Turkish 
Petroleum Company and away from any flirtations with the Inver-
forth Group. After the Mosul decision, however, when the 
Inverforth Group had lost its initial raison d'etre, the 
relationship ceased to be 0£ benefit to Britain, and it assumed 
a different aspect entirely, as will be seen later. 
During the period up to the League decision on Mosul, 
it has been seen that British oil policy had had to contend 
with various complicating factors. Apart from direct approaches 
by Turkish Government representatives, the possibility of 
Italian gains should Mosul revert to Turkey, and intrigues on 
behalf of the Sultan's heirs, there was evidence of a potentially 
dangerous attempt by the (so-called) Inverforth Group to oust 
the Turkish Petroleum Company from Mosul and its oil. Any one of 
these attempts might, had it succeeded, have shattered the 
Turkish Petroleum Company, the support of which was a cardinal 
1. See below. 
point in Britain's oil policy. 
The Turkish Petroleum Company itself was by no means in 
an unassailable position. True, it was granted a concession 
covering Mosul and Baghdad in Viarch 1925, but this would not have 
been of much use had the whole of Mosul been later awarded to 
Turkey. Moreover, the very existence of the Company as it had 
been painstakingly built up was threatened by the Gulbenkian 
controversy. The Americans, insisting on certain conditions 
being fulfilled before they formally became members of the 
Company, would at any time have broken away had they felt that 
their prospects of gaining a larger share of Mosul oil would be 
better served by doing so. 1 • The British government's oil 
policy would thus have suffered a major defeat, and it might 
well have then faced problems even more difficult than it had 
faced in the period 1919-21, when it had had to cast about for 
ways of placating both French and American interests at the same 
time that it secured its own. Physical possession of Mosul had 
1. A very interesting summary of the American Group's reasons 
for not breaking away from the T.P.C. at this juncture is 
given in a memorandum (drawn up a week before the League 
decision on Mosul was announced) by a Standard Oil Company 
official, C.P. Stuart Morgan. Morgan argued that if Mosul 
were awarded to Turkey, Britain would ensure that the T.P.C.'s 
concession rights were guaranteed first; and even if this 
were not the case, no company could rely on the Turks a:nyway, 
because of their untrustworthiness and the general chaotic 
conditions in the area. 
See: Enclosure in Swain Std. Oil Com 
De artment December 16th 1 2 im U.S. 
Microfilm M722 25. No.0312-0314. 
to Dulles State 
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then been of primary importance -- but it could not be guaranteed 
that even such a hold as Britain still retained in 1924-25 would 
be maintained after the League had made its decision on the future 
of the province. 
For these reasons, then, British oil policy went through 
a trying period of nervousness and anxiety during the period 
1924-25. It was not until December 1925 that many (but not all) 
of the doubts and uncertainties were removed, when the League 
finally announced its decision on Mosul. 
III. The Mosul Decision 
The League of Nations decision on the Mosul dispute, 
announced on December 16th 1925, awarded Mosul to Iraq, provided 
certain conditions were met by Iraq and Great Britain (as 
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Mandatory) • 1. In addition to fulfilling the League's conditions, 
however, it was necessary, in the interests of peace, and with 
a view to reducing some of Britain's expensive burden of defending 
Iraq, to conclude a treaty with disgTUiltled Turkey and thereby 
finally settle the question of Iraq's northern frontier. 2• 
Among the points considered in framing the instructions 
to be given to R.C. Lindsay, 3. who was to negotiate 
the treaty with the Turks, 
1. Great Britain was to conclude a new treaty with Iraq which 
was to last for twenty-five years unless Iraq was admitted 
to the League before the expiry of that period. This was 
meant to ensure the continuance of responsible government 
in Iraq. 
Parliamentary Papers (H of C) 1924-5 (Cmd 2562) xxxi, 549. 
"League of Nations: Decision Relating to the Turco-Irak 
frontier adopted by the Council of the League of Nations, 
Geneva, December 16th 1925". 
2. Iraq and Great Britain concluded a treaty to comply with 
the League decision on January 13th 1926. This was 
accepted by the League, and in March the decision on Mosul 
was declared to be definitive (Shwadran, op.cit., p.232). 
3. H.M. Ambassador to Turkey, resident at Constantinople. 
was the question of His Majesty's Government using its "good offices" 
to sec'\.U'e for Turkey some participation in the Turkish Petroleum 
Company's concession. Apart from the obvious difficulty of getting 
the jealous Groups to give up any of their shares to the Turks, any 
suggestion that the Tµrks should have a share in Iraq's oil royalties 
was likely to raise a storm of protest in Baghdad, particularly since 
Iraq had herself reluctantly agreed to waive her right to participate 
in the Company. When the Cabinet considered these alternatives on 
March 3rd 1926, therefore, the difficulties involved were seen to be 
very considerable. However, it was ruled that "if essential to a 
1. 
settlement", the British Government would consider either alternative. 
2. 
The negotiations in Angora began in earnest in April 1926, and 
soon, after being bogged down on the question of the territorial 
concessions demanded by '11.lrkey, they 11took a surprising turn" when the 
Turks ceased to insist on territorial concessions but instead asked 
3. 
for some share participation in the Turkish Petroleum Company. 
However, despite its earlier decision to consider the problem of 
Turkish participation, the British Government now felt that it was 
useless to approach the Turkish Petroleum Company on this point, but 
1. Cabinet Minutes, March 3rd 1926. CAB 23/52. 9(26)3. 
See also Minute by Spring Rice, April 23rd 1926. 
FO 371/11461/62/2574. 
2. See D.B.F.P., Series lA, Vol. I, pp. 828-831. 
3. Lindsay (Angora) to Chamberlain, April 21st 1926, in D.B.F.P. 
Series lA, Vol. I, pp. 832-834. 
Turkey's internal difficulties,.and fear of Italian menaces 
(see below), were believed to be factors behind this "surprising 
turn". 
instead gave consideration to a number of alternatives, including a 
sug·gestion to give a portion of Iraq's royalties to Turkey, which 
1. 
it was hoped might satisfy the Turks. 
While subsequent delays in obtaining Iraqi consent to these 
proposals ensued, causing the British Government some anxiety in case 
2. 
the opportunity of a settlement with the 1fu.rks was lost, the Angora 
negotiations then took "another surprising turn". Lindsay reported 
on May 7th that the Turks were only interested in securing participa-
tion in order immediately to turn it into cash, and he sug-gested that 
possibly £30(\000 to £500,000 would satisfy the Turks on this score. 
Thus, it seemed, a settlement on the basis of royalties, not participa-
tion, without reference to American or }'Tench interests (since only 
Iraq was the loser) later to be turned into a lump cash sum, would 
3. 
serve the purpose. 
1. Other alternatives included a proposal that the 'furkish Petroleum 
Company's concession might be extended into Turkey, with Turkey 
getting royalties in proportion to the area granted. Another 
proposal concerned assistance to Turkish railways. 
Colonial Office to Acti ~ Hi h Commissioner for Ira 
2. While King li'eisal was agreeable to the proposal to give Turkey a 
share in Iraq's royalties, the Ira~ Prime Minister anticipated 
difficulties in getting agreement in the Cabinet and Parliament, 
and preferred to consider the railway proposals. 
(Acti Hi h Commissioner for Ira to Colonial Office Oth 
1926 and Dobbs Hi h Commissioner for Ira to Colonial Office, 
~fay 1st 1926. FO 371 11461 62 2736 and 2763. 
3. Uedsay (Angora) to Chamberlain, May 7th 1926, filn 
D.B.F.P., Series lA, Vol. I, pp. 841-2. 
After some discussions on the question of how much of the cost 
of satisfying Turkey should be borne by the British Government and how 
1. 
much by Iraq, Lindsay was authorised to offer the Turks a sum up to 
£500,000, or, alternatively, a percentage of Iraq's royalties, on 
condition that immediate settlement would be reached without cession 
2. 
of territory. 
On May 21st Lindsay offered the Turkish Minister for Foreign 
Affairs the sum of £500,000 which, however, the latter regarded as 
3. 
"entirely inadequate". While the British Government was considering 
the question of increasing the offer to £775,000 (as Lindsay now 
suggested) the Turks asked Lindsay what the British Government and 
Iraq would offer by way of royalties. Lindsay's immediate offer of 
lo:}~ of Iraq's royalties, for a period of twenty five years, was 
accepted on May 30th by the 1l'urks, who later secured the option to 
capitalize for £500,000 within one year. On June 5th, therefore, a 
Treaty between Britain, Iraq, and Turkey was signed, and the Mosul 
4. 
dispute was finally resolved. 
1. See minutes etc. in FO 371/11462/62/2860, 2894 and 2957. 
2. Chamberlain to Lindsay (Angora), May 17th 1926, in D.B.F.P., 
Series lA, Vol. I, pp. 842-3. 
3. Lindsay (Angora) to Chamberlain, 1926 (Teleg. No. 25), in 
D.B.F.P., Series lA, Vol. I, pp. 
Lindsa ora to Chamberlain (Teleg. No. 31) 
FO 371 114 2 3140. 
4. Lindsa ora Chamberlain :Ma and F. 0. :Vdnutes) • 
FO 371 114 2 2 314 • 
Lindsay (A.ngora) to Chamberlain, May 30th 1926, and June 4th 1926, in 
D.B.F.P., Series lA, Vol. I, pp.844-845. 
The text of the Frontier Treaty of June 5th 1925, between the 
United KinoD'(l.om, Iraq, and Turkey, may be found in Hurewitz, op.cit., 
Vol. II, pp. 143-146. 
In the diplomatic "poker game" over Mosul the Turks had undoubtedly 
been worsted. 'I'he resurgence of nationalism after the war had 
prevented any partition of Turkey itself, and at Lausanne the Turks 
had bargained as equals, not as a defeated nation on whom terms could 
be imposed. On the Mosul issue, however, the Turks had commanded 
neither the diplomatic prestige nor the economic power to secure much 
international support for their by no means indisputable claims, and 
thus, inevitably as it now seems, Nosul had finally to be given up. 
It is here contended that oil was by no means a deciding factor 
1. 
for either side. If no oil had been suspected to be present in Mosul, 
the dispute between Britain·and Iraq on the one hand, and Turkey on 
the other, would still have occurred and, while no doubt in that 
case it would have been surrounded by much less intrigue and 
propaganda, the dispute would still in all probability have run the 
same course and have had the same result. It could possibly be 
argued that the League Commission of Enquiry might have been more 
1. This writer is inclined to agree with the views expressed in 
the Survey of International Affairs, 1925, Volume I at page 
529. Referring to contemporary charges that oil was the 
main British motive in the Nosul dispute, the Survey rightly 
points out that "little positive evidence ••• appears to have 
been brought forward in support of this view". As for the 
faat that Curzon and others "protested too much", the Survey 
states: "it is probable that such protestations were at any 
rate less remote from the truth than the accusations which 
evoked them". Moreover, continues the Survey, the British 
Government's reaction to Turkish approaches in March 1925 
(see this chapter) "substantially vindicates their diplomacy 
from the charge of being tainted with oil". 
(It has not been considered relevant in this thesis to 
examine in depth the relative merits of the whole Mosul issue, 
which would require close scrutiny of, for example, the ethnic, 
geographical and other arguments put forward by the disputants.) 
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inclined to favour a partition of the vilayet between Iraq and Turkey 
had the problem of the Turkish Petroleum Company's concession, with 
all its international complications, not been a stumbling block to 
1. 
such a suggestion - but, in this writer's opinion, this argument is 
a weak one. 
With Nosul safely secured for Iraq, Britain was prepared to offer 
Turkey some crumbs from her table to appease the disgruntled loser. 
It is not of great significance that these "crumbs" took the form 
of oil royalties. This was purely a device, because "for face-saving 
purposes an unknown quantity with an oily glamour to it was better 
2. 
than cash" - particularly when that "unkno"Ym quantity" could readily 
3. 
be turned into cash. 
The Russian press ref erred to the final Treaty of June 1926 as 
4. 
a British "highway robber's triumph". ·w11ile not exactly apposite, 
this description has some elements of truth, in that by the Treaty 
Turkey lost all hopes of territorial gains, and secured only a small 
cash sum in exchange. However, Turkey was induced to drop her demands 
for territorial concessions because of, as it appears, two things -
her own internal financial disorder, and Italian menaces (over issues 
1. See Chapter ·7 (above). 
2. ·.vords of Turkish :Minister for Foreign Affairs to Lindsay. 
Lindsay (Angora) to Chamberlain, June 6th 1926. FO 371/11463/62/3621. 
3. The Turks had secured an option to obtain £500,000 in cash instead 
of royalties. It is curious, however, that the Turks dia not 
immediately take up this option, in view of their current financial 
needs. As late as November 1938 the option had still not been 
exercised, although Turkey was then giving it some consideration 
in connection with urgent rearmament and industrial development 
plans. (see FO 371/21923/67/5176 and 7os3). 
4. See FO 371/11464/62/3939. 
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not connected with the Mosul question). 1 • Furthermore, Turkey 
failed to take advantage of current disorder in Britain during 
the coal crisis, 2 • and her Ministers were very much out-boxed 
by the British negotiator, Lindsay. Had the Turks but known it, 
they could have secured better financial terms for their final 
signature of the Treaty, 3.although even this would not have 
prevented the resurgence of internal opposition at Turkey's 
diplomatic "defeat" in losing the whole of Mosul. 4· 
The conclusion of the Mosul dispute marked the end of 
the post-war territorial complications in the Iraq oil question. 
Now that that question was out of the way, the development of 
Iraq's oil potential could proceed - but this was to be by no 
means straightforward. 
1. See Lindsa 
FO 371 11~ 1 
Lindsa ora to Chamberlain Via 
FO 371 114 2 62 3019. 
Chamberlain to Lindsay (Angora), April 24th 1926, in 
D.E.F.P., Series lA, Vol. I, p.837. 
R. Graham Rome to Chamberlain June and 
Foreign Office Minutes FO 371 114 3 
3. Lindsay was authorised to offer up to £775,000 on May 26th 
1926, but the Turks did not press him beyond £500,000 at this 
point (although they had originally asked for very much more 
than this). 
Forei Office to Lindsa 




THE RED LINE AGREEMENT 
I. Gulbenkian and .Anglo-French Differences 
At the beginning of 1926 the several groups concexned with 
the development of Iraq's as yet untapped oil resources were 
still wrestling with the problem of how to incorporate the 
American Group into the Turkish Petroleum Company. The points 
ostensibly at issue in the continuing Gulbenkian dispute were as 
follows: Firstly, Gulbenkian claimed royalties not only on 
the Turkish Petroleum Company's 24 plots, but also on the other 
areas in the Mosul and Baghdad vilayets, whether operated by 
the main Company or independently by one of the constituent 
Groups. This claim was disputed by the Company. 1 • Secondly, 
Gulbenkian claimed benefits in Basra if the Company obtained 
the concession. While Cadman had drawn up a draft on December 
23rd 1925 which conceded this point, the Americans 
had not yet accepted it, and, in the Foreign Office 
1. However, on December 23rd 1925 Cadman had offered Gulbenkian 
a 2% royalty on outside areas, providing that he contributed 
5% of the capital. (Memo by H.E. Nichols: §ynopsis of the 
Negotiations for American participations in the Turkish 
Petroleum Com an December 2 th 1 2 • 
FO 371 10829 43 8197. 
view, Gulbenkian had no right to such benefits. Thirdly, Gulbenkian 
claimed benefits from concessions in any other territory outside Iraq 
which the Company might acquire. All the groups rejected this claim, 
and the Foreign Office agreed that Gulbenkian had no valid claim on 
1. 
this point. 
However, in looking at the Gulbenkian controversy in this way, 
certain vital issues are ignored. Until the end of 1925 the issue as 
seen by the Foreign Office was one of reaching a financial settlement 
between Gulbenkian and the Groups, and the points in the dispute were 
regarded as being largely financial, with Gulbenkian seeking to 
maximise his claims and the Groups on the other hand trying to keep 
them within as tight limits as possible. This view of the dispute 
was possibly a valid one initially, but as the long drawn out 
controversy had progressed, and as it had become apparent just how 
much of a block Gulbenkian could be to the Groups' (especially the 
American Group's) plans, the purely financial issue had become of 
secondary importance, and the Groups then had begun to see as the 
major issue the question of how much control Gulbenkian would be 
allowed to retain over the Company's actions. No doubt the financial 
considerations involved were substantial but, as Osborne minuted on 
January 4th 1926, what the Groups, "and perhaps particularly the 
Americans, want to avoid is the retention by Nr. Gulbenkian of the 
legal right as a shareholder to restrain the Company's policy." While 
1. ~· (See Foreign Office comments at the side of this document). 
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Gulbenkian would want the Company to erect refineries and become 
a competitor in its own right in the oil market, the Groups 
did not, and, Osborne continued, "If this is so, it is by no 
means purely a question of satisfying Mr. Gulbenkian financially 
but of depriving him of control over the policy of the Company11 • 1 • 
Some attenpt to get the dispute resolved by arbitration 
was made towards the end of 1925, but in view of the American 
Group's unwillingness to take part in any such arbitration, 
this attempt held little prospect of success. The American 
Group made it clear that they stood by the terms of their 
memorandum of October 6th. 2• 
Gulbenkian had disputed the Groups' contention that 
they were "not obliged to respect the terms of the 1914 Foreign 
2. See previous Chapter for the memorandum of October 6th 1925. 
The American Group could not enter into arbitration with 
Gulbenkian, it was held, because the U.S. State Department 
did not recognize that Gulbenkian had any rights. 
(F.R.u.s., 1926, II, pp.363-364~ 
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Office Agreement which precluded them dealing in territories 
1. in Mesopotamia outside the Turkish Petroleum Company". 
In Gulbenkian's opinion, the Foreign Office Agreement was not 
only still valid and applicable, but, indeed, "constitute(d) 
the vital point of the Company's existence". 2• The 
French Government was soon also to invoke the pre-war Agreement 
as having some relevance still. On the other hand, the 
United States did not recognize as valid any Turkish 
Petroleum Company arrangements prior to the 1925 Concession. 
In between these two extremes were the Anglo-Persian and 
the Shell Groups, which.were both prepared to ignore the 
Agreement of necessary. The Foreign Office's attitude, 
although at this time they did not fully appreicate 
the point in the discussions, was that, whereas 
1. December 10th 1 2 • 
2. Ibid. 
the Grand Vizier's letter of June 28th 1914 had been valid, it wa~ by 
no means certain that the 1914 Foreign Office Agreement had not lapsed 
1. 
after the outbreak of hostilities. Each party, including Gulbenkian, 
the Groups, and the Governments concerned, took the view which was 
felt to be most to its advantage, which, in view of the difficult legal 
problem posed by the issue, was easily possible. Soon this question 
was to dominate the discussions. 
With the Americans unwilling to go to arbitration there was 
little point in the other Groups doing so, and they themselves were 
2. 
not particularly enamoured with the idea. The only way out was 
therefore to continue to search for an acceptable compromise, a 
procedure which was not helped by the growing animosity between 
3. 
Gulbenkian and Deterding over the unrelated matter in Venezuela. 
Meanwhile, the Foreign Office had still not answered the French 
note of November 21st 1925 which claimed a share in any oil development 
4. 
carried out by any company in Basra. On Narch :t4th 1926 an inter-
Departmental Conference met to discuss the matter, when it was decided 
to tell the French that their claim could not be entertained, unless 
the Turkish Petroleum Company itself obtained the concession for Basra. 
December 
2. See various letters, minutes etc. of around this time, under the 
following references:- FO 371/10829/43/8198. FO 371/11455/27/27, 
144, 278, 496. Also F.R.u.s., 1926, II, p.366. 
3. See above, p.254, footnote 2. 
4. See above, p.267. 
Thi·s· decision was implemented in an official note to the li'rench 
1. 
Ambassador, dated April 14th 1929. 
On l"ia.rch 26th, however, the French had already made another 
approach to the Forei&in Office, and as a result the extreme closeness 
of the relations between Gulbenkian and the Quai d'Orsay at last 
became apparent. 1l1he J!'rench note of Harch 26th began by stressing 
}
1rance 's continuing desire for American participation in the Turkish 
Petroleum Company, and then went on to suggest that the upholding 
2. 
of the pre-war agreements (1912 and 1914) by which participants in 
that Company undertook not to be interested in territories of the 
Turkish Empire except through the Turkish Petroleum Company itself, 
would be sufficient to give Gulbenkian all the guarantees he sought, 
without him demanding other rights. The note then urged the British 
Government to advise the groups accordingly, and, by implication, 
intimated that the French Government considered itself bound by the 
3. 4. 
pre-war agreements. :Morgan minuted in the 1'1oreign Office files: 
It is clear that the note is inspired by Nr. G'ulbenkian, for 
it embodies his ideas and supports his views ••• (it also) 
1. Nemo by Horgan, March 25th 1926. FO 371/11455/27/1040. 
Chamberlain to Fleuriau, April 14th 1926. FO 371/11455/27/2244. 
2. The 1912 Agreement referred to was that concluded on the original 
formation of the 11urkish Petroleum Company. The 1914 Agreement 
was of course that of March 19th 1914 (Foreign Office) • ~ Ip.t~~duct~pn. 
3. French .AmBassador to Foreign Office, March 26th 1926.FO 371/11455/27/2041. 
4. Norgan had occupied various minor posts in Turkey and the Middle 
East before being employed in the Foreign Office from April 1923. 
(capacity not stated in Foreign Office List). 
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throws some light on a recent French demand for 
participation in oil development in Basra vilayet. 1. 
As a few days after receivi!l[; the French note there seemed some 
prospect of definite agreement between the Groups and Gulbenkian, 
however, the Foreign Office made no reply to this latest French 
,,,- 2. 
demarche. Later, after further French approaches on the 
subject, 3. the Foreign Office carried out an exhaustive search 
into their files to examine the various points raised, and ended 
by categorically rejecting the French thesis that the pre-war 
agTeements were still valid and legally binding. All the 
survived the war, the British maintained, was the Grand Vizier's 
i 4. prom se. 
It should be noted that the influence which Gulbenkian 
had with the French Government was particularly potent by virtue 
of the fact that France's interests in Tuxkish Petroleum Company 
1. }linute by Morga,n, March 30th 1926. FO 371/11455/27/2041. 
2. The Groups and Gulbenkian concluded a tentative Agreement on 
March 31st 1926, but later attempts to frame the principles 
agreed into a definitive legal contract led to difficulties 
and the eventual abandonment of the tentative Agreement. 
(For the details of the Agreement see the signed copy at 
FO 371/11455/27/3027). 
3. Berthelot to Tyrrell, September 14th 1926. FO 371/11456/27/5404. 
Berthelot to Tyrrell, January 17th 1927. FO 371/12263/104/304. 
4. Tyrrell to Berthelot, January 20th 1927. FO 371/12263/104/342. 
See also Minute by Morga.n, October 2nd 1926. FO 371/11456/27/5404. 
and Minute by Malkin, January 29th 1927. FO 371/12263/104/342. 
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oil were in some respects similar to those of Gulbenkia.n. Both 
would benefit if the old Agreements, with their self-denying 
provisions, were resurrected and declared binding, since neither 
had facilities to operate areas independently. The larger the 
area the Turkish Petroleum Company itself controlled and 
operated (as opposed to independent component groups) the more 
could France and Gulbenkian take advantage of the drilling, 
operating and other facilities at the disposal of their partners. 
The question of self-denying provisions in the pre-war 
agreements came up at a Turkish Petroleum Company Board Meeting 
on February 16th 1927, when, following the Board's refusal to 
take action against the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company regarding 
activity in Farsan, 1 • the French Group (supported by Gulbenkian) 
obtained a writ against the Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Persian 
Companies - although the atmosphere at the meeting was reported 
to have been friendly. 2• 
At this stage, then, the whole matter of the Turkish 
Petroleum Company had five major aspects. Firstly, the Company 
1. A subsidiary of the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company was 
prospecting for oil in Farsan. However, Farsan was considered 
to be within the area covered by the self-denying provision 
in the pre-war agreements. (The matter was eventually 
resolved by excluding Farsan from the area). 
Feb 
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was proceeding with prospecting operations. 1 • Secondly, th~re 
was still the question of the Americans taking up their shares. 
Thirdly, there was the Gulbenkian controversy, still unresolved, 
tied in with personal animosities, and blocking the way to 
American participation. Fourthly, there was the Anglo-French 
correspondence on French rights under the San Remo Oil Agreement, 
in particular regarding Basra. Fifthly, there was the question 
of the self-denying ordinance, and the now pending legal 
proceedings in relation to it. All these aspects were to some 
extent inter-dependent, even the first point having, indirectly, 
an effect on all the others when the Company's operations 
eventually bore fruit. 
Not all of these aspects were matters over which the 
British Government had any control, however. All that that 
Government could hope to do with regard to most of them was to 
help to establish an atmosphere of friendly cooperation rather 
than one of strife. Once again Britain's oil policy had become 
largely one of "wait and see". 
1. The Foreign Office had earlier felt that to allow prospecting 
in Mosul before the League decision on Mosul had been made 
would be regarded as "an anticipation of that decision and 
might have an unfortunate effect both on Turkey and on the 
League". American criticisms were also feared. In October 
1925, however, the Turkish Petroleum Company was allowed to 
begin work in the southern half of Mosul. The Company had 
to wait until the dispute was completely settled (by the 
Treaty of June 1926 between Britain, Iraq and Turkey) before 
all restrictions were removed. See FO 371/10828/43/4168 
and 5986. FO 371/11455/27/1821. 
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II. The Agreement of 1928 
Towards the end of February 1927 the Foreign Office, who 
were ever anxious about the Americans, received welcome news, 
for the American Group offered definitely to take up its shares 
in the Turkish Petroleum Company on the basis of 2}i% shares to 
each Group. Gulbenkian was to have 5%, but negotiations with 
him for the purchase of his shares would be undertaken, and, 
until these were completed, the Working Agreement would be 
inoperable. The French then informed the Americans that they 
and Gulbenkian would accept these terms on condi tion-·that the 
self-denial provisions of the pre-war agTeements were accepted 
by all Groups. Gulbenkian also was willing to sign the Working 
Agreement if an arrangement were made for the purchase of his 
share of crude oil under that Agreement, and provided that he 
was given a directorship in the Turkish Petroleum Company. As 
the State Department apparently had no objection to the American 
Group accepting the self-denial provision, 1·negotiqtions 
between the various groups could proceed further. 
The Foreign Office, however, was still not free from 
entanglement with the French on the subject of Iraqi oil, for 
on June 7th 1927 the French Ambassador returned to (inter alia) the 
1. F.R.u.s., 1927, II, pp.822-824. 
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matter of French claims to participation in a:ny oil exploitation 
. d t . B l. carrie ou in asra. The Foreign Office, weary of the matter, 
a:nd feeling that the French claims were in any case of little 
practical import, decided in the end that the Basra claim should 
be conceded, if Iraq did not raise objections. 2• There was, 
however, underlying these Anglo-French discussions, the issue 
of the self-denying clause enshrined in the 1912 and 1914 
agreements. While the French endeavoured to prove the agreements 
still valid, the British remained unconvinced. Legal advice 
obtained by the Turkish Petroleum Company at that time tended to 
support the British view, although there were legal opinions given 
which supported the French (and Gulbenkian) thesis. 3. 
Meanwhile, however, discussions among the Groups on this 
point had developed to the stage where the idea of getting all 
the Groups to accept a ~ self-denial clause was being mooted, 
and there seemed some prospect that agreement on this point might 
be reached. 4. 
1. 
2. See various letters, minutes etc. in FO 371/12263/104/2539. 
and FO 371/1226~/104/2819, 3205, 3665, 3763. 
The British were rather puzzled at this time as to what the practical 
aims of the French were in putting forward the various assertions. 
3. See Cadman to Oli hant 
G e "Morni Post" to T 
by Malkin, February 12th 1927. 
4. All the Groups but the Americans seemed disposed to accept a new 
self-denial clause, and Cadman expected that even they would 
accept it as regards production (though not refining). 
(Cadman to Oliphant, June 24th 1927. FO 371/12264/104/2819.) 
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On August 26th 1927 a Draft Agreement was concurred in by 
all the Groups, including the Americans and Gulbenkian. It was, 
however, only a draft, and had still to be drawn up into a legal 
contract -- a procedure which was no mere formality nor a 
foregone conclusion, as earlier events had so often proved. 
Then oil was struck at Baba Gurgur in prodigious quantities a 
few weeks later, which "shifted the problems from the realm of 
theory to that of fact" 1 • and made the participants rather less 
willing to indulge in disputes and procrastination than they had 
hitherto been. The Draft Agreement of AUoO"USt 26th 1927 became, 
therefore, the basis upon which the later definitive contract 
of July 1928 was drawn up. 
2
• 
The final Agreement, known as the "Red Line Agreement" 3·, 
was signed on July 31st 1928, after delays occasioned by a tedious 
dispute over the definition of the area to be included - ; 
in the scope of the self-denying clause. 4. It provided 
for a fusion of interests on the basis of 23.75% 
participation each for the four Major Groups, with 
1. Hurewitz, op.cit., Vol. II, p.162. 
(Oil was struck in October 1927. For its effects on T.P.C. 
policy see next Chapter, below). 
2. A copy of the Draft Agreement of August 26th 1927 may be 
found at FO 371/12264/104/4242. (Its provisions were very 
similar to those finally agreed in July 1928). 
3. So called because a red line marked the area where the "self-
denial" provision applied. Text of the Agreement in Hurewitz, 
op. cit., Vol. II, pp.162-176. 
4. See correspondence and minutes at FO 371/13028/94/330 and 903. 
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5% for Gulbenkian. 1 • The Anglo-Persian Oil Company was to have, in 
addition, a royalty of 10-f of the crude oil derived from the 24 plots 
to be worked under the 1925 Concession terms. 2• Each Major Group was 
to have two directors on the Board; Gulbenkian and the Iraq Government 
were each to have one. 3• The Turkish Petroleum Company was to confine 
its operations to exploration and production, the oil being offered 
to the Groups at cost price (the "Working Agreement"). 4·under Article 10 · 
of the Agreement the Groups undertook not to be interested in any 
concessions or production within an area defined on a map attached to 
the Agreement - this was the "Red Line" self-denying clause.5·There 
was, however, one notable exception to this general regulation, in 
that, under Article 11, the American Group would be allowed to 
operate, independent of the Turkish Petroleum Company, any plots it 
1. The precise names of the companies involved were:- D'Arcy · 
Exploration Company Limited; Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company; 
Compagnie Francaise des Petroles; Participation and Investments 
Limited (this was the Gulbenkian interest); Near East Development 
Corporation (the American Group, consisting of Standard Oil (New 
Jersey), Standard Oil (New York), Atlantic Refining Company, Gulf 
Refining Company, and Pan American Petroleum and '!Tansport Company). 
2. This was to be free of cost. (Article 12.) 
3. In addition, bringing the number of directors up to twelve, the 
Chairman and Managing Director were of course on the Board. 
(Article 4.) 
4. Article 13 (there was provision for a small addition to be added 
to the cost). 
5. See map on page 290. 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































obtained by bidding under Article 6 of the 1925 Concession. 
Article 14 of the Red Line Agreement provided for the construction 
of a pipeline to the Mediterranean when the concession area had been 
2. 
adequately proved. The Groups would be allowed to erect their O\om 
refineries at the terminus of this pipeline, but were not allowed, 
however, to market oil in Iraq. The Turkish Petroleum Company it&elf 
would supply this market, but refineries erected for this purpose would 
3. 
not refine more oil than was needed to meet Iraq's requirements. 
Under a separate "Sale of Oil Agreement" negotiated between 
Gulbenkian and the French, the French Group was to purchase Gulbenkian's 
4. 
crude oil share, although, .. unkno1im to Gulbenkian, the French agreed 
5. 
also to share such purchases with the other Groups in the Company. 
1. Other Groups were also allowed to bid, under certain 
condlitions, independently of the T.P.C. However, these Groups 
were bound to offer participation to the other Groups in 
the T.P.C. in any plots so obtained. (The· American Group 
were not so bound). See Articles 10 and 11. 
2. This article set out the conditions governing the construction 
of pipeline facilities to meet the requirements of lessees 
under Article 6 of the 1925 Concession. 
3. Articles 16 and 17. The terms of the 1925 Concession obliged the 
Turkish Petroleum Company to construct a refinery for oil 
required for local consumption. 
4. On this see H.S. Gulbenkian, op. cit., pp. 95-97. 
5. JJ:. S. Sen~te_, Select Committee on the International Petroleum 
Cartel, p. b2, note 71. 
The Red Line Agreement was a defeat for the British, Anglo-Dutch, 
and American Groups' plans to divest Gulbenkian of all ability to 
interfere in their schemes. By the Agreement Gulbenkian now had 
more authority than he had had under the 1914 Foreign Office Agreement, 
when his 5~:s shares had been without voting rights. In addition, 
thanks to French support, he also had the self-denial clause. 
'11he French, who had worked closely with Gulbenkian, shared to 
some extent in his triumph. They had not supported Gulbenkian out 
of sentiment, of course, but because in doing so they forwarded their 
own interests, 2..nd, protected by the self-denial provisions, they 
could now benefit from the utilization of the fc.cili ties for oil 
development which the other Groups possessed. Against this, the 
li'rench had lost a mere 1.25~; of the share they had been allotted at 
San Remo (although this loss was more than offset by the denial of 
Iraqi participation in 1925) and also, of course, their share value 
was diminished by the provision regarding the Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company's royalty. 
The Americans had their 1.Iorking Aoo-reement and thus could avoid 
double taxation. They had had to accept the "self-denial" provision, 
but even this was tempered somewhat in Article 11 of the Agreement. 
To some extent the self-denial provision can be said to have closed 
the "Open Door" for which the American Government had clamoured, but 
its closure was only partial, and in any case applied only to production, 
1. 
and not to marketing of products. 
1. See on this ~· pp. 56-61. 
29la. 
The Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company had gained a very slight 
increase ih percentaee over its 1914 share, but as with the American 
and French Groups, the value of its shares was reduced somewhat by 
the Anglo-Persian's royalty provision. Also, for what it was worth, 
1. 
the Anglo-Saxon now no longer had the support of Gulbenkian. 
By the Red Line Agreement the Anglo-liersian Oil Company formally 
accepted what it had previously agreed to - the reduction of its 
share from 47-5~ (1914 Agreement) to 2}41~ in return for a royalty of 
lOi, of crude oil from the Iraq concession plots. vfnile it had lost 
all hopes of overall control, nevertheless it could still congratulate 
itself on having retained the largest slice of the benefits to be 
obtained from a Company with which, at its foundation, it had not 
even been associated. 
How successful had the British Government's policy been up to 
this point, and how far had it achieved its objectives? 
To the extent that the Turkish Petroleum Company had at last 
become a viable unit, incorporating all the elements liable, had they 
been excluded, to make a great deal of trouble for Britain in her 
international relations, the British Government's policy had succeeded 
fairly well. Horeover, the Company had already not only secured the 
concession which the British Government had striven to gain for it, 
but it had also, at Baba GurBUr, shown that the British Government's 
efforts had not been in vain. There was now, it seemed, some prospect 
I.The quarrel between Gulbenkian and Deterding over the Venezuelan oil 
concession had resulted in a permanent rift. 
of Britain havine a useful source of oil in an area where she still 
had some measure of control and which, also, once the pipeline was 
constructed, would be within rel2.tively easy reach of Britain (in 
peace time at least) in addition to being a useful supply source 
for the British :Mediterranean Pleet. 
On the other hand, it should be noted that the British Government 
had not, in the event, secured what originally had been one of its 
prime objectives - British control of the 11lrkish Petroleum Company. 
'11his objective had been secured in l:·larch 1914 and, assuming that the 
Turks could have been induced eventually to grant a definitive 
concession, it would presumably have been retained had not the war 
intervened. Even when the French had been reluctantly admitted, this 
objective was still not irmnediately abandoned - until the American 
onslaught rendered its retention impossible. 
On balance it is true to say that the British Government's shifting, 
and at times confused, policy regarding the Turkish Petroleum Company 
had succeeded reasonably well by the time t.he Red JLine Ag;reement was 
1. 
sic,ned. As things turned out, however, this was by no means the end 
of the British Government's problems with regard to Iraq oil, as will be 
seen presently. 
1. To some extent, however, the British Government's interests 
suffered later through the.applicatioh of the self-denial provisions 
when the A.P.o.c., having secured a concession in Qatar, had perforce 




THE PIPELINE CONTROVERSY: THE FIRST PHASE (1928-29) 
I. The political background 
During the period 1922 to 1927 British and Iraqi officials had 
worked fairly harmoniously together. Increasingly, however, Iraqi 
desire for complete freedom from British tutelage became manifest. 
The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1922 had envisaged a twenty-year 
mandatory period, which period had been reduced to four years by 
a protocol of 1923. Iraqi insistence on independence became very 
strong as the stipulated period drew to a close but, despite Iraqi 
clamour, the British refused to sponsor Iraq's entry into the League 
of Nations in 1928. In 1930~ however, following a period of growing 
mutual mistrust and impatience, a new treaty was concluded between 
Britain and Iraq providing for, inter alia, Iraq's entry into the 
League in 1932. After the conclusion of this treaty, both Britain 
and Iraq became anxious not to do anything which might worsen the 
chances of Iraq gaining League approval for her application, and thus 
placed great stress on the maintenance of cordial relations with 
League Members. 1 • 
Among League Members, France was particularly important in 
this context, because of her direct interest in the area. During 
the period 1922-32 Anglo-French rivalry in the Middle East was fairly 
strong, and, amongst other things, Britain suspected French motives 
in trying to foster economic enterprises in Persia (though these 
were not on a:ny great scale), and resented reported French moves to 
1. The best general studies of Iraq are, as indicated earlier, 
Longrigg, !rag 1900 to 1950, Ireland, op.cit., and Foster, op.cit. 
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make political contacts with members of the Iraqi royal family. 1 •The 
French for their part still held some lingering resentment over 
what they considered to have been British injustices at the Peace 
Settlement, 2 •and were to some extent jealous of Britain's position in Iraq. 
The borders of the French mandated territory of Syria with 
the British mandates of Transjordan and Iraq were still not finally 
delimited during this period, though a series of Anglo-French 
discussions on delimitation ·was-· held, attended often by bickering 
and disagreement. In Syria itself, the French encountered difficulties 
in that nationalist fervour was strong, and definitely anti-French. 
Although the French managed to crush a revolt which broke out in 
1925, and kept other incipient risings at bay, they had great 
difficulty in establishing a working constitution for Syria. 3. 
Some of the difficulties in Syria, the French felt, were 
at least partly attributable to British machinations. Whereas 
French policy was one of decentralization, the Syrians' policy tended 
in the opposite direction. Moreover, there was a definite movement 
in the area aiming for a degree of Arab unity, envisaging ultimate 
union of all the lands of the "},ertile Crescent". This movement was 
sponsored and encouraged by King Feisal of Iraq, and, in the French 
1. One particular e~ample of this occurred in 1931, when the French 
made approaches to King Feisal's brother Ali (at one time King 
of the Hedjaz) suggesting he should become a candidate for the 
throne of Syria. What the British resented about this approach 
was that it seemed to be aimed at swaying Iraqi policy with 
regard to the T.P.C.pipeline alignment (on which see below) 
against British wishes. 
Hi h Commissioner B hdad to Colonial Office Jan 1 
CAB 27 436. IOC 30 28 • 
2. The French still felt that they had been "swindled" somehow in the 
abandonment of the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement (see Chapter 3 
above, Section I). 
3. For accounts of French policy in Syria see S.H. Longrigg, Syria 
and Lebanon uhder French Mandate (London, 1958) and A.H. Hourani, 
Syria and Lebanon (London, 1946). 
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view, the British were deliberately encouraging these ideas, for 
1. their own purposes. 
In fact the British Government did not encourage such ideas in 
this period. 2 • They were all too well aware that such a deliberate 
policy would greatly increase friction with the French. It would also, 
it was feared, be bitterly resented by the Jews in Palestine, and, 
because of his hostility to the Hashemites, would incur the enmity of 
the ruler of Arabia, Ibn Saud.3. True, now that Britain's traditional 
Nineteenth Century strategy of supporting Turkey in order to 
safeguard her interests in the Middle East as a whole (and beyond) 
had had to be abandoned, Britain did endeavour to extend her influence 
over the Arabs in the lands of the former Ottoman Empire - but Britain was 
not prepared to do this to the exclusion of every other consideration~· 
Such reasoning did not greatly appeal to the French, however, 
who continued to view everything which the British did with suspicion -
an attitude fully reciprocated by the British. Partly through ill-
conceived notions of the other's true motives, partly through 
traditional mistrust of each other, therefore, Anglo-French jealousy 
and rivalry in the Middle East persisted. Any development likely to 
enhance the position of one rival in the area automatically produced 
1. E. Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle Ea.st 1914-56. (London, 
1963) p.83. -
2. (Despite the promises implicit in the famous wartime Hussein-
McMahon correspondence (Parliamentary Papers 1939 (Cmd 5957) 
xxvii, 573.)) 
3. Monroe, op.cit., lee.cit. 
Relations between Iraq and Ibn Saud were never good during this 
period. Apart from border and other disputes there was also a 
certain rivalry for leadership of the Arab world (See J.Morris, 
The Hashemite Kings (London 1961)). 
On Palestine see R.I.I.A., Great Britain and Palestine (London 1939). 
4. P.A. Reynolds, British Foreign Policy in the Inter-War Years 
(London, 1954) p.53. 
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an attitude of opposition in the other. It was in this situation, 
after the striking of oil by the Turkish Petroleum Company in 1927, 
that discussions on, inter alia, a project for the construction of a 
pipeline to carry oil from Iraq to the Mediterranean seaboard became 
important and, at the same time, difficult. 
II. British interest in the pipeline project 1919-1928 
The Turkish Petroleum Company began drilling for oil in Iraq 
in April 1927. In June of that year a well was "spudded in" at Baba 
Gurgur (north of Kirkuk) which in October yielded oil in prolific 
quantities, and thereby brought to the fore the question of the 
construction of a-· pipeline to the Mediterranean. 1 • 
The question of the alignment of the pipeline, and the choice 
of its port of debouchment, had been a subject of interest to the 
British Government at least since the time when the breakup of the 
Ottoman Empire had been envisaged during the First World War. 2•The 
Petroleum Imperial Policy Committee had concerned itself with the 
matter in 1918, and early in 1919 its Chairman, Lord Harcourt, had 
been anxious that the French should agr~e to the pipeline passing 
through French territory.3• The Admiralty, however, who were greatly 
concerned with the strategic side of the question, stressed that any 
pipeline constructed should run "to a port on the Syrian littoral 
1. Longrigg, Oil in the ¥.Liddle East, pp. 70-71. 
There had already been questions on the subject asked in Parliament 
(in ¥.tarch and May, 1927). Parliament Debates (Hof C) 5th ser., 
Vol. 204 (1927) cols.15-16, and Vol.206 1927 cols.198-199.) 
2. The Admiralty wrote to the Foreign Office on the subject in 
December 1916. Admiralt Polio in relation to the Peace 
Settlement, January 1919. ADM 116 1861, page 44. 
3. Curzon to Balfour Paris Feb,...,,~~~r 
FO 608 231 file 1371 1 2 1349· 
See also Report and Proceedings of the Petroleum Imperial Policy 
Committee, pp.9, 32-33, 83-84. FO 368/2255/87990/141764. 
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(Haifa was suggested) which would give access to Mesopotamia through 
1. 
territory entirely under British influence", and this tied in with 
current plans for a military route from Baghdad to the Mediterranean. 
At this time, too, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was considering the 
question of surveying the area with a view to constructing a pipeline 
from Persia, and approached the War Office on the subject; the 
Company was not at this time in favour of a southern alignment, which 
the War Office wanted, but it nevertheless indicated its willingness 
to consider such an alignment if there was some prospect of there being 
a railway constructed on this route. Various delays and difficulties, 
however, prevented much progress being made, and a survey party sent 
out early in 1920 was forced to abandon the project in June of that 
2. 
year. 
Meanwhile, as has been seen earlier, the various Anglo-French 
Oil Agreements of 1919 and 1920 provided for passage of a pipeline 
from Iraq across French territory should such passage be required. 
Also, on December 23rd 1920, a Franco-British Convention was signed 
which gave the British Government the right to ask for a concession 
to readjust the frontier line in the Yarmuk valley should such 
readjustment be necessary to enable a British railway and pipeline 
to run through all British territory. The option on this was to 
1. Admiralt 
page 30. 
the Peace Settlement Jan 
2. See various notes, minutes etc. under the following references:-
FO 371/3880/4303/120358. FO 371/4231/102161/102161, 148291, 163513. 
FO 371/5059/4/3041. FO 608/231/1371/1/4/2633. 
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1. 
expire ten years from the signature of the Convention. 
In 1921 some discussion relating to the pipeline project (together 
with discussions on road, rail, and air routes) took place at the 
2. 
Cairo Conference, but nothing came of the various projects either 
for a pipeline or a railway, and there the matter stood when the 
Turkish Petroleum Company struck its gusher late in 1927. 
As can be seen from the above, the question of the pipeline and 
the question of a railway from Iraq to the Mediterranean were closely 
linked, since the construction of a railway would greatly facilitate 
3. 
the construction and maintenance of a pipeline. 
On November 1st 1927 the Committee of Imperial Defence gave some 
consideration to a project for constructing a railway from Baghdad 
to Haifa, for which at this time Sir Albert Stern was putting forward 
4. 
tentative proposals, and it was then formally concluded by the 
Committee that the construction of such a railway was desirable, on 
strategic grounds, if it ran through all British territory. Sir Charles 
Madden (First Sea Lord) stressed in these discussions the now familiar 
1. Parliamentary Papers (H of C) 1921 (Cmd 1195) xlii, 669. "Franco-
Bri tish Convention on certain points connected with the Mandates 
for Syria and the Lebanon, Palestine and Mesopotamia," Article 5 (3). 
2. Re ort on the Middle East Conference held in Cairo and Jerusalem, 
March 12th-30th 1921. CAB 24 126. CP. 3123, pages 11, 193. 
3. There was also the added consideration that the close proximity 
of the rail and pipeline would be an advantage from the point of 
view of defence. 
4. Sir Albert Stern, of Stern Brothers Ltd., was associated with 
the firm of Schroders (the banking firm) in the project. 
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Admiralty point of view in favour of a pipeline to the Mediterra-
nean preferably debouching at Haifa. To this, however, Sir 
Samuel Wilson (Under-Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs) 
pointed out that as the French had a substantial interest in the 
Turkish Petroleum Company there might be difficulty in ensuring 
that the pipeline ran through British territory entirely. l. 
The problem which the British Government faced in trying 
to ensure, as it now sought to do, that the pipeline went to 
Haifa, was fundamentally one of geography and economics, with 
strategic and political factors complicating the issue. The 
Haifa route was approximately one hundred miles longer than the 
other possible routes, which of course meant that an extra hundred 
miles or so of pipeline would have to be laid if this route were 
chosen. Notwithstanding the fact that the Haifa route was 
considered (in British official circles at least) to be more 
secure than the others, due weight would have to be given by the . 
Turkish Petroleum Company to that route's greater length and the 
2. 
consequent greater expense entailed in construction and maintenance. 
1. Minutes of the Committee of Im erial Defence November 1st 1 2 • 
CAB 2 5. 230th Meeting 1 • 
2. For a comprehensive review of the advantages and disadvantages 
of the several routes, see the Report referred to in the next 
footnote, below. (See also Map at p. 362 below). 
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The British Government's interests in the pipeline and 
railway project were well set out in a report, dated June 13th 
1928, of a Committee of Imperial Defence Sub-Committee on the 
Construction of the Proposed Haifa-Baghdad Railway and/or 
P . i· 1. ipe ine. The Report pointed out that the Fleet would gain 
a reliable source of oil which could be very important if 
political developments rendered the Persian supply uncertain. 
This source would be a thousand miles nearer to the Home theatre 
of operations, would be immediately available for Mediterranean 
operations, and, furthermore, would be on the direct line of 
the navy's passage to the Far East. If a pipeline link to the 
Mediterranean from South Persia were made (as was then planned), 
oil could be switched either to Haifa or to Abadan as naval 
circumstances required. The railway would be a line of 
communication from Cairo to Basra, alternative or additional 
to the Suez Canal, which, the Committee Report stressed, would 
be important in a Middle East War, "or, in particular, (in a 
war) with Russia". There was, however, the fact that the 
2. 
railway increased Britain's defence commitments to be considered. 
1. the Construction 
eline. 
2. Ibid., pp.13, 17. 
~Report also noted the desirability of the overland and 
air routes following the same routes, to facilitate the 
defence of each. 
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In the economic sphere the Committee considered that the 
Baghdad-Haifa Railway and Pipeline project would benefit Great 
Britain "by the general expansion of Middle Eastern trade, and 
by the existence of the terminal of a big oil supply at a port 
under British control in the Mediterranean". The development 
of Middle East oilfields would strengthen British oil interests 
and reduce Britain's dependence on America. Iraq also would 
benefit by obtaining royalties on oil exports, and would benefit 
from the existence of a railway "in particular as a cotton- and 
grcin-producing area", while Palestine would benefit in the 
development of Haifa, and in the employment provided by the 
construction and maintenance work involved in the project. 
f t t 
1. The railway would also acili ate developmen in Transjordan. 
The Committee concluded its Report by stressing that, as the 
Baghdad-Haifa Railway was not in itself a coDDDercial proposition, 
it would not be constructed without assistance from either the 
interested governments or the oil companies, or from both. The 
Turkish Petroleum Company, it was felt, might possibly approach 
the French Government for assistance with a Syrian railway 
project. There was thus, it appeared, only one way of 
ensuring that the pipeline would be laid in British-controlled 
territory, and that was for the British Government to arrange 
for the construction of the Haifa - Baghdad Railway, in 
1. Ibid., p.14. 
~Report also stated that Persian trade might find an 
advantageous route via Baghdad and Haifa, although Persia 
might not desire this if it interfered with Persian railway 
plans. 
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collaboration with the oil companies. :Joweve:r, the Report ended, 
11 in view of the uncertainty which at present surrounds the whole 
matter, no action is necessary or desirable at the moment". If the 
oil companies came forward with proposals, these should be accepted 
only if they did not commit the British Government, Iraq, and 
Palestine to a liability of over £),000,000, and only if the oil 
companies guaranteed in advance to construct the pipeline alongside 
1. 
the railway. 
The conclusions of the Report of June 13th 1928 indicate the 
attitude which was to prevail and to cause so much trouble subsequently. 
The British Government wanted the pipeline to go to Haifa for strategic 
(and political) reasons but, appreciating the disadvantages of this 
route from the point of view of construction and maintenance expenses, 
and seeing the only means of outweighing these disadvantages to be 
by the construction of a railway, it had therefore become more than 
ever interested in the railway scheme. However, although wishing to 
facilitate the railway's construction, the British Government 
nevertheless was not prepared to lay out a:ny really substantial sums 
of money for it. Eventually, therefore, the British Government was to 
resort to other methods of securing a Haifa alignment, which methods 
then involved that Government in a tangled mass of troubles with both 
the oil companies and the J'rench Government, from which it was to 
1. ~., pp. 18, 19. 
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find great difficulty in extricating itself. 
III. The Turkish Petroleum Company's Extension Proposal and the 
Entry of the B.O.D. Company. 
The oil strike at Baba Gurgur had aroused great interest 
in British official circles. Nevertheless, it had not been 
followed by any immediate drawing up of plans by the members of 
the Turkish Petroleum Company in order to get the pipeline 
project under way, because their thoughts were already turned in 
another direction. The Turkish Petroleum Company could not, 
they held, employ its resources immediately on the pipeline 
project because, by the terms of the 1925 Concession, it had to 
choose its 24 plots by November 28th 1928. 1• However, they 
stated, if an extension of this limit were granted, then progress 
with the pipeline could be made. 2 • 
1. Article 5 of the Concession read: "Within 32 months after the 
date of this Convention the Company shall select 24 rectangular 
plots, each of an area of eight square miles ••• " 
The Company thus originally had to select plots by November 
1927. However, it was granted an extension of one year in 
August 1927. (United States, Senate, Small Business, Select 
Committee on International Petroleum Cartel Staff Re ort to 
Federal Trade Commission. Committee Report, 82nd Congress, 
2nd Session) (1952) page 68). 
2. Note of a conversation with Sir Adam Ritchie Turkish 
Petroleum Com on November 11th 1 2 b Sir H. Dobbs, 
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Whether or not this was the real, and the only, motive 
1. 
of the Turkish Petroleum Company at this juncture is not known, 
but some suspicion was entertained in British Government circles 
that the Company was deliberately trying to secure an eventual 
abandonment of the plot system altogether. Also, the then 
current world over-supply of oil 2• was possibly a factor 
discouraging early development of Iraqi oil, although the Company 
denied that this factor had any influence on its policies. 
On January 19th 1928 the Turkish Petroleum Company applied 
to the Iraq Government for an extension to the time limit in 
which it had to choose .its 24 plots. 3. After some discussion, 
1. Cadman endeavoured to make a convincing case for the Company's 
request, arguing that the T.P.C. had so far not sufficient 
information "to justify the selection of even one single 
plot". Baba Gurgur, despite its great promise "could not by 
itself justify the laying of a pipeline, which (would) cost 
millions sterling". (Memo b Cadman: Summ of Reasons for 
askin for an Extension Januar 1 28 • FO 371 13028 94 919.) 
On the other hand Ritchie of the T.P.C.) told Dobbs that 
sufficient oil had been proved to justify pipeline construc-
tion Note of a"'Conversation with Sir Adam Ritchie b Sir 
H. Dobbs, November 12th 1927. FO 371 12277 1412 4886. 
2. See above, Chapter 1. 
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the Colonial Office instructed Dobbs to support the request 
provided that the extension requested did not exceed five years 
and provided also that the Company proceeded to order a pipeline 
as soon as tests were satisfactory, without waiting for full 
selection of plote. l. On April 2nd Dobbs reported that the 
Iraq Government had approved the five yea.rs' extension, subject 
to Parliamentary approval. 2• 
Thus, the Turkish Petroleum Company apparently was well 
on the way to achieving what it sought. It had gained acceptance 
for its extension proposals from the Iraq Government, and future 
acceptance by the Iraqi Parliament did not seem fraught with 
difficulties. Moreover, the Company was, as usual, able to rely 
on the British Government for support. 
Trouble began for the Turkish Petroleum Company (and 
therefore for the British Government), however, with the appearance 
of a rival in the field -- the B.O.D. Company ("British Oil 
Development Company", but its registered name was "B.O.D. 
3. 
Limited"), a company registered in London on March 1st 1928. 
Associated with it were prominent shipowners, coalowners, and 
1. Colonial Office to Dobbs, March 8th 1928. FO 371/13028/94/1263. 
2. Office A ril 2nd 1 28. 
3. Longrigg, Oil in the Middle FAst, page 74, note 1. 
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building contractors, including the ever-active Lord Inverforth, 
Admiral Wester Wemyss, and E.M. Iliffe, M.P. (Chairman of Allied 
Newspapers). Also associated with it was F.W. Rickets - "a 
pest and a most persistent and dangerous intriguer who is 
responsible for a good deal of misunderstanding and mutual 
suspicion both in Angora and in London." 1 • As has been seen 
in Chapter 8, several of the people involved in the B.O.D. 
Company had been (allegedly) associated with anti-Turkish 
Petroleum Company intrigues in the past. Their opposition was 
now to be more powerfully (and overtly) exercised against that 
Company, for on April ~8th 1928 Dobbs reported that the B.O.D. 
Company was about to make a formal application to prospect for 
oil in Iraq. 2• 
In Dobbs' opinion the chances of the Turkish Petroleum 
Company getting its extension proposals through the Iraq 
Parliament were now very slim, for the Iraqis would clearly 
want to benefit from throwing open the area outside the 24 plots 
now that there was a likely bidder in the field. Dobbs therefore 
1. Memo on B.O.D. Com 
enclosed in Sir E.T. Crowe to 
Shuckbur h Colonial Office 
FO 371 13029 94 4154. 
For reference to some of Rickets's earlier intrigues, see 
Chapter 8 (above). 
2. Office A ril 18th 1 28. 
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suggested that it would be best for the British Government to 
withdraw its support for the extension proposals, otherwise 
there might be "many complications and possible difficulties, 
both with Iraq and foreign powers." 1. Dobbs' fears were enhanced 
by the reported interest of the group in a Mediterranean pipeline 
and railway, and he feared that this might sway King Feisal to 
suspend his consent to the extension of the Turkish Petroleum 
Company's time limit. 2• The Colonial Office, however, refused 
to be panicked, and instead urged Dobbs to do what he could to 
get the extension proposals through Parliament. 3. 
Lord Wester Wemyss, of the B.O.D. Company, arrived in 
Baghdad on May 17th. Although at this stage the B.O.D. Company 
wanted a friendly arrangement with the Turkish Petroleum Company, 
it was obvious that, failing such arrangement, it was prepared 
to make the situation extremely difficult for its rival. One 
useful card in its hand was the geologist, De Loys, who, as a 
former employee of the Turkish Petroleum Company, was armed with 
information which could be utilised in an anti-Turkish Petroleum 
1. Foreign groups desirous of gaining entry under Article 6 would 
obviously press their governments to protest if the operation 
of this clause was postponed for several years. See also 
various other points in: Dobbs Ba hdad to Colonial Office, 
April 27th and April 28th 1928. FO 371 13028 94 2417. 
2. B hdad to Colonial Office Va th th 
FO 371 13028 94 2417, 2458 and 2559. 
King Feisal was known at this time to be keen on having a 
railway to the Mediterranean coast). 
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Company campaign. According to De Loys, the Turkish Petroleum 
Company was "not playing quite straight" with Iraq and the British 
Government, and, he stated, the Company's only difficulty was 
that it could not include all the rich areas in the concession 
in its 24 plots, but would need at least 42. The Company's 
policy was to get the five years' extension, and then another five, 
hoping that by the end of that time they (would) 
have gained such a grip on the country that they 
(would) be in cfposition to arrang~ in some way or other 
for other interests to be per:manently excluded. 
Pretence that they (were) unable to select the best 
areas immediately and construct pipeline without 
delay (was) without foundation. 
As Dobbs (to whom De Loys ~ade these allegations) pointed out, 
whether or not the allegations were true, it was easy for the 
B.O.D. Company to "queer the pitch ••• and prejudice (the) Iraq 
Parliament against the Turkish Petroleum Company". 1 • 
The Turkish Petroleum Company was not prepared to 
compromise with the B.O.D. Company, and clearly expected full 
British Government support in its stand. The British Government, 
however, was only prepared to go part of the way with its 
r / 
troublesome protege, -- such as by trying to persuade the Iraq 
Government to submit the Turkish Petroleum Company's proposals 




genuineness of the rival B.o.n. Company's tempting railway offer 
to Iraq, and hoped that the Turkish Petroleum Company itself would 
counter this offer with equally tempting railway proposals. 1 • 
Early in July 1928 Ritchie, General Manager of the Turkish 
Petroleum Company, arrived in Iraq, his purpose being to find out 
exactly what the situation was with regard to both his Company's 
proposed extension of the time limit and the B.O.D. Company 
opposition. Although he himself did not realize it, it was also 
intended that he should be instrumental in securing his Company's 
support for the Haifa railway project, which was one of the prime 
objectives for which Cadman had sent him. 2 • 
The importance of the part played by Sir John Cadman in the 
Pipeline Controversy (and,indeed, in the whole oil scene of the inter-
war yea.rs) was very great.3•As Chairman of both the Turkish Petroleum 
Company and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, and as a former 
1. ¥1inute b J.H. Hall Ma 
Colonial Office to Dobbs 
FO 371 13028 94 2734. 
2. "Ritchie as salaried official representing foreign as well as 
British interests in the Turkish Petroleum Company is placed 
differently from Cadman, is not fully in his confidence and is 
unaware of the objects which Cadman hopes to achieve from 
visit ••••" Colonial Office to Dobbs B dad June 1th 1 28 
("Important, Secret" FO 371 13029 94 3178. 
3. It is unfortunate that Cad.man's personal papers were destroyed 
some years ago, and that access to his papers in the British 
Petroleum Company (and Iraq Petroleum Company) archives is 
denied. His biography (J. Rowland and Lord Cadman, Ambassador 
for Oil (London 1960) is far too scanty of detail to be of 
much help in this study. 
British Government official still very much persona grata in 
Government circles, Cad.man's position was unique, and it gave him a 
great influence in the confusing multilateral tug-of-war which 
occurred over the alignment of the pipeline, and other issues, in 
the late 1920's and early 1930's. Cadman could, and did, sway the 
Turkish Petroleum Company's policy one way or another - and, in 
the nature of things, inevitably he tended to steer that Company 
in the direction in which its British element, the Anglo-Persian 
Oil Company, desired that it should go. This direction was, of course, 
very often (but not always) the same direction that the British 
Government wished it to go. In fairness to Cadman, however, it 
should be noted that he himself had been reluctant to take over the 
poeition of Chairman of the Turkish Petroleum Company. He had felt, 
rightly, that the chairman of such a composite international company 
1. 
ought to be independent of any of its component gToups. 
Ritchie, after seeing King Feisal and the Iraqi Prime Ninister, 
telegraphed to the 'rurkish Petroleum Company in London that, in view 
of · strone Iraqi feeling, the Company ought to give a definite 
assurance that if it constructed a pipeline to the Nediterranean 
it would also simultaneously arrange for the construction of a 
railway. In return, the Company would be gTanted the five years' 
2. 
extension, alone with the right to exchange plots as it wished. 
1. Cadman to Gulbenkian,September 12th 1927. FO 371/12264/104/3942. 
2. Dobbs (Baghdad) to Colonial Office, July 6th 1928. FO 371/13029/94/3411. 
The T1P.C. had earlier asked for the right, after its initial 
selection of plots, to exchange any selected plot which it no 
longer wished to develop for any plot which it bad previously 
released. 
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On July 12th the Turkish Petroleum Company Board approved this 
proposal, and telegraphed Hitchie accordingly. There was, however, 
no specific mention of either Baghdad or lfaifa in the Company's 
telegram, although at this time apparently the Colonial Office was 
under the impression that Haifa~ specified as the port of debouchment. 
In instructing Dobbs to support the Company's proposals, the Colonial 
Office urged him to ensure that the Iraq Government sufficiently 
clarified everything so as to leave no loophole for the Company to 
wriggle out of the railway commitment. The Colonial Office telegram 
also, significantly, impressed on Dobbs the need for discretion 
because, it stat~d, it was important that Ritchie and the foreign 
groups in the Turkish Petroleum Company "should not realise that Cadman 
(was) in close touch and cooperating with His Majesty's Government in 
1. 
this matter". 
On July 16th both the Turkish Petroleum Company and the B.O.D. 
Company presented formal proposals to the Iraq Government. The B.O.D. 
Company proposal was an offer to make an iIIUnediate survey for a railway, 
without cost to Iraq, in return for which the Company asked for 24 
plots in Mosul and Baghdad. If oil were proved, the Company would 
build its own pipeline. The B.O.D. Company also intended, apparently, 
to give a written undertaking to construct that section of a Baghdad-
Haifa railway which lay inside Iraq (about half the total lene,-th) in 
1. Colonial Office to Dobbs 
"Important, Secret" FO 
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return for being allowed to bid for its plote in November of that 
year. Furthermore, the Company offered to settle the Sultan's 
heirs' and other claims, which were still being pressed. l. 
The Turkish Petroleum Company's proposal of July 16th was 
an offer to assist wi~h others in furnishing a guarantee for the 
construction of a Haifa-Baghdad railway ("Haifa" was now specified 
be it noted) without cost to Iraq, railway construction to begin 
simultaneously with pipeline construction, "should construction 
of railway at that time prove (a) commercial possibility." In 
return the Company would obtain a five years' extension to the 
time limit for choosing its plots. 2 • 
The Iraqi Prime Minister immediately objected to the 
Turkish Petroleium Company's proviso that the railway must be 
adjudged a "commercial possibility" before construction could 
be undertaken, and he demanded a more binding undertaking from 
the Company. 3. Eventually, after considerable discussion 
by all the parties concerned, various modifications to the 
original proposals were carried out, resulting in, inter alia, 
1. Dobbs Jul 1 th and Jul 18th 
_, 
c ..... , ... I ;' e 
2. Off ice Jul 
proposals also provided 
3. Ibid. 
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the originally proposed five years' extension being converted to 
an initial extension of only eighteen months, the balance of 
the five years to be subject to satisfactory terms being arranged. 
These modified proposals were approved by the Iraqi Cabinet 
on August 18th. l. 
Thus far, then, the Turkish Petroleum Company appeared 
to have made only limited headway towards its goal of securing 
a long extension to the time limit for choosing its plots. Much 
of the responsibility for this lay with the B.O.D. Company, 
whose intervention had first made the Iraq Government a little 
more sensitive to popular opinion within Iraq on oil matters, 
and then in consequence had stiffened that Government's attitude 
vis~a~vis the Turkish Petroleum Company's extension proposals. 
Instead of having a five-year extension granted practically 
without conditions, the Turkish Petroleum Company had only 
secured one for eighteen months; if it wished to secure the 
remaining three and a half years' extension it had to arrange 
to participate in the construction of a Haifa-Baghdad railway, 
thereby increasing its commitments beyond what it had originally 
intended. 
1. Dobbs B hdad to Colonial Office _August 20th 1928. 
FO 371 13029 94 4178. 
(For the various interesting points raised in the discussions 
leading up to the Iraqi Cabinet's Resolution of August 18th 
see FO 371/13029/94/3744, 3794, 3795, 3796, 3812, 3858, 
3992, and FO 371/13761/62/1710. 
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The B.O.D. Company's intervention had at the same time 
complicated matters for the British Government. However, in so 
far as that Government wished to influence the Turkish Petroleum 
Company's policy with regard to the proposed pipeline and railway 
project, the intervention could be regarded as beneficial, in 
that the Turkish Petroleum Company now needed that Government's 
support even more than before. This was tl;'Ue at this juncture --
until, as will be seen, the British Government overreached itself 
on this matter and became involved in a dangerous controversy 
with the French. 
lI.V :: • The Anglo-French Pipeline Controversy 
Early in October 1928, as the B.O.D. Company began to 
mount an anti-Turkish Petroleum Company campaign - spiced with 
wild tales of Foreign Office machinations to keep the British 
Prime Minister, the Acting Foreign Secretary (Lord Cushenden), 
and others,.in the dark on the situation 1 • - the Turkish 
Petroleum Company began to court trouble by going back on the 
proposals already approved by the Iraqi Cabinet. 
1. Dobbs B hdad to Colonial Office 
FO 371 13030 94 4924. 
Part of the 
See also FO 371/13030/94/5223, 5233, 5296 and (for B.O.D. 
Company approaches to the Colonial Office) FO 371/13030/94/5325. 
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reason for this change of front was, as will be seen, symptomatic 
of the uneasy marriage of the different interests which now 
formed that most international of oil companies. 
The Turkish Petroleum Company sent a revised draft of its 
original proposals to the Iraqi Government. Various important 
changes had been made, including the omission of the earlier 
promise to construct the railway simultaneously with construction 
of the pipeline1 and the omission of any specific mention of 
"Haifa" as the proposed terminus. l. It appeared that the French 
representatives on the Turkish Petroleum Company Board had raised 
objections (on general grounds) to the specific mention of Haifa. 
However, apparently they were willing to bind themselves in a 
letter to the selection of Haifa for the railway, and according 
to Cadman they had raised objections rather to avoid political 
complications with their Government than because of any objection 
to the selection of Haifa in particular. 2 • 
2. According to Cadman the French objection at this time was not 
so much to Haifa itself as to the mention of ~ terminal 
outside Iraqi territory, "their objection being not to 
Haifa in particular but to the commission by Iraq of an 
'acte politique' entirely beyond its competence". 
Shuckburg1l to Oliphant, November 2nd 1928, and 
Cadman to Amery, October 31st 1928. FO 371/13030/94/5325. 
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It was at this juncture, after certain unsuccessful private 
attempts had been made to get the Turkish Petroleum Company to 
go back to its initial proposals, that the British Government, 
departing:.rather markedly from its practice of avoiding direct 
involvement in Turkish Petroleum Company affairs, overreached 
itself. The main responsibility for the miscalculation rested 
with the Colonial Office, though the other Government Departments 
also were not entirely blameless. 
The Colonial Office, on hearing of the changes made in 
the Turkish Petroleum Company's proposals, decided that the 
omission of any specific mentioh of Haifa from the proposals was 
unacceptable, and called an inter-Departmental Conference to 
discuss the matter. Then, after prolonged discussion at the 
Conference, (on Nove~ber 5th), and after-Cadman had made it plain 
that there was now no chance of his Company agreeing to specific 
mention of Haifa in the proposed Agreement, it was decided that 
the only course of action open was to ensure that Haifa ~ 
specified as the railway terminus in a letter which would bind 
the Company. However, the Colonial Office was itself anxious 
to draft this letter, and this was agTeed to. 1 • 
1. November 
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By November 8th Cadman had accepted the Colonial Office's 
draft letter - which contained an assurance that a railway 
survey "(would) be made in the first instance ••• from Baghdad 
to Haifa", and that a construction project would be submitted for 
that route (unless insuperable difficulties were revealed by 
the survey) l._ and had telegTaphed it to Baghdad. He had then, 
in a letter dated November 9th, informed M. hercier of the }°Tench 
Group of his action, and asked for his approval. 2• 
Then, in mid-November 1928 a long and at times bitter 
Anglo-French controversy over the pipeline began. On November 
16th the French Ambassador .in London (N. Fleuriau) called at the 
Foreign Office and gave Lindsay (Permanent Under-Secretary of 
State) a copy of Cad.man's letter of November 9th to M. Hercier. 
He then enquired whether or not the British Government had pressed 
the Turkish Petroleum Company to construct the proposed railway 
from Baghdad to Haifa, drawing attention to a statement made by 
Cadman (in the letter of November 9th) that the letter telegraphed 
to Baghdad concerning railway construction 3• was sent, "afin 
d'obtenir l'entier appui de la puissance mandataire et une 
1. Cadman to Shuckbur h November 8th 1 28, and Colonial Office to 
Dobbs, November 8th 1928. FO 371 13030/94/5392. 
2. Cadman to Mercier, November 9th 1928. FO 371/13030/94/5470. 
3. (That is, the letter drafted by the Colonial Office). 
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pression suffisante sur les Iraquiens". The French Ambassador 
stated that his government considered that the Company's involve-
ment in railway construction might diminish the value of the 
French share in Iraqi oil. 1 • 
In replying officially to the French demarche, on November 
28th, Sir Austen Chamberlain (Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs) avoided making any direct answer to the }°Tench query 
as to whether or not the British Government had intervened in 
the Iraq-Company negotiations, and instead concentrated on 
explaining the terms of the proposed agreement on the Company's 
extension proposals, stati~g that the British Government "(did) 
not consider that there (was) any objection to the agreement". 2 • 
On December 1st, however, M. Fleuriau again called at the Foreign 
Office, complaining that the British note did not reply exactly 
to the question posed, and appealing to the British Government 
to intervene with the Iraq Government to induce that Government 
to abandon its requirements (f<hr a railway) 3. "which were 
4. 
injurious to the Turkish Petroleum Company and to French interests". 
1. Minute by Lindsay, November 16th 1928. FO 371/13030/94/5470. 
3. The extremely important point as to how far the Iraqis (a) 
desired a railway to the Mediterranean (b) desired that the 
terminal of the pipeline and railway be at Haifa, will be 
dealt with subsequently in the remainder of this Chapter and 
in Chapter 11. 
in a note of December 13th. 
Embass December 1 th 1 28 
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Several weeks later the Foreign Office had still not made 
any direct reply to the French approaches. On January 7th 1929 
Tyrrell (British Ambassador in Paris) warned his home Government 
that any attempt to maintain the stand for Haifa as the port of 
debouchment by insisting on specific mention of it in either an 
agreement or in supplementary letters would result in "a long 
unpleasant and almost futile controversy". 1 • The Foreign Office 
at this juncture t~nded to agree with Tyrell, and feeling that, 
in any case, the Haifa alignment .. ·would eventually be chosen, 
considered that matters would only be made worse by trying to 
press for this alignment by means of the supplementary letter. 
They now viewed the Colonial Office action of November (in 
drafting the letter specifically mentioning Haifa) as a mistake 2 • 
- a feeling shared by Cadman, who "deplored ••• the mistake he 
made in allowing himself to be persuaded by the Colonial Off ice 
to act against his better judgement". 3• Nevertheless, it was 
1. ell Paris to Forei Office Jan 
FO 371 13760 62 111. 
Tyrrell felt that the French Government was "primarily 
actuated by the desire to safeguard themselves vis~'a-vis 
their own public opinion", and did not really expect to prevent 
a Haifa alignment being chosen by the T.P.C. (though they 
obviously were prepared to try to prevent itl) 




felt, matters had already gone too far to admit any radical 
change in policy, which, it was considered, would only serve to 
complicate the situation. Accordingly, the Foreign Office 
attempted again to satisfy the French with plausible explanations 
and half-truths, and thereby dragged themselves even further 
into the quagmire. 
Sir Austen Chamberlain's note of January 12th 1929 to 
M. de Fleuriau was an attempt to justify the Colonial Office's 
action in inserting the specific mention of Haifa in the letter 
telegraphed by Cadman to Baghdad in November. Ref erring to 
the fact that, in August 1928, the Iraqi Government had made the 
granting of an initial extension of time conditional on a survey 
for a railway line, and that a further extension was conditional 
on the construction of that line from Baghdad to Haifa, the note 
stated that the original draft of the letter prepared by the 
Company to embody its undertaking did not sufficiently guarantee 
that Iraq's conditions would be fulfilled, and: 
His Majesty's Government would not have been justified 
in urging (Iraq) to accept a form of undertaking which 
did not comply with (its) requirements. The revised 
draft of the letter ••• was put forward to meet this 
difficulty. 1. 
1. Chamberlain to Fleuriau Jan 12th 1 2 • FO 371/13030/94/6085. 
It will be demonstrated in the next Chapter that no British 
pressure was needed (or applied) to make Iraq demand a 
Haifa alignment for the railway and pipeline). 
The French did not take long to resume their attack, and 
they had little difficulty in pointing out the inadequacy of 
Chamberlain's latest note. In a letter and memorandum of January 
24th, from M. Berthelot, the French argued that it was not Iraq 
which insisted on priority being given to Haifa, but the British 
Government, and that the modifications to the Company's original 
letter had therefore been carried out at the instance of that 
Government. The British note of January 12th 1929 had been 
received, wrote Berthelot, "avec un penible surprise," and it 
still did not answer the French question as to whether or not 
the British Government had intervened directly with the Turkish 
Petroleum Company. The French Government therefore formally 
protested against the British action, and requested that the 
Turkish Petroleum Company be now left full liberty of action to 
hold or to withdraw the letter to the Iraq Government. 1 • 
Tyrrell, in Paris, was obviously impressed with the 
cogency of the French arguments, and, in forwarding Berthelot's 
aide-memoire to Oliphant at the Foreign Office, he suggested 
that he (Tyrrell) should try to find some formula with the French 
1. Berthelot to Tyrrell, 
Memoire b Berthelot 
FO 371 137 0 62 565. 
M. Berthelot was General Secretary at the French Foreign 
Ministry. 
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- without, however, raising the specific question of the with-
drawal of the letter - which would satisfy them that the Turkish 
Petroleum Company was free to withdraw the letter to Iraq if it 
so wished, and that the Company had full liberty of action in all 
other matters. "Otherwise", wrote Tyrrell, 
I must warn y9u seriously ••• that the effect is going 
to be deplorable here. It cannot indeed be said that 
we did not tell the French Government the truth in our 
note of January 12th but I do not see that we can 
disguise the fact that we concealed the truth - and they 
seem to me to have caught us out. 1. 
"Rarely, if ever, did the Colonial Office reach a worse 
decision than when they brought pressure on Sir J. Cadman", 
commented Oliphant on reading Tyrrell's letter. 2• In expressing 
himself thus, however, Oliphant apparently forgot that Colonial 
Office pressure had only been applied after the question had 
been the subject of discussion by all the interested Departments, 
including the Foreign Office, on November 5th 1928. 
The British Government had thus really put itself into 
difficulties with the French. The efforts of the Colonial 
Office to ensure that the Turkish Petroleum Company was connnitted 
to a Haifa alignment for its pipeline and railway projects had 
1. Jan "Personal") 
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strayed outside the normal limits of British oil policy - which 
was in general committed to the avoidance of direct interference 
with the Company's affairs - and had aroused French protests. 
Then, clumsy Foreign Office attempts to cover up the more damaging 
aspects of the Colonial Office actions had aggravated the 
situation and markedly increased Anglo-French tension. The 
French were rightly suspicious, and on the specific issue of the 
Cadman letter they had a legitimate grievance against British oil 
policy. 
Both the Colonial Off ice and the Foreign Off ice had some 
share of blame in the situation as it stood in January 1929. 
They were not the only culprits, however, for Cadman himself was 
also partially responsible. Furthermore, Cad.man's responsibility 
went beyond the mere fact that he "allow(ed) himself to be 
persuaded by the Colonial Office to act against his better 
judgement," 1•ror it was partly on the basis of information 
supplied by him that the Colonial Office took the line which it 
did. Cadman had, as we have seen, played down the importance 
2 
of French objections to the selection of Haifa as terminus, • 
and while this does not by any means excuse the Colonial Office 
their grave miscalculation with regard to the French attitude, 
1. See above, p. 315 
2. See above, p. 311 (and footnote ~ ). 
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it does partly help to explain it. 
Wherever the responsibility for the tense state of Anglo-
French Middle Eastern oil relations might lie, however, one thing 
was clear at this juncture - that the situation could not be 
allowed to deteriorate. Something positive must be done. 
Exactly what that "something positive" was to be became, it 
transpired, a highly controversial issue among the formulators 
of the British Government's oil policy • 
.. .,,. Solution by Compromise 
The key to the situation in which the British 
Government found itself as a result of the French attack 
on its pipeline policy was, in the Foreign Office view, the 
attitude of the Iraq Government, and on this score serious doubts 
now began to be entertained. At the time, negotiations between Britaih 
and Iraq on new Hilitary and l"inancial Agreements were proving 
troublesome, matters being made worse by the fact that the Iraqi 
Cabinet members were only carrying on temporarily, having resigned 
1. 
earlier. Seymour (a Secretary in the Foreign Office) voiced his 
fears in a minute of February 1st 1929:- "It is of course possible 
that the Iraqi Government, in view of their present difficulties 
with His Majesty's Government, may wish to let us down on this 
2. 
railway question". 
In a letter to the Colonial Office, dated }?ebruary 6th 1929, 
the Foreign Office suggested that Dobbs be instructed to find out 
whether or not the Iraqi Gover~ent wished to secure the Haifa 
alignment for the railway. If the British Government still intended 
to try to get the agreement through in the form :proposed, however, . 
warned the }1oreign Office, ''it has now become certain that this can 
only be done in the face of the strongest :possible opposition, which 
will be carried into other fields". The best course, the :B1orei[:,in 
Office felt, was to seek some compromise with the French, (on the lines 
1. In 1927 a new Anglo-Iraqi Treaty was concluded, supposedly as 
an advance on the previous treaties (1922 and 1926), actually a 
disappointment to the Iraqis, who had expected more autonomy. 
In view of the progress made by Iraq, however, it was announced 
that Iraq would be put forward for admission to the League in 1932. 
Heantime (following- Iraqi pressure) the Colonial Office agreed 
to discuss amendment of the Military and Financial Agreements 
between Britain and Iraq. The resultant discussions were 
extremely difficult in 1928 and 1929. (Ireland, op. cit., p:p.406-412). 
2. Minute by Seymour, February 1st 1929. FO 371/13760/62/565. 
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suggested by Tyrrell) especially since the Americans would most 
likely side with them (the French) 1 • and since, in any case, 
the letter in dispute did not of itself ensure a Haifa alignment. 2 • 
The Colonial Office reply of February 18th, however, was 
riGid and uncompromising. It began by casting doubt on the 
necessity for asking Dobbs to find out the Iraqi attitude, 
asserting that the Colonial Office already had ample evidence 
of this, and enclosing copies of this evidence (some of which 
did seem to indicate that Iraq was keen on a Haifa alignment). 3• 
1. The Foreign Office had duly noted a significant postscript 
written by Berthelot on his letter of January 24th to Tyrrell:-
"Faut-il vrai}'.llent nous appuyer sur le gToupe americain 
dans ces discussions?". 
2. Office Pebru 
3. Of the 7 documents enclosed as evidence, 5 were telegrams 
from Dobbs in Baghdad. None of these could in themselves 
be considered as proof that Iraq felt more than a mere 
preference for Haifa. The other two documents, translations 
of communications from the Iraqi Director on the T.P.C. 
Board to the Iraq Government, however, could be considered 
as good evidence of Iraq's desire definitely to secure Haifa 
as the terminus of the railway:-
(a) Telegram dated November 1st 1928. The Iraqi Director 
at a T .P .c. :Board Meeting "pointed out clearly that Iraq 
prefer the Haifa line for several reasons". 
(b) Letter dated November 29th 1928. The Iraqi Director 
at a T.P.C. Board Meeting objected to a French statement 
that Iraqi preference for Haifa was not on their own 
initiative, but the result of British persuasion. He pointed 
out that "the port of Haifa was more convenient for Iraq 
from several aspects, the most important of which was the 
political aspect, as the Iraq (sic) will have in Haifa a 
safe outlet not exposed to threat from the north." 
(Enclosures in Colonial Office to Forei Office Feb 
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As for the letter to Iraq about which the French were concerned, 
the Colonial Office stated that at the time that it was drafted 
they had felt that any less definite form "would have failed to 
satisfy the Iraq Government". 1. 
The Colonial Office letter continued with a passage which, 
perhaps deliberately, wholly misconstrued the Foreign Office 
attitude: 
If Mr. Amery rightly appreciates the course of action 
advocated in your letter, it would seem that a definite 
surrender to the French Government's views is contem-
plated, possibly involving political action vis-a-vis 
the Iraq Government to induce them to abandon their 
demand for a survey of the Baghdad-Raif a route in 
return for the extension desired by the Turkish 
Petroleum Company •••• 2. 
Then, after stating that, in the Colonial Office view, British 
and French interests on the pipeline and railway were diametric-
ally opposed (a statement only partially true), the letter went 
on: "The difference is a fundamental one, and one which, in Mr. 
Amery's opinion, must at some stage lead to a dispute with the 
French Government"; consequently it was better to make a stand 
now, as if the British Government gave way now it would inevitably 
1. A pencilled "?" was written here on the Colonial Office 
letter, obviously by someone in the Foreign Office. 
2. Williams, in the Colonial Office, had minuted four days 
before the Colonial Office letter was sent:- "I think that 
it is important that we should make our letter ~o the 
FO (sic) as strong as possible at this stage •••• " 
(Colonial Office, Minute b Williams Febru 
CO 730/146. file 68354, Pa.rt I "A". 
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have to make a stand later on when conditions might be less 
favourable. 
The alternatives before His Majesty's Government thus 
seem to be either to abandon the idea of securing the 
adoption of Haifa as the Nediterranean terminal of the 
pipeline or to face now and overcome strong opposition 
on the pa.rt of the French Government •••• 
The Colonial Office stated that this was a Cabinet decision, 
but suggested that the matter be first considered by the 
Committee of Imperial Defence. 1 • 
The views of the Admiralty at this juncture are of 
interest. The minutes recorded after receipt of copies of the 
Colonial Office-Foreign Office exchange of letters reveal strong 
feelings in favour of the Colonial Office attitude. In the view 
of one member of the Admiralty: 
The Foreign Off ice letter shows a strange lack of 
vision. Surely they should be able to realise the 
advantages of every kind that would accompany the 
debouchment of the railway and pipeline at Haifa and 
the corresponding loss if they reach a Syrian port 
owing to a weak surrender to French interests now •••• 2. 
The minute also highlighted an important factor motivating the 
desire for a firm stand - the British (and Iraq) Government's 
1. Colonial Office to Forei Office Feb--H•....-.r 
FO 371 137 0 2 865. 
(Note that the eventual solution to the Anglo-French pipeline 
problem, bifurcation (see Chapter 11), does not seem to 
have been considered - possibly because such a solution 
was deemed too costly). 
2. "The safety of the Anglo-Persian oilfields and the lines of 
communication to India, to say nothing of the prosperity 
of Palestine, are amongst the assets to be included", 
continued the minute. (Admiralt Minute b .? Ille ible) 
February 22nd 1929. ADM 116 2692. M0475 29. 
325. 
desire to avoid financial conunitment, coupled with the inherent 
weakness resulting from the fact that "on purely economic 
grounds there is nothing to be said for the Haifa project, 
and the Company, if left to itself, must opt for Syria". 1 • 
It was not the Foreign Office, however, which suffered 
from any "strange lack of vision" on this question. Rather 
was it the Colonial Office which suffered from a want of clarity 
of vision in that they refused to see the weakness of their 
case on the specific issue which the French.Government repeatedly 
stressed as important - the modification by Cadman, in order to 
secuxe British Government support, of the letter to Iraq. 
Moreover, both the Admiralty and the Colonial Office miscon-
strued the whole line of argument of the Foreign Off ice in 
choosing to believe that the Foreign Off ice advocated any 
surrender to the French on any issue but that of the letter to 
Iraq, and even on that point the Foreign Office had not 
specifically advocated withdrawal. The Foreign Office still 
wanted to secure a Haifa alignment (although they were not fully 
clear at this stage exactly how this was to be achieved), but 
not at the cost of a severe worsening of Anglo-French relations. 
The disputes on policy continued, and on ¥iarch 13th 1929 
Amery raised the matter in the Cabinet2•. The issues were 
1. ~· 
2. Cabinet Minutes, March 13th 1929. CAB 23/60. 11(29)7. 
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discussed at length on l1arch 20th, but the final outcome was a 
victory for the Foreign Office in that the Cabinet repudiated the 
earlier Colonial Office view that a rigid stand on the whole 
question should be taken, and the decision arrived at embodied 
the Foreign Office suggestion that some direct approach to the 
French should be made. It was to be made clear that the Turkish 
Petroleum Company was free either to maintain or to withdraw 
the letter in dispute, but that the British Government would 
not press Iraq either to maintain or to withdraw the condition 
to which the }~ench objected (that is, the stipulation of Haifa 
as terminus). Tyrrell was to emphasise to the French that 
His Majesty's Government does not conceal its desire 
for the adoption of Haifa as the terminus of a pipeline 
and railway, just as the ~"Tench Government is known to 
prefer a Syrian port, (1) and that they reserve their 
full right to promote it by such means as the complete 
or partial construction, a guarantee of interest or 
subsidy of a railway and similar methods. 2. 
On April 30th 1929 Neville Henderson (Minister Pleni-
potentiary in Paris), acting in place of Tyrrell (on leave in 
London), handed to M. Berthelot a memorandum on the pipeline 
and railway question, thereby implementing the decision arrived 
1. The Foreign Office had not failed to note that the French 
Government must have put pressure on the French directors 
in the T.P.C., since they (the directors) had reportedly 
been unconcerned about Haifa being the pipeline terminus 
(before the Anglo-French dispute blew up). 
See Chamberlain to Tyrrell, Viarch 26th 1929. FO 371/13761/62/1487. 
2. Cabinet Minutes, March 20th 1929. CAB 23/60. 12(29)5. 
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at by the Cabinet on March 20th. 1• M. Berthelot, in replying 
later to this communication, accepted the British Government's 
assurances regarding the Turkish Petroleum Company's freedom of 
action, but, he stated, the French Government reserved the right, 
as did the British, to promote the passage of the pipeline and 
·1 thr h •t d t d t •t 2• rai way oug 1 s own man a e erri ory. 
M. Berthelot's reply closed the question officially, as 
far as the immediate issues were concerned. However, there 
was now to be an important difference in the situation for the 
British Government, due directly to the Anglo-French controversy 
over Cad.man's letter of November 1928. The Colonial Office's 
attempt to circumvent French objections to Haifa as pipeline 
terminus, and Foreign Office efforts to cover this up, had 
resulted in firstly a marked rise in tension in Anglo-French 
relations as concerned the Turkish Petroleum Company, and then 
in internal disputes on policy among the British Government 
Departments themselves. The issue of whether or not the 
British Government ought to stand up to the ]1rench and try to 
secure, without compromise, a Haifa alignment for the pipeline 




had decided that an effort to placate the French should be made. 
This, however, had involved giving what amounted to a pledge 
not to interfere on either side in the pipeline discussions -
and now any deviation from this was more than ever likely to 
arouse French hostility. 
To some extent, then, British policy was to be hampered 
and subject to inhibition as the Pipeline Controversy entered 
its second phase in ~iay 1929. Just what the consequences of 
this were to be will be seen in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 11 
THE PIPELINE CONTROVERSY AND THE REVISED CONCESSION OF 1931 
I. The Iraq Government and the Turkish Petroleum Company's 
Revision Proposals. 
During the time that the .Anglo-French controversy had 
been raging, political difficulties in Iraq (unconnected with 
the oil question) 1 •had prevented any progress being made on the 
concession proposals submitted by the Turkish Petroleum Company 
(hereafter to be referred to as the Iraq Petroleum Company) 2 • 
in the autumn of 1928. 3. Early in May 1929, however, the Iraq 
Government began once again to consider the matter. 
On May 16th the Colonial Office learned that the Iraq 
Government had asked the Company, as a condition for signature 
of the proposed extension to the time limit for the selection 
of its plots, to grant a loan of £1,000,000. Apparently, also, 
1. As noted earlier, the Anglo-Iraqi discussions on new 
¥1ilitary and Financial Agreements were difficult. 
(See above). 
2. The Turkish Petroleum Company became known as the Iraq 
Petroleum Company from June 8th 1929 (Hurewitz, op.cit., 
Vol. II, p.131). 
The new name will be used throughout this chapter, even 
whiBre reference is made to it before June 8th 1929. 
3. See previous Chapter. (The I.P.C. had earlier been given 
extensions to the time limit for selection of plots up to 
June 10th 1929). 
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the Iraq Government was "not disposed to press for delivery of 
(the) supplementary letter". 1 • In accordance with his instruc-
tions, the Acting High Commissioner had preferred no advice. 2 • 
It seemed, therefore, that Iraq was not prepared to press for 
Haifa as the pipeline and railway terminal - and the British 
Government, as a result of the Anglo-French dispute, could not 
do anything about it. 
At the end of July 1929i following an Iraqi suggestion 
that the Iraq Petroleum Company submit proposals for re-opening 
negotiations "on the basis of a revised agreement", Cadman saw 
Ja'Far El Askeri, the Iraqi Minister in London, and put forward 
broad proposals for the revision of the concession, involving 
the grant to the Company of a larger defined area, the remainder 
to be disposed of by Iraq for its sole benefit. 3. 
1. (That is, Cadman's letter of November 1928, which 
had caused all the trouble. See previous Chapter). 
2. Acti Hi h Commissioner for Ira B hdad to Colonial 
Off ice Ma 16th 1 2 • FO 371 137 1 62 257 • 
The Foreign Office had insisted that the Colonial Office 
should instruct the British representative in Baghdad to 
refrain from advising Iraq on the pipeline and railway issues 
- see FO 371/13761/62/2474~ 
3. Memo by Petroleum Department on the Iraq Petroleum Company: 
Review of Ne tiations March 20th 1 O. 
ADM 116 2752. M01012 30. 
Ja'Far El Askeri Ira i Minister 
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Delays ensued, however, so that it was not until the end 
of September that the Iraqi Cabinet considered these proposals. 
Meanwhile, the B.O.D. Company had been attacking on all fronts. 
It had been known for some time that the B.O.D. Company was 
interested in securing Italian support for its claims, while 
for their part the Italians had long coveted some share in Iraqi 
oil. Negotiations to give the Italians a 40;,:~ participation 
had therefore been under way between the B.O.D. Company and the 
Italian Government, and these were soon to be successfully 
concluded. The B.O.D. Company was intent on submitting its 
case - that the Iraq Petroleum Company's concession had lapsed, 
and that therefore the B.O.D. Company was entitled to be 
considered for a concession in Mosul and Baghdad - to the 
Permanent Mandates Commission, and looked for strong Italian 
support at Geneva. 1 • 
In addition to this move, the B.O.D. Company's representa-
tive, Stanley, was by no means inactive in Iraq. He busied 
himself sending "open letters" to the Iraqi Prime Minister and 
generally publicising· his Company's claims, pointing out how 
useful B.O.D. Company money would be to Iraq. 2• In the Iraqi 
3100. 
2. to Colonial Office, 
• 1161 June 1 2 • 
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Parliament there was now a strong movement towards the idea of 
leaving the Iraq Petroleum Company's concession as it was and 
enforcing its provisions, or, if the concession must be modified, 
then it was felt that Iraq ought to demand as much as possible 
. t 1. in re urn. 
Possibly.in consequence of this opposition, when on 
October 6th the.Iraq Council of Hinisters met to consider the 
Iraq Petroleum Company's application for an extension to the 
time limit in which the Company was to select its 24 plots, the 
Company's application was refused, and it was ruled that the 
Company must select its plots by November 21st 1929 (later 
extended to November 28th). As to the proposed concession 
modifications, the Council stat~d that these must be put in 
writing if the Company wished to go further with them. 2• 
The raising of the question of a substantial modification 
of the 1925 Concession had given rise in British Government 
circles to much pondering and discussion on what was involved 
as regards the "Open Door" provisions. Although the Colonial 
Off ice held that the only international obligation Iraq was 
under with regard to this was to see that Article 11 of the 
1. Minister of Finance to Prime Oth 
1.2,g2 in Economic Report No. 144 • 
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Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1922 was not contravened, 1. the Foreign 
Office was not convinced that this view covered all the aspects 
of the case, and expressed anxiety about possible int~~national 
repercussions if the Iraq Petroleum Company were allowed to get 
the whole of the Nosul and Baghdad vilayets. 2• 
In connection with this question, Oliphant asked Cadman 
to call at the Foreign Office. Cadman then demonstrated how 
easily the Iraq Petroleum Company could obtain any plot it 
wanted at the auctions (should it be forced to choose its plots 
and allow those auctions to proceed), which would thereby arouse 
complaints that the so-called "Open Door" provision was a sham 
anyway. According to Cadman, it was to meet this difficulty 
that he had got his Board to agree to a proposal that Iraq be 
asked to grant to the Company outright an area equal to 
approximately ten per cent of the area of the Mosul and Baghdad 
vilayets, the rest to be disposed of by the Iraq Government as it 
thought fit. 3. In view of this, the Foreign Office felt that 
1. This Article provided that there should be no discrimination 
against the nationals of any state (League members, or states 
covered by· certain treaties). (Text: Hurewitz, op.cit., Vol.II, 
p.113.). . 
2. Colonial Office to Foreign Office, September 27th 1929, and 
Forei Office to Colonial Office November 2nd 1 2 • 
FO 371 137 2 62 4962. 
3. ~linute by Steel, October 16th 1929. FO 371/13762/62/4962. 
(See also Copy of a minute by Sir 3.Shuckburgh (n.d.)Fo371/13763/62/5620.) 
Apaxt from the obvious fact that the concession area now proposed 
greatly exceeded the area awarded under the 1925 Concession, it is 
not easy to see a:ny other likely motives of the I.P.C. for 
wishing to revise the concession. Even a comparison of the area 
now demanded (-about 10,000 square miles)against the 1925 Con-
cession area (24 x 8 square miles) is not very mea.ningful,since, 
as Cadman pointed out, the I.P.C. Groups could get any area it 
wanted at the auctions. (Here is one of the many queries to 
which access to Oil Company records, had it been granted, could 
probably have furnished an answer). 
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Cad.man's proposals could be defended, should the necessity arise, 
before the Permanent Mandates Cormnission, and that the illusory 
nature of Article 6 (of the 1925 Concession) could be demonstrated 
to that Commission as part of this defence. 1 • 
On October 24th the Iraq Petroleum Company put its 
detailed proposals for a revised concession to the Iraq Government, 
the main features of which were as follows. The procedure 
outlined in Articles 5 and 6 of the 1925 Concession was to be 
abolished; the Company was to surrender 8&;fv of its present area, 
and to retain 12% (which equalled approximately 10,000 square 
miles), the Company selecting this area within one week of the 
signature of the agreement. The Company was to pay an annual 
dead rent of £100,000, which was to be deducted from future 
royalties, drilling obligations were to be increased, and construe-
tion of a pipeline was to be commenced not later than Mardh 14th 
1932 (no terminus was specified). 2 • 
On November 8th, after discussions at an inter-Departmental 
conference, the Colonial Office instructed the Righ Commissioner 
in Baghdad to inform the Iraq Government that His ¥iajesty's 
Government considered the Iraq Petroleum Company's proposals to be 
1. Off ice November 2nd 1 2 • 
2. October 
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generally advantageous to Iraq (although reserving opinion as to 
details). The High Commissioner was to adopt a benevolent 
attitude to the negotiations, while not interfering in details, 
and, the telegram stressed, "it is specially important that you 
should hold aloof from any discussions concerning alignment of 
• l" II le pipe ine • 
By this time, however, the Iraq Government had already 
come to the conclusion that the Company's proposals were unsatis-
factory, 2 • and, moreover, although still willing to consider any 
further proposals for the modification of the concession, that 
Government was determined that the Company should choose its 
plots by November 28th. 3.· This was made clear to the Company, 
which, nevertheless, seemed very reluctant to comply with the 
Iraqi demands. Finally, however, on November 28th "the latest 
permissible date, and at a late hour" 
to the Iraq Government formal 
1. Colonial Office to 
November 8th 1929. 
4. the Company gave 
2. The reasons were that no railway was mentioned in the Company's 
proposals; there was no mention of any change in local oil 
prices; the drilling obligations proposed were unsatisfactory; 
Iraq objected to the proposal that dead rent was to be deducted 
from future royalties; in addition, although the pipeline 
starting date was satisfactory, no completion date had been 
fixed. (Minist of Communication and Works to Secret Council 
of rlinisters November th 1 2 in Ira Economic Re ort No.l 
FO 371 13763 62 6452. 
3. Acti to Colonial Office, 
November 27th 1929 ~-
notification that it had selected its 24 plots, the Company adding 
that this was on the understanding that future negotiations would not 
thereby be prejudiced. It is worthy of note that of the 24 areas 
1. 
selected, 13 were in Kirkuk. 
Iraq had won a victory of sorts, it seemed, although this did 
not really get things much further forward. Out of all the arguments 
and differences had emerged a new plan - if, indeed, things had not 
been deliberately so steered by the Iraq Petroleum Company - whereby 
the 1925 Concession would be considerably modified. It was in the 
battle over this new plan, in which Iraq sought to gain a greater 
benefit from the exploitation of her oil resources than she had 
hitherto obtained, that the real victory would have to be won. 
The Iraq Petroleum Company had once again courted trouble:_·, and 
had only just managed to draw back in time. Although defeated in 
its aims to get a prolonged extension, and forced instead to choose 
its 24 plots, it had by no means sustained a real defeat. Indeed, if 
in fact it had been the Company's intention all along to secure 
modification of the 1925 concession terms, it had won a victory, for 
Iraq had now definitely accepted the idea. 
The B.O.D. Company had suffered a defeat. Although it had 
immensely complicated the whole situation for its rival, and was to 
some extent responsible for ensuring that that rival did not get its 
1. Memo b Petroleum De artment on the Ir 
Review of Negotiations, March 20th 1930. 
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desired extension, the auctions at which it had hoped to bid 
were still as remote and unlikely to occur as ever. It had, 
however, now been strenc;thened by the introduction of an Italian 
element (since Au.gust 1929) 1 • which enthusiastically proclaimed 
its ambitions and hopes, and ensured at least some support for 
the B.O.D. Company's attempts to influence the Permanent :VJ.andates 
C . . . 't f 
2 • ommission in i s avour. 
II. The pipeline: British wavering and Iragi firmness. 
During· the first ha~f of 1929 the French had been busy 
in Syria, with two experts from Paris studying the question of 
enlarging Beirut port, and the problems involved in the proposed 
construction of a Homs-Palmyra railway. Other considerations 
than the pipeline were no doubt involved in this activity, but 
1. 
to 
2. See Extract and Translation from "Po olo di Roma" November 
24th 1929. FO 371 137 3 62 740. 
The B.O.D. Company complaint was still awaiting consideration 
by the League. Early in December 1929 the British Government 
furnished the Permanent Mandates Commission with its comments 
on this complaint. See FO 371/13763/62/6260, and also 
FO 371/14512/51/3704. 
(The Foreign Off ice does not seem to have been unduly perturbed 
either by reference of the B.O.D. Complaint to the League or 
by .the involvement of Italy. These matters were seen more as 
a nuisance than a real threat at this stage). 
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it seems probable that these French actions were motivated to 
some extent by the desire to persuade the Iraq Petroleum Company 
to adopt a Syrian alignment for the pipeline. 1 • 
The British, too, had not lost interest in the project. 
In±ts Third Annual Report, dated April 26th 1929, the Oil Board2 • 
concluded that it was "of first importance to the Empire in a 
maritime war that the oil pipeline from Iraq should have a terminal 
at Haifa". 3. Amery, in s~pport of this conclusion, further 
stressed that 
1. 
it was becoming an urgent matter that some action should 
be taken to ensure that the terminal of the pipeline 
should be at Haifa ••• (and) therefore ••• that a decision 
should be reached by His Majesty's Government regarding 
the construction of· a railway from Haifa to Baghdad. 4. 
2. For details of this body, see above, Chapter 2. 
3. Third Annual Re ort of the Oil Board A ril 26th 1 2 • 
CAB 24 203. CP. 142 29 page 11. 
The use of the phrase "~ terminal at Raif a" was not 
significant, since the question of there being two terminals 
was not given serious consideration at this time. 
4. ¥1.inutes of the Committee of Im erial Defence Ma 
CAB 2 5. 242nd Meeting 4 • 
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The Cabinet, however, decided that the question would have to 
await developments in the Iraq-Company negotiations, and, equally 
imponderable, the outcome of the British General Election, then 
. . t 1. imminen • 
The coming of the second Labour Goverrunent to power after 
the election led inevitably to some further investigation and 
reappraisal of the pipeline question. 2• A Cabinet Committee was 
appointed which, in its report, considered that the idea of 
British Government assistance in the development of a railway 
from Iraq was "worthy of closer investigation". 3• Later, however, a 
further Committee met to consider the situation anew after reported 
French efforts to influence the Iraq Petroleum Company to choose 
a Syrian alignment. After hearing from Cadman that, as 
French and American interests in the Iraq Petroleum Company 
1. Extract from Cabinet Minutes, Yiay 9th 1929. FO 371/13761/62/2500. 
(Polling in the General Election took place on Hay 30th.) 
2. The Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs (Lord Passfield) 
prepared an interesting memorandum showing (inter alia) that 
British expenditure on the administration and defence of Iraq 
fell from £32,000,000 in the year 1920-21 to only £2,000,000 
in 1927-28. Lord Passfield stressed the benefits and 
advantages of Britain remaining in Iraq (prestige, League 
obligations, maintenance of military and civil air routes 
etc.)+ and, with regard to oil, stated: "So long as we remain 
in Iraq we can, in the last resort at least, control this 
important source of supply." (Memo by Secretary of State for 
the Colonies "Our Position in Ira " Jul 8th 1 2 • 
CAB 24 205. CP.214. 
3. Cabinet Committee on the B hdad-Haifa Railwa 
Pipeline, September 11th 1929. CAB 24 205. CP 247 29 ~ 
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were united in a desire for a Syrian alignment, it was extremely unlikely 
that the Iraq Petroleum Company as a whole would choose Haifa as 
1. 
terminus, the Connnittee produced its Report. 
The Cabinet Committee Report, dated May 1st 1930, cast doubt 
on the much aired strategic argument for ensuring that the pipeline 
should terminate at Haifa. The Haifa alignment would necessarily 
pass close to French-controlled territory, and thus, the Report 
argued, in the event of a war with France the pipeline was very liable 
to be cut by French forces. Accordingly, there was no guarantee of 
oil supplies being obtained even if Haifa were the terminus. As for 
any suggestion that the Britis.h Government should seek to influence 
the alignment by assisting financially in railway construction, the 
Report gave due weight to the Chancellor of the Exchequer's view that 
in no circumstances should His Majesty's Government spend or 
guarantee a shilling in connection with a railway from Haifa 
to Baghdad on the chance of getting the Iraq Petroleum 
Company to bring its pipeline to Haifa rather than Tripoli. 2. 
The Report's recommendations were, firstly, that a Syrian terminal 
to the Iraq-Mediterranean pipeline and railway should be accepted, 
1. Cabinet Minutes, March 26th 1930 CAB 23/63. 17l30)3. 
Minutes of the Second Neeti of the Cabinet Committee on the 
Baghdad-Haifa Railway and Pipeline, April 1st 1920• CAB 27 419. 
2. Re ort of the Committee on the B hdad-Haifa Railwa 
May 1st 1930 CAB 24 211. CP. 136 30 • 
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and secondly, that negotiations should be opened with the }"Tench 
Government as early as possible "with the object of obtaining 
the requirements desired by His Najesty's Government and the 
Government of Iraq" l. should the terminal be in Syria. The 
Cabinet accepted the Report on Nay 7th, despite strong Admiralty 
opposition, and the High Connnissioner in Iraq was instructed to 
find out if Iraq would agree to the procedure which the British 
Government proposed to adopt. 2• 
1. Ibid. 
The British requirements were investigated by a Sub-Committee 
of the main Cabinet Committee, and were stated to be (1) That 
France would allow exports of oil to British ports "in time 
of peace, or when France is a neutral, or an ally". (2) That 
France would allow the passage of British troops to be carried 
on any Iraq-Mediterranean railway in time of war (subject to 
such a provision being compatible with international law) 1 
other points concerned the placing of orders for railway and 
pipeline material, the connection of Haifa to Tripoli by 
rail, etc. (Report of the Inter-De)axtmental Sub Committee, 
May 1930. CAB 24/211 CP. 141(30 .) 
2. Cabinet Minutes, N.ay 7th 1930 CAB 23/64. 25(30)4. 
Colonial Office to Hi~h Commissioner in Ira B hdad). 
May 7th 1930 FO 371 14511 51 2408. 
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The British Government thus had decided on what was virtually 
a policy of surrender to the French. Regret at this surrender was 
1. 
to some extent shared by all British officials, and indeed was 
bitterly resente~ in the Colonial Office and the Service Departments, 
but it had been felt by the Cabinet to be inevitable in the 
circumstances. The only alternatives seemed to be either to lay 
out a large sum of money to facilitate construction of a railway to 
Haifa, and thus induce the Iraq Petroleum Company to build the pipeline 
alongside that railway, or to use political pressure either to.induce 
the Company to go against its own economic interests in choosing the 
more costly Haifa alignment or to persuade Iraq to stipulate the Haifa 
alignment as a sine qua non for revision of the concession. The 
British Government was not prepared to finance a railway, and, tied 
as it was by its pledge to France in 1929, it could not even consider 
applying pressure either to the Company or to Iraq, even had it 
2. 
deemed such pressure likely to be successful - unless it also was 
prepared to see a considerable worsening in the state of Anglo-French 
1. Pa.rt of the Cabinet minutes of ¥ia.y 7th reads: 
"While general regret was expressed that the facts set forth in 
the Report of the Cabinet Committee were adverse to the 
establishment of the terminus at Haifa, the Cabinet agreed ••• that 
there was no alternative but to accept the policy proposed ••• " 
(Cabinet Ylinutes, May 7th 1930 CAB 23/64. 25(30)4.) 
2. The British Government could not have expected quite the same 
cooperation from Cadman as it had been able to rely on in 1928. 
The Colonial Office was not in any case disposed to trust Cadman 
as fully as it had once done. 
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relations in the Middle East. With Iraq seeking admission to the 
1. 
League of Nations in 1932, an irreparable breach between Britain 
2. 
and France on such an issue was particularly to be avoided. 
This"policy of surrender" was, in the event, to be shortlived. 
The key to the whole question, even before the Anglo-French contre-
temps over Cadman's letter of November 1928, had always been the 
attitude of the Iraq Government. While the ]1oreign Office had had 
doubts as to what that attitude really was (as has been seen in 
Chapter 10), the Colonial Office had never wavered in its belief 
that Iraq definitely wanted a Haifa alignment for the railway and 
pipeline. Now the accuracy ~f the Colonial Office's assessment was 
to be made very plain indeed. 
On May 13th 1930 the Colonial Office received a telegram from 
the High Commissioner in Iraq which told of Iraq's determination~ 
to allow the pipeline to terminate in Syria; the Iraq Government was, 
it transpired, prepared if necessary to break off negotiations with 
3. 
the Iraq Petroleum Company on this point. This news was greeted 
with great joy in Admiralty circles, and the Colonial Office, also 
1. On November 4th 1929 the League of Nations had received a communica-
tion from the British Government stating that it intended to 
recommend Iraq for admission to the League in 1932. (Ireland, 
op. cit., p. 417). 
2. Unless the B.O.D. Company obtained some satisfaction, it could 
also be expected that Italy would make trouble for Iraq with the 
League. (The Italian company, A.G. I .P., had a 40% share in the 
B.o.D. Company). 
3. Hi h Commissioner in Ira B hdad to Secret 
Colonial Affairs, May 13th 1930. CAB 27 436, 
of State for 
lOC 30 9. 
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elated, was not slow to take advantage of a development which possibly 
they had at least half expected. The Colonial Office immediately 
put forward a memorandum to the Cabinet, suggesting that consideration 
be given to the idea of dropping all support for the Iraq Petroleum 
Company and advising Iraq to grant to that Company only half the 
concession area it now asked for in the revised concession proposals. 
This action would not necessarily cause the Company to change its 
mind about the alignment, the memo stated, but at least it would 
prevent the Company from getting a monopoly over the oil resources 
of Iraq, and thus potentially prolific oil-bearing areas would still 
1. 
be open for development by British interests. 
On ¥iay 21st the Cabinet discussed the new si tua ti.on which the 
firm attitude of Iraq had produced in the pipeline question. It 
was then decided that the Cabinet Committee of March should re-examine 
2. 
the whole matter. 
At the first meeting of the reconstituted Cabinet Committee (now 
known as the "Cabinet Committee on Iraq Oil") there was a divergence 
of opinioh on the attitude to be adopted to the Iraq Petroleum Company 
in general, and to Sir John Cadman in particular. Some members showed 
a marked distrust of Cadman, and were opposed to him being furnished 
CAB 24 212. CP. 1 4 30 • 
An enclosed memo by the Colonial Office, dated May 5th 1930, 
reads a little like "special pleading" for the B.O.D. Company -
but whether or not this can be regarded as significant is a matter 
for conjecture. 
2. Cabinet Minutes, May 21st 1930 CAB 23/64. 28(30)6. 
345. 
with any further confidential information, in particular as 
concerned the new clear attitude of the Iraq Government. When 
he appeared before them on June 4th, however, Cadman succeeded in 
restoring the Committee's confidence in him, partly because he 
was able to play on party animosities and attribute his own now 
difficult position to the actions of the previous Government, 
which "had made the fatal mistake in insisting upon reference 
t f 
1. o Hai a". 
The Cabinet Committee on Iraq Oil issued an Interim 
Report on June 20th advocating, in effect, that no action be taken 
until it was seen how things developed. 2 • Meanwhile, the Iraq 
Government, uninfluenced by British advice on the subject, had 
prepared a detailed statement of why it preferred Haifa, and it 
proposed to tell the Iraq Petroleum Company that without the Haifa 
1. Minutes of 2nd Meeti of Cabinet Committee on Ira Oil, 
June 4th 1930 CAB 27 436. 
It is hardly exact, however, to say that most of Cad.man's 
difficulties at this stage were the result of the previous 
Government's actions; certainly the trouble over the letter 
of November 1928 increased his difficulties, but to some extent 
Cadman himself was to blame even for this. He had consistently 
encouraged British officials in their attitude over the Haifa 
alignment - as part of his A.P.O.C. policy, no doubt - and 
had minimised the hostility of the French (when talking to 
British officials). 
2. Interim Re ort of the Cabinet Committee on Ira Oil June 20th 
.!23.Q. CAB 24 213. CP 209. 
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alignment no further negotiations were possible (see Note 1 
below). 1. 
As can be seen from the above, British oil policy was 
still operating on almost a day-to-day basis, without much of the 
deviousness or overall "grand design" so often attributed to it. 
A Conservative Government, faced by strong recommendations to 
action in the pipeline and railway question, had procrastinated, 
and had then been followed by a Labour Government which, initially, 
had done the same. Later, however, the Labour Government had 
reluctantly decided on a "policy of surrender", and resolved not 
to fight against ~"Tench opposition to a Haifa alignment (despite 
internal pressures to do so). 2• Then, when British policy thus 
1. Ibid. (Appendix I) 
The principal reasons included (1) The Haifa route would 
include the longest haul of rail and pipeline within Iraqi 
territory. (2) Iraq desired that the route "should pass 
through the territory of her friend" (Transjordan). (3) In 
the event of Great Britain being at war, Iraq would be 
automatically involved; a pipeline and railway through 
French controlled territory might also involve her in any 
French troubles. (4) Iraq dlid not want Syria to have a 
stranglehold on the pipeline and railway route to the 
Mediterranean. (5) Iraq was anxious to develop trade with 
Egypt, and the southern was the better route for this, 
(etc.). 
2. Too much shoula not be inferred from the fact that a Labour 
Government at one point advocated a "policy of surrender", 
while the Conservative Government had never done so. In 
both Governments there were elements advocating a strong stand 
against the French. It is, however, true that Labour was in 
general less keen on sanctioning Government expenditure on 
overseas projects (such as the pipeline and railway projects 
of the I.P.C.) than were the Conservatives - but the evidence 
in the Iraq Oil question is insufficient to warrant a conclusion 
that a Labour Government's oil policy would normally necess-
arily be different from that of a Conservative Government. 
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seemed at last to be fairly straightforward, it had once more 
,,.. / 
been swung round by the determination of its protege, Iraq, to 
do the very thing which the British Government had shrank from -
to stick out for a Haifa alignment. Britain's protege had, it 
seemed, become "more pro-British than His Najesty's Government". 1. 
It remained to be seen how much support His ~iajesty's Government 
would give it. 
III. British policy and the bifurcation proposals. 
During July and Auglist 1930 the Iraqi Prime Ninister was 
in London, where he conducted negotiations with Cadman on the 
basis of a revised agreement. No definite agreement was reached 
at this stage, however. 2• Meanwhile the Foreign Office had to 
deal with the latest development in the perennial Anglo-French 
struggle over the pipeline. The French were perturbed at Iraq's 
determined stand for the Haifa alignment, and viewed it as an 
attempt by King Feisal, for family reasons, to ensure that the 
1. T. Shaw, Secretary of State for War, told a meeting of the 
Cabinet Committee on Iraq Oil, "It had to be recollected that 
the attitude of the Iraq Government had been consistently 
more pro-British than that adopted by His ¥J.ajesty's 
Government ••••• " (Minutes of 4th Meeting of the Cabinet 
Committee on Iraq Oil, February 4th 1931. 
CAB 27/436.) 
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pipeline crossed the territory of his brother, Amir Abdullah 
(that is, Transjordan). l. In the }'rench view, this was a form 
of political pressure on the Iraq Petroleum Company and, it was 
argued, the British Government ought to intervene to prevent 
this, and was bound to do so by its pledge of April 1929. 
Otherwise, the li'rench felt, the Iraq Petroleum Company would be 
made to incur unwarrantable expense in constructing a pipeline 
along the more costly Haifa route instead of along a Syrian 
alignment. 2• 
The British, however, were not prepared to press Iraq to 
- {rightly) 
be neutral in the question, and they argued/that the British 
pledge of April 1929 was simply a promise to refrain from putting 
pressure on either Iraq or the Iraq Petroleum Company, and that 
it did not include any promise to ensure Iraq's neutrality. 
Iraq was, and ought to be, free to express her preferences and 
to impose any conditions she desired in return for agreeing to the 
1. Amir Abdullah had been recognised as ruler of Transjordan 
at the Cairo Conference of 1921 (G.E. Kirk, A Short Histo!:J'_Q_[ 
-~he __ ~liddle East, London 1948) p .160) • 
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revision of the concession. 1 • 
The French were at this time highly critical of Cadman 
and his policy with regard to the pipeline alignment. 2• 
However, Cadman had now apparently won the support of the American 
interests, and in mid-O~ctober the Iraq Petroleum Company Board 
approved his latest proposals to be put to Iraq. The main 
points of these proposals were that, firstly, the Company should 
get a blanket concession for the whole of the :tviosul and Baghdad 
vilayets east of the River Tigris (an area of approximately 
32,000 square miles), in return for certain dead rents, royalties, 
and an undertaking that the Iraq Petroleum Company would build 
a pipeline to Haifa by a given date, and a branch line to 
Tripoli. The Tripoli branch was to be started immediately, 
but the Haifa branch would possibly have to await the construe-
tion of a trans-desert railway. The point of bifurcation of the 
two lines was not stated, but it was proposed that this should 
1. Nemes communicated to 
September 19th 1930. 
and 
2. The French were also violently opposed to wh~t they suspected 
to be the policy of the Anglo-Persian and Anglo-Saxon Companies 
- that is, deliberately to retard Iraq oil production. The 
French would have pref erred to abandon the attempts to revise 
the 1925 Concession, and a total breakdown of negotiations 
might well have served their purpose. (Memo by J.H. Hall, 
October 9th 1930. FO 371/14513/51/4500.) 
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1. 
depend on technical considerations. 
For the first time the idea of there being two pipelines, one 
to Tripoli and one to Haifa, had assumed concrete form. It had, 
indeed, often been talked of in the years of discussion on the pipeline 
2. 
project, but generally it had not been taken up as a serious 
proposition, and as late as April 1930 Cadman had expressed doubts 
3. 
about the practicability of building a pipeline to each port. 
Now the idea of there being two pipelines had come to be accepted 
by the Company, but not, as one might too readily assume, directly 
because of the need to compromise between British and French aims, 
but rather because of the need·to compromise between the Company's 
4. 
interests and the political interests of Iraq. 
5. 
The Company's proposals were communicated to Iraq on October 15th. 
1. B hdad 
2. The idea of pipelines to both a Syrian and a Palestinian port was 
mooted in French circles at least as early as May 1928. (see 
FO 371/13029/94/3283 and 3585). 
In August 1929 Cadman expressed the opinion that a pipeline to a 
Syrian and a Palestinian port "would very likely be the ultimate 
solution:-(cAB 27/388. ~iinutes of First Meeting). However, in 
April 1930 he no longer seemed to favour the idea. (CAJ3 27/419. 
Minutes of Second Meeting). See also FO 371/14510/51/5187. 
3. Ninutes of the Second Meeti of the Cabinet Committee on the B dad.-
Haifa Railway and Pipeline, April 1st 1930. CAB 27 419. 
4. This is true, strictly, but of course one might convincingly 
argue that had the British and the French Governments' aims not 
been opposed the result might have been different. 
5. Cadman to Nu.ri Pasha, October 15th 1930. FO 371/14513/51/5708. 
By the end of the month, however, a serious situation had developed. 
The Iraq Government was prepared to countenance the Company getting 
the large concession area for which it asked, but, although the two 
sides agreed on the figures at which minimum royalty and dead rent 
should be set, they disagreed on certain provisions regarding them, 
in particular as to how much of the dead rent should be recoverable 
from future royalties. On the pipeline question Iraq was highly 
suspicious of the Company's intentions. In the first place the Iraqis 
wanted all the oil to go to Haifa, and while to some extent they were 
prepared to compromise and allow the :B'rench share of oil to go to 
Tripoli, they were definitely determined that in that case the main 
line should go to Haifa, and that bifurcation should be as far west 
(within Iraqi· territory) as, possible. In general the Iraqis felt 
that the Company's proposals had been drafted ambiguously, and 
the document as a whole ha(d), in the eyes of the Iraq 
Government, the appearance of calculated duplicity; it ha(d) 
produced a most unfortunate impression upon them. 
The Iraqis were exasperated, and, possibly influenced by B.O.D. 
Company propaganda, they now contemplated not only demanding auctions 
under the 1925 Concession terms, but they also began to consider the 
1. 
possibility of declaring the whole concession null and void. 
The policy to be adopted by the British Government was discussed 
at an inter-Departmental meeting on October 31st, when the great 
1. Hemo b Secretar 
Oil Ne otiations 
CAB 27 436. lOC 
of State for Colonial Affairs on the Ira 
November 18th 1 0 and A endix AI AII and B) 
30 17. 
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difficulties which would a.rise with France and the United States, 
should Iraq proceed to extremes, were noted and discussed. At 
the meeting the Colonial Office representatives spoke resolutely 
in favour of a policy of urging Iraq to accept the principle 
of there being two pipelines; against this the Foreign Office 
just as resolutely opposed the idea of there being any inter-
vention by His Majesty's Government. The meeting as a whole, 
however, accepted the Colonial Office view, and as a result a 
draft telegram, for transmission to the High Commissioner 
in Iraq, was drawn up by the Colonial Office. 
1. I;iemo b Rendel October 
FO 371 14513 51 5915. 
o. 
1. 
~L1he Poreie,n Office would not concur in the sending of this 
telegram. While not insensible to the value of getting Iraq to 
compromise with the Iraq :Petroleum Company and the French, the Foreign 
Office felt that it was a bad move tactically for the British Government 
to interfere. The lj1oreign Office decried the undertaking given by 
the previous Government to the l;'rench (in April 1929) and felt that 
it might well have proved disastrous had thi~s turned out differently, 
but, the l•;orei.gn Office argued, now thc.t Iraq had dug in her toes 
( wi t!1out being influenced by Britain) and refused to allow the pipeline 
to debouch at. :_my port but Haifa, the British undertaking not to 
intervene had become a positive advantage. If the French stuck to 
their demand for a Syrian alit'.nment they could not get the :British 
Government to put pressure on Iraq to accept such an ali~~1Tilent, since 
1. 
the British Government had promised not to intervene. 
In a way this was a curious reversal of the roles played by 
the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office since November 1928. 
\·lhereas earlier the Foreign Off ice had sought to compromise to 
avoid trouble with the F:rench,and the Colonial Office had advocated 
takine a strong line, now, in effect, the Foreign Office was taking 
the strong line (which by now had become the policy of non- intervention) 
2. 
while the Colonial Office was urging the need to compromise. 
1. I11orei Office to Colonial Office November 12th 1 0. 
Appendix "D" to :Memo by Secretary of State for Colonial 
Affairs) CAB 27/436. 10C(30)17. 
2. One factor influencing the Foreign Office attitude was the 
suspicion that the Iraq Petroleum Company might be bluffing in 
its stand on the pipeline issue. · 
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In the end, after further discussion, the telegram actually 
sent (on November 21st) was generally on the lines of the 
Colonial Office draft, with certain modifications made to 
emphasise the fact that His Majesty's Government was only adyising, 
not pressing, Iraq, in Iraq's own interest, in advocating some 
form of compromise. On November 25th the High Commissioner 
reported that he had advised Iraq on the lines set out in the 
1. telegram. 
At this stage, then, the British Government was no longer 
mainly concerned with trying to ensure a Haifa alignment, for 
that already seemed assured, in view of the Iraqi attitude. 
Instead, its main problem was to ensure that the struggle over 
the pipeline alignment, and the questions associated with 
bifurcation, did not lead to a serious rift between Iraq and the 
French, and that the Iraq - Company negotiations on the revision 
of the concession should reach fruition. However, the British 
Government was to some extent hampered in dealing with this 
problem. While it was undoubtedly true that, as the Foreign 
Office argued, the Government's earlier pledge to France not to 
intervene directly in the Iraq-Company negotiations had now been 
1. The final draft of the telegram may be found at CAB 27/436, 
10C(30)18. for the High Commissioner's telegram of November 
25th see FO 371/14514/51/6427. 
355. 
turned to that Government's advantage (since Iraq demanded a 
Haifa alignment), it was also unfortunately true that inability 
to intervene directly in the negotiations might well allow those 
negotiations to break down. The British Government could only 
advise, not press, Iraq to compromise with the French views: 
the success or failure of Britain's whole oil policy in Iraq 
thus rested on negotiations over which Britain now had little 
control. 
IV. The revised concession of March 1931. 
In Iraq, the Iraq Petroleum Company's negotiator, Skliros, 
seemed to be making little headway with the resumed negotiations, 
and by December 1930 the presence of Cadman there seemed 
imperative. 1 • However, Cadman was concerned that negotiations 
then being carried on with the Governments of Palestine and 
Transjordan regarding wayleaves for the proposed pipeline should 
be successfully concluded before he want to Iraq. After a little 
prompting by the British Government, the Palestine Government 
eventually signed a pipeline Convention with the Iraq Petroleum 
Company on January 5th 1931, and Transjordan followed suit on 
1. Apparently Skliros's general attitude, and tactless handling 
of the negotiations, was not helping matters. Also Gulbenkian 
was reportedly stirring up trouble in Iraq for the I.P.C. 
He, apparently, supported the French view that it was best to 
keep to the 1925 Concession. See va:ri.ous communications etc. 
under the references:- CAB 27/436. 10C(30)19 and 10C(30)23. 
FO 371/14514/51/6275 and 6958. FO 371/15305/5/1646. 
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January 11th. l'11eanwhile, similar ne{3'otiations with the Syrian 
Government were still being pursued. 1 • 
On January 13th 1931 Cadman arrived in Iraq. The first 
negotiations were concerned with the concession area, payments 
to be made by the Company, and cheap oil for Iraq's internal 
use. After some haggling, agreement was reached on dead rents 
and certain other matters, but when the pipeline question came 
up for discussion, negutiations came to a halt over, primarily, 
the choice of the point of bifurcation. The Iraqis favoured 
bifurcation at Rutba, but, while the American and :Anglo-Dutch 
Groups in the Iraq Petroleum Company were prepared to accept this 
on certain conditions, 2 ~ the French were adamant against it, 
and declared that they would only be prepared to accept 
bifurcation as far south as Haditha. 3. 
On being asked for advice by the High Commissioner in Iraq, 
1. For the texts of the Pipeline Conventions see FO 371/15304/5/636. 
At this time Skliros was having various difficulties in his 
negotiations with the Syrian authorities. See FO 371/15305/5/79 
and 130. (The Syrian and Lebanese Pipeline Conventions were 
signed some weeks after the Palestinian Convention). 
2. Mainly reduction of dead rent. 
3. For the relative positions of Rutba and Haditha, see map 
at page 362 (It will be noted that the Iraq-Syria frontier 
had not yet been finally delimited. It was, however, 
sufficiently defined for there to be no confusion in the 
context of the pipeline question). 
For the reasons why Iraq did not favour Haditha, see next 
par%n-raph below. 
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the Colonial Office came out in support of Iraq's stand for 
bifurcation at Rutba, primarily because it was felt that 
bifurcation at Haditha inevitably meant that the French would 
construct a railway to Abu Kemal, which in turn would mean the 
death of the Haifa-Baghdad Railway project. 1 • 
Later, however, as the Iraq Petroleum Company refused to 
accept Rutba as the point of bifurcation, the Colonial Office, 
worried in case the negotiations broke down completely, and 
especially concerned that Iraq did not continue to incur French 
hostility in case this jeopardised her prospects of entry into 
the League of Nations in 1932, came round to the view that Iraq 
would be wise after all to accept Haditha as the bifurcation 
point. A note to this effect was eventually sent, with full 
. 2. Cabinet approval, to the High Commissioner in Iraq. 
By February 19th a great deal of progress had been made, 
for the High Commissioner had induced Iraq to accept Haditha as 
the point of bifurcation, and Cadman had accepted, after initial 
2. atch to Hi h Commissioner 
1) 
Cabinet Minutes Febru 1. CAB 23/66. 12(31)1. 
One factor influencing this decision was a report that the 
F-rench had abandoned their plans for a railway to Abu Kemal -
thus removing a potential threat to the Haifa-Baghdad railway 
proposals). 
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reluctance, an Iraqi stipulation that both pipelines be completed 
within six months of each other. However, at this juncture 
Iraq raised the question of taxation of the Company's external 
profits (Article 27), and the whole negotiations were once more 
. . d 1. in Jeopar y. 
When Cadman left Iraq on Narch 12th there was still no 
final agreement on Article 27. Furthermore, it was by no means 
certain that the Iraq Petroleum Company Boa.rd would accept all 
the points agreed to in the negotiations, particularly the one 
concerning pipeline completion dates. A Boa.rd Meeting scheduled 
for Viarch 19th had been called off because the French would not 
attend but instead "reserv(ed) to themselves the fullest 
liberty" to criticise Cad.man's actions. Cadman thereupon 
decided 
that he was going to give them some actions to 
criticise, and (he) proposed to authorise Mr. Skliros 
to sign the agreement as prepared before he left 
Baghdad. 2. 
1. High Commissioner in Irag (Baghdad) to Colonial Office, 
Fe th 1 1 and Note b Secretaries of Cabinet Committee 
on Iraq Oil, February 23rd 1931. CAB 27 436. lOC 30 42 and 44. 
Colonial Office Memo on the Histo of the Ne otiations, 
March 31st 1931. FO 371 15305 5 1646. 
(In the sunnner of 1930 the Iraqi Prime Y.Linister, Nuri Pasha, 
had assured the I.P.C. that Iraq would not try to impose a 
tax on the Company's external profits. However, he was now 
forced to go back on this assurance, for reasons connected 
with Iraqi internal politics. He was now demanding that Iraq 
receive a tax based on the difference between the price of the 
Company's oil as it crune out of the ground and the final 
selling price). 
2. Colonial Office 
March 18th 1931 
otiations since 
359. 
The Agreement revising the 1925 Concession was actually 
signed on March 24th. It still had to be ratified, however, and 
as signature had only been obtained at the cost of the 
resignation of Nuzahim Pachachi, the Ninister of Economics and 
Communications, it could be expected that there would be at least 
some opposition to its passage through the Iraqi Parliament. 1 • 
The Bill was eventually passed, though, by fifty four votes to 
four, and on May 18th was approved by the Senate. 2• 
Cadman, too, had his "Parliament" to face. Soon after the 
Agreement was signed he obviously came under pressure from the 
Groups, and was forced to appeal to the British Government to 
press Iraq to extend the six months' interval between completion 
of the two pipelines to twelve months. The British Government, 
however, refused to entertain the idea. 3. 
1. Hi h Commissioner in Ira Ba hdad to Colonial Office March 
27th 1931. FO 371 15306 5 1838. 
In order to strengthen his hand in Parliament, Nuri Pasha 
wondered if it would be possible to arrange for a telegram 
to be sent from the Turks (who, of course, had an interest 
under the 1926 Treaty) welcoming the new agreement. In 
London, however, approaches to the Turks on this matter were 
not deemed to be advisable, since the Turks might regard such 
approaches as·consultation on the question. 
2. Hi ·h Commissioner in Ira B hdad to Colonial Office Ma 18th_, 
1221· CAB 27 436. roe 30 55A. 
3. 1. 
360. 
The Agreement revising the 1925 Concession terms completely 
altered the basis on which the earlier convention had been 
framed. 1 • Whereas under Articles 3, 5 and 6 of the 1925 
Concession the Company had been obliged to select 24 plots, 
each of an area of eight square miles, and to surrender 
the rest in order that the remaining area might 
1. 4greement made the Twenty fourth day of Naxch, 1931, between 
His Excellency Nuri Pasha Said, Prime Minister, acting on 
behalf of the Government of 'Ira ••• and John Skliros acti 
on behalf of 'Iraq Petroleum Company. FO 371 15307 5 3183. 
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be auctioned, under the new Agreement the Company retained the sole 
right to exploit "all lands situated in the vilayets of Baghdad 
and Mosul which are bounded by the east bank of the River Tigris by 
the 'Iraq-Turkish frontier and by the 'Iraq-Persian frontier" 
(excluding, of course, the "Transferred Territories" area worked by 
1. 
the Anglo-Persian Oil Company). This was an area of approximately 
2. 
32,000 square miles. The remainder of Iraq was left free for Iraq 
to dispose of as she thought fit. 
In place of the somewhat vague references to pipeline 
construction in Articles 5 and 6 of the 1925 Concession, an entirely 
new article now laid dovm in.precise form the conditions relating to 
such construction. The pipeline was to be of a total capacity of not 
less than 3,000,000 tons per year. It was to follow an alignment: 
from any point in the defined area to any point on the 
Euphrates between Haditha and Hit and thence one trunk 
pipeline system shall be constructed by way of Rutbah or the 
vicinity thereof to a terminal in the Bay of Acre and from such 
point on the Euphrates the Company shall be free to construct 
another trunk pipeline system to any other terminai ··on the 
Mediterranean. 
At least 50 per cent of the oil was to go to the Bay of Acre until 
at least four million tons per annum was put through that terminal. 
1. Clause 3 of the Agreement (i.e. new "Article 3"). 
See Map at page 3q~. 













































































































































































































































































The pipeline system was to be completed by December 31st 1935, 
and the Bay of Acre section was to be completed within six months 
of completion of the other line "unless the Government in writing 
request the Company to delay the construction of the pipeline 
system to the Bay of Acre in the interests of a Baghdad-Haifa 
railway." 1 • 
The 1925 provision whereby Iraq received a royalty of 
four shillings (gold) per ton of oil exported (with a sliding 
scale in operation after twenty years) remained operative under 
the new .Agreement. However, under the Agreement, Iraq was to 
receive a dead rent of £200,000 (gold) (not recoverable by the 
Company) and an advance o.f £200 ,OOO (gold) (recoverable by the 
Company from future royalties) until oil export conunenced. Once 
exports commenced, Iraq was to be guaranteed a minimum royalty 
of £400,000 (gold). 2• Iraq was also to receive certain 
additional sums from the Company in lieu of taxation. 3. 
1. Clauses 4 and 5 of the Agreement. 
2. Clause 8 of the .Agreement. 
3. The taxation arrangement was not included in the main Agreement, 
but was detailed in an exchange of letters (attached to the 
.AgTeement} between Nuri Pasha and Skld.ros. The I.P.C. was 
to be exempt from all taxation in consideration of the payment 
of £9,000 (gold) per year until regular export of oil 
commenced. Thereafter the Company was to pay £60,000 (gold) 
for the first 4 million tons of oil exported, and then 
£20,000 (gold) for each subsequent million tons exported. 
(Copy of letter No.1155 dated 24th }'larch, 1931, from H.E.Nuri 
Pasha As Sa' id Prime Minister to ¥.ir. J. Skliros Acti General 
!Vianager, 'Irag Petroleum Co. Ltd. FO 37'1,.. 15307 5 3183 • 
Clause 13 of the new Agreement modified Article 20 of 
the 1925 Concession (whfch laid down the conditions under which 
railways for Company use might be constructed), imposing restric-
tions on the construction of railways outside the concession 
area, thereby countering any danger of the early construction 
of a railway to a Syrian port. This provision was also supple-
mented by independent guarantees given by the French that they 
would not construct any railway in Syria from Palmyra to Abu 
Kemal, or towards Rutba. 1 • 
Other provisions in the .Agreement related to oil 
products to be produced by the Company for Iraq's internal 
consumption, and the prices thereof, 2• while others related to 
facilities to enable the Company's operations to proceed without 
1. Charge d'affaires de France en Irag 'a son Excellency le 
Ministre des Affaires Etrang~res 'a Bagdad, J.lardh 22nd 
1231.· 
FO 371/15306/5/2735. 
2. Clauses 10 and 11 of the Agreement. 
d h . d 1. un ue in ranee. 
All the various interests concerned could feel·reasonably 
satisfied with the outcome of the protracted negotiations. 
Iraq had made certain financial gains in the dead rent 
and tax provisions, and in the articles relating to oil 
for internal consumption. She now also had a completely 
free hand in disposing of the territory not included in 
the Iraq Petroleum Company's Concession. Against this, 
however, she had, as it proved, given almost all the really 
useful oil areas to the Iraq Petroleum Company and, while 
she had ensm:ed to some extent that that Company would 
not continually retard the development of its 
1. Clauses 12, 16 to 19. 
concession, she was still no nearer to realizing what was possibly 
one of her prime objectives - the construction of a railway to Haifa. 
True, a pipeline would go to that port by 1935 at the latest, but 
1. 
there was no guarantee that the railway would ever be built. 
The Iraq Petroleum Company had certainly achieved its prime 
objective - complete monopoly of all the likely oil resources of Iraq, 
and, while in the economic blizzard of the Depression the price it had 
had to pay for this monopoly in dead rents, fixed sums in lieu of 
taxation, etc., and the obligation to construct a double-branched 
pipeline, may have seemed a little steep, it could nevertheless congratu-
late itself on having got a very good bargain. 
Even the French could have had very few real misgi villb"S about the 
2. 
Agreement, for, in the political circumstances of the time, they would 
have been exceedingly lucky to have secured full control of the outlet 
for Iraq's oil which a sole pipeline to Tripoli would have ensured -
and in any case such control was of very limited practical value 
considering that the source of the oil was entirely outside French 
control. While they had been prevailed upon to give certain guarantees 
concerning Syrian railway construction, they had at least the satisfaction 
of knowing that the construction of a British controlled railway from 
Iraq to the Mediterranean was still as unlikely as it had ever been. 
1. In January 1935 the Standing Ministerial Sub-Committee of the 
Committee of Imperial Defence for Questions Concerning the Middle 
East approved conclusions reached in the previous October that, neither 
on political, economic, nor strategic grounds could the construction 
of a Baghdad-Haifa railway be justified. (CAB 51/1). In 1938 a project 
for the construction of a first class road instead was approved by the 
Cabinet. (Cabinet Minutes, February 23;a:-T938. CAB 23/92. 9(38)5.) 
2. French political and commercial circles were reported to be satisfied 
with the outcome of the negotiations (The "Times" May 27th 1931, 
page 11, col. e). 
The American Government had scarcely concerned itself 
about the revision of the concession, and its much proclaimed 
principle of the "Open Door", long dead in actual practice as 
far as this concession was concerned, was still, to all appearances, 
alive and operative in that most of the area of Iraq was now 
free for disposal to any likely concessionaire. The two 
remaining American Oil Companies forming the American Group in 
the Iraq Petroleum Company were reported to be well satisfied 
with the Agreement. 1 • 
British interests had come out well from the long 
negotiations. A Haifa debouchment for the pipeline freed the 
Anglo-Persian Oil Company from any possible French interference, 
an important consideration should the Company, at some future date, 
plal/to transport any of its Persian supplies direct to the 
Mediterranean. 2 • Also, the Company, in addition to controlling a 
vast concession area in Persia, was now a partner in another 
extensive oil-bearing concession adjacent to it, and it, too, 
would benefit from the advantages, technical and otherwise,3·of 
the change from the 24-plot concession to the very much larger 
blanket concession.4· 
1. Note of a Neeti of the Near East Develo ment Board (the American 
Group in the I.P.C. FO 371 15307 5 294 • For further brief 
comments on the "Open Door" see Chapter 14 below). 
2. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company had earlier feared the imposition 
of taxes on oil piped across Syrian territory (See Note by 
Commander Naund, April 20th 1928. FO 371/13020/7/2177). Also, 
Article 9 of the San Remo Oil Agreement (whereby the French 
claimed 25% of Persian oil piped through French territory) had 
to be reckoned with. 
3. The larger area granted to the Company would facilitate, for 
instance, the proper establishment of unft control practice 
(for which see CJnpter 1 above). · 
4. In view of the larger area involved, the A.P.O.C.agreed (after 
initial reluctance) that its oil royalty, fixed at 10;~ under 
the Red Line Agreement, should be reduced to 7-fty~. ( Longrigg, Oil 
in the Middle East, p.75). ---
The conclusion of the Revised Concession Jioi-r:reement was a def eat 
for the B.O.D. Company's attempt to oust its stronger rival from control 
of the most promising oil areas of Iraq. It had sought to use its 
influence against the Iraq Petroleum Company both in Iraq, and, aided 
by its Italian element, in the League of Nations, and had suffered 
1. 
defeat in both spheres. Nevertheless, all its efforts had not been 
in vain, and it was, in 1931, in a stronger position than any other 
Company with regard to applying for concessions in areas not covered 
by the Iraq Petroleum CompaI:ly's concession, as events were soon to 
2. 
prove. 
What of the British Government's interests and policy? Once 
again it had helped to steer Iraq and the Iraq Petroleum Company safely 
to agreement, thus avoiding the many dire international consequences 
which threatened at every hold-up in the negotiations. By refusing 
to press Iraq to surrender on some issues, but urging compromise when 
necessary, the British Government had to some extent allowed Iraq to 
fight its battles with the Company without thereby so antagonising the 
}'rench that hostility to Iraq 1 s entry into the League of Nations needed 
to be feared from that quarter. In so doing, of course, the British 
1. In October 1931 the League Council decided that, as the B.O.D. 
Company could have resorted to a court in Iraq competent to deal 
with its complaint, the Council could not consider it. (Extract: 
Resolution ado ted b Council of Le October th 1 1. 
FO 371 15308 5 5 32. 
2. The B.O.D. Company secured a concession for areas west of the 
Tigris (see Map at pag-e 392) in April 1932. (See Chapter14,beJ.ow). 
Government had not only been helping Iraq, but had at the same time 
been securing what it considered to be its own interests. 
Yet, one is forced to ask what would have been the outcome had 
Iraq not adopted, as she did, an attitude "more pro-British than that 
adopted by His Majesty's Government", in demanding that Haifa be 
the pipeline terminal? At the time when the Iraqi attitude at last 
became clear (May 1930) the British Government had already decided on 
a policy which seemed to be tantamount to surrender to the French. 
Had Iraq's stand not stiffened the British resistance at this crucial 
point, it seems probable that what the British generally held to be 
a great strategic interest - that a pipeline should carry oil from 
Iraq to Haifa - would eventually have been surrendered. In that event, 
the whole bitter Anglo-French dispute of November 1928 to April 1929, 
coupled as it was with internal strife among British officials, would 
have had to have been regarded as a pointless farce instead of as a 
genuine clash of what each side considered to be its best interests. 
A "pointless farce" might well describe the whole controversy 
over the pipeline question, however. Both the British and the French 
fought doggedly to ensure that the pipeline should run xhrough 
territory under their own control. To some extent they felt that 
whichever alignment was chosen, along that same alignment would be built 
a railway, which would be of use strategically. But, this view was 
also often reversed - and the British at least gave some consideration 
to the building of a railway to Haifa in order to attract the pipeline 
1. 
there. Nevertheless, the strategic arguments of both the British and 
1. See Chapter 10. 
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the French had inherent flaws, for in the British case their much 
vaunted "all-Hed route" for either pipeline or railway would always 
have been subject to cutting by the French in the event of a war 
between the two nations, and, against the :F'rench argument, there was 
the fact that however much control France might have had over a 
pipeline and railway in Syria, she would have had none over the portion 
which necessarily went through Iraq. Only when the two sides were not 
at war with each other, and when only one was at war with a third power, 
did the alignment of the route for the pipeline and railway matter. 
This being the case, it would have been better for the two sides to 
have agreed on some common policy and arrangement to safeguard each 
other's interests (such as, perhaps, the British "surrender" of May 1930 
might have produced) rather than to have struggled pointlessly to secure 
apparent advantages which were in reality of doubtful value. 
The pipeline controversy amply demonstrates the difficulties 
inherent in any situation where international rivalries are present. 
The multilateral tug-of-war within the ~raq Petroleum Company itself 
might well have destroyed that Company as a viable entity, or at the 
very least it might eas·ily have destroyed the authority of its 
Chairman, Sir John Cadman. That Cadman himself survived this difficult 
time, and, despite some passing doubts among British officials, that he 
still maintained his close contacts with the British Government, may 
be regarded (from the British point of view) as not the least satisfactory 
aspect of the outcome of the struggle. 
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CHAPTER 12 
THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THE ANGLO-PERSIAN CRISIS OF 1932-33 
I. The coming of the crisis. 
While the most difficult problems which the British 
Government faced in the late 1920's in its Middle Eastern oil 
policy centred round Iraq and the Turkish/Iraq Petroleum 
Company, nevertheless this was not the only area of difficulty. In 
Persia, too, developments were taking place which were to bring 
problems for the British Government, although matters did not 
really come to a head until late in 1932, when a serious crisis 
over the cancellation by Persia of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's 
1901 concession arose. 
During the 1920's and early 1930's Persia supplied 20-25% 
of Britain's total imports of refined oil products, and 
approximately 75% of Britain's imports of crude oil. However, the 
loss of this source of supply would not have been a major disaster 
affecting Britain's vital interests in the context of Britain in 
peace-time. Even the Admiralty, which normally obtained about 
40% of its peace-time requirements of fuel oil from Persia, 1 ·would 
1. (1924 figure) Memo by First Lord of the Admiralty, January 10th 
~· CAB 24/164 C.P. 20. 
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merely have suffered from higher prices, not deprivation of oil, 
had Persian oil not been available. 1 • 
It was primarily on account of its strategic value in the 
event of a maritime war in the Far East that Persian oil was 
important to Britain. As has been seen in Chapter 2, the war 
plans of the British navy were directed primarily against Japan, 
for which reason the Admiralty had pressed for the construction 
of a naval base at Singapore to which, in an emergency, the 
main Fleet could be sent. During the Fleet's passage to 
that base the strategic location of oil supplies at Abad.an 
would be of prime importance - especially since there was as 
yet no pipeline to transport Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean. When the 
1. This would have been so despite the reduction of 
the general ay,ailability of fuel o~l resulting from 
the development of "cracking". 
Fleet was actually stationed at Singapore, the Persian supply would 
be important also for keeping up the large reserves plarmed for that 
base; no reliance could be placed on Far Eastern oil sources in the 
1. 
event of a war with Japan, and transport from the more distant American 
sources tied up vital tanker tonnage, which could ill be spared. 
The above aspects of the matter must be kept in mind in considering 
the attitude and actions of the British Government in the Anglo-Persian 
crisis of 1932-33, as must the fact that the crisis came while the 
Japanese occupation of Nanchuria was causing the British Government 
to review its thinking on the situation in the :B'ar East. This latter 
fact may possibly have had some marginal influence and have led to 
greater firmness on the part of the British Government in dealing with 
Pe.csia; on the other hand, as will be seen later, the Japanese 
precedent of forceful action tended to make the British even less 
willing to consider the use of force against Persia than they already 
were. 
In December 1925 Reza Khan became Shah Pahlevi, the Q,ajar ruler 
having been ousted from the throne of Persia by an Act passed by the 
Medjlis in the previous October. Reza Khan was thus able formally 
to assume the power and authority he had already been exercising to 
some extent for some years. Persia then entered on an era of 
modernization, the main motivation for which was an intense nationalism 
2. 
and a desire to rid Persia of foreign domination. With such 
1. Report of Oil Board Sub-Committee, ¥.Larch 20th 1929. attached to 
Third Annual Reuort of the Oil Board A ril 26th 1 2 
CAB 24 203. CP 142 29 page 17. 
2. Banani, op. cit., pp. 43-51, 146-159. 
motivation, this period of modernization inevitably brought conflict 
between the rersian Government and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. 
1. 
After 1920 the Armitage-Smith A&TTeement had continued to be the 
basis on which Persia's royalties from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company 
were calculated, but the Persian Government was not entirely satisfied 
with this state of affairs. Sir Percy Loraine wrote in June 1925:-
What the Persians want is increased revenue from the oil royalties, 
and a feeling of security that they are not being swindled, by 
manipulations which they can neither understand nor control, 
in the calculations on the profits basis. 2. 
At this time Sir John Cadman was in Tehran discussing· the question 
(inter alia) with the Persian Government, but no agreement was arrived 
at between the two sides. 
The ?e~sian Government had never had the Armitage-Smith Agreement 
ratified by the Medjlis. As the Persia of Reza Shah began to feel 
itself no longer merely the totally helpless pawn of the Great Powers, 
it was inevitable that the validity of the AsTeement would eventually 
be questioned if Persia did not receive the amount of profit to 
which she felt herself to be entitled. In 1928 the validity of the 
Aoo-reement was definitely challenged by the Persian Government as part 
of its argument that the terms of the 1901 D'Arcy Concession should 
be revised. Although at this point the Anglo-Persian Oil Company 
maintained that the Armitaee-Smith Agreement ~valid, the Company 
1. See Chapter 5 (above). 
2. Loraine (Tehran) to Oliphant, June 1st 1926. FO 371/11498/1194/3853. 
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itself favoured a revision of the concession, particularly with 
regard to e)..--tending the concession's duration. 1. Thus discussions 
on the basis of a revised concession were initiated. 
The British Government, with its controlling shares in 
the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, 2• naturally had a great interest 
in any proposed revision of the 1901 concession, and was kept 
fully informed of the Company's proposals for this. In November 
1928 a Conference of Ministers called specifically to discuss 
the question agreed to allow negotiations to proceed on the 
basis of Persia extending the life of the concession (which then 
had only thirty-two years. to run) in return for Persia being 
granted a block of shares in the Company. 3. Later negotiations 
broke down, however, primarily on the question of how large 
the block of shares was to be. 4• 
1. Shwadran, op.cit., pp.41-42. For a discussion of both the 
Company's and the Persian Government's points of view, see 
Nikpay, op.cit., pp. 468-474. 
2. On the relations between the British Government and the 
A.P.o.c. see above, Introduction, and Chapter 4. 
3. There were, however, doubts expressed in Government circles 
4. 
on the wisdom of giving Persia a shareholding in the A.P.o.c., 
particularly since, it was feared, Iraq would resent this - and 
the pipeline question still had to be settled (Iraq had not been 
given any share participation in the T.P.C., it will be recalled). 
Proceedi s of Conference of Ministers November 20th 1 28. 
CAB 21 306. 
col.b. 
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On April 1st 1931 Teymourtache (the Persian Minister of 
Court) put forward a list of fourteen demands. These included, 
inter alia, reduction of the concession area, cancellation of 
the Company's exclusive right to lay pipelines, Persian 
participation in shareholding, and a minimum annual payment 
under royalty and share participation headings of £2,500,000, 
as well as £200,000 on account of the settlement, together 
with demands for oil at cost prices etc. On July 1st the 
Company officially rejected these proposals, 1 ·and on August 7th 
1. Lockhart's memo pointed out that if the Company had agreed 
to pay Persia the sums she demanded in 1931 it would have been 
left with a mere £17,700 for allocation to reserve and for 
preference and ordinary shareholders. 
(Memo by Lockhart etc. page 4. FO 371/16933/17/182.) 
It is 1rikely that knowledge of the financial gains made 
by Iraq in the Revised Concession of 1931 spurred on the 
Persians to put forward such demands. 
Cadman, feeling that the differences between the two sides were too 
great to be reconciled, suggested, in a letter to Teymourtache, that 
the question of the revision of the Concession should be left over 
"(until) times were more propitious and the present chaotic condition 
1. 
of the oil industry ha(d) disappeared". 
After Au.onust 1931 negotiations between Persia and the Anglo-
Persian Oil Company continued, no longer on the basis of a revision 
of the Concession, but on the narrower problem of the calculation of 
royalties. Failure to settle this problem satisfactorily, and the 
sudden reduction of Persia's royalty from £1,288,312 for the year 
1930 to a mere £306,872 for ·the year 1931, as a result of the economic 
2. 
depression, then led Persia to resort to desperate measures. 
The main story of Persia's unilateral cancellation of the D'Arcy 
Concession and the subsequent Anglo-Persian crisis of 1932-33 has 
3. 
been told in detail by several writers who were able to take full 
advantage of the fact that, since the dispute came before the League 
1. Ibid., p. 9. 
~rding to information supplied in confidence to the writer, 
one of the reasons why no progress was made with the negotiations 
in 1931 was that the Company was not willing to offer a large 
enough gift to Teymourtache and others. 
2. Shwadran, op. cit., p. 42. R.I.I.A., Survey, 1934, p.237. 
3. Notably:- Elwell Sutton, P.er.sllUi .Oil (London, 1955). 
Shwadran, op. cit • 
Nikpay, op. cit. 
R.I.I.A., Survey, 1934. 
of Nations, and was followed some years later (1951) by a (prima facie) 
similar Anglo-~ersian controversy, a great deal of information relating 
to the dispute has been made public. For this reason only a bare 
outline of events will be given here, included primarily for the sake 
of completeness, and in order to make intelligible certain less well-
knovm aspects of the matter. 
It must first of all be pointed out that, in the negotiations 
leading up to the crisis, the British Government played no part -
except as has been indicated in earlier pages of this chapter. 
Although during most of the period of the negotiations the British 
Minister in Tehran was actively discussing with the Persian Government 
various matters, including debt claims, air routes, capitulations, 
1. 
etc., the oil negotiations were at no time deliberately linked 
witp these other matters. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company conducted 
its own negotiations, and doubtless would have resisted any further 
complication of its already complex problems which inclusion in a 
general settlement between the two Governments would have involved. 
The British Government received its first formal intimation 
1. 
See: R.I.I.A., Survey, 193&, p. 223. 
Also, Foreign Office Memo, October 24th 1932. CAB 24/234. CP. 358(32) 
Foreign Office Memo, December 2nd 1932. CAB 24/235. CP 415(32). 
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that serious trouble from Persia might be innninent on October 
21st 1932, in a letter addressed to the Foreign Office by Sir 
John Cad.man. No specific Government action seemed called for 
at this stage, however. 1 • Then, on November 27th the Persian 
Minister of Finance handed the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's 
representative in Tehran a note stating that the Persian 
Government had cancelled the D'Arcy Concession and considered it 
void, but that, nevertheless, the Persian Government"(would) not, 
in principle, refuse to grant a new concession" to the Anglo-
Persian Oil Company. 2• 
The Anglo-Persian Oil Company immediately protested. 
Initially the Company felt, as there did not appear to be much 
actual trouble in the oilfields - although the Company's signs had 
been blacked out - that it would be better to keep the matter 
entirely between the Company and the Persian Government, rather 
than involve the British Government. At this stage, Oliphant 
(Assistant Under-Secretary of State for :B1oreign Affairs) was 
willing to acquiesce in this line. 3. 
1. Cadman to Foreign Office, October 19th 1932. FO 371/16078/3880/5508. 
2. R.I.I.A., Survey, 1934, p.238. 
The prime mover behind this unexpectedly drastic move seems 
undoubtedly to have been the Shah, who was extremely anxious 
to force the Company to some settlement which would give 
Persia more money and thus enable his modernization schemes 
(particularly as concerned railways) to go forward. 
See: Hoare Tehran to Forei Office December rd 2. 
FO 371 1 080 3380 6748. Also Hoare Tehran to Oli hant ~.arch 
11th 1933. FO 371/16937/17/1637. 
3. R.I.I.A. Survey, 1934, p.238. 
Minute by Rendel, November 29th 1932, and _H ... o_ar~e--,..-~~­
Foreign Office, November 29th 1932. 
and 6267. 
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On November 29th, however, Vansittart (Permanent Under-
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) struck out against the 
view then held generally by his colleagues in the Foreign Office 
that the British Government should stand by ahd leave the matter 
to be settled between the Company and the Persian Government. 
"If we do not make ourselves felt at the outset, we shall have 
far worse trouble with the Persians later", he minuted. Later 
he commented (on receiving news that there was little interference 
with the Company's operations at the oilfields): 
This news is better. But H I1 G (sic) cannot keep 
out of it al togethei,, and it is useless to expect 
that we can. Nor. do I think that we should, 
and he urged that "a very strong telegram to Tehran (woula) now 
b 1. e necessary". Vansittart's view was supported by the Cabinet 
as a whole on November 30th, and the British ll!inister in Tehran 
(R.H. Hoare) was instructed to protest at once and to demand the 
immediate withdrawal of the Persian note of cancellation. 2• 
The Anglo-Persian Oil Company, possibly a little surprised 
at the British Government's immediate strong reaction to what 
1. l'iinutes by Vansittart, November 29th and 30th 1932. 
FO 37lfl6078f3880/625s, 6259 and 6267. 
(Vansittart, of course, was consistently a "hard liner" on 
many issues - his positive views on British policy with 




appeared to be a Persian manoeuvre designed to force the Company 
to compromise, initially considered measures by which negotia-
tions might be re-opened. Later, however, the Company decided 
to leave matters to be conducted by His ¥1.ajesty's 
Government, whose recent strong language showed the 
intention of not being browbeaten by the Persians. 
The only point on which the Company would feel uneasy 
would be were His Majesty's Government to modify the 
strong attitude hitherto outlined and then to turn 
to the Company and invite them to build their own 
bridge... 1. 
'rhe British Government had no intention of modifying its 
firm attitude. On December 6th Vansittart reviewed the situation, 
in a memorandum for the Cabinet. It was important, he stressed, 
that Britain did not resort to force at this stage, since such 
action would result in Persia appealing to the League of Nations, 
and the main point at issue would then become the question of 
British aggression against Persia, not Persia's cancellation of 
the D'Arcy Concession, to the obvious detriment of the British 
case. ]\1.rthermore, the use of force would afford too much of a 
parallel with recent Japanese action in Manchuria, and, 
were the matter referred to the Council, His Majesty's 
1. A.P.o.c.) 
December and POSTSCRIPT) 
Government would probably be able to count on the support of 
Japan alone to prevent a unanimous recommendation under 
Article 15 that His Majesty's Government should withdraw 
their troops or cease the forcible action which they had 
embarked upon; and the general concensus of international 
opinion would undoubtedly be that if the action of Japan in 
Nanchuria had weakened and rendered doubtful the efficacy 
of procedure before the League and the Hague Court, the 
action of His Majesty's Government in Persia had completed 
in this respect the destructive work of Japan. 
There was also, Vansittart noted, some danger of involvement with 
Russia should Britain use military force in Persia. The policy of 
the British Government should be to continue to press for the definite 
withdrawal of the Persian notice of cancellation of the Concession 
as an essential preliminary ~o any Company-Persian Government 
negotiations, and, failing a satisfactory response from Persia, to 
1. 
refer the dispute to the Permanent Court of International Justice. 
2. 
On December 7th the Cabinet approved this line of action. 
On December 8th the Persian Government was informed of the 
British Government's decision. In reply, the Persian Government 
related its grievances, and threatened to bring His YJ.ajesty's 
Government before the League on the grounds that that Government had 
resorted to threats and pressure ag-ainst Persia. Thereupon the 
British Government resolved to forestall Persia, and itself submitted 
the dispute to the Lea[,rue Council, under Article 15 of the Leaaaue 
1. :Memo b Vansittart "Cancellation of An~lo-Persian Oil Com 's 
Concession", December 6th 1932. CAB 24 235. CP. 421. 
2. Cabinet Minutes, December 7th 1932. CAB 23/73. 65(32)3. 
Covenant, on December 14th. The dispute had now definitely 
become an issue between the British and Persian Governmen~ 
tentative moves by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company to get negotia-
tions going between its represent~tives and the Persian 
Government were therefore blocked until a settlement satisfactory 
to the British Government could be reached. 1 • 
II. The new Concession Agreement. 
The cancellation of the D'Arcy Concession led to a renewed 
appraisal of defence sche~es for the South Persian oilfields. 
Up to this time all such schemes had been geared to a situation 
where aggression against the oilfields was expected to come from 
marauding bands against which the protection of the Persian 
Government had become inadequate. They had not envisaged 
aggression .!?z the Persian Government. On December 7th 1932 the 
Cabinet therefore suggested that attention should now be given 
2. to that latter contingency. 
On December 12th the Joint Planning Sub-Committee of the 
1. R.I.I.A., Survey, 1934, pp.239-240. 
Forei Office to Hoare Tehran December 2-rd 1 2 (also 
Foreign Office Minutes • FO 371 16080 3880 6744. 
Article 15 of the League Covenant begins:-
"If there should arise between Members of the League any 
dispute likely to lead to a rupture which is not submitted 
to arbitration as above (i.e. Articles 12 and 13), the Members 
of the Leae;ue agree that they will submit the matter to the 
Council ..... 11 
2. Cabinet Minutes, December 7th 1932. CAB 23/73. 65(32)3. 
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Chiefs of Staff Sub-Connnittee of the Conunittee of Imperial 
Defence produced its Report. It concluded that the forces then 
available were not sufficient to protect the Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company's pipeline to the Gulf if the Persian Government decided 
to seize it, and reinforcements to regain it would take several 
months to arrive. The Report therefore suggested an initial 
three-phase operation, involving the initial evacuation of 
personnel, and then, later, possible bombing of military objectives 
- though the Report also warned of the possible repercussions of 
such actions on, for instance, Russian policy in Persia, and the 
internal situation in Iraq~ The Cabinet, however, merely took 
note of the Report, postponing any action until it was seen how 
t 
1. he situation would develop. 
On January 24th 1933 the League Council appointed Dr. Benes, 
of Czechoslovakia, to be its Rapporteur on the dispute between 
Britain and Persia, and on January 26th spokesmen for both sides 
in the dispute argued their respective cases. 
2
• 
1. Report of the Joing Planning Sub-Committee of the Chiefs of 
Staff Committee "Protection of the An lo-Persian Oil Com an 's 
Property" December 12th 1932. CAB 24 235. CP. 430. 
Cabinet Minutes, December 14th 1932 CAB 23/73. 67(32)3. 
Nuch has been made in accounts of the Anglo-Persian dispute 
of the fact that British warships appeared in the Gulf at the 
time of the crisis. It is difficult to tell from the available 
documents, however, to what extent the sending of the ships 
was a deliberate act designed to impress the Persians (as most 
writers allege or imply that it was). 
2. R.I.I.A., Survey 1934, p.240. 
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The aim of the British Government at this stage was not 
so much to secure a decision against Persia in the dispute (except 
as a last resort), but rather it was to get a suitable formula on 
which negotiations between Persia and the Company could proceed; 
there were to be no negotiations on the basis that the Concession 
had been cancelled. 1 • On January 31st Persia accepted the 
Rapporteur's formula of suspension of action before the League 
while negotiations were begun between the Persian Government and 
the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, without prejudice to the position 
ta.ken by either side. If there were no decision by Nay, when the 
Council was next in session, the Council would again consider 
the matter; meanwhile, the Company's operations were to continue 
. p . unh 0 d d 2 • in ersia in ere • 
On February 4th Persian Government and Company representa-
tives met in Paris, but no agreement could be reached, and 
negotiations were therefore transferred to Tehran. 3. In April 
1. Forei Office Memo on 
January 11th 1933. FO 
2. R.I.I.A. Survey, 1934, pp.240-242. 
H.M. Consul at Geneva Mr. Eden to Forei Office Jan 1st 
.!.222.• telegs. numbers 37 L.N. and 38 L.N. 
FO 371/16935/17/645 and 646. 
3. Note of Proceedi ~s at Geneva between Persian and Com an 
representatives, February 4th 1933. FO 371 16936 17 1235. 
Cadman to &ien, February 13th 1933. FO 371/16936/l T/933. 
385. 
the Tehran negotiations ran into trouble, to be saved, however, by 
the direct intervention of Cadman with the Shah: 
Sir John convinced His Imperial Najesty that neither the 
Anglo-Persian Oil Company nor any other oil Company could 
possibly exploit the Persian oil fields on the basis of 
the Persian proposals.... 1. 
The Shah then consented to be present at the next meeting of the 
negotiators, when he 
consigned the Persian proposals to the waste-paper basket 
•••• (and) concluded that the proposals of the company 
would provide a solution of lasting benefit to both 
sides. 2. 
:Most of the main issues were settled at that meeting, 
although the very important question of the duration of the 
concession had to await the outcome of a further exchange of 
views between Cadman and the Shah. After various difficulties 
in drafting, the AgTeement was finally signed on April 
30th. On Nay 28th it was ratified by the Medjlis, and 
received the Shah's signature the following day. 3. 
1. Off ice Fi.a 
2. Ibid. 
It seems likely that the Shah's anxiety to push forward his 
modernization schemes, for which he would need A.P.O.C. money 
from royalties etc., led him to aim for a settlement at this 
juncture rather than let the matter drag on. 
(See above, page 378 , fo0tnote 2 ). 
Hoa.re 
38'6. 
'11he dispute between the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and the 
Persian Government was thus settled amicably. While the part 
played by the two principal protagonists in the Tehran negotiations, 
Sir John Cadman and Heza Shah, was obviously of great importance in 
securing the final settlement, the part played by Vansittart at the 
outset was also crucial, and the comparatively rapid settlement of 
the dispute would seem to some extent -to vindicate Vansittart's 
policy. 
1. 
The new Concession AgTeement was a far more comprehensive 
document than the 1901 D'Arcy Concession, and its provisions were 
much more detailed. Articles 1 and 2 gave the Ang·lo-Persian Oil 
Company exclusive exploitation rights in a_r1 area coverine the 
2. 
southern half of the original D'Arcy Concession until December 31st 
1938, by which date the Company was to select from this area "one 
or several areas of such shape and such size and so situated as the 
Company may deem suitable", of a total area not exceeding 100,000 
square miles. Thereafter the Company's right to search for and 
extract ~etroleum was to be confined to the selected areas. Article 
3 :;ave the Company the right to construct pipelines in Persia, but 
this was no longer to be an exclusive right. 
The Persian Government was to receive payment from the Company 
on the basis of an annual royalty of four shillings for every ton of 
1. Text in: Hurewitz, op. cit., pp. 188-196. 
2. This was marked on a map attached to the AgTeement. (See Map at 
page ~81,) 
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PERSIA AND THE REVISED CONCESSION AREA (1933) 
The 1933 Concession comprised allthe area south of the so-called 
"Violet Line" until December 31st 1938. After that date the 
Concession consisted of the areas shown (shaded). 
M!P EreEared from a map supplied by the British Petroleum Conpany, 
the latter map being a copy of a map located in: - I .c .J. Pleadings,· 
Anglo-Iranian 011 Co. Case, Memorial submitted by the Government 
of the United Kingdom ••• ·Vol. 2, Appendix 22 to Annex 3. 
petroleum either sold in Persia or exported. In addition, the 
Persian Government was to receive a sum equal to 20'~S of the distri-
bution to ordinary stockholders in excess of ~671,250. The total 
annual payment under these two headings was never to be less than 
1. 
£750,000. Provision was made for adjustment of the payments in 
the event of fluctuations in the value of sterling as compared with 
2. 
gold. For the first thirty years of the new concession period 
the Company was to be exempt from taxation, in consideration of 
payment of nine pence per ton for each of the first six million 
tons sold, and six pence per ton thereafter for the first fifteen 
years, after which these payments were to be increased to one 
shilling, and nine pence, respectively. 'rhese payments were never 
to fall below an annual total of £225,000 (£300,000 for the second 
3. 
fifteen years). 
Article 15 gave the Persian Government the right to appoint 
a "Delegate of the Imperial Government" who was to be present at all 
meetings of the Company Board. 1l 1he period of the Concession was to 
be from the date of its coming into force to December 31st 1993 
(Article 26). Part of Article 21 read:-
1. A.rticle 10, I, a, b, c, ('Ibe figure £671,250 was the equivalent 
of a 55{ dividend.) 
2. Article 10, V. 
3. After the first thirty years, new arrangements were to be made. 
Article 11, I. 
This Concession shall not be annulled by the Government, 
and the terms therein contained shall not be altered 
either by eeneral or special legislation in the future, 
or by administrative measures or any other acts whatever 
of the executive authorities. 
1. 
Differences between the parties were to be settled by arbitration. 
In settlement of all past claims the Company was to pay the 
Persian Government the stun of £1,000,000, plus an adjustment for 
Persian taxation claims. In atldition, royalty payments for the 
years 1931 and 1932 were to be adjusted by basing calculations for 
2. 
those years on Article 11, I, (a) of the new Ag-reement. 
"Neither the Persians nor the Company emerged from the 
agreement with decided adva.nta;J;es one over the other, as compared 
3. 
with the D1 A:rcy concession11 , writes B. Shwadran. This is certainly 
true. W1nile on the one hand the Persian Government had undoubtedly 
secured what had been its main aim, a much more satisfactory basis 
for the Company 1 s payments than under the D1 Arcy concessioh, together 
with some (though limited) share in the profits of the Company as a 
1. Article 22. 
2. Article ?3. 
The provision regarding the guaranteed minimum royalty payment 
(Article 10) was not to apply for these years. Total payments 
to Persia for 1931, which under the D1 Arcy Concession had been 
assessed at £306,872, were, under the new .Agreement, £1,339,132. 
(Shwadran, op. cit., pp. 42 and 163) 
(This gives some idea of the financial advantages (to Persia) of 
the new Agreement.) 
3. Shwadran, op. cit., p. 56. 
whole, on the other hand the Company had also secured its main aim -
an extension of the life of the concession. Against the fact that 
the Company had had to surrender its exclusive exploitation rights 
over much of the area of the 1901 Concession was the undoubted 
advantace that, with a free hand to select its areas, the Company 
would be able in practice to retain control of nearly all the likely 
oil-bearing land in Southern Persia. Both Persia and the Anglo-Persian 
1. 
Oil Company could be well satisfied with the outcome, the latter in 
particular being able to derive as much satisfaction from the onerous 
2. 
terms it had avoided havine to make as from its actual gains. 
The British Government, too, could congTatulate itself on the 
conclusion of the dispute. The old"gunboat diplomacy" of the previous 
century being outmoded and impracticable for the Britain of the 1930's, 
the British Government had had perforce to rely on more pacific 
means of settling disputes with such nations as Persia. The results 
on this occasion were gratifyine, for not only was the dispute quickly 
settled, but it was settled amicably, and the British Government's 
vital interest in the matter - protection of the 1-'ersian source of 
naval oil supplies - remained secure. 
1. For a detailed comparison of the gains and losses made by each 
side in the dispute see R.I.I.A., Survey 1934, pp. 243-24i 
Elwell Sutton, op. cit., pp. 80-87. 
See also Rendel to Shedden Australian Liason Officer A st 2nd 
1222· FO 371 16938 17 4248. 
2. :b1or example, the Company was still exempt. from Bersian taxation 
(except for the payments made under Article 11, I) and customs 
dues. Also, at one time the Persians had claimed the right to 
appoint as many as 4 directors to the Company's Board 
(Rendel to Sheddon, August 2nd 1933. FO 371/16938/17/4248). 
The crisis of 1932-33, however, brought home to the British 
Government facts which had until then been only vaguely apprehended. 
Until Reza Shah had taken full control of Persian life and develop-
ment, Persia had been of little account as a political or a military 
force. However, in the last few years, Britain now realized, Persia 
ha(d) changed conside~ably in that there (was) now a strong 
central government in Tehran and Persia must be regarded as 
a definite military entity. (Furthermore) recent events 
(had) shown that trouble with the Persian Government over the 
oilfields (might) occur with very little warning... 1. 
It was thus necessary, it appeared, for Brita.in to take account of 
these facts, and to include them in its scheme for defence of what it 
considered to be a vital interest, the South Persian oilfields. As 
2. 
the emergency scheme of December 12th 1932 had remained merely as a 
bare outline plan, it was therefore considered advisable to give 
attention to its further development. Consequently, on April 11th 
1933 the Joint Planning Sub-Committee of the Chiefs of Staff Sub-
Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence was asked, as a first 
step, 
to prepare plans for the recapture and subsequent defence 
of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's property in Persia, and 
that the question of considering any extension of those 
operations should be deferred until this investigation was 
completed. 3. 
1. Report by Joint Planning Sub-Committee of the Chiefs of Staff 
Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, "Defence 
of the South Persian Oilfields" A ril 8th 1 "7 
CAB 53 23. C.O.S. 305 J.P.) 
2. See above. 
3. Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee Papers prepared for use of the 
Chiefs of Staff in the Annual Review for 1 : Annexure • pp.31-32 
CAB 53 23 C.O.S. 306. 
392. 
Eventually, however, the idea of a_evelopinz the scheme of December 
1932 in such Et way was not pursued, and instead defence planning 
reverted to the old basis of meeting only the contingency of th~ 
Persian Government lapsing once aGain into such a state of weakness 
that it would be unable to protect the Anglo-Persian Oil Company from 
such threats as dissident tribesmen, maraudinr; bands etc. One 
reason at least for this decision was the satisfactory nature of the 
1. 
new Concession Agreement reached in April 1933. 
2. 
After an initial setback, British prestige in the Eiddle East 
did not appreciably suffer as a result of the Anglo-Persian crisis, 
but, to British military planners at least, Britain's inherently 
weak hold on the situation in that part of the world had been exposed. 
Britain had not the military strencth on the spot to deliver a short, 
sharp rebuke to any antagonist, and the le11uo-th of time that it would 
have taken to build up sufficient strength to be able to do this 
would have eiven ample opportunity for her political enemies to 
1. Report by Joint Planning Sub-Committee of the Chiefs of Staff 
Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence "Scheme for 
Defence of the South Persian Oilfields" Ma 1 th 1 
CAB 53 23. C.O.S. 334 J.P.) and C.O.S. 335 J.P. 
2. For example, the Sheikh of Kuwait, who had been approached by 
the .Ahglo-Persian Oil Company on the subject of an oil concession 
in his territory, was showing a marked reluctance to come to 
terms early in 1933. The Forei&rn Office felt that one reason 
for the Sheikh's attitude was the damage done to both the A.P.O.C's 
and the British Government's prestige in the Gulf by the Persian 
cancellation of the D'Arcy Concession. 
(Minute by Rendel, Narch 4th 1933. FO 371/16835/12/1196.) 
39.3.:'. 
muster their propaganda, and, perhaps, their military weapons 
against her. rrhus, while Britain could perhaps still have played 
the dominant political role, it is very doubtful if, had a serious 
crisis come, she would have had the military strength to maintain 
that role - at least, as lon8' as she had remained without po\·rerful 
1. 
allies. 
1. Britain's forceful action in Persia in 1941 was carried out in 
conjunction with Russia. Such action would have been impossible 
in any other circumstances. 
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CHABTER 13 
BAJffiEIN, KUWAIT, ilill - THE. BEITISH EMPIRE'S OIL LEASING POLICY 
I. Bahrein and British oil leasing policy. 
As has been seen in previous chapters, British oil policy 
durine the period of this study was usually the resultant of 
several opposing policies put forward by the different Government 
Departments. Thus, for example, while on the one hand the 
Admiralty usually advocated a policy which gave almost exclusive 
consideration to the Admiralty's strategic needs, on the other 
hand Admiralty desiderata often ran counter to the political 
desiderata of the Foreign Office, and this evoked opposition from 
that Department. 
The struggle within British official circles to determine 
the policy of the Government is well illustrated in the issue of 
the leasing of oil-bearing territory within the British Empire 
as a whole, and in territories such as Bahrein and Kuwait. In 
order to complete the story of Britain's Niddle F.astern oil policy, 
some detailed examination of these issues is necessary. 
Mention was made in Chapter 2 of attempts in the early 1920's 
to rationalise the rather haphazard "policy" of the British 
Empire with regard to the leasing of oil-bearing territory, all of 
which attempts came to nothing. The status quo was maintained, 
and as far as the records show there was no further discussion of 
the matter for several years. In 1929, however, three things 
conspired to raise the question again in British circles. These were, 
firstly, an attempt by American oil interests to gain an oil concession 
in Bahrein. Secondly, a note from the American Embassy, dated 
April 3rd 1929, which dealt with this subject (the proposed American 
oil concession in Bahrein), and which, furthermore, asked for a 
statement of the British Governrnent· 1 s general policy on the operation 
of concessions by foreigners in British controlled territories such 
1. 
as Bahrein. Thirdly, a request by the Governor of British Guiana 
that His Majesty's Government waive the restrictions in that colony 
2. 
on the development of oil-bearing territory by foreign capital. 
The question of policy in British Guiana might well have been 
settled immediately by the waiving of all restrictions on foreign 
capital, had it not been for its probable bearing on future policy 
3. 
in Trinidad. The Bahrein question was in some respects similar, 
but here the question was less simple because, unlike British Guiana, 
Bahrein was not a British colony. Whatever control Britain had of 
1. Memo b7 :Mr. Atherton U.S. Char 0 d'Affaires 
FO 371 13730/281 1697. 
2. Petroleum De t. her.io "Oil Concessions in British Colonies 
and Protectorates: British Control of Com anies" n.d., 
probably May 1929 FO 371 13540 252 3407. 
Interest in oil prospects in British Guiana grew after indications 
of the presence of oil were found in a water boring. 
(Petroleum Dept. Memo, July 1929. FO 371/13540/252/4591.) 
3. The Admiralty objected to the waiving of restrictions in British 
Guiana (because of Admiralty interest in Trinidad oil development). 
Note of Inter-De artmental Meeti · Ma th 1 2 
FO 371 13540 252 3408. 
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Bahrein derived (legally) only from certain treaty obligations and, 
in the case of oil concessions, from a specific promise by the 
Sheikh (in 1914) not to grant any concession without British 
Government approval. 1 • 
Britain's interest in Bahrein was mainly on account of its 
being one of a chain of Gulf sheikhdoms whose independence Britain 
wished to see maintained in order that her own control of the Gulf 
should not be jeopardised. Of itself Bahrein was of limited 
strategical value, and the Admiralty did not place much value on it 
as a naval base; it could, however, serve as a useful link in Britain's 
air route to the East. 2 • The British Government's concern over possible 
American entry into Bahrein was rather because such entry would give 
the Americans a foothold in the Gulf, which might lead to further 
encroaclunent, and to consequent political repercussions, than because 
of any belief that worthwhile oil deposits existed there.3· 
1. The Sheikh of Bahrein first signed a treaty with Great Britain 
in 1820; this was followed by others in 1861, 1880 and 1892, 
which gave the British Government a considerable degree of 
control over the Sheikh's actions. 
See Memo b on the Forei Polio of His Ma"est 's 
Gdvernment submitted to Chamberlain A ril 10th 1 26, in 
D.B.F.P., Series lA, Vol. I, p.865. 
For the Sheikh's promise see D.H. Finnie, Desert Enterprise, 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1958), p.34. 
2. Re ort b Chiefs of Staff "The Persian Gulf" October 11th 1 28. 
CAB 53 1 • C.o.s. 179. 
Air Ministry to Foreign Office, December 28th 1927, and 
Admiralt to Colonial Office Januar 
FO 371 12997 51 51 and 352. 
3. Bahrein was not generally considered to be a promising source 
of oil in the 1920's. 
In December 1925 a British Company,the Eastern and General 
1. 
Syndicate, obtained a concession from the Sheikh of Bahrein covering 
an area of approximately 100,000 acres. Two years later, after 
unsuccessful attempts to interest British companies, the Syndicate 
signed a contract with the Gulf Oil Company of Pennsylvania whereby 
the latter Company acquired an option to take over the concession. 
In December 1928 this option was transferred to the Standard Oil 
Company of California, which then organized.a Canadian subsidiary 
2. 
to take over the concession. 
In October 1928 the Eastern and General Syndicate approached 
the Colonial Office on the question of securing a one year's extension 
3. 
to its prospecting licence, which was due to expire in December 1928. 
Thereupon the Colonial Office, concerned to prevent transfer of the 
concession to American interests, informed the Syndicate that the 
extension would only be allowed if the concession were modified so 
as to include a "British Control Clause". To this the Syndicate 
objected, on the grounds that such a clause would be unacceptable to 
1. The Eastern and General Syndicate was registered in 1920, 
in London. See: W.R. Skinner, The Oil and Petroleum Manual 
(London, 1925), p. 75, and G.W. Stocking, Middle East Oil 
(London, 1971) p. 70. 
2. F.R.u.s., 1929, III, p. 80. 
(The Gulf Oil Company of Pennsylvania was a member of the 
American Group in the Iraq Petroleum Company, and was therefore 
subject to the restrictive provisions of the Red Line Agreement, 
in which area Bahrein was included.) 
3. It had already been renewed once, from December 1927. 
1. 
the American company to which the concession was to be transferred. 
'rhe '~ri tish Control Clause" was a series of provisions which 
had been incorporated into certain oil leases in Trinidad in order 
to ensure British control of an extremely useful source of oil within 
the British l!Jmpire ('rrinidad' s annual oil production passed the one 
million ton mark in 1928). Under these provisions it was provided 
that the lessee should be and remain a British Company, registered 
• 
in IIis Najesty's dominions; the managing director and a majority 
of the other directors of the leasing Company, as well as the local 
manager and a proportion of the staff, should be British subjects; 
neither the Company nor the premises comprised in the lease were to 
be controlled, directly or indirectly, by foreigners; there was to 
be no change in these provisions (which were usually incorporated 
in the :Memorandum and Articles of Association of the Company) without 
2. 
the consent of the Governor. The British Control Clause was, if 
3. 
necessary, generally applicable in CrO\m colonies; its application 
1. Eastern and General Syndicate to Colonial Office, October 22nd 
19~8 and Colonial Office to Eastern and General S dicate November 
~~d 1928. FO 371 13017 3239 5414 and 5638. 
2. Petroleum Dept. Nemo, "Oil Concessions in British 
Protectorates: British Control of Com anies" n.d. 
May 1929 FO 371 13540,252 3407. 
3. Strictly, the British Control Clause applied where oil rights were 
the property of the Crown. Thus it applied in:-
Trinidad - the Crown held three quarters of all the oil rights. 
Other Crown Colonies - all mineral rights were reserved to the 
Crown. 
Burmah - the Crown held all the oil rights. 
India - the Crown held most of the oil rights. 
(lEJ-2..) 
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in such a territory as Bahrein, however, was a somewhat different 
matter. 
The Petroleum Department, which from 1919 to 1923 had vainly 
sought to put British oil leasing policy on a more rational 
basis, again took the initiative, and it concerned itself as 
much with the question of general policy as with the particular 
cases of Babrein and British Guiana. In addition to initiating 
discussions with the other Government Departments, the Petroleum 
Department also sought the views of the main British oil companies 
on the general policy question, evincing replies which generally 
favoured the abandonment of British restrictions on development 
b f . . 1. y oreign companies. 
Inter-departmental discussions on general leasing policy 
found the Service chiefs opposed to radical changes. On the 
question of Bahrein, however, there was, eventually, general 
agreement that opposition to the participation of American 
interests in the Bahrein concession should be abandoned, on 
certain conditions, which were to be worked out; 2 • Later, 
1. to H.W. Cole Pet. De 
(Trinidad Leaseholds) 
2. Note of Inter-De artmental Committee Neeti 
FO 371 13540 252 3408. 
(As noted, the Admiralty, the Department most interested in 
oil policy, had no great strategic interest in Bahrein. Hence 
the :B1oreign Office, concerned for Anglo-American relations, 
had little difficulty in getting its view accepted). 
401. 
discussions on the subject of these conditions began between the 
Colonial Office on the one hand, and the Eastern and General 
Syndicate and the Standaxd Oil Company of California on the other, 
final agreement being reached in 1!1ebruary 1930. 1. 
The main conditions agreed were that the company formed to 
take over the Bahrein concession was to be and remain a British 
Company, registered in Canada; one of the five directors was to 
be a British subject persona grata to the British Government; the 
Company's chief local representative (who alone was to be responsible 
for the Company's dealings with th~ local authorities) was to be 
a person approved by the British Government, and as many employees 
of the company as possible should be either British subjects or 
subjects of the Sheikh of Bahrein. 2• On June 12th 1930 the 
Eastern and General Syndicate signed an agreement which 
incorporated these conditions with the Sheikh of Bahrein, and then 
transferred its rights to the Bahrein Petroleum Company, the 
Canadian subsidiaxy of the Standaxd Oil Company of California. 3. 
1. for the negotiations between June 1929 and February 1930, see:-
FO 371/13730/file 281/paper number 3091 to end of file. 
FO 371/14454/file 28/paper numbers 28 to 726. 
2. Colonial Office to Eastern and General S dicate Feb 8th 
1930. FO 371 14454 28 726. 
See also the Draft Agreement at FO 371/14454/28/1331. 
3. Shwadran, op.cit., p.374. 
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Meanwhile, the Petroleum Department had completed a 
memorandum setting out the advantages and disadvantages of a 
change of Britain's general oil lands leasing policy,giving as its 
conclusion that 
the balance of advantage now (lay) in the direction of 
admitting foreign capital within the Empire on more 
generous terms than ha(d) been the case in the past. 1. 
Sw;gestions for the basis of future policy were also made, aiming 
to make it possible for foreign capital to be invested in oil 
concessions on British territory, while at the same time the 
British Government would retain certain safeguards which would 
enable it, when necessary,to exercise some control over the 
companies' activities. The Admiralty's interests would be 
safeguarded to some extent by a refinery clause, which was 
designed to encourage the setting up of refineries on British 
territory and thus widen the Admiralty's network of supply 
2. sources. 
The Petroleum Department's memo was acceptable to all 
Departments except the India Office, which maintained a lone 
1. Petroleum Department Nemo, "Oil Concessions 
Colonies and British Control of Com anies" 
2. The main suggestions included (a) Transfer of leases to be 
subject to British Government approval; (b) Admission of foreign 
interests only on a reciprocal basis; (c) Companies to be 
British-registered, and the majority of employees to be British 
subjects; (d) At least 50'}S of the oil obtained to be refined 
on British territory; (e) British Government right of pre-
emption in an emergency. 
(Ibid.) 
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stand against any change of policy applying to India. 1 •nowever, 
although the Cabinet in October 1930 approved the memo in 
principle, it was decided that discussion of details was to be 
reserved until after discussion at the 1930 Imperial Conference.
2
• 
In the event, however, no such discussion took place at the 
Confer~nce, and the matter was left in abeyance. 3. 
1. The India Office was concerned because Indian capital was, 
2. 
at that time, backward; if foreign capital were allowed 
into India, it was feared that it would leave nothing 
worthwhile for Indian capital (when it had attalned strength) 
to develop. Also, the India Office pointed out, as long as 
Indians were subject to_ disabilities with regard to lancll1olding 
in the United States, it would be difficult to get the Indian 
legislature to accept the idea of allowing American citizens 
to acquire rights in India. 
:Memo on the Grantin of Oil Concessions in British India, 
November 1st 1 29 enclosure in Petroleum De artment to :B1orei 
Off ice Ma 1 th 1 0 • 
FO 371 14295 3435 3435. 
October 
10. 
3. (However, the question of British Guiana was resolved by 
a Cabinet decision to lift the embargo on foreign 
development in that particular colony. 
Cabinet Ninutes December rd 1 O. 
CAB 23 65. 71 30 6 • 
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The raising of the question of the oil concession in 
Bahrein had thus resulted in what turned out to be inconclusive 
discussions on Britain's general oil leasing policy. While the 
Bahrein issue itself had been satisfactorily resolved, the w~y 
had not yet been cleared for the emergence of any definite general 
policy for application in all cases. Any new case which might 
arise would, it seemed, still have to be judged entirely on its 
merits and some agreed policy determined. British oil policy 
was thus still, in many aspects, very empirical. 
II. Kuwait. 
Soon after the Bahrein concession question had been 
resolved, another problem of policy for the British Government 
came to the fore. The Eastern and General Syndicate had for 
several years been endeavouring to obtain an oil concession from 
the Sheikh of Kuwait, and in AUonust 1930 it sent to the Colonial 
Office a copy of a draft concession it int~nded to submit to the 
Sheikh. Included in the draft concession was a clause providing 
for the transfer of the concession, when obtained, to any other 
company, under conditions based on those finally agreed to in the 
Bahrein concession. The Syndicate, in sending this draft, asked 
1. 
for an opportunity to discuss the matter with the Colonial Office. 
1. Colonial Office 
405. 
It was obvious that the i3yndicate desired to transfer any 
concession which it might obtain to another American company. 
The British, however, were at first not pre1)ared to acquiesce so 
easily this time, and 1:1ere determined instead to use the hold 
which they had over the Sheikh, by reason of a promise made in 
1913 not to grant any concession without the approval of the 
British Government, l. to its fullest extent. Kuwait was, unlike 
Bahrein, of great strategic importance in itself., situated as it 
was at the head of the Gulf, and the prevention of foreign interests 
from getting a foothold there had long been considered of 
importance. There was also another difference between the case 
of Bahrein and that of Kuwait, in that, whereas in the former 
case a concession had already been granted when the question of 
transfer arose, in the latter case this was not so. There 
was thus the possibility that British interests might be willing 
to compete for the concession and an overt stand against American 
interests might then be avoided. 2• 
The British Government's problem appeared to be reasonably 
easy of solution when it was reported that the Sheikh of Kuwait 
1. For the Sheikh's promise see Hurewitz, op.cit., Vol. I, 
pp.272-273. 
2. The status of Kuwait was similar to that of Bahrein. The 
British Government signed a treaty with the Sheikh of Kuwait 
in 1899. See D.B.F.P., Series lA, Vol. I, page 865. 
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had refused, on his own initiative, to countenance any non-
British company holding the concession, and that he had further 
insisted that the British Control Clause be inserted in any 
concession which he might grant to the Eastern and General 
Syndicate. 
1
• All that the British Government needed to do was 
to refuse to advise the Sheikh to change his mind; this policy 
was agreed to by all Departments in December 1930. 2 • 
On July 2nd 1931, however, the Sheikh sent a letter to 
Major Holmes, the Eastern and General Syndicate's representative, 
which seemed to indicate that the Sheikh was willing to omit the 
British Control Clause if the British Government would agree to 
its omission. 3. In consequence, the Syndicate then wrote (on 
August 4th) to the Colonial Office asking whether, in view of 
the Sheikh's letter, the British Government would waive its 
1. According to the Political Resident, the Sheikh was emphatically 
against foreign (i.e. non-British) interests coming into his 
territory, because of the difficulty of dealing with them in 
the event of trouble (difficulties with British subjects could 
always be adjusted via the Political Agent). 
(Political Resident Bushire to Colonial Office November th 
1930. FO 371 14484 4914 630. 
2. See various items of inter-departmental correspondence in 
FO 371/14484/4914/6630. 
3. A photostat copy of the Sheikh's letter (which was in Arabic) 
and of a translation into English made by the official trans-
lat er of the Iraqi Government, is located at FO 371/15277/325/6439. 
Part of the letter reads (in translation):-
"if you and your Company agree with H.M.'s Government on 
the said clauses ••• and it allows you to omit them, 
then we shall have another opportunity of discussing 
matters with you." 
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objection to the grant of a concession without the British Control 
Clause. The reply which the Syndicate received, however, was 
evasive, as the Colonial Office, which had been supplied with 
conflicting information as to the Sheikh's real attitude, wanted 
1. 
to be absolutely certain of the position before committing itself. 
At this point the Anglo-Persian Oil Company stepped into 
the picture. It is a curious fact that, apart from carrying on 
some half-hearted negotiations with the Sheikh in the early 1920's, 
that company had up to this point shown very little interest in 
K •t 2. uwai • On August 25th 1931, however, the Company informed 
the Petroleum Department that it considered the prospects of oil 
existing in Kuwait to be now "perhaps somewhat less remote than 
ha(d) hitherto been the case", and the Company asked for 
permission to undertake a survey in the area. 3. 
1. The Political Resident in the Gulf, for instance, saw the 
Sheikh's letter as merely a device used by the Sheikh to get 
rid of the Eastern and General Syndicate's representative for 
a while. The Sheikh later told the Political Resident that he 
stood by his earlier declaration that the British Control 
Clause must be inserted in any concession which he granted. 
(Political Resident Bushire to Colonial Office, November 3rd, 
1221· FO 371 15277 325 6260. 
2. See various letters, minutes etc. under the following 
references:-
FO 371/6258/769/12104. FO 371/7717/510/510, 1361, 1444. 
FO 371/8941/67/5144. FO 371/8945/121/7959. 
August 25th 
not in the 
"Red Line area", so the A.P.O.C. would not be bound to share 
any concession it gained with the I.P.C. members. 
'l1his was very welcome news to the British Government, since it now 
meant that the Sheikh would have to consider the Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company's application as well as that of the Syndicate. 
The Colonial Office's uelay in replying to the Eastern and 
General Syndicate's letter of AUf,rust 4th, however, aroused the United 
States Government to intervene, the Charge d'Affaires, Atnerton, 
making representations on the subject on December 3rd 1931. In the 
American view, American interests had the ri.c;ht to participate in 
the development of Kuwait's oil resources on an equal footing with 
British interests, and, stated.Atherton, the American Government 
hoped that the Colonial Office would be able to satisfy the Eastern 
and General Syndicate in the matter of the British Control Clause 
1. 
which, the Syndicate held, was no longer insisted on by the Sheikh. 
The question was discussed at inter-Departmental meetings 
early in 1932, when the policy to be adopted should the .Ang·lo-
Persian Oil Company decide, after its survey, not to pursue the matter 
further was considered. At first both the Colonial Office and the 
India Office advocated the.maintenance of the stand against the entry 
of American interests into Kuwait. The India Off ice eventually 
modified its view after a communication from the Government of India 
1. Memo by Oliphant, December 4th 1931. FO 371/15277/325/6011. 
F.R.u.s., 1932, II, pp. 1-2. 
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had declared its belief that "the balance of advantage (lay) in 
(the) admissibility of American interests", since American capital 
in the Gulf "(would) make for stability and peace". 1. The 
Colonial Office, however, maintained its stand that the British 
Control Clause should be retained, while the :F'oreign Office, 
worried in case such a line should lead to another bitter Anglo-
American oil controversy, urged moderation. 2 • 
Up to this point the Service Departments had not been 
consulted on the question, but, on being informed of the issues, 
the Air Ministry and the Admiralty came doi.m in support of the 
Colonial Office line. At.an inter-Departmental meeting on Narch 
11th 1932 one of the Admiralty representatives, Admiral Dreyer, 
stated that the Admiralty was "seriously perturbed" at the proposal 
to abandon the British Control Clause, and he str~ssed the 
advantages of having an oil source at Kuwait under British control. 
Oil at Kuwait would be a useful alternative to Abadan, said Dreyer, 
and it could readily be brought under effective control by naval 
1. Government of India Forei 
Office, Pebruary 25th 1932. 
to India 
2. Ninute by Roberts, December 30th 1931. FO 371/15277/325/6350. 
Memo b Warner Janu r 1st 1 2. FO 371/15277/325/6414. 
See also FO 371 16001 121 261, 496, 647. 
(Note: The records give a rather confusing picture of what 
departmental attitudes actually were. The int~rpretation 
given here is an attempt to simplify the issues, and is felt 
to be, for the purpose of this study, essentially accurate). 
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forces. "In the event of Russia occupying the Persian oilfields, 
it would be possible to fall back on Kuwait ••• ,"he argued. 
Instead of abandonine the British Control Clause, the Admiralty 
felt that it ought rather to be streng~hened; the conditions as 
specified in the Bahrein concession were, the Admiralty felt, 
insufficient to safeguard British interests. 1 • 
In combatting some of the Admiralty's arguments, Oliphant 
(Assistant Under Secretary of State in the I11oreign Office) 
pointed out that there was, anyway, no certainty that there would 
be any oil at Kuwait, and, as for the position vis-a-vis Russia: 
Supposine the Russians occupied the Persian oilfields, 
His :Majesty's Government might well be in a better 
position if they were associated with the United States 
Government in the matter than without them. 
2. 
On A~ril 6th, following renewed American approaches, 3.the 
matter was put to the Cabinet. The Foreign Office view was that 
a "dog in the manger" attitude would be indefensible,both from the point 
1. Record of a meeti at 
dated Harch 12th 1 2 
2. Ibid. 
11th 1 2 
3. For the series of Anglo-American exchanges on the Kuwait 
issue up to this point, see F.R.u.s., 1932, II, 
pp.1-13. 
(il:-•. 
of view of relations with the United States and with regard to 
British obligations to protect the Sheikh of Kuwait's interests. 
The Americans should be told, the liloreign Office felt, that the 
British Government would not insist on a clause confining the 
concession to British interests, although it would reserve the right 
to examine any concession to ensure that it was in the Sheikh's best 
interests. Against this view, the Admiralty insisted that full 
British control should be ensured by, inter alia, the inse.rtion of a 
provision that at least 50 per cent of the capital in the company 
1. 
operating the Kuwait concession should be British. 
A compromise was reached, however, between the two sides. 
The Petroleum Department had pointed out that approval had been given, 
in October 1930, to the principle of replacing the British Control 
• 
Clause by five specific conditions. On the Foreign Office's acceptance 
of the five conditions for inclusion in the Kuwait concession terms, 
the Admiralty then agreed to drop its insistence on 50 per cent of 
the capital being British. 'l1he Cabinet therefore decided that, after 
enquiries had been made as to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's attitude 
1. Cabinet ~linutes, April 6th 1932. CAB 23/71. 20(32)6. 
2. ((ba) Transfer of leases to be subject to British Government approval. 
( ) Admission of foreign interests only on reciprocal basis. 
(c) British registration, and majority of employees to be British. 
(d) At least 50% of oil refined on British territory. 
(e) British Government right of pre-emption). 
(See above). 
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to the concession, the Americans should be told that the British 
Government would not insist on a clause confining the Kuwait 
concession to British interests, but that the actual concession 
terms as so fa:c drafted would need revision. 1 • 
The Anglo-Persian Oil Company was not at this time very 
enthusiastic about Kuwait's oil prospects, and, in fact, Cadman 
told Oliphant on April 11th 1932 that the Junericans were "welcome 
to what they (could) find there." 2 • Nevertheless, the Company 
persisted in its efforts, and submitted a draft concession to the 
Sheikh - an action which was now unwelcome to the Foreign Office, 
which feared further compl_ications with the United States. 3 • 
the 
In the end the Anglo-American struggle for/Kuwait oil 
concession was settled by a compromise arrived at by the 
rival compai!ies themselves. After negotiations which 
lasted, intermittently, throughout 1933, the American 
Company (the Gulf Oil Corporation) and 
1. Cabinet Minutes, April 6th 1932. CAB 23/71. 20(32)6. 
The Foreign Office note to the American Charge d'Affaires was 
sent on April 9th, before the A.P.O.C. had been approached. 
Text in F.R.u.s., 1932, II, pp.14-16. 
Also: FO 371/16002/121/1733. 
2. Memo by Oliphant, Auril 11th 1932. FO 371/16002/121/1897. 
3. to Dickson (Political Agent, Kuwait) 
2. 
see also Foreign Office fl'linutes. FO 371/16002/121/3589.) 
the Anglo-Persian Oil Company agTeed to share the concession equally, 
1. 
forming the Kuwait Oil Company for the purpose. On Harch 5th 1934 
the Kuwait Oil Company siened a Political .Agreement with the British 
Government, and obtained a concession from the Sheikh of Kuwait on 
2. 
December 23rd of that year. 
r11he Political AgTeement of Ha.rch 5th 1934 included provisions 
that the Company and any transferee or subsidiary company that might 
be formed should ge and remain a British company, registered in the 
British Empire. The concession was not to be transferred without 
the prior consent of the British Government, and in any case was not 
to be held by a company the ·capital of which was less than fifty 
per cent British. The Company's employees were to be, as far as 
possible, Britisn subjects. In addition, the British Government 
was to have the right of pre-emption of all oil produced in time of 
emergency, and the company was to construct a refinery, if commercial 
3. 
conditions justified it. 
This was, in effect a modified British Control Clause,. 
incorporating sufficient safeguards to satisfy even the Admiralty. 
1. Shwad.ran, op. cit • , pp. 387-388. 
Stocking, op. cit., pp. 114-116. 
See also:- FO 371/16003/121/6830. FO 371/16835/file 12/v~ious 
papers. 
FO 371/16836/file 12/various papers. 
FO 371/16837/file 12/various papers. FO 371/16840/156/7783. 
FO 371/18905/19/59. 
2. The concession was for 75 years, and covered the whole of Kuwait. 
(Gtocking, op. cit., p. 117). 
3. Ninth Re ort of the Oil Board October , pages 8-9 
CAB 50 5. O.B. 134. 
Sir John Simon F.o. to Sir A. R an Jedda Jan th 1 ~ 
FO 371 18905 19 59. 
(The fact that the A.P.o.c. had a 50% share under the Gulf Oil -
A.P.o.c. agreement made it easier to include the proviso abmut 
50'fa British capital). 
It would not have been possible, however, for the British Government 
to have secured quite such a satisfactory outcome to the Anglo-
American struggle had it not been for the willingness of the two 
rivals concerned to cooperate. An outright victory for the British 
Company might have been very welcome to the Admiralty, but it would 
in all probability have worsened Anglo-American relations in the 
Middle East - at a time when the American entry into that area was 
1. 
beginning in real earnest. 
Durin{:'.,' the time that the struggle over Kuwait was proceeding 
there was some further discussion on the question of establishing 
a comprehensive policy for the leasing of oil lands within the British 
Empire. Although, strictly speaking, Kuwait was not part of that 
Empire, it was nevertheless a factor in the Foreign Office's attitude 
towards the broader question of Imperial oil policy, and to some 
extent it induced the Petroleum Department to continue to take the 
initiative in this matter. Thus, despite some initial Colonial 
Office resistance, the efforts of the Foreign Office and the Petroleum 
Department succeeded in securing some agreement on the question of a 
change to the more liberal policy advocated in the Petroleum Department's 
2. 
memo of 1930 (see above) coming before the Ottawa Conference of 1932. 
1. (see Chapter :14·, below). 
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In the event, however, the matter was never raised at the 
Ottawa Conference. Again the matter fell into abeyabce, and the 
Empire's oil leasing policy remained the untidy patchwork it had 
always been. 1. 
Conclusions 
On the question of a comprehensive policy for the Empire with 
regard to oil leases, the bar to progress was not only the conflict 
between the British Government departments on the question - to some 
extent that had been resolved in 1930 - but it was the need to get 
the cooperation of the rest of the Empire on which the matter 
foundered. This proved to be difficult not because of any 
intransigence on the part of the Empire's constituent units - although 
certainly objections could have been expected from India - but 
because of the difficulty of getting the question discussed at 
all under the pressure of other more important business. 
Perhaps, as seems thus to be implied, the question of having 
a comprehensive oil leasing policy for the Empire was not really very 
important. Nevertheless, as the haphazard leasing policy so far 
1. In July 1936 it was announced in Parliament that restrictions 
on foreign companies prospecting in British colonies would be 
removed, subject to certain restrictions, as from September 1st 
1938. By the outbreak of the Second World Wi:µ-, however, there 
was still no uniform policy throughout the Empire as a whole. 
(Parliamentary Debates, (~ __ of. C) 5th Ser.'·· Vol. 314 (1935-6) 
cols. 1407-1409. 
(See also PO 371/16613/466/1897. FO 371/19833/file 629/various 
papers~ . 
pursued. had shoi.m its elf incapable of sit;.rnificantly reducing the 
Empire's dependence on outside oil sources, the more liberal policy 
· proposed by the Petroleum Department could hardly have made matters 
worse. It might even have produced some significant improvement. 
The Empire seemed incapable of producing more than a small 
1. 
amount of oil. At the same time, owing to financial stringency, 
the Admiralty could not secure (as noted in Chapter ~e ·) the full oil 
reserves that it needed. Surely, therefore, the Admiralty reasoned, 
whatever oil was likely to be found on British controlled territory 
should be made secure by guaranteeing its control by British interests. 
In the cases reviewed in this chapter, however, the Admiralty's 
desiderata could only have been met at the cost of a worsening of 
relations with the United States, and, in the end, some compromise 
had to be reached. 
r.I.1he British strl..lg'gle for Niddle Eastern oil was not merely a 














(If Persia (6,549,000) included, grand total = 10,126,000 metric 
tons) • Not all of this would be available for the Admiralty, of 
course, since, in particular, the Indian and Canadian production 
was completely absorbed by local requirements. 
(Figures from Dlmstan, The Science of Petroleum, Vol. I, pp.22-23). 
struggle against the other different interested nations, but it was 
also an internal struggle of policies, and even of ideals. In the 
conflict between the Admiralty and the Foreign Office, for example, 
one might perhaps see glimpses of a wider conflict - a conflict 
between the traditional concept of Britain as a dominant power in 
the world and. the more realistic concept of 3ri tain in slow decline 
from dominance in the changed situation of the Twentieth Century. 
To the AdJniral ty, as long as the l~leet was in being and obtained its 
desiderata, Britain could still dominate any situation likely to arise. 
To the Foreit:,11 Office, however, this was no longer true, and t~1ey 
could at least vaguely discern that the world was no loneer for 
Britain what it had once appeared to be. 
SUMIJAil.Y AND CONCLUSIONS 
In 1931 the United States Government made approaches to Britain 
with the aim of securing equal treatment for American :na.tionals 
regarding applications for an oil concession in the area of Iraq 
1. 
not covered by the Iraq Petroleum Company's revised concession. For 
various reasons, however, the Iraq Goverrunent prefer:red to negotiate 
2. 
with the B.O.D. Company rather than with any other interest, and on April 
20th 1932 it gxanted to the B.O.D. Company a concession for an area 
covering the vilayets of Hosul and .Baghdad west of the river Tigris 
3. 
and north of the 33rd parallel. This was the end of Anglo-American 
exchanges on the question of an "Open Door" for Arnerican'~oil interests 
in Iraq. 
On Nay 31st 1932 oil was struck in quantity on Bahrein island, 
and, moreover, the oil was of good quality. This gave added 
1. F.R.u.s., 1931, II, pp. 604-611. 
2. The Iraq Government was worried in case rejection of the B.O.D. 
Company's offer would result in Italian opposition to Iraq's 
entry into the League of Nations. (The B.O.D. Company had 
contained a strong Italian element since August 1929.) 
Minute by Sterndale Bennett, Pebruary 12th 1932. FO 371/16042/250/637. 
3. Shwadran, op. cit., p. 249. 
A copy of the text of the concession is located at FO 371/16042/250/2218. 
See the Map at page 3q2. 
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incentive for companies to consider seriously the possibility that 
the whole of the Arabian east coast might contain considerable 
deposits of marketable oil. In the resultant struggle for 
concessions the Americans came off best, and their entry into the 
Middle East oil situation, hitherto restricted by having to 
compromise in one form or another with British interests, began 
in earnest. 
How far had Britain's oil policy in the Middle F.ast been 
successful up to this point? 
In 1919 Britain had faced the problem of securing for the 
future sufficient supplies of the now demonstrably vital commodity, 
oil. The British .Empire's oil resources were minimal, and therefore, 
in order to reduce her dependence on wholly foreign sources, Britain 
had sought to ensure control of the (as yet unproved) oil resources 
of the Middle East, an area in which, primarily for other reasons 
than oil, she had established herself. 1• The methods used by 
British Government officials to achieve this aim, however, were 
highly empirical, and were designed rather to meet immediate, 
pressing problems -· .: than to secure any carefully formulated 
long-term aims. Nevertheless, haphazard as such methods might 
appear, there can be little doubt that they were the only ones 
which were at all practicable in the political circumstances of the 
1. The Middle East had long been important to Britain, since it lay 
astride the route to India. Before the First World War Britain 
had generally supported Turkey a..gainst foreign, particularly 
Russian, encroachment on the area, supplementing this policy by 
the extension of British influence into Persia and the Gulf, Aden, 
etc. With the collapse of the Turkish Empire in 1918,Britain 
considered it necessary to extend her influence and physical 
presence into the power vacuum left by this collapse - primarily to 
protect her lifeline with India and Australasia. 
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time. 
By 1932 Britain did not dominate the Middle Eastern oil 
situation to anything like the extent which had seemed likely in 
the immediate aftermath of the First World War. The immediate 
post-war dreams of "permanent British control" of Iraqi oil had 
quickly vanished under the dual onslaught of American and French 
claimsr notwithstanding the British Government's early, and rather 
confused, plans for, inter alia, exploitation by State enterprise. 
In 1932, however, British interests still retained the largest 
single share in the Iraq Petroleum Company, which was a registered 
British Company. Moreove~, the fact that that Company still 
remained in existence as a viable unit, after all the international 
bickering over participation, the rights of Gulbenkian, the difficult 
pipeline issues, and despite the complications involved in the 
Mosul question, represented, to some extent, a success for Britain's 
oil policy. 
That the Iraq Petroleum Company gained the concession it 
sought was to no small extent attributable to British Government 
policy. British Government support for the Company's by no means 
indisputable claims in the immediate post-war years was essential 
to the Company's survival, and later was of considerable importance 
in the concession negotiations of 1923-25. By avoiding direct 
intervention, except on occasions when intervention was considered 
to be absolutely necessary to prevent a breakdown, the British 
Government managed to steer those negotiations to a conclusion. 
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Here, in so far as Britain definitely desired that the Company 
should be granted the concession, this was a definite success. 
British policy was similarly successful in the negotiations leading 
up to the grant of the Revised Concession of 1931, despite the 
apparent handicap Britain incurred by her pledge to France not to 
intervene between Iraq and the Company with regard to the pipeline 
1 . t 1. a ignmen • 
However this might be, since Britain had at this time certain 
definite obligations to protect Iraq's interests in these 
negotiations, the verdict of success for British policy must be 
qualified somewhat. Brita.in allowed the Iraq Petroleum Company to 
conclude negotiations in 1925 without providing for Iraqi participa-
tion in the Company, and, in 1931, she (possibly unwittingly) 
allowed the Company to gain control of practically all Iraq's 
oil-bearing lands. Had the Iraq Petroleum Company been a purely 
British concern, this last qualification of the British Government's 
success might have been considered as enhancing that success (in 
the sphere of oil policy), but, as has been pointed out in an 
earlier chapter, the multi-national character of the Company makes 
sto.Y\d to 
it a debateable point whether Britain did no~gain more from Iraqi 
2. 
gains in the concession negotiations than from those of the Company. 
1. See Chapter 10, Section v. 
2. See page 247, footnote 2. 
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Although in 1932 Britain's legal opportunities to control Iraqi 
policy were somewhat lessened by the termination of the Mandate, 
in practice this made little difference. The British bad never, in 
any case, wholly dominated the Iraq Government's actions {after 
1922), and such control as they had maintained in the period 1922-32 
was not fundamentally altered by Iraq's admission into the League 
of Nations, since Iraq was still bound to Britain by a close 
t t f 11 . 1. rea y o a iance. In the last resort, therefore, a certain 
strategic control of Iraqi oil could be secured, which was 
important now that Iraqi oil was no longer merely a theoretical 
possibility, but a proved fact, and a pipeline to transport it to 
the Mediterranean, half of it going directly to a port under British 
t 1 . f t t' 2 • con ro , was in process o cons rue ion. If, as was seeming 
rather more likely at this time than hitherto, a war with Japan 
were to occur, the British navy would have a ~~ntee!:.source of oil, 
additional to Persia, directly on the route to the Fast. 
In this respect, then, British oil policy had achieved one 
of its prime aims in the sphere of Imperial strategy. However, as 
pointed out earlier, 3. it is a matter for conjecture whether this 
1. A Treaty of Preferential Alliance between Britain and Iraq, 
signed on June 30th 1930, came into operation on Iraq's admission 
to League of Nations membership. (Text: Hurewitz, op.cit., Vol. 
II, pp. 178-181). 
2. The pipeline was completed, and oil put through it, in 1934· 
3. Chapter 11, Section IV. 
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aim would not have been achieved equally well, and much more 
smoothly, without the whole rather farcical business of the Anglo-
French controversy over the pipeline and railway alignment. 
Moreover, if it really was a vital British interest that the pipeline 
should terminate in British, not French, territory (and the Labour 
Government of 1929-31 obviously had doubts on this score) then, 
in the event, British interests were served better by her protege, 
Iraq, than by the British Government. 1• 
In Persia, British interests had maintained their hold on 
the country's oil resources, which had not belied their early 
promise but instead had developed into a very important source of 
oil for Britain and her Empire. The repeated attempts by the Royal 
Dutch-Shell interests to gain control of Persian oil, via the 
companies' amalgamation proposals, all came to nothing, and the 
British Government wisely clung to their much coveted shares in 
the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, thereby not only making financial 
gains, 2• but also ensuring the maintenance of the Company as an 
entirely British concern. This last consideration was important, 
it should be noted, not only for Britain's interest in Persian oil, 
but also for Britain's interest in oil elsewhere, especially in 
Iraq.3• 
1. See Chapter 11. 
2. In December 1932 it was stated in Parliament that the British 
Government had received a total of £9,997,344 in dividends and 
interest up to that point. 
(Parliamentary Debates (Hof C) 5th Ser.,Vol.273,(1932-33)Col.8.) 
In addition, of course, the Admiralty must have made a consider-
able saving on expenditure on fuel oil under the 1914 contract 
(for example, rebate due in 1921 was £153,530; by the time of the 
revised Admiralty-APOC agreement of 1928 (Chapter 11-) the annual 
rebate had risen to £245,000). Murra Admiralt to Secret to 
H.M.Treasu;y,January 26th 1928). ADMll 2318.C. CP.3730 28. 
3. Since, of course, the A.P.o.c. had the largest stake in the I.P.C. 
(Also, the A.P.O.C. had oil in the "Transferred Territories") 
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The struggle to gain the North Persian oil concession for the 
Anglo-Persian Oil Company ended in failure, but, on the other hand, 
no other interest succeeded there either. However, in view of 
the inevitable Russian hostility which would have been engendered 
had the Anglo-Persian Oil Company succeeded in its claim, it is 
questionable whether it would have been in the best interests of 
the British Government (or the Company) to have secured 
consummation of that claim. Oil in such an area in any case was 
of very little, if any, strategic value to the British Empire, while 
1. 
its purely commercial exploitation was fraught with difficulties. 
1. See pp. 194-195 above. 
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In 1924 Britain had lost an ally, the Sheikh of Mohannnerah, 
as a consequence of the growth in power of the Persian Government, 
and this had created a gap in Britain's scheme for defence of the 
Persian oilfields. This gap was more than filled by the Persian 
Government itself, however, but the fact that Persia had now arisen 
from her former decadence, and could no longer be dominated by 
Britain, meant a weakening of Britain's hold in this area. Never-
theless, when faced by the Persian Government's challenge in cancelling 
the D'Arcy concession, the British Government's policy was firm, 
and Britain secured not only a rapid settlement of the matter, but, 
also, she prevented any pennanent loss of her prestiee in the Niddle 
East. 
Elsewhere British oil policy had also achieved a certain 
amount of success. True, Britain had been forced to allow American 
interests into Bahrein, and, shortly after 1932, American interests 
secured a footing in Kuwait, but in neither of those areas were 
American interests allowed free rein, and, in any case, Britain still 
maintained her traditional influence over the rulers of those 
territories. 
Renewed interest in eastern Arabia after the Bahrein oil strike 
of 1932 led to British anxiety in case American interests should 
attempt to gain an oil concession in the Qatar peninsula, thus, as in 
the case of Bahrein and Kuwait, introducing a foreign element into 
the chain of British protected Gulf sheikhdoms. In the end British 
policy ensured that the concession went to the Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company (in 1935), whence it was transferred to an Iraq Petroleum 
Company subsidiary (unc1er the .ned Line Agreement). British interests 
were secured by means of a political agreement similar to that 
1. 
concluded in the case of Kuwait. 
Other areas in the Middle East where oil concessions were of 
some significance during the period ending in 1932 were Egypt and the 
J:i'arsan Is lands • In the first of these, Egypt, although oil production 
had started in 1911 it never attained an annual figure of much more 
than a quarter of a million tons, all of it controlled by a rloyal 
2. 
Dutch-Shell subsidiary. Britain, by retaining control of EgyJ?t, 
retained physical control of this production also. 
The Farsan Islands were of transient importance around 1927, 
when a Shell subsidiary drilled, unsuccessfully, for oil, a.nd faced, 
amongst its challenges, attempts by Italian interests to establish 
themselves there. Some Anglo-Italian exchances took place on the 
subject, Britain being worried over possible Italian naval develop-
ments in the iied Sea area, but the whole matter subsided in a 
1. Copies of the Qatar Oil Concession Agreement of Nay 17th 1935, 
and of the Political Agreement between the Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company and the British Government, June 5th 1935, axe located 
at }10 371/19967 /35/1044. 
(It should be noted that, in the case of Qatar, purely 
British interests suffered by reason of the application of 
the I.P.C. Red Line Agreement, since British interests held 
only part of the I.P.C. shareholding·, as opposed to the purely 
British holding in the A.P.o.c.). 
2. Longrigg, Oil in the Niddle East, pp. 22-24, 94-97· 
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comparatively short time, with no impairment to British interests.1• 
In the .Arabian territories of Ibn Saud the period up to 1932 
did not see any outstanding developments regarding oil concessions, 
although there was a certain amount of activity in the area, 
notably by the Eastern and General Syndicate. 2• Until 1932 it 
could be said that British desiderata were met in this area in so 
far as no foreign oil interest had established itself there. 
The picture up to 1932 is thus one of reasonable success for 
Britain's oil policy in the Middle East. While Britain had not 
achieved all she would have liked to have achieved, she had 
nevertheless suffered no disastrous defeats and, moreover, she 
had an interest of one sort or another in every ton of oil derived 
from the area. 
This picture of success is true, however, only up to a certain 
point. In the greater part of Arabia Britain's hold on the 
situation had become very tenuous. Whereas in 1919 the fragmented 
political state of Arabia had allowed Britain to exert a strong influence 
on the actions of the several rulers, the later growth of the power of Ibn 
Saud, as he gradually extended his control over the whole peninsula, led 
3. 
to a considerable weakening of British influence there. By the time of 
1. D.B.F.P., Series lA, Vol.II, pp.841-862. 
Cabinet Minutes July 21st 1926, CAB 23/53. 47(26)1. 
Re ort b Chiefs of Staff Sub Committee "Position in s.w.Arabia", 
November 8th 1 2 CAB 24 182. CP.377 2 • 
Also FO 371 1147 2660/4258. FO 371/13001/65/3851. 
2. Colonial Office Memo on the Hasa, Kuwait, and Neutral Zone 
Concessions, April 1933. FO 371/16s70/4s7/2147. 
3. By the Treaty of Jedda, May 20th 1927, the British Government 
recognized "the complete and absolute independence of the dominions 
of His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Depend-
encies" (Article 1). Text in Hurewitz, op.cit., Vol. II, pp.149-
150. 
the formal unification of Hedjaz and Nejd into the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia (September 1932), what influence Britain still had over Ibn 
Saud was certainly not sufficient to enable the British Government 
even to try to secure the inclusion of safeguards for British 
interests in any concession which he mie-ht grant in his territory. 
Thus it was to be a straight fight in 1933 between American interests 
and the Iraq Petroleum Company in bidding for a concession for the Hasa 
province; the Americans' greater re2,diness to furnish Ibn Saud with 
1. 
the gold which he demanded was to be decisive, and a purely American 
company, unfettered by any semblance of a British Control Clause, 
was thus able to secure what subsequently turned out to be one of the 
richest oilfields in the Niddle East. 
Britain's success in her oil policy in the period ending in 
1932 thus does not seem quite so clear cut when viewed in the light 
of the situation which was to obtain immediately afterwards. However, 
this does not alter the fact that, overall, .Britain's Niddle Eastern 
oil policy ~ reasonably successful. Why was this so? 
Britain's Niddle Eastern oil policy obviously could not have 
succeeded without the broad basis of political influence which Britain 
had long maintained in the area, and which was enhanced during the 
1. Shwad.ran, op. cit., p. 290 (and note 11 thereon). 
Longrigg, Oil in the Hiddle East, pp. 107-108. 
}.i1irst World \iar by force of arms. This was especially true of Iraq, 
where the British presence after 1918 was of fundamental importance 
in the oil question, ensuring not only that Nosul, with all its rich 
oil deposits, remained in Iraq, but also enabling Britain to push 
forward with some confidence the rather dubious claims of the 
Turkish Petroleum Company. The problem of securing Iraqi oil for a 
company in which British interests were strong was difficult even 
with the British Government as mandatory for Iraq, for, as the 
concession negotiations show, the Iraqi Government was no mere tool 
of the British. Without such political influence on the situation, 
the outcome for British interests of the international struggle for 
Iraqi oil might well have been defeat. 
In Persia, too, Britain's influence was an important factor 
in the fortunes of the .Ang·lo-Persian Oil Company. Here, however, 
other forces were also at work. '11radi tional British influence 
tended, whilst acting as a support for the Company, to attract Persian 
hostility also. In addition, the knowledge that British Government 
support would always be forthcoming in an emergency might well have 
made the Company far too complacent in its dealings with the Persian 
Government, an attitude which could have contributed to the 
development of the Anglo-Persian crisis of November 1932. 
Had Egypt developed into a prolific source of oil, the British 
presence there would, of course, have guaranteed British control. In 
the Persian Gulf, too, Britain's political influence ensured that 
the coastal sheikhdoms did not dispose of any likely oil concessions 
1. 
without the express concurrence of the British Government. As has 
1. In 1922 the India Office requested the Government of India to instruct the 
Political Resident at Bushire to obtain from the Trucial Coast sheikhs 
promises regarding oil concessions similar to those given(in 1914) by 
the Sheikhs of Bahrein and Kuwait. India Office to Vicero India, 
Februa.r th 1 ~2. FO 371/7717/510 1361~ For some of the agTeements 
7723/6279/6279, 6705. FO 371/7815/7/3949). 
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been pointed out, however, the rise of Ibn Saud to a status which 
precluded the dominance of British influence over his actions meant 
that Britain's interests would not necessarily be safeguarded in any 
oil concession granted in Saudi Arabia. 
An extremely important aspect of the British Government's 
oil policy was that Government's close relationship not only with the 
Anglo-Persian Oil Company but, notwithstanding its international 
composition, with the Turkish (later Iraq) Petroleum Company. The 
key figure in both these relationships was Sir John Cadman, who, 
long after leaving Government seryice, maintained close contact with 
such men as Oliphant, an important figure in the determination of 
the Foreign Office's attitude to oil questions, with Baldwin, and with 
other Government officials. Cadman was, in a way, the British 
Government's "Trojan Horse" in both the Anglo-Persian and the Iraq 
Petroleum Companies. It was, significantly, at the British Govern-
ment 's sw:;gestion that Cadman was first appointed to the Anglo-Persian 
Oil Company Board and, later, designated as Chairman to succeed Sir 
1. 
Charles Greenway. The British Government no doubt also promoted 
Cadman's candidature for the post of Chairman of the Iraq Petroleum 
Company. 
With Cadman in such a key position, British Government influence 
in two of the most important oil companies engaged in the Niddle East 
1. See Chapter .4, above. 
was as high as it could be without direct Government interference. 
Without access to Cad.man's mm personal records, however, it is 
impossible to assess exactly what effect this had on the situation, 
but it was no doubt considerable, as the discussion of the pipeline 
controversy has indicated. Cadman's influence must therefore be 
considered to have been an important factor in the general success of 
Britain's oil policy during the period ending in 1932. 
As has been seen in this study, Britain's oil policy was often 
confused, indecisive, and liable to swift changes of front. The 
picture conjured up by some writers of the British Government having 
followed some deeply laid, highly developed plan to gain control of 
all oil sources within reach can thus be seen to have been very far 
1. 
from the truth. As a general bacY~.rround influence on Government 
policy the growing importance of oil, both in the British economy 
and, particularly, as a strategic material vital to the navy, was 
of course strong, but it was by no means sufficient to override other 
broader considerations. Thus, for instance, Admiralty clamour for 
a highly restrictive policy against American entry into Kuwait, and 
the move by some Government Departments to secure, at all costs, a 
Haifa alignment for the Iraq-Hediterranean pipeline, ignoring likely 
1. It should be noted that there was no particular difference in 
oil policy between the Conservative -and Labour governments of 
this period. :rhe latter governments were perhaps rather less 
willing to sanction financial expenditure on strategic oil 
projects than were the former, but any such difference was 
only marginal a.TI:d cannot be said greatly to have affected any 
particular issue witlh which this study has been concerned 
(ignoring the Singapore base issue in 1924, which was not 
primarily an oil question). 
consequential dama{~·e to Britain's international relations, did not, 
in the end, decide British policy. Instead, British policy was 
generally determined by consideration of just how far Britain could 
go along the lines demanded by the more militant departments (usually 
the Admiralty, often supported by the other Service Departments, 
and sometimes by the Colonial Office, the India Office and the 
Petroleum Department) without incurring too much hostility from the 
other important Powers concerned. 'rhus, }]ri ta.in' s oil policy was a 
compromise between two opposed desiderata, namely, that Britain's 
strategic oil interests should be safeguarded, and that satisfactory 
Anglo-American and Anglo-:E1rench relations should be maintained. 
Alongside this, of course, considerations of financial economy, and 
the need to keep on 0·ood terms with :Middle Eastern rulers, also played 
a part. 
The very flexibility which British policy possessed in 
consequence of its diversity of origin was one reason for its success. 
Had it been more rigid, determined less by empirical methods and by 
internal, often highly controversial, discussion than by any previously 
formulated overall plan, British oil policy might well have alienated 
the two Powers who counted most in the sphere of hiddle East oil, 
1"rance and the United States. Compromise with those two Powers was 
absolutely necessary in the post-1918 era, and, for the British 
Government, compromise proved to be the key to success. 
There remains, however, one aspect of Britain's Middle Eastern 
oil policy not so far considered in this assessment. In 1932 the 
British navy's oil reserves were still very far behind the originally 
laid dovm schedule for completion, and neither the Royal Air :Force 
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nor the Army had any petrol or other oil product reserves which 
related even remotely to probable war-time needs. Although 
Britain had learned the lesson of oil's importance to the modern 
nation at war in the bitter conflict of 1914-1918, nevertheless, 
fourteen years after this conflict had ended, she still gambled 
with her chances of survival. Without adequate oil reserves in 
the places where they were needed, Britain, even with the whole 
of Middle Eastern oil at her command, would still have run the risk 
of a disastrous defeat in the event of war. By running that risk, 
the British Government rendered meaningless much of its Middle 
Eastern oil policy. 
Before leaving this study, it may be useful to consider very 
br~efly the question of how far oil considerations affected Britain's 
international relations and general policy in the Middle East during 
the period covered, although, it is emphasised, no systematic 
attempt has been made in this study to place Britain's oil policy 
in that context, and what follows here is therefore somewhat 
conjectural. 
In view of the manifest importance of oil during the First 
World War, it can be inferred that oil considerations played a gTeater 
part in Britain's international relations and general policy in 
the Middle East than they had done in pre-war yea.rs. Nevertheless, 
their influence should not be exaggerated. Naturally the presence, 
or suspected presence, of oil in the Middle ]Jast enhanced the 
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importance of that area in British eyes - but Britain would still 
have been extremely interested in the Middle East, for reasons of 
general Imperial strategy, had the area been thought to be 
completely barren of oil. In this writer's opinion the history of 
British influence in the Middle East during the period 1919 to 1932 
would not have been different in any major aspect had oil not been 
involved at all. For example, Britain would still have gone into, 
and remained in Iraq, and would still have secured Mosul for her 
protege, even had oil been of no consideration whatsoever. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that oil considerations 
exerted no influence. On the contrary, such considerations tended 
to make Britain's relations in the Middle East with, in particular, 
France and the United States, even more important than they 
otherwise would have been. Oil considerations also enhanced the 
importance for Britain of maintaining good relations with Persia 
and the other Niddle Eastern states. 
As noted in Chapter 3, Britain's relations with the United 
States in the years immediately following the Armistice were 
embittered by, amongst other things, the question of Mesopotamian 
oil. Yet, the advent of oil as a vitally important strategic 
material made the maintenance of good relations with the 
United States, as the world's major source of oil, even more 
necessary than hitherto to Britain - a fact which was underlined 
when Britain paused to contemplate the possible danger to her Empire 
1. 
from the growing might of Japan. 
Britain's relations with France in the Middle East were 
especially important, with or without any considerations of oil. 
Certainly the British desire for Hosul was partly due to lmowledge 
of the vilayet's possible oil potentialities, but, oil or no oil, 
the British would have done their best to overturn the Sykes-Picot 
Agreement, which awarded Nosul to };ranee, as soon as they had 
2. 
cleared out the Turks from the vilayet late in 1918. Throughout 
the period 1919 to 1932 Anglo-French jealousy over oil was a minor 
source of friction in the mutual relations of the two countries; 
only during the bitter Anglo-French pipeline controversy over Cadman's 
letter of November 1928, however, did it threaten to become anything 
3. 
more serious. 
Britain's interest in Persian oil naturally lent added 
importance not only to Anglo-Persian relations, but also to Anglo-
Russian relations. Yet, notwithstanding Britain's dependence on 
Persian oil in the event of a Far Eastern War, Persian oil was by 
no means the only reason for avoiding Anglo-Russian friction in 
Persia. As ever, Britain sought to avoid anything which might tend 
to threaten the security of her prime Imperial possession, India. 
1. See Chapter 2~, above. 
2. See Chapter 3, above. 
3. Chapter J.Q, , above. 
Thus, long before oil had come on the scene, Britain's policy in 
Persia had been aimed at keeping Russian influence to a minimum; 
the advent of Persian oi1 merely added a further reason for 
maintaining that traditional policy. 
Britain's policy in the Persian Gulf and in the Arabian 
Peninsula had long been aimed at preventing the growth of any 
foreign influenccttl.ere. That policy di~ not chanGe with the coming 
of the oil age except that, as with other areas, oil considerations 
tended to reinforce the need for such a policy. Soon, however, the 
area was to be invaded by American oil concessionaires, events which 
indicated not so much that Britain's policy in the area had changed, 
but that Britain's ability to enforce that policy had, and, moreover, 
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APPENDIX III. 
AMERICAN OIL PRICES 1913-1934. 
Source: Figures for the graphs are derived from a graph in:-
Waley-Cohen, "Economics of the Petroleum Industry, 
II in 
Institution of Petroleum Technologists, Petroleum: TwentI.,: 
five Years' Retros Eac t, p. 24. 
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.BIBLIOGHAPHICAL NOTE 
As mentioned in the l;'ore1,1ord, the most important source of 
information for t(lis study has been the British .Foreign Office 
papers in the i.:ublic Hecord Office, London. In addition to Foreign 
Office papers, Cabinet records, including the records of the 
Co~Jnittee of Imperial Defence and its sub-committees, have also 
• 
been invaluaole. Admiralty documents have been found useful, while 
certain Treasury files reveal aspects of Government-Company 
relations on wl1ich the other. Departments' papers are silent. 1.I1he 
Colonial Office papers were, on consultation, rather disappointing, 
largely because I had. already gleaned most of the information 
which they contained from the ll1orei5-n Office papers. 
The files of the Petroleum Dep2,rtment of the Board of 'l'rade 
provide several useful items of information not obtainable 
elsewhere. It should be noted, however, that a few of the more 
interesting files in this class (to judge by their titles) are 
still "closed" for 50 years or more. 
11.1l1e records of the oil companies are inaccessible to the 
academic researcher. At one time there seemed some prospect of 
my (;aining access to the London records of the "Shell" company, out, 
in the end, after several months of delay, I had to abandon hope 
of this. A particularly <l.isappointing aspect of my enquiries in 
this field, also, is the knowledge that tr1ere is in existence a 
book, prepared by nrizadier LongTigg, using the Iraq Petroleum 
Company's private archives, which deals with the history of the 
441, 
r11urkish/Iraq Petroleum Company during the period covered by this 
study, but which book the Company will not allow to be read by 
anyone other than Co:rlpany staff. It should be mentioned, 
however, that a member of the Iraq Petroleum Company, Hr. I.G. 
Nacpherson, uncle_·took some research on my behalf into his company's 
archives, but unfortunately he found the material therein to be too 
scanty to provide answers to the several cletailed. points which I 
had put to him. Similarly, Dr. lf.W. Perrier, of the British 
Petroleum Company, endeavoured to furnish me with answers to several 
detailed queries which I had made. 
Attempts to sain information from the personal records of 
various prominent people involved in oil matters during the :period 
of interest have been almost a complete failure. 1rl1.e papers of 
the person who was of most importance from the point of view of 
this study, Sir John Cadman, were destroyed some years before I 
began my research. Similarly, most of my enquiries concerning 
the papers of other prominent figures have elicited replies stating 
either that the material that I wanted had long since been destroyed, 
or that, as in the case of Lord Wester ':Iemyss, the still extant 
material did not contain 2.nytning relevant to the subject of my 
study. In the case of the Gulbentian papers, I was informed that 
access to them could not ;Je allowed on account of their confidential 
nature. Where access to private papers has proved possible - for 
example, to the papers of Sir L. Oliphant (of the Foreign Officeh Sir 
A. Chamberlain, and others, which are housed in the Public Hecord 
Office· - t1·1ese have proved to contain little or nothing of value. 
Similarly, although 1·1r. A.J .P. Taylor was kind enough to see if there 
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was anything of value to my studies in the Beaverbrook papers, and 
allowed me access to the papers of Lloyd George and Bonar Law, little 
of particular interest emerged. 
Much useful information on the American attitude and viewpoint 
has been published, in the "Foreign Relations of the United States" 
series of documents, and in the Staff Report to the Federal Trade 
Commission on "The International Petroleum Cartel". In addition, 
copies of unpublished State Department files are available, on 
microfilm, from the U.S. National Archives and Records Service, 
Washington. Of particular relevance is a file on the Turkish Petroleum 
Company, which, however, naturally contains much more of importance for 
a study of American oil policy than of British. 
French Government archives of relevance to this study are 
still closed (although some of the earlier files were initially due 
to be opened this year - 1973 - and the rest by 1975). As noted in 
the Foreword, this gap cannot be satisfactorily filled from French 
published sources. Although such documents as are published by the 
French Government provide useful background reading, they do not 
contain much information of direct relevance to the rather narrow 
issues involved in this study. 1 • Similarly, secondary works from 
1. It is unfortunate that the comprehensive series of "Documents 
Diplomatiques" on the origins of the Second World War, published 
by the Ministere des Affaires :Etra.ngeres, only begins at the 
year 1932. 
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French sources provide little concrete and reliable information not 
already available elsewhere. Even the best of these sources -
books by Faure, by Labarriere, and the biography of Ernest Mercier 
(the principal French representative in the Turkish Petroleum 
Company) by Kuisel - deal with matters of relevance to this study 
in far too general a way to be of real use. Such sources do, 
nevertheless, sometimes provide a different outlook on matters dealt 
with elsewhere from a purely British point of view. 
Of the secondary works of importance to this study, two 
books in particular stand out. The first is :B. Shwadrah's "The 
Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers", an extremely useful book 
which helped me t9clarify the issues involved in the very early 
stages of my work on this thesis. One should beware of Shwadran's 
interpretations of :British Government policy, however, The second 
outstanding book is by Brigadier S.H. Longrigg, "Oil in the Middle 
East", which sets out to tell the broad story of ¥dddle East oil 
from the beginning to the present day. This work is less useful 
than Shwad.ran's for the political aspects of this story, but it has 
especial value for its clear account of the actual development of 
the oil sources, prospecting etc. 
Commercial journals and newspapers have not provided much 
useful information relating to the political aspects of this study, 
since I have been very wary of accepting as reliable such informa-
tion as they contained. The "Economist", and the Journal of the 
Institute of Petroleum, however, have been extremely useful for 
information of an economic or technical nature. 
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